L.G. v. Antonio Bostic , 720 F.3d 887 ( 2013 )


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  •                Case: 12-11819       Date Filed: 07/03/2013      Page: 1 of 31
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________________
    No. 12-11819
    _____________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 7:03-cv-02989-UWC
    LAQUARIUS GRAY, a minor, by and through her mother and next friend, Toniko
    L. Alexander,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ANTONIO BOSTIC,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    _____________________________
    (July 3, 2013)
    Before WILSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and BOWEN,* District Judge.
    BOWEN, District Judge:
    *
    Honorable Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., United States District Judge for the Southern District
    of Georgia, sitting by designation.
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    This is the fifth appeal involving the detention and handcuffing of a nine-
    year-old student, Laquarius Gray,1 during her physical education class. Now,
    Antonio Bostic, a Deputy Sheriff for Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, appeals from
    the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees. After careful review and oral
    argument, we reverse and remand for the entry of judgment in favor of Defendant
    Antonio Bostic.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Factual Background
    At this point in the case, the factual background is undisputed. Gray was a
    nine-year old female African-American student at Holt Elementary School in
    Tuscaloosa, Alabama, at the time of the incident. Bostic was a Deputy Sheriff for
    Tuscaloosa County, in Alabama.
    On March 7, 2003, while attending her physical education class, Gray had a
    disagreement with her instructor as to whether she properly completed the
    “jumping jack” exercises she was ordered to perform. Gray ex rel. Alexander v.
    1
    Laquarius Gray was a minor when the litigation commenced. Thus, any reference to
    Gray is intended to reflect and include the fact that this action was brought on her behalf by and
    through her mother and next friend, Toniko L. Alexander.
    2
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    Bostic, 
    458 F.3d 1295
    , 1300 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Gray II”). Gray’s instructor
    ordered her to sit against the wall behind the class. 
    Id.
     During the course of the
    disagreement, Gray made a disrespectful and physically threatening comment to
    the instructor. 
    Id.
     At that time, Bostic was stationed as a school resource officer,
    and he was present when Gray made the threatening remarks to her instructor. 
    Id. at 1301
    . Despite another female teacher being present and offering to handle the
    situation, Bostic immediately intervened and ordered Gray to exit the gymnasium.
    Bostic then took Gray into an adjacent lobby area, where he pulled her arms
    behind her back and handcuffed her. 
    Id.
     “Bostic testified that Gray was
    handcuffed for less than 60 seconds.”2 (Appellant Br. 5.) Simply put, Bostic
    applied the handcuffs to an arguably compliant nine-year-old child for purely
    punitive purposes.
    B. Procedural Background
    1. Initial District Court Proceedings
    Gray brought suit against Bostic and Tuscaloosa County Sheriff Edmund
    Sexton in their official and individual capacities on November 4, 2003. Nine other
    defendants were also named in the complaint in both their individual and official
    2
    On appeal, Appellee-Plaintiff Laquarius Gray adopts Appellant-Defendant Antonio
    Bostic’s version of the facts. (Appellee Br. viii.)
    3
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    capacities: Joyce Harris, the Principal of Holt Elementary School; Joyce Sellers,
    the Superintendent of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama; and Frankie Thomas, James
    Barnnet, James Junkin, Morris Acker, Don Presley, Dot Smith, and Pam Garner,
    all Board Members of the Tuscaloosa County Board of Education. Gray’s initial
    complaint against these eleven defendants listed eight counts, including claims:
    (1) under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     for violations of Gray’s First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
    and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count 1); (2) under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
     (Count
    2); and (3) under state law for invasion of privacy, assault and battery, false
    imprisonment, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Counts
    4 through 8). Gray also requested declaratory and injunctive relief (Count 3). As
    to each count, Gray sought an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive
    damages; attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs of litigation; and any other equitable
    relief to which she may have been entitled.
    Defendants Joyce Harris, Sellers, Thomas, Barnnet, Junkin, Acker, Presley,
    Smith, and Garner then filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6).
    Approximately one month later, before the district court ruled on the motion, Gray
    dismissed her claims against those defendants, thus leaving only Bostic and
    Sexton as the remaining two defendants.
    On November 25, 2003, Bostic and Sexton, in their official and individual
    4
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    capacities, moved to dismiss Gray's complaint based on absolute, statutory, and
    qualified immunity, which the district court granted. On February 12, 2004, Gray
    moved to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, or in the alternative, to amend her
    complaint. The district court denied that motion.
