Dean Harris v. Vargo , 482 F. App'x 303 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            SEP 26 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DEAN PHILIP HARRIS,                              No. 10-35490
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01654-ST
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    VARGO, Dr.; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Ancer L. Haggerty, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 19, 2012 **
    Before:        LEAVY, HAWKINS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Oregon state prisoner Dean Philip Harris appeals pro se from the district
    court’s summary judgment in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging that defendants
    were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 
    391 F.3d 1051
    ,
    1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment to Hardy Myers, the
    former Oregon Attorney General, because Harris failed to raise a genuine dispute
    of material fact as to whether Myers was personally involved in any alleged
    deprivation of Harris’s rights. See Barren v. Harrington, 
    152 F.3d 1193
    , 1194 (9th
    Cir. 1998) (order) (“Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal
    involvement of the defendant.”).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment to the remaining
    defendants because Harris failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
    whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his chronic back pain. See
    Toguchi, 
    391 F.3d at 1060
     (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”); see
    also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 
    680 F.3d 1113
    , 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (difference of
    medical opinion is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference).
    Contrary to Harris’s contention, his consent to the magistrate judge’s
    designation was not required because the magistrate judge did not enter dispositive
    orders and the district court judge conducted de novo review. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (b)(1); Estate of Conners by Meredith v. O’Connor, 
    6 F.3d 656
    , 658 (9th Cir.
    1993) (discussing scope of magistrate judge’s authority under § 636(b)(1)(B)).
    2                                   10-35490
    We do not consider issues not explicitly and distinctly raised and argued in
    the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal.
    See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
    Harris’s motion to strike, received on August 6, 2012, is granted.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                   10-35490