Tommie Ray Limbrick v. State ( 2015 )


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  • Motions Denied and Order filed August 6, 2015
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-15-00258-CR
    TOMMIE RAY LIMBRICK, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 263rd District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1389665
    ORDER
    Appellant filed a motion and amended motion for permission to file an out
    of time motion for new trial and requests this Court to abate this appeal and
    remand for a hearing on his motion for new trial. The State did not file a response.
    Appellant claims that he was not represented by counsel during the entire
    30-day period for filing a motion for new trial and was thereby prevented from
    presenting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel has a duty to
    represent the client throughout the appellate process or file leave to withdraw with
    the court. See Ex parte Axel, 
    757 S.W.2d 369
    , 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en
    banc) (retained counsel has not concluded a case until he has filed a motion to
    withdraw if he knows his client intends to appeal). The Texas Court of Criminal
    Appeals in Axel held:
    [T]rial counsel, retained or appointed, has the duty, obligation and
    responsibility to consult with and fully to advise his client concerning
    meaning and effect of the judgment rendered by the court, his right to
    appeal from that judgment, the necessity of giving notice of appeal
    and taking other steps to pursue an appeal, as well as expressing his
    professional judgment as to possible grounds for appeal and their
    merit, and delineating advantages and disadvantages of appeal. The
    decision to appeal belongs to the client.
    
    Id. To prevail
    on a claim of deprivation of counsel during the time to prepare, file,
    and present a motion for new trial, appellant must affirmatively prove that he was
    not represented by counsel during this critical stage of the proceedings. See Garcia
    v. State, 
    97 S.W.3d 343
    , 347 (Tex.App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (citing Oldham v.
    State, 
    977 S.W.2d 354
    , 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc)). When the record
    does not reflect that trial counsel withdrew or was replaced by new counsel after
    sentencing, there is a rebuttable presumption that trial counsel continued to
    effectively represent the defendant during the time limit for filing a motion for new
    trial. Smith v. State, 
    17 S.W.3d 660
    , 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (Johnson, J.,
    concurring).
    The record reflects, and appellant concedes, that trial counsel did not file a
    motion to withdraw and there is no order allowing counsel to withdraw.
    Accordingly, the record does not establish appellant was entirely without counsel
    during the critical stage to file a motion for new trial. See Rogers v. State, 14-09-
    00665-CR, 
    2011 WL 7290492
    , *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 8, 2011,
    no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication).
    Appellant refers to the fact that on March 2, 2015, appellant filed a pro se
    notice of appeal requesting appointment of appellate counsel. Appellant’s notice of
    appeal is insufficient to rebut the presumption of adequate representation. See
    Smallwood v. State, 
    296 S.W.3d 729
    , 734 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009,
    no pet.). Moreover, appellant’s timely-filed pro se notice of appeal is evidence he
    was advised of at least some of his rights, and we presume that he was adequately
    represented unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise. See 
    Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 363
    .
    Appellant claims in his motion that trial counsel “informed the appellant that
    he would not represent him on appeal, and filed a Certification of Appeal which
    indicated that the appellant’s case was a plea bargain case, and appellant had no
    right to appeal.” Appellant’s affidavit asserts no facts regarding the above claims.
    It states only that “[t]he allegations listed in the aforementioned Motion for New
    Trial are correct and true to the best of my knowledge.”
    The record reflects that on the trial court’s certification of the defendant’s
    right of appeal (“CORTA”) filed February 13, 2015, the box is checked that
    provides this case “is not a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has the right of
    appeal.” The box providing this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO
    right of appeal” is also checked but it is crossed out. The CORTA is signed by
    defendant’s trial counsel. The CORTA does not reflect that trial counsel filed the
    CORTA or that trial counsel marked the incorrect box. Regardless, the CORTA is
    signed by appellant and states “I have also been informed of my rights concerning
    any appeal of this criminal case.” Neither appellant’s motion nor his affidavit
    contradicts this statement.
    Appellant’s motion also asserts “Mr. Limbrick’s affidavit confirms that trial
    counsel did not discuss potential issues for filing a motion for new trial with him.”
    However, appellant’s motion makes no factual allegations regarding whether trial
    counsel conferred with him regarding the merits of an appeal or a motion for new
    trial.
    There is a rebuttable presumption a defendant’s trial counsel continued to
    represent the defendant adequately during this critical stage. Cooks v. State, 
    240 S.W.3d 906
    , 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
    When a motion for new trial is not filed, courts apply a rebuttable
    presumption that the attorney discussed the merits of the motion for
    new trial with the appellant, and the appellant rejected it. 
    Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 363
    . The Court of Criminal Appeals indicated that
    appropriate rebuttal evidence would show that “trial counsel thought
    that his duties were completed with the end of trial, and had thereafter
    abandoned the appellant.” 
    Id. Under Oldham
    and its progeny, an
    appellant’s statement that he has not been represented since
    sentencing is not enough to rebut the presumption of effective
    assistance. See 
    id. at 363;
    Smith v. State, 
    17 S.W.3d 660
    , 662–63 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2000). Appellant must also show that counsel did not
    confer with him regarding the merits of filing of a motion for new
    trial. See 
    Smith, 17 S.W.3d at 663
    .
    Nguyen v. State, 
    222 S.W.3d 537
    , 540 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.
    ref’d). Appellant’s motion makes no allegations that, even if correct and true as
    averred to in his affidavit, show counsel failed to confer him.
    Based on the record before us, we find appellant has not rebutted the
    presumption of adequate representation. See Smallwood v. State, 
    296 S.W.3d 729
    ,
    734-35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Smith v. State, 
    17 S.W.3d 660
    , 662–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), and 
    Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 362
    –63.
    Accordingly, appellant’s motions are denied.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Justice Christopher, Brown and Wise.