    2. Gray I3
    Gray appealed the district court's orders dismissing her claims against
    Bostic and Sexton and denying her leave to amend her complaint. On December
    27, 2004, in an unpublished, per curiam opinion, this court reversed the judgment
    of the district court with respect to the claims against Bostic and Sexton in their
    individual capacities and remanded the case for further proceedings. This court
    concluded that, as to Bostic, Gray's allegations sufficiently alleged a constitutional
    violation that was clearly established on that date. Further, as to Sexton, this court
    noted that Gray’s amended complaint remedied any problems with her original
    pleading. Thus, her amended complaint sufficiently alleged a constitutional
    violation against Sexton. This court instructed that Gray would be able to pursue
    her Fourth Amendment handcuffing claims against Bostic and Sexton only in their
    individual capacities under her amended complaint.
    On remand, Gray filed an amended complaint asserting claims of excessive
    3
    Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 127 F. App’x 472 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Gray I”).
    5
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    use of force and unreasonable seizure against Bostic and Sexton individually.
    Discovery ensued. Sexton and Bostic then moved for summary judgment on
    September 8 and 9, 2005, respectively, on the bases of, inter alia, qualified
    immunity. The district court denied their motions for summary judgment on
    December 12, 2005.
    3. Gray II4
    Bostic and Sexton appealed that decision on December 19, 2005. This court
    (Hull, J.) reversed the district court's order denying Sexton qualified immunity but
    upheld the decision as to Bostic. Specifically, as to Bostic, this court held that the
    handcuffing was excessively intrusive and was an “obvious violation of Gray’s
    Fourth Amendment rights.” Gray II, 
    458 F.3d at 1306-07
    . The case was
    remanded and was ordered to proceed only against Bostic on Gray’s illegal seizure
    claim and for declaratory and injunctive relief. Bostic's petition for rehearing en
    banc with this court was denied.
    4. Trial
    The district court conducted a jury trial on January 16, 2007. At the close of
    Gray's evidence, based upon Bostic’s proffer, the district court declined to allow
    any defense witnesses or exhibits to be offered into evidence. It then granted
    4
    Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 
    458 F.3d 1295
     (11th Cir. 2006) (“Gray II”).
    6
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    Gray's oral motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. The
    issue of damages was submitted to the jury, and after brief deliberations,5 one
    dollar in nominal damages was awarded to Gray. Judgment was entered on even
    date.
    5. Gray III6
    Gray filed two motions for attorney's fees. On February 14, 2007, Bostic
    appealed the district court's judgment against him to this court. The district court
    denied Gray's two pending motions for attorney’s fees, allowing Gray to re-file
    after this court ruled on Bostic's appeal. This court heard oral argument on
    February 6, 2008, and in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the decision of the district
    court granting judgment as a matter of law against Bostic.
    5
    Forty-five minutes after receiving the case, the jury returned to the courtroom with a
    question regarding compensatory damages and whether they have to be proven. After the
    response was sent to the jury, deliberations ensued for sixteen minutes. At that time, the jury
    asked the court: “What is the allowable amount that can be awarded? Is there a minimum and a
    maximum; and if so, what are they?” The district judge answered that “[t]here is, technically, no
    minimum and no maximum. But as a practical matter, in terms of the maximum, I would
    consider any award of more than $30,000 to be unreasonable.” The judge then explained that if
    the jury finds that Gray has not suffered any mental anguish damages, then she is only entitled to
    nominal damages ranging from one dollar to one hundred dollars. Deliberations then continued
    for a mere four minutes until the jury reached a verdict of one dollar.
    6
    Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 264 F. App’x 856 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Gray III”).
    7
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    6. Gray IV7
    Again, Gray filed two motions for attorney’s fees. On July 29, 2008,
    without hearing, the district court granted Gray's motions for attorney's fees,
    expenses of litigation, and costs in a total amount over $70,000. Bostic appealed
    this decision on August 20, 2008. On June 12, 2009, this court (Carnes, J.)
    vacated the district court's July 29, 2008, order and remanded the case for further
    proceedings.
    On August 2, 2010, this court (Carnes, J.) rescinded its earlier opinion of
    June 12, 2009, and supplanted it with a new opinion, which also vacated the
    district court's previous award of attorney's fees. This court clarified that the
    "issue [was] whether the district court abused its discretion under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     by awarding Gray attorney's fees even though the jury awarded her only
    $1.00 in nominal damages for Bostic's violation of her Fourth Amendment right to
    be free from illegal seizure." Gray IV, 613 F.3d at 1038. This Gray IV court
    noted that the district court, in deciding that an award of fees and expenses was
    warranted notwithstanding the nominal amount of damages, had relied on the fact
    that the one published opinion to have previously come out of the litigation, Gray
    II, had been cited in more than fifty other cases. In measuring the "public purpose
    7
    Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 
    570 F.3d 1321
     (11th Cir. 2010) (“Gray IV”).
    8
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    served" of the legal issue, see Farrar v. Hobby, 
    506 U.S. 103
     (1992), the district
    court had relied on this significant number of citations. In Gray IV, this court held
    that the district court had misapplied the law and had overstated the impact of that
    decision because the substantive law Gray II established had only been cited twice
    by other courts.
