James Healy v. Haverford Twp , 462 F. App'x 224 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 11-1010
    _____________
    JAMES E. HEALY,
    Appellant
    v.
    HAVERFORD TOWNSHIP; HAVERFORD TOWNSHIP POLICE OFFICER
    WILLIAM SHIELDS BADGE #2165, individually and as a police officer for Haverford
    Township
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 09-02982)
    District Judge: Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    February 6, 2012
    Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE, and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed February 22, 2012)
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    GARTH, Circuit Judge.
    James Healy appeals from a jury verdict in favor of Haverford Police Officer
    William Shields after Healy brought a 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging use of excessive
    force.
    Healy contends that the trial court improperly allowed the admission of certain
    evidence at the trial. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the December 3, 2010
    judgment of the District Court against Healy.
    I.
    We write principally for the benefit of the parties and recite only the facts essential
    to our disposition.
    On July 6, 2007, Officer Shields was on patrol when he saw Healy operating a
    motor vehicle in Haverford Township. Shields knew Healy from prior arrests for driving
    under the influence, and was aware that as of July 6, Healy‟s license was suspended as a
    result of prior offenses related to driving under the influence. Shields activated his
    overhead lights and siren to direct Healy to pull to the side of the road. Healy pulled into
    a parking lot two blocks from the point where the lights were activated, exited his car,
    and approached Shields‟ car. Shields exited his own vehicle, and an altercation between
    the two men followed. Shortly into the altercation, Shields placed Healy under arrest. As
    he walked Healy to the front of Shields‟ vehicle and instructed him to place his hands on
    the hood of the vehicle, Shields believed that Healy was resistant and began to ball up a
    fist. At that time, Shields used his taser on Healy and successfully took him into custody.
    Thereafter, Shields drove Healy to a hospital where he ordered a blood test to
    determine Healy‟s blood alcohol level. The blood test revealed no alcohol in Healy‟s
    system, but did reveal the presence of marijuana. Healy was subsequently charged with
    driving under the influence, driving while under suspension, and resisting arrest. He pled
    guilty to the first two charges and Nolo Contendere to the resisting arrest charge. Healy
    2
    thereafter filed a § 1983 action against Haverford Township and Shields, seeking
    compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other relief on the grounds that Shields
    used unreasonable force during the arrest. Healy thereafter agreed to dismissal of
    Haverford Township as a defendant. Prior to trial on the § 1983 action, Healy filed
    motions in limine seeking the preclusion of: 1) evidence that, prior to the incident which
    gave rise to the action, he had been stopped and arrested for driving under the influence
    and related offenses; and 2) evidence relating to the time between Healy‟s arrest and his
    blood test and evidence that Healy‟s blood reflected the presence of marijuana in his
    system. The District Court ruled that the evidence pertaining to Healy‟s blood test would
    be admissible at trial, but that evidence of his prior driving under the influence offenses
    would not.
    At trial, following cross-examination of Shields and testimony from Healy
    pertaining to prior encounters between the two, the District Court ruled, over Healy‟s
    objection, that Shields could introduce evidence of prior contact between the two parties
    that had led to convictions of Healy. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict
    in favor of Shields. Healy timely appealed.
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction over Healy‟s action pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    , and we have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . “We review a trial court‟s
    decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.” U.S. v. Starnes, 
    583 F.3d 196
    , 213-14 (3d Cir. 2009).
    III.
    3
    On appeal, Healy contends that: 1) the District Court improperly permitted
    testimony by Shields that he stopped Healy because he “knew he had a DUI [driving
    under the influence] suspended license; and 2) the District Court improperly permitted
    the introduction of video of Healy during his transportation to the hospital and the
    introduction of recordings of events once Healy and Shields arrived at the hospital. We
    will address these contentions in turn.
    Healy first claims that evidence of his prior history of driving under the influence
    was improperly admitted because it was not relevant evidence under Federal Rules of
    Evidence 401 and 402. In the alternative, Healy argues that if the evidence was relevant,
    its introduction would be unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Shields
