Jordan LaJuan London v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                         ACCEPTED
    06-18-00001-CR
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    3/28/2018 2:53 PM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    FILED IN
    6th COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    No. 06-18-00001-CR
    3/28/2018 2:53:57 PM
    In the                     DEBBIE AUTREY
    Court of Appeals                     Clerk
    for the
    Sixth District of Texas
    at Texarkana
    i
    No. 17-0208X
    In the 71st District Court of
    Harrison County, Texas
    i
    JORDAN LAJUAN LONDON
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    i
    ANDERS BRIEF
    i
    KIMBERLEY MILLER RYAN
    Attorney for Jordan LaJuan London
    State Bar No: 24053602
    203 N. Wellington St.
    Marshall, TX 75670
    (903) 471-0816 phone
    (888) 753-8808 fax
    kimryanlaw@gmail.com
    APPELLANT DOES NOT REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(g) and TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1, appellant does not
    request oral argument.
    IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
    Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A), a complete list of the names of all
    interested parties is provided below.
    Counsel for the State:
    COKE SOLOMON  District Attorney of Harrison County
    200 W. Houston St. STE 206, Marshall, TX 75670
    SHAWN CONNALLY  Assistant District Attorney at trial
    200 W. Houston St. STE 206, Marshall, TX 75670
    Appellant:
    JORDAN LAJUAN LONDON
    Counsel for Appellant:
    KYLE DANSBY  Counsel at trial
    P.O. Box 1914, Marshall, TX 75671
    KIMBERLEY MILLER RYAN  Counsel on appeal
    Trial Judge:
    HON. BRAD MORIN
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT………………………………i
    IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES…………………………………………...i
    TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………...ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………iii
    SUMMARY OF THE CASE………………………………………………………..1
    STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………………….1
    ISSUES PRESENTED……………………………………………………………...1
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT……………………………………………….2
    POINTS OF ERROR………………………………………………………………2
    CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………….…6
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE………………………………………………6
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE…………………………………………………..…7
    ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES
    Balderas v. State, 
    517 S.W.3d 756
    (Tex.Crim.App.2016).
    Holland v. Texas, 
    761 S.W.2d 307
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).
    Meza v. Texas, 
    206 S.W.3d 684
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984).
    STATUTE
    Texas Pen. Code 29.03
    iii
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    A pretrial hearing on a Motion to Suppress was held on November 20, 2017 in
    this matter (CR 27). The Motion was denied on the record. (RR 42). On December
    18, 2017, Appellant entered a plea of no contest to an Aggravated Robbery charge in
    exchange for a plea bargain of 15 (fifteen) years in the Texas Department of Criminal
    Justice. (CR 32) (RR 8). He accepted his sentence, and waived his right to appeal,
    reserving only his right to appeal the pretrial motion wherein relief was denied. (SCR
    14) (RR 8). On January 2, 2018, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal (CR 50), with an
    Amended Notice of Appeal following on January 5, 2018. (SCR 8).
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The out-of-court identification of Jordan LaJuan London was made by the
    mother of a codefendant who had gone to the police station to discuss the case. (RR
    16). The police showed her a video and she identified her son, and she also identified
    Jordan LaJuan London by name due to his walk, as his face was covered. (RR 16-17).
    When asked if she was certain, she responded that she had “damn near” raised him.
    (RR 34-35).
    ISSUES PRESENTED
    There is no arguable issue in this case.
    1
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    This is an Anders brief in support of counsel’s motion to withdraw.
    The Due Process Clause prohibits the admission of identification into evidence
    only when its introduction “is so extremely unfair that its admission violates
    fundamental conceptions of justice.” Balderas v. State, 
    517 S.W.3d 756
    (Tex.Crim.App.2016). The Constitution generally protects a defendant against a
    conviction based on unreliable evidence, not by prohibiting its introduction, but by
    giving the defendant the ability to persuade the jury that the evidence should be
    discredited. 
    Id. A defendant
    has the burden to establish by clear and convincing
    evidence that the pretrial procedure was impermissibly suggestive. 
    Id. There is
    no evidence on the record of any inappropriate or influential comment
    or behavior on behalf of any of the officers present at the pretrial identification of
    Appellant by his codefendant’s mother. The evidence in the records throughout the
    Motion to Suppress hearing is merely a challenge to her credibility as a witness, and not
    a challenge to the admissibility of the evidence itself based on a corruption of the way
    in which it was obtained. The issue of whether or not the pretrial identification of the
    Appellant was credible or reliable was an issue to be determined by a fact finder in a
    trial proceeding, not in a pretrial motion to suppress. The trial court’s denial of the
    Motion to Suppress was proper. The judgment and sentence accurately reflect the trial
    2
    judge’s ruling and the sentence is within the range of punishment allowed for aggravated
    robbery. Finally, the trial counsel’s representation of Appellant was effective.
    In light of the above stated summary, no arguable issues of reversible error exist
    in this case.
    POINTS OF ERROR
    There is no arguable point of error in this case.