    This Gray IV court clarified that Gray II's substantive point of law was
    narrow: that a law enforcement officer, acting as a school resource officer, who
    handcuffs a compliant nine-year-old child for purely punitive purposes has
    unreasonably seized the child in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district
    court had erred by counting decisions that cited Gray II for general principles of
    law that were already well established or for holdings on issues and claims upon
    which plaintiff had failed to prevail. This court provided direction that if the
    district court chose to count citations to Gray II to determine the "public purpose
    served," it should only count those that cite Gray II for its Fourth Amendment
    holding.
    Further, this court pointed out in Gray IV another troubling aspect of the
    district court's order: the district court considered the "fact" that civil rights cases
    are unattractive to attorneys in the Northern District of Alabama because those
    attorneys have to advance expenses and take the cases on a contingency basis with
    9
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    delayed payment. This court reasoned that if those reasons justified an award of
    fees and expenses in nominal damages cases in one district, they would justify
    such an award in every district. However, the Supreme Court had stated that
    usually the only reasonable fee in nominal damage cases is no fee at all. Farrar,
    
    506 U.S. at 115
    . Thus, the district court's reasoning was the inverse of that
    statement, effectively turning Farrar around so that in a nominal damages case
    there would usually be a fee award. This court then directed the district court to
    apply the Farrar principles in granting a reasonable award of attorney's fees.
    Lastly, this court noted that the district court may have employed its
    decision on the expenses and fee issue as an “end-run around the jury's nominal
    damages award.” Gray IV, 613 F.3d at 1043. In the district court's order, it
    referred to the jury's verdict as "abundantly unsupported by the evidence" and later
    noted that the jury’s decision not to award any actual damages was "considerably
    unsupported by the evidence." This court acknowledged that it was uncertain that
    Farrar permits a judge to factor into his attorney's fees decision his doubts about
    the validity of the jury's still-standing nominal damages verdict. This court
    declined to explore that issue because it was pretermitted by the decision to vacate
    the district court's order on other grounds. Moreover, the presiding district judge
    had retired. This court had no reason to believe that the new judge would use
    10
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    similar reasoning. This court also denied the suggestion of rehearing en banc.
    Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 
    625 F.3d 692
     (11th Cir. 2010).
    7. Background of this Appeal (Gray V)
    This court remanded this matter, leaving the district court to decide
    “whether the plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and expenses under
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     even though she recovered only nominal damages.” Gray IV,
    613 F.3d at 1046. The district court ordered the parties to re-brief the attorney's
    fee issue in light of this court’s recent guidance. On March 5, 2012, the district
    court entered an order granting in part Gray’s motion for attorney's fees, and on
    March 30, 2012, the district court entered an order granting attorney’s fees for the
    previous appeal. Altogether, the court awarded Gray a total sum of over $39,900.
    It is from these orders that Bostic now appeals.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    "We review a district court's order awarding attorney fees for an abuse of
    discretion," which occurs if the court "fails to apply the proper legal standard or to
    follow proper procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon
    findings of fact that are clearly erroneous." ACLU v. Barnes, 
    168 F.3d 423
    , 427
    (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). An abuse of discretion also occurs
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    when a district court commits a clear error of judgment. See United States v.
    Frazier, 
    387 F.3d 1244
    , 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). “The abuse of discretion
    standard usually implies a range of choices, instead of only one right choice, and
    often we will affirm even though we would have decided the other way if it had
    been our choice.” Gray IV, 613 F.3d at 1039. Even though determining a
    reasonable attorney's fee is a matter committed to the sound discretion of a trial
    judge, the judge's discretion is not unlimited. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
    III. DISCUSSION
    A plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    . Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at 112
    ; see 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     (“[T]he court, in its
    discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
    reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”). “Although the ‘technical’
    nature of a nominal damages award or any other judgment does not affect the
    prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under §
    1988.” Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at 114
    .
    “In some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally ‘prevails’ under §
    1988 should receive no attorney’s fees at all. A plaintiff who seeks compensatory
    damages but receives no more than nominal damages is often such a prevailing
    12
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    party.” Id. at 115. This is because, inter alia, “the awarding of nominal damages
    also highlights the plaintiff’s failure to prove actual, compensable injury.” Id.
    “When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove
    an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is
    usually no fee at all.” Id.8
    The majority opinion in Farrar provides one consideration, and little other
    guidance, for district courts considering granting attorney’s fees after a nominal
    damages award. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence articulates two additional
    factors. As discussed in the majority opinion, the most critical factor in
    determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee award is the degree of success
    8
    The touchstone of the attorney’s fee inquiry is reasonableness. See Hensley v.
    Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 433 (1983) (explaining that a prevailing party status merely brings the
    plaintiff across the statutory threshold and that the district court must then determine what fee is
    reasonable); see also Trezevant v. Tampa, 
    741 F.2d 336
    , 341 (11th Cir. 1984) (“But where the
    plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees
    that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.”). However, in this jumble of litigation
    including eleven original defendants, eight separate claims, capacities both official and
    individual, five appeals, many depositions, motions, and over one hundred forty docket entries,
    we are left with one defendant, one incident of obvious liability, and one dollar in nominal
    damages. It is axiomatic that a prevailing party must demonstrate that there is a genuine
    relationship or connection between the efforts expended and the result obtained. See Hensley,
    
    461 U.S. at 434-35
     (noting that a plaintiff may present various claims for relief based on different
    facts or legal theories and that, in such cases, “work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed
    to have been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved”) (internal quotations omitted);
    Trezevant, 
    741 F.2d at 341
     (“The trial court correctly recognized that the fee award should
    exclude the time spent on unsuccessful claims except to the extent that such time overlapped
    with related successful claims.”). Here, even the most attentive court would struggle to discern
    the nature and extent of the time, talent, and expense which contributed to the one dollar verdict.
    13
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    obtained. Id. at 114. “Other factors, including the significance of the legal issue
    on which the plaintiff prevailed and the public purpose served, go into
    determining whether a plaintiff’s victory is substantial enough to make it one of
    those unusual nominal damages cases where the defendant is required to pay the
    plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.” Gray IV, 613 F.3d at 1040 (internal quotations
    omitted) (emphasis added); see Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at 121-22
     (O’Connor, J.,
    concurring). After considering the above mentioned factors in the context of this
    litigation, the de minimis nature of Gray’s victory is apparent; her victory is not
    substantial enough to justify an award of attorney’s fees. Our opinion discusses
    the three Farrar factors seriatim.
    A. Degree of Success Obtained
    The most critical factor is the degree of success obtained. Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at 114
    . When considering this factor, we must compare the amount of damages
    sought to the amount awarded. See 
    id.
     (explaining that the district court is
    “obligated to give primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as
    compared to the amount sought”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]
    substantial difference between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought
    suggests that the victory is in fact purely technical.” 
    Id. at 121
     (O’ Connor, J.,
    concurring). Here, this factor weighs against the award of attorney’s fees.
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    Certain facets of the litigation in our case bear a strong resemblance to
    Farrar. In Farrar, the plaintiffs operated a school for delinquent, disabled, and
    disturbed teens. The state indicted one of the plaintiffs for murder after a student
    died due to an alleged willful failure to administer proper medical treatment and
    failure to provide timely hospitalization. After the state shut down the plaintiffs'
    school, the plaintiffs filed suit against the state officials responsible for the
    closing. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged "deprivation of liberty and
    property without due process by means of conspiracy and malicious prosecution"
    and sought $17 million in damages and injunctive relief under 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
    and 1985. Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at 106
     (majority opinion). The jury concluded that
    Defendant Hobby, the then Lieutenant Governor of Texas, had deprived Plaintiff
    Joseph Farrar of a "civil right" and awarded him nominal damages. However, the
    jury refused to award any other damages for this violation because it found that
    Hobby's conduct was not a proximate cause of any injury suffered by Farrar.
    Despite the nominal award, the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs
    were "prevailing parties" under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    , because they nonetheless
    succeeded on a significant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefit
    the parties sought in bringing suit. 
    Id. at 109
    . The Court noted, however, that the
    technical nature of nominal damages can affect the propriety of awarding fees
    15
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    under § 1988. "Once civil rights litigation materially alters the legal relationship
    between the parties, the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the
    reasonableness of a fee award . . . ." Id. at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    As noted above, the Court held that the "most critical factor" in determining the
    reasonableness of a fee award is the “degree of success obtained." Id.
    The Court then described when no fees are appropriate. "[D]amages
    awarded in a § 1983 action must always be designed to compensate injuries caused
    by the [constitutional] deprivation." Id. at 115 (alteration in original) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). “When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages
    because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary
    relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." Id. (citation omitted).
    Applying its legal conclusions, the Farrar Court recognized that the
    plaintiffs had sought $17 million in compensatory damages but only received $1 in
    nominal damages. The Court described the litigation as having accomplished little
    beyond giving the plaintiffs the "moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court
    concluded that [their] rights had been violated in some unspecified way.” Id. at
    114 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs’
    victory was a technicality and was not the kind of legal change that Congress
    sought to promote in the fee statute. Id. at 119 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus,
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    even though the Fifth Circuit erred in failing to recognize that petitioners were
    prevailing parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's reversal of the
    district court's fee award. Id. at 116 (majority opinion).
