Clifford Smith v. Charter Communication, Inc. (S , 467 F. App'x 742 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 03 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CLIFFORD JAMES SMITH, No. 10-55831
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-03716-RGK-
AGR
v.
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. MEMORANDUM *
(ST. LOUIS); PAUL ALLEN, Chaiman of
the Board Charter Communications,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2011 **
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, SKOPIL, and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Clifford James Smith appeals pro se the district court’s order dismissing his
case. Smith’s complaint alleged that Paul Allen and Charter Communications,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Inc., violated several different federal securities laws and committed tortious acts
of fraud and misrepresentation. We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. The facts of the case are known to the parties. We repeat them
only as necessary.
I
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Knievel v.
ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We review de novo a district court’s
interpretation of a consent decree. Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 494
F.3d 846, 855 (9th Cir. 2007). We also review de novo a district court’s
determination that a claim is barred by res judicata. Manufactured Home Cmtys.
Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005).
II
The district court correctly interpreted the scope of the Third Party Release
provision (releases) in the Charter reorganization to include Smith’s claims. As a
former shareholder, Smith was subject to the terms of the reorganization plan even
though he did not acquiesce to its terms. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a). Therefore Smith
could not raise his claims because they had been waived by the releases in the
reorganization plan.
2
The district court also correctly held that Smith cannot challenge the validity
of the releases or the reorganization plan through a collateral attack. “Once a
bankruptcy plan is confirmed, it is binding on all parties and all questions that
could have been raised pertaining to the plan are entitled to res judicata effect.”
Trulis v. Barton, 107 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 1995). Where a “creditor fails to
protect its interests by timely objecting to a plan or appealing the confirmation
order, it cannot later complain about a certain provision contained in a confirmed
plan” by bringing a collateral attack in another court. In re Pardee, 193 F.3d 1083,
1086 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Smith did not appeal the
confirmation order directly. His challenge to its validity is now barred by res
judicata. See Trulis, 107 F.3d at 691.
Because Smith’s claims fall within the scope of the releases, and Smith is
barred by res judicata from challenging the validity of the releases, the district
court correctly dismissed this case for failure to state a claim.
III
We have reviewed Smith’s remaining contentions and determine that they
lack merit. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED
3