Lewis v. Apfel ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 30 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LOUISE L. LEWIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-5139
(D.C. No. 96-CV-971-EA)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner (N.D. Okla.)
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff applied for disability benefits on January 18, 1994, alleging
disability since December 27, 1993, because of pain in her knees, legs, neck and
arms, and residuals from carpal tunnel surgery. Her application was denied
initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing, and the
administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits, finding that plaintiff was not
disabled because she had the residual functional capacity to perform her past
relevant work as a telemarketer, despite her severe impairments. The Appeals
Council denied review, thus leaving the ALJ’s denial of benefits as the final
decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff appealed the denial to the district court,
and the district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.
We review the [Commissioner’s] decision to determine
whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
[Commissioner] applied the correct legal standards . . . . Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. In addition to a lack of
substantial evidence, the [Commissioner’s] failure to apply the
correct legal standards, or to show us that [he] has done so, are also
grounds for reversal.
Winfrey v. Chater , 92 F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotations and citations
omitted). Guided by these standards, we must reverse the district court’s
affirmance and remand the case for remand to the Commissioner.
Plaintiff’s first argument is that the ALJ did not properly consider her
subjective complaints of pain. We disagree. The ALJ considered plaintiff’s
complaints of pain in accordance with the standard set forth in Luna v. Bowen ,
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834 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1987). The record shows that the ALJ considered all
the relevant evidence and found that plaintiff’s complaints of pain were not
credible to the extent she could not perform sedentary work. We agree with the
district court that “the ALJ did not err in concluding--and demonstrating by
specific and substantial evidence--that the claimant’s complaints were
disproportionate to the objective findings and not credible beyond her ability
to perform sedentary work.” Appellant’s App. Vol. I at 13.
We disagree with the district court, however, that the Commissioner
applied the correct legal standard in finding that plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity to perform her past relevant work as a telemarketer. At step
four, the ALJ must perform a three-phase evaluation of a claimant’s physical
residual functional capacity, the physical demands of the claimant’s past relevant
work, and “whether the claimant has the ability to meet the job demands found in
phase two despite the mental and/or physical limitations found in phase one.”
Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1023. The ALJ must make specific findings at each step.
See id.After summarizing plaintiff’s medical history, the ALJ in this case found
that “[t]he claimant has a combination of impairments which have resulted in
some limitations.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17. The ALJ went on to find that
those limitations do not prevent plaintiff from performing sedentary work. He
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neglected, however, to make any findings as to what specific limitations plaintiff
suffers. 1
Neither did the ALJ make specific findings regarding the physical
requirements of plaintiff’s past relevant work as a telemarketer. The ALJ noted
that the vocational expert classified the telemarketing job as sedentary, and he
then stated that “[t]he claimant has also described her telemarketer’s job as
sedentary as she performed it.” Id. “While the claimant retains the burden of
showing that he is disabled at step four, the ALJ has a duty of inquiry and factual
development. The ALJ must obtain adequate factual information about those
work demands which have a bearing on the medically established limitations.”
Washington v. Shalala , 37 F.3d 1437, 1442 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotations and
citations omitted). Here, the ALJ elicited no evidence of the physical demands of
plaintiff’s telemarketing work, and the record contains very little evidence of the
exertional demands of plaintiff’s past relevant work. See id. The ALJ simply
made the conclusory statement that plaintiff could perform the telemarketing work
because it was sedentary.
Having failed to make the necessary findings as to plaintiff’s limitations
and the physical demands of her telemarketing work, the ALJ was unable to make
1
We note that the record indicates that plaintiff uses a cane, a physical
limitation the ALJ does not even mention.
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the necessary findings regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform her past relevant
work despite her physical limitations. See Winfrey , 92 F.3d at 1024-25. There
was no comparison of plaintiff’s limitations with the physical demands of her past
relevant work.
We must remand this case to the district court with instructions to remand
to the Commissioner, so that he can make the necessary findings about plaintiff’s
specific limitations, the exertional demands of plaintiff’s past relevant work, and
plaintiff’s ability to perform that work despite her limitations, comparing
plaintiff’s specific limitations with the physical demands of the work.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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