    Like the plaintiffs in Farrar, Gray achieved very limited success in this case;
    she asked for a large amount of money and received a nominal award. True, she
    did not seek $17 million. But the difference remains substantial between the
    $25,000 that she sought and the nominal award she received.9 For the purposes of
    measuring the degree of success Gray obtained, the “substantial difference
    between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought suggests that the victory
    is in fact purely technical,” id. at 121 (O’ Connor, J., concurring). As the district
    court concluded, this first factor—the most important of the three—weighs heavily
    against Gray.
    B. Significance of the Legal Issue
    Even though we conclude that the first and most important factor weighs
    against an attorney’s fee award, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Farrar
    reminds us that not all nominal damages awards are de minimis. Id. at 121
    (“Nominal relief does not necessarily a nominal victory make.”). This is because
    “an award of nominal damages can represent a victory in the sense of vindicating
    9
    The difference is substantial particularly in light of the appearance that the jury did not
    consider Gray’s mental anguish damages proven. See supra n.5.
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    rights even though no actual damages are proved.” Id. Thus, Farrar allows us to
    also consider the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to
    have prevailed.
    This second Farrar factor “is concerned with the general legal importance of
    the issue on which the plaintiff prevailed.” Mercer v. Duke Univ., 
    401 F.3d 199
    ,
    206 (4th Cir. 2005); accord Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, 
    593 F.3d 1054
    , 1062 (9th
    Cir. 2010) (noting the importance of the legality of state-sanctioned force resulting
    in death); Piper v. Oliver, 
    69 F.3d 875
    , 877 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting the
    significance of the plaintiff’s right to be free from illegal detention); Milton v.
    City of Des Moines, 
    47 F.3d 944
    , 946 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that the civil right
    the plaintiff sought to vindicate in his excessive force claim was a significant
    issue). The district court concluded that this factor weighs in favor of granting
    attorney’s fees because Gray changed the law and announced a rule that has
    benefitted other students. We disagree and conclude that the second factor, like
    the first, weighs against a fee award.
    In the entirety of these proceedings, Gray was able to demonstrate that
    Bostic violated the Fourth Amendment and that he was not entitled to qualified
    immunity. See Gray II, 
    458 F.3d at 1306-07
    . More pointedly, we held that
    Bostic’s “conduct in handcuffing Gray, a compliant, nine-year-old girl for the sole
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    purpose of punishing her was an obvious violation of Gray’s Fourth Amendment
    rights.” 
    Id. at 1307
     (emphasis added). As Bostic’s appellate brief correctly
    pointed out, it is axiomatic that government actors are not immune from obvious
    violations of one’s constitutional rights. This is a long-standing principle of civil
    rights law, and nothing in Gray’s litigation deviates from this principle. Simply
    put, Gray’s litigation did not “change the law.”
    Nor will Gray’s litigation aid qualified immunity litigation in future cases.
    The “obvious clarity” reasoning upon which the Gray II court relied applies to
    make certain egregious conduct unconstitutional notwithstanding the lack of
    precedential, fact-specific case law. See Lee v. Ferraro, 
    284 F.3d 1188
    , 1199
    (11th Cir. 2002). The Gray II court concluded that Bostic’s conduct far surpassed
    the “hazy border” of action teetering on the edge of unconstitutionality. See Gray
    II, 
    458 F.3d at 1307
     (noting that Bostic’s conduct went “well beyond the hazy
    border that sometimes separates lawful conduct from unlawful conduct, such that
    every objectively reasonable officer would have known that the conduct was
    unlawful”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). The district court
    reasoned that Gray’s litigation offers a precedential example of such “obvious”
    conduct. However, since every objectively reasonable officer would have known
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    that Bostic’s conduct violated the Constitution, then the significance of the case as
    a precedential example is greatly diminished.
    It is true that Gray prevailed on the issue of whether her civil right was
    violated. But her victory did not alter the landscape of civil rights law in the
    public schools. Nor could it have. As we concluded, her victory was wholly
    determined by the legal landscape Gray now claims it altered. The cases that have
    cited to Gray II prove the point. In only three cases is Gray II cited for anything
    more than a general legal proposition that could be supported by numerous other
    legal authorities. See El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 
    636 F.3d 452
    , 458 (8th Cir.
    2011); C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 
    691 F. Supp. 2d 1170
    , 1179–82 (E.D. Cal. 2010);
    E.W. v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:09-CV-198-FL, 
    2010 WL 1286218
    , at *7
    (E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2010). Even those cases cannot use Gray II for any
    groundbreaking legal point. In El-Ghazzawy, the Eighth Circuit uses Gray II to
    support the broad proposition that an officer may violate the Fourth Amendment
    by, among other actions, handcuffing someone in the absence of a threat to
    anyone’s safety. 
    636 F.3d at 458
    . Similarly, E.W. simply cites Gray II as an
    example of a Fourth Amendment violation that involved an officer binding a
    student. 
    2010 WL 1286218
    , at *7. And in C.B., the district court for the Eastern
    20
    Case: 12-11819   Date Filed: 07/03/2013    Page: 21 of 31
    District of California only quotes Gray II at length without commenting on it or
    applying it in any meaningful way. 
