In Re: Laprade Family Trust ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE LAPRADE No. 67570
FAMILY TRUST ORIGINALLY DATED
JANUARY 25, 1996 AND RESTATED
ON SEPTEMBER 23, 2011,
FILED
ARNE LAPRADE, MAR 2 5 2016
Appellant,
TRACIE K. UNDEMAN
vs. CLERK F SUPREME COURT
BY •
ERIK LAPRADE, DEPUTY CLERK
Respondent.
ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT AND REMANDING
This is an appeal from a district court order confirming a
report and recommendation of the probate commissioner in a trust matter.
Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Gloria Sturman, Judge.
In this appeal, Arne LaPrade (Arne) argues that: (1) this court
has jurisdiction to hear his undue influence and conflict of interest
arguments; (2) the district court abused its discretion by failing to
adequately address Arne's argument that Erik LaPrade's (Erik) counsel
has a conflict of interest because Erik's counsel represents Erik as trustee
and owes Arne a duty of care under Charleson v. Hardesty, 108 Nev. 878,
882-83, 839 P.2d 1303, 1306-07 (1992) 1 ; ( 3) the district court's conclusions
'Although we conclude that the district court abused its discretion
by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing and by failing to conduct the
balancing test required under Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 44, 53-54, 152 P.3d 737, 742-43 (2007), we direct the
parties and the district court to consider on remand NRS 162.310(1),
which states that "[aln attorney who represents a fiduciary does not, solely
as a result of such attorney-client relationship, assume a corresponding
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regarding Arne's undue influence claim are not supported by substantial
evidence; (4) the district court erred in accepting the typewritten list for
the distribution of personal property; and (5) the district court incorrectly
concluded that section 5.2 of the restated trust creates a specific bequest
for Erik.
For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the district
court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding Arne's
undue influence and conflict of interest arguments. However, we decline
to address the other issues on appeal because the resolution of those
issues may be influenced by the outcome of the undue influence and
conflict of interest claims. 2 We therefore vacate the district court's order
and remand this matter to the district court so that it may further address
the issues and develop the record. Since the parties are familiar with the
facts and procedural history of the case, we do not recount them further
except as necessary for our disposition.
• . continued
duty of care or other fiduciary duty to a principal." It appears that the
parties and the district court overlooked NRS 162.310. The legislative
history of the statute clearly indicates that it was enacted in response to
Charleson, 108 Nev. at 882-83, 839 P.2d at 1306-07. See Hearing on S.B.
221 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 76th Leg. (Nev., March 21, 2011);
see also Hearing on S.B. 221 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 76th
Leg. (Nev., May 2, 2011).
has also been brought to our attention that there is a pending
2 It
action in the district court challenging the trust on the basis of undue
influence, fraud, and mistake. In the interest of judicial economy, the
district court should consider consolidating this matter with the pending
action.
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As a preliminary matter, we first conclude that this court has
jurisdiction to hear Arne's undue influence and conflict of interest
arguments. If an order constitutes a final judgment, then it is
substantively appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1) (permitting an appeal from
a final judgment in a civil action). The finality of an order or judgment
depends on "what the order or judgment actually does, not what it is
called." Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 445, 874 P.2d 729,
733 (1994). To be final, an order or judgment must "dispose[ ] of all the
issues presented in the case, and leave[ ] nothing for the future
consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as
attorney's fees and costs." Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d
416, 417 (2000). Where all issues have been rendered moot by the district
court's order, the judgment is final. See K_DI Sylvan Pools, Inc. v.
Workman, 107 Nev. 340, 342-43, 810 P.2d 1217, 1219 (1991) (reasoning
that partial summary judgment was not a final appealable judgment
where district court order dismissed plaintiffs claims against defendant
but did not render defendant's counterclaims moot). Here, the district
court order failed to address Arne's undue influence and conflict of interest
arguments. Nonetheless, we conclude that the district court order
rendered those arguments moot and left nothing for the future
consideration of the court. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
order constitutes a final, appealable judgment.
We next conclude that the district court abused its discretion
by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to adequately address Arne's
conflict of interest argument and by failing to undertake the balancing test
required under Nev. Yellow Cab Corp., 123 Nev. at 53-54, 152 P.3d at 742-
43 (holding that "a district court must undertake a balancing test in
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determining whether disqualification is warranted in a particular
situation" and providing that this court reviews a district court's ruling on
disqualification for a manifest abuse of discretion). Here, the probate
commissioner refused to make a ruling regarding Arne's conflict of interest
argument and the district court thereafter refused to make any findings
concerning the same. See Carson Ready Mix, Inc., 97 Nev. at 476, 635
P.2d at 277 ("We cannot consider matters not properly appearing in the
record on appeal.").
We further conclude that the district court erred by failing to
adequately address Arne's undue influence claim and that the district
court's tacit dismissal of this issue is not supported by substantial
evidence. See In re Estate of Bethurem, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 92, 313 P.3d
237, 242 (2013) ("Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (internal quotation
omitted)). The probate commissioner made no findings regarding Arne's
argument that Erik exerted undue influence on the trustor, Ludmilla
LaPrade. The district court explicitly refused to address any arguments
that were not included in the probate commissioner's report, including
Arne's undue influence argument. Accordingly, neither the probate
commissioner nor the district court determined whether there is a
presumption of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence. See
In re Estate of Bethurem, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 92, 313 P.3d at 241 (stating
that "a presumption of undue influence arises when a fiduciary
relationship exists and the fiduciary benefits from the• questioned
transaction" (internal quotation omitted)). As neither the district court
nor the probate commissioner addressed the issue of undue influence, we
conclude that the district court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary
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hearing and that the district court's tacit dismissal of this issue is not
supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court VACATED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
this order. 3
--nic‘oPa c. J.
Parraguirre
Gibbons
3 The
Honorable James W. Hardesty, Justice, voluntarily recused
himself from participation in the decision of this matter.
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cc: Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge
Marquis Aurbach Coffing
Grant Morris Dodds PLLC
Jeffrey Burr, Ltd.
Eighth District Court Clerk
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