    contends that the doctrine of curative admissibility allowed for the admission of this
    evidence in spite of any potential problems under the Federal Rules.
    “The doctrine of „opening the door,‟ sometimes referred to as „curative
    admissibility,‟ provides that when one party introduces inadmissible evidence, the
    opposing party thereafter may introduce inadmissible evidence to rebut or explain the
    prior evidence.” Government of Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 
    987 F.2d 180
    , 187 (3d Cir.
    1993). In the present case, Healy‟s counsel cross-examined Shields about prior
    interactions between Shields and Healy, including prior interactions that had resulted in
    arrests and convictions for driving under the influence. On direct examination, Healy
    also testified about his prior contact with Shields, including testimony about arrests. All
    of this evidence was inadmissible under the District Court‟s pre-trial ruling on Healy‟s
    4
    motion in limine. There is no question, therefore, that Healy opened the door by
    introducing inadmissible evidence of this nature.
    In addition to eliciting and introducing evidence of these prior arrests, Healy‟s
    counsel attempted to suggest that Shields was motivated by a history of personal dislike
    for Healy. In order to rebut the suggestion that he was personally biased towards Healy,
    as suggested by the otherwise inadmissible evidence that Shields had arrested Healy on
    previous occasions, Shields sought to prove that the arrests had been legitimate:
    specifically, to indicate that at least some of those prior arrests had ended in convictions
    for driving under the influence. Once Healy opened the door and introduced inadmissible
    evidence of the history between the two parties and attempted to explain that history in a
    manner unfavorable to Shields, it was within the District Court‟s discretion to allow
    Shields to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut that explanation.
    Healy next claims that the District Court abused its discretion when it allowed the
    introduction of a video recording of Healy from the time he was arrested until he and
    Shields arrived at the hospital for the administration of his blood test, and when it
    allowed the introduction of an audio recording of the interaction between Shields, Healy,
    and technicians at the hospital.
    Healy briefly argues that admission of the video of him during transport to the
    hospital was irrelevant to any element of the trial. Insofar as the video, by Healy‟s own
    description, “simply showed [Healy] calmly sitting in the back of the patrol vehicle doing
    nothing and saying nothing,” it was relevant to Healy‟s claim of unnecessary force.
    Healy‟s demeanor, lack of indications of injury, and lack of requests for medical
    5
    treatment all bear directly on both the extent of the force used against him and his
    credibility. The video recording was therefore relevant, and the District Court did not
    abuse its discretion in allowing Shields to introduce it at trial.
    Healy next claims that the District Court erred in allowing the introduction of an
    audio recording of his blood test. Healy does not articulate any reason for or otherwise
    explain this claim, other than to say “the prejudice far outweighs any probative value.
    There are several hearsay statements made by unknown technicians.” Having reviewed
    the entire recording entered into evidence by Shields, we are unable to conclude that any
    portion of the recording after Healy was taken into custody is in any way prejudicial.
    Nevertheless, the recording does serve as evidence of Healy‟s state of mind and his
    injuries or lack thereof; as such, it was both relevant and probative evidence.
    Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion to admit that portion of the recording.
    Finally, Healy claims that the District Court erroneously allowed Shields to
    introduce evidence that Healy‟s blood test indicated the presence of marijuana in his
    bloodstream. Healy contends that the introduction of that evidence was designed “solely
    to attack Mr. Healy‟s character.” Shields argues that the presence of marijuana in
    Healy‟s blood would clearly impair his ability to accurately recall the events surrounding
    his arrest. Because the exact nature and sequence of those events was in dispute at the
    trial, the veracity and accuracy of Healy‟s recollection would have been significant, and
    the presence of marijuana in his blood therefore served a purpose other than a character
    attack on Healy. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission of
    evidence of the presence of marijuana in Healy‟s blood at the time of his arrest.
    6
    IV.
    Because we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
    allowing the introduction of evidence of Healy‟s prior driving under the influence
    conviction, or of the circumstances surrounding his blood test, we will affirm the
    judgment of the District Court.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1010

Citation Numbers: 462 F. App'x 224

Judges: Garth, Sloviter, Vanaskie

Filed Date: 2/22/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023