    691 F. Supp. 2d at
    1179–82.
    Gray prevailed, but her victory carries very little legal significance, if any at
    all. The second factor therefore weighs against a fee award.
    C. Public Purpose Served
    We next address the public purpose served. Gray’s success “might be
    considered material if it also accomplished some public goal other than occupying
    the time and energy of counsel, court, and client.” Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at 121-22
    (O’Connor, J., concurring). This factor principally relates to whether the victory
    vindicates important rights and deters future violations. Cartwright v. Stamper, 
    7 F.3d 106
    , 109 (7th Cir. 1993); see Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at 122
     (O’Connor, J.,
    concurring).
    Other circuits have had greater opportunity to address the application of this
    factor. Some courts appear to analyze it in more generous terms, “concluding that
    a public goal is accomplished if the plaintiff’s victory encourages attorneys to
    represent civil rights litigants, affirms an important right, puts the defendant on
    notice that it needs to improve, and/or provokes a change in the defendant’s
    conduct.” Barber, 254 F.3d at 1232; see, e.g., O’Connor v. Huard, 
    117 F.3d 12
    , 18
    (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the plaintiff’s victory provided an incentive to
    21
    Case: 12-11819     Date Filed: 07/03/2013    Page: 22 of 31
    attorneys to represent civil rights litigants and that it served as a deterrent to future
    abuses). On the other hand, other courts appear to read the factor as requiring a
    more compelling showing of the public good that is being advanced. Barber, 254
    F.3d at 1231 (“Some courts appear to read the [third] factor restrictively.”); see,
    e.g., Pino v. Locascio, 
    101 F.3d 235
    , 239 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that “not every
    tangential ramification of civil rights litigation ipso facto confers a benefit on
    society”).
    We find the reasoning of certain Seventh Circuit opinions to be instructive
    and therefore decline the more lenient suggestion of the First Circuit as found in
    Huard, 
    117 F.3d at 18
    . The Huard Court recognized the importance of providing
    an incentive to attorneys to represent civil rights litigants whose claims may not
    result in substantial monetary compensation as a factor warranting the grant of
    attorney’s fees. 
    Id.
     Providing an incentive for representing civil rights litigants is
    something that every attorney’s fee award accomplishes. Simply stated, such
    reasoning would justify an attorney’s fee award in every case. This logic flouts
    the Supreme Court’s recommendation that in nominal damages cases “the only
    reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at 115
    ; see also Gray IV,
    613 F.3d at 1042 (noting that the consideration of incentivizing attorneys to take
    civil rights cases as a factor for granting an attorney’s fees award would justify an
    22
    Case: 12-11819     Date Filed: 07/03/2013    Page: 23 of 31
    award for such fees in every case, thus belying Farrar’s admonition that in nominal
    damages cases the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all). Applying the First
    Circuit’s reasoning would thus turn the Supreme Court’s statement around so that
    there would usually be a fee award in a nominal damages case. Gray IV, 613 F.3d
    at 1042.
    In Cartwright, 
    7 F.3d 106
    , the plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action against the
    superintendent of the Indiana state police and an officer, alleging, inter alia, that
    the defendants violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by an
    unauthorized entry into their apartment. The plaintiffs’ case against the officer
    went to trial, where the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs but only awarded them
    one dollar in nominal damages on each of their claims. The district court then
    awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $52,875. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
    reversed the award after analyzing the three Farrar factors. As to the public
    purpose served, the Seventh Circuit noted that “[t]he more important the right at
    stake and the more egregious the violation the more likely it is that the victory
    serves a public purpose. An award of punitive damages, therefore, is strong
    evidence that the victory served a public purpose.” Id. at 109. Because the district
    court granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant on the claim for punitive
    damages, and because the future deterrent effect of the action was limited, the
    23
    Case: 12-11819     Date Filed: 07/03/2013    Page: 24 of 31
    court of appeals held that the factor weighed firmly in favor of finding the victory
    technical. Id.
    The Seventh Circuit addressed a similar situation in Maul v. Constan, 
    23 F.3d 143
     (7th Cir. 1994). In Maul, an inmate brought a § 1983 action against
    prison officials, alleging that the forced administration of psychotropic medication
    violated his constitutional rights. The district court awarded the plaintiff $22,500
    in compensatory damages and granted the plaintiff $18,542.93 in attorney’s fees,
    which were paid to his attorney. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. On
    remand, one dollar in nominal damages was awarded to the plaintiff, and the
    defendants moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) for a
    refund of the attorney’s fees previously paid to the plaintiff’s attorney. After
    applying the three Farrar factors, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court
    abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. As to the public
    purpose served, the Court of Appeals reasoned that
    since all § 1983 claims seek to redress the deprivation of rights,
    privileges[,] and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
    this factor is not satisfied merely because the plaintiff establishes, as
    he did here, that his constitutional rights have been infringed.
