Chao Chen v. Holder , 466 F. App'x 52 ( 2012 )


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  • 11-1019-ag
    Chao Chen v. Holder
    BIA
    Schoppert, IJ
    A094 915 895
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
    RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
    A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
    FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
    A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
    REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 4th day of April, two thousand twelve.
    PRESENT:
    ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
    REENA RAGGI,
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________________________________
    CHAO CHEN,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                11-1019-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _______________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                 Farah Loftus, Esq., Century City, CA
    FOR RESPONDENT:                 Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Erica B. Miles, Senior
    Litigation Counsel; Jesse D. Lorenz,
    Trial Attorney, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, United
    States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Chao Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s
    Republic of China, seeks review of a February 23, 2011
    decision of the BIA affirming the March 5, 2009 decision of
    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Douglas B. Schoppert, which denied
    his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).     See In
    re Chao Chen, No. A094 915 895 (B.I.A. February 23, 2011),
    aff’g No. A094 915 895 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 25, 2008).
    We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    and procedural history in this case.
    Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
    decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA’s decision.
    See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005).
    The applicable standards of review are well-established.
    See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
    2
    For asylum applications governed by the amendments made
    to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the REAL ID Act of
    2005, an IJ may base a credibility finding on the
    applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the
    plausibility of the applicant’s account, and inconsistencies
    in the applicant’s statements, without regard to whether
    they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”    
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008).   We will “defer . . . to an IJ’s
    credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
    circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
    could make” such a finding.   Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    .
    In this case, the IJ reasonably found Chen to lack
    credibility based on inconsistencies between Chen’s asylum
    application and testimony, inconsistencies within Chen’s
    testimony, and inconsistencies between Chen’s testimony and
    the testimony of his corroborating witness.   Chen indicated
    in his asylum application that he was born on April 7, 1987,
    then testified that he was born on April 8, 1987.   Chen
    stated in his asylum application that he was questioned by
    police about his uncle in February 2006, initially testified
    that he was questioned in February 2005, and later revised
    his testimony to state that he was questioned in February
    3
    2006.   Chen initially testified that he was baptized on
    April 8, 2006, but later indicated that he was baptized in
    April 2007.     Chen testified that he had last seen his
    corroborating witness several weeks before his hearing,
    while the witness testified that he had spoken with Chen at
    church the day before the hearing.     These were all proper
    grounds for an adverse credibility finding.      See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 166
    .
    The IJ also properly based his adverse credibility
    finding on Chen’s demeanor at the hearing. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).     Specifically, the IJ found that Chen
    appeared to be “reciting a story that he had memorized and
    not testifying about events that he had actually lived
    through.”     Addendum to Pet’s’s Br. at 32.   We generally
    defer to such a demeanor finding and do so here.      See Majidi
    v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).
    The BIA’s decision addressed both the inconsistencies
    and Chen’s demeanor.     The BIA also properly concluded that
    Chen failed to introduce sufficient corroborating evidence
    to rehabilitate his credibility.     See Biao Yang v. Gonzales,
    
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2007).     Given the totality of the
    circumstances, including the inconsistencies, Chen’s
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    demeanor, and the lack of sufficient corroborating evidence,
    we conclude that the agency’s adverse credibility
    determination is supported by substantial evidence.      See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    .
    As the only basis for Chen’s withholding of removal and CAT
    claims also depended on his credibility, the adverse
    credibility determination is also dispositive of those
    claims.   See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156 (2d Cir.
    2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    ,
    523 (2d Cir. 2005).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of
    removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    this petition is DISMISSED as moot.    Any pending request for
    oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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