    This is an Anders brief in support of appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw. In
    compliance with the Anders procedure, as set forth in Meza v. Texas, 
    206 S.W.3d 684
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), appellate counsel has filed:
    1.       Motion to Withdraw
    2.       Notice of Filing of Anders Brief, which includes a copy of the letter to the
    defendant informing him that:
    a.    Counsel has provided him a copy of brief;
    b.    Counsel has informed him of the right to review the record;
    c.    Counsel has informed him of the right to file a brief or other
    response on his own behalf; and
    d.    Counsel has informed him of the right to pursue a petition for
    discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, should the Court of
    Appeals deny him relief on appeal.
    3
    The appeal at issue here is solely based on the pretrial motion to suppress, as
    Appellant waived his appellate rights to all other issues on the record during his plea,
    and in the Trial Court’s Certification of Waiver of Right to Appeal, and only reserved
    the right to appeal his pretrial motions. As such, Counsel has reviewed the entire clerk
    record and both reporter’s records for the following:
    1.     Trial court ruling regarding suppression of pretrial identification.
    2.     Judgement and Sentence.
    3.     Effectiveness of trial counsel.
    PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION
    The Due Process Clause prohibits the admission of identification into evidence
    only when its introduction “is so extremely unfair that its admission violates
    fundamental conceptions of justice.” Balderas v. State, 
    517 S.W.3d 756
    (Tex.Crim.App.2016). The Constitution generally protects a defendant against a
    conviction based on unreliable evidence, not by prohibiting its introduction, but by
    giving the defendant the ability to persuade the jury that the evidence should be
    discredited. 
    Id. A defendant
    has the burden to establish by clear and convincing
    evidence that the pretrial procedure was impermissibly suggestive. 
    Id. There is
    no evidence on the record of any inappropriate or influential comment
    or behavior on behalf of any of the officers present at the pretrial identification of
    Appellant by his codefendant’s mother. The issue of whether or not the pretrial
    identification of the Appellant was credible or reliable was an issue to be determined
    4
    by a fact finder in a trial proceeding, not in a pretrial motion to suppress. The trial
    court’s denial of the Motion to Suppress was proper.
    JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
    The Judgment and Sentence properly reflect the trial judge’s ruling as reflected
    on his entry on the docket sheet. (CR 48). Further, the sentence of 15 (fifteen) years
    imposed by the trial court falls within the range of punishment stated for aggravated
    robbery in the Texas Penal Code, which states the charge is a felony of the first degree
    with punishment range beginning at five years and ending at 99 or life. Texas Pen.
    Code 29.03. Accordingly, the Judgement and Sentence is proper.
    EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL COUNSEL
    The Court of Criminal Appeals states the standard of review regarding the issue
    of ineffectiveness of counsel in Holland v. Texas, 
    761 S.W.2d 307
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).
    In Holland, the Court adopts the rule set forth in Strickland v. Washington, which states in
    order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show his trial
    counsel’s performance was deficient, in that counsel made such serious errors he was
    not functioning effectively as counsel, and that the deficient performance prejudiced
    the defense to such a degree that appellant was deprived of a fair trial. Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984). Prejudice is shown by demonstrating that there was a
    reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would
    have been different. 
    Id. 5 Here,
    counsel made no perceivable errors on the record, and Defendant pled
    guilty in exchange for a plea bargain, thereby eliminating the consideration of the
    prejudice element of the Strickland test, so there was no ineffective assistance of counsel.
    CONCLUSION
    After examining the facts of the case in light of the applicable law, counsel on
    appeal believed there is no basis for presenting any legally nonfrivolous issue. For the
    foregoing reasons, counsel respectfully requests that this Court conduct an independent
    examination of the record for any prejudicial error. Counsel asks the Court to grant
    her Motion to Withdraw.
    /S/ KIMBERLEY MILLER RYAN
    KIMBERLEY MILLER RYAN
    Attorney for Appellant
    110 S. Bolivar St. B2
    Marshall, TX 75670
    SBN 24053602
    (903) 471-0816 phone
    (888) 753-8808 fax
    kimryanlaw@gmail.com
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    In accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, I hereby certify
    that appellant’s brief, filed on March 26, 2018 contains 1402 words, excluding
    introductory pages, based upon a word count under MS Word.
    /s/ Kimberley Miller Ryan
    KIMBERLEY MILLER RYAN
    Attorney for APPELLANT
    State Bar No: 24053602
    110 S. Bolivar St. B2
    Marshall, TX 75670
    6
    903.471.0816
    Fax: 888.753.8808
    kimryanlaw@gmail.com
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I certify that a copy of this brief was served on the State of Texas on March 26,
    2018.
    In accordance with the Anders guidelines, I further certify that a copy of this
    brief for Appellant is being mailed on the same day to Appellant, and that counsel has
    reasonably attempted to communicate in a manner and language understood by
    Appellant that: 1) counsel has fully examined the record and reviewed the relevant law,
    and there are no meritorious issues for appeal; 2) counsel has therefore moved to
    withdraw; 3) if granted, the motion will result in dismissal of the appeal; 4) but Appellant
    has a right to file a response in English, opposing counsel’s motion, within 30 days.
    /s/ Kimberley Miller Ryan
    KIMBERLEY MILLER RYAN
    Attorney for Appellant
    7
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-18-00001-CR

Filed Date: 3/28/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/5/2018