    Instead, this Court must scrutinize plaintiff's complaint to determine
    whether the allegations made and the relief sought evince a public
    purpose rather than merely attempt to redress a private injury.
    24
    Case: 12-11819     Date Filed: 07/03/2013    Page: 25 of 31
    Id. at 146. In examining the plaintiff’s complaint, the Maul court concluded that
    “his complaint indicate[d] a more limited objective, redressing his private injury.”
    Id. Specifically, the Maul plaintiff “failed to establish anything more than that he
    had been denied a protected right: he did not establish that he had suffered actual
    injury (hence the award of only nominal damages); he did not obtain an injunction
    prohibiting future violations; and he did not establish that the defendants' conduct
    was sufficiently reprehensible to warrant punitive damages.” Id. at 146-47.
    At oral argument, Gray’s counsel attempted to couch this case as evincing a
    public purpose. However, after applying the reasoning found in the above
    mentioned Seventh Circuit cases, it is clear that Gray commenced the litigation to
    redress private injury, and it does not serve a public purpose. Like the plaintiff in
    Maul, Gray failed to establish anything more than that she had been denied a
    protected right. Despite her numerous claims, Gray was unable to establish that
    she suffered actual injury. Similar to the plaintiffs in Cartwright, Gray specifically
    sought, but failed to obtain, punitive damages for those claims. Even though Gray
    did allege and seek a declaration that Sexton instituted or engaged in a custom or
    policy of failing to train deputies on the detention of students, her prayer for
    injunctive relief failed because there was no evidence of such a policy or custom.
    Gray II, 
    458 F.3d at 1309-10
    . Instead, an examination of Gray’s relief sought and
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    Case: 12-11819      Date Filed: 07/03/2013       Page: 26 of 31
    obtained makes clear that the primary purpose of her lawsuit was the recovery of
    private damages.10 Thus, the third Farrar factor weighs against an award of
    attorney’s fees.
    Moreover, the district court applied an improper legal standard when it
    misstated the potential deterrent effect of Gray’s litigation. The district court
    reasoned that Gray’s litigation accomplishes a public purpose because Gray II
    deters unconstitutional behavior “if attorney’s fees are awarded.” (Doc. no. 135, at
    17.) It also stated that “[h]ere, the only way to make Gray’s success meaningful,
    and substantively benefit the public, is to provide a deterrent against the illegal
    conduct.” (Id. at 19) (emphasis added). In essence, the district court
    acknowledged that there is no public purpose of deterrence in this litigation absent
    an attorney’s fee award.
    Here, the district court actually used attorney’s fees as the deterrent. The
    deterrence of civil rights violations, however, is accomplished by a multitude of
    other factors, including: the expense and other burden of protracted litigation, the
    possibility of compensatory damages for physical and emotional injuries, and the
    10
    For example, in support of Gray’s claims against Sexton, Gray alleged in her amended
    complaint that Sexton and the Tuscaloosa County Sheriff’s Department implemented an
    unconstitutionally discriminatory policy against African American individuals. At our oral
    argument, it was revealed that Gray declined to pursue those allegations upon learning at trial
    that Bostic was also African American.
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    Case: 12-11819     Date Filed: 07/03/2013     Page: 27 of 31
    threat of punitive damages. By choosing to award attorney’s fees as the deterrent,
    the district court ignored this court’s admonition in Gray IV not to make the award
    of attorney’s fees an “end-run around the jury’s nominal damages award.” Gray
    IV, 
    613 F.3d 1043
    . Farrar directs district courts to analyze the magnitude of a
    plaintiff’s victory, despite a nominal damages award, to decide whether an award
    of attorney’s fees is appropriate. It does not direct the inverse–that a court should
    award attorney’s fees in order to enhance the magnitude of a plaintiff’s victory.
    The district court’s reasoning and use of an inappropriate legal standard
    constitutes an abuse of discretion. See ACLU, 168 F.3d at 427 (noting that a
    district court abuses its discretion if it fails to apply the proper legal standard or to
    follow proper procedures in making the determination to award attorney’s fees).
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Having weighed the Farrar factors, we conclude that Gray achieved a de
    minimis victory. The district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s
    fees to Gray. Accordingly, the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees is
    REVERSED, and the action is REMANDED for the entry of judgment in favor
    of Defendant Bostic on Plaintiff Gray’s claim for attorney’s fees.
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    Case: 12-11819     Date Filed: 07/03/2013    Page: 28 of 31
    WILSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    I find no abuse of discretion on the part of the district judge in awarding
    attorney’s fees to Laquarius Gray, the prevailing party in this litigation.
    The majority correctly notes that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Farrar
    announced a three-factor calculus for determining attorney’s fees awardable to a
    party who prevails under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     despite receiving nominal damages.
    See Majority Op. at 13–14. As far as the first factor is concerned—the degree of
    success obtained by Gray—I agree with the majority that it weighs in Bostic’s
    favor. Gray sought somewhere between $25,000 and $40,000 in damages against
    Bostic, and she wound up with $1. Yet while I concede that the first Farrar factor
    favors Bostic, an unsuccessful claim for $25,000 cannot possibly sink the scales as
    much as an unsuccessful claim for $17 million, the amount sought by the plaintiff
    in Farrar. See Farrar v. Hobby, 
    506 U.S. 103
    , 106, 
    113 S. Ct. 566
    , 570 (1992). A
    $24,999 failure is materially different from a $16,999,999 failure, and not all
    successes (or failures) are created equal — we should evaluate the degree of
    success. So while I agree with the majority that the first Farrar factor favors
    Bostic, I cannot say that it “weighs heavily.” Majority Op. at 17.
    The second Farrar factor — the significance of the legal issue — weighs in
    favor of Gray in my view. The majority opinion emphasizes that Bostic’s
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    Case: 12-11819     Date Filed: 07/03/2013   Page: 29 of 31
    handcuffing of Gray was an “obvious violation of Gray’s Fourth Amendment
    rights.” Id. at 18 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Because it was an “obvious violation,” says the majority opinion, Gray’s litigation
    could not possibly be significant, because she did not “change the law.” Id. at
    18–19. By this logic, any future decision by this court that denies qualified
    immunity to a government actor will be deemed insignificant, because every denial
    of qualified immunity stems from “obvious” constitutional violations. See Gray
    ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic (Gray II), 
    458 F.3d 1295
    , 1307 (11th Cir. 2006). In my
    view, Gray’s achievement in defeating Bostic’s qualified immunity in the district
    court was quite significant: in November 2003, Bostic successfully moved the
    district court to dismiss Gray’s complaint on qualified immunity grounds; Gray
    appealed that decision, won, and on remand defeated Bostic’s motion for summary
    judgment on qualified immunity grounds; again Bostic appealed, and again Gray
    successfully persuaded this court that Bostic should not receive qualified
    immunity. See Majority Op. at 4–6. Yet despite all of this, and even though a
    federal judge originally granted Bostic qualified immunity, the majority concludes
    that Gray’s victory was a foregone, “obvious” conclusion. Again, I cannot agree.
    Gray’s victory was protracted, hard fought, and hardly “obvious.” I would hold
    that the second factor weighs in her favor.
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    Case: 12-11819     Date Filed: 07/03/2013    Page: 30 of 31
    Finally, I turn to the third Farrar factor, whether Gray’s litigation
    “accomplished some public goal other than occupying the time and energy of
    counsel, court, and client.” Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at
    121–22, 
    113 S. Ct. at 578
    (O’Connor, J., concurring). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that
    incentivizing the vindication of civil rights through attorney’s fees should not bear
    on this final factor. If that were the case, the majority warns, “such reasoning
    would justify an attorney’s fee award in every case.” Majority Op. at 22. Justice
    O’Connor’s concurrence seemed to implicitly accept the private attorney general
    theory: “The District Court speculated that the judgment, if accompanied by a
    large fee award, might deter future lawless conduct, but did not identify the kind
    of lawless conduct that might be prevented.” 
    Id. at 122
    , 
    113 S. Ct. 578
    –79
    (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice O’Connor rejected that
    approach in Farrar, not because incentivizing civil rights attorneys was improper,
    but because the district court was unclear as to “the kind of lawless conduct that
    might be prevented.” 
    Id. at 122
    , 
    113 S. Ct. at 579
     (O’Connor, J., concurring).
    Here, by contrast, the future conduct that will be prevented because of Gray’s
    efforts is entirely clear: grade-schoolchildren may not be handcuffed by
    government actors simply because they act disrespectfully towards a teacher. I
    would hold that the third factor favors Gray.
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    Case: 12-11819     Date Filed: 07/03/2013   Page: 31 of 31
    Twice, a district court has awarded Gray attorney’s fees. And twice, this
    court has struck down that award. A district court’s discretion in determining an
    award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party is necessarily broad, because “the
    [district court judge] ‘has far better means of knowing what is just and reasonable
    than an appellate court can have.’” Copeland v. Marshall, 
    641 F.2d 880
    , 901
    (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (quoting Trustees v. Greenough, 
    105 U.S. 527
    , 537,
    (1882)). Especially where the district court is “intimately familiar with the barrage
    of pleadings, memoranda, and documents filed,” it is preferable to have that
    decision made “by the court which has been most intimately connected with [the]
    case.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    I would conclude that although the first Farrar factor weighs in favor of
    Bostic, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the second
    and third factors weigh in favor of Gray. I dissent.
    31