Wolfgang Hirczy v. Citibank, N.A. ( 2014 )


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  • Opinion issued August 26, 2014
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-13-00986-CV
    ———————————
    WOLFGANG HIRCZY, Appellant
    V.
    CITIBANK, N.A., Appellee
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 1001936
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Wolfgang Hirczy appeals the post-answer default judgment rendered in
    favor of appellee, Citbank, N.A., on its cause of action for breach of contract. In
    four issues, Hirczy contends that (1) the trial court erred in granting judgment in
    favor of Citibank absent proof of the underlying contract; (2) the trial court’s
    judgment contravenes federal law governing national banks; (3) the trial court’s
    judgment contravenes federal and state policy favoring arbitration; and (4) the
    absence of a reporter’s record constitutes reversible error. We affirm.
    Background
    Based on Hirczy’s default on a credit card agreement, Citibank filed suit
    alleging breach of contract and seeking damages of $15,555.33, plus interest and
    costs. The petition was accompanied by requests for disclosure, interrogatories,
    and requests for admissions. Although the return of service reflects that Hirczy
    was served with the petition and discovery requests on October 24, 2011, he failed
    to answer any of the discovery requests.
    The following May, 2012, Citibank amended its petition and filed a second
    set of discovery requests 1 seeking that Hirczy admit, among other things, that (1)
    he used a credit card account issued to him by the bank to make purchases and/or
    obtain cash advances; (2) he made at least one payment on the account; (3) he was
    provided with a copy of the applicable terms and conditions and/or the cardholder
    agreement for the account prior to using the account; (4) he did not object to the
    1
    Although entitled “Plaintiff’s First Discovery Request,” these requests for
    disclosure, production, admissions, and interrogatories were actually Citibank’s
    second set of discovery requests. In this amended petition, Citibank sought
    damages in the amount of $15,831.33.
    2
    applicable terms and conditions; (5) Citibank paid all vendors and merchants for
    any purchases charged by him to the account; (6) he received monthly account
    statements; (7) he ceased making payments on the account; (8) he received a
    demand letter for payment of the debt; (9) all due payments, credits, and/or
    adjustments in his favor were applied to the account; and (10) he had a balance
    remaining owed on the credit card account at the time he ceased making payments.
    Despite several attempts, Citibank never served Hirczy with the amended pleading
    and discovery requests. Hirczy filed his answer on February 3, 2013, but never
    answered any of the discovery requests.
    Although Citibank provided notice of the August 19, 2013 trial setting via
    certified mail, 2 Hirczy failed to appear.
    The following trial exhibits were admitted: 3
    • Citibank’s notice to Hirczy of the trial setting and the court’s order for trial
    setting (Exhibit A);
    • an affidavit on deemed admissions by Citibank’s attorney (Exhibit B);
    • a certificate of last known mailing address (Exhibit C);
    • a non-military affidavit (Exhibit D);
    2
    During the course of litigation, Hirczy filed a motion to dismiss and Citibank filed
    a motion for summary judgment but the trial court did not rule on these motions.
    3
    It is undisputed that Citibank presented no live testimony at trial.
    3
    • the affidavit of Daniel Fisher, a Citibank document control officer (Exhibit
    E); and
    • an account statement (Exhibit F).
    On August 21, 2013, the trial court entered judgment against Hirczy in the
    amount of $15,831.33, plus interest and court costs.          The trial court entered
    findings of fact and conclusions of law on September 13, 2013, at Hirczy’s request.
    Hirczy timely filed this appeal.
    Discussion
    In his first issue, Hirczy contends that the trial court’s judgment for Citibank
    on its breach of contract cause was error because there was no evidence of the
    underlying contract, i.e., the cardmember agreement. Absent proof of the terms of
    the underlying contract, he argues, the evidence is insufficient.
    We must initially address Hirczy’s argument that the trial court’s findings of
    fact and conclusions of law demonstrate that the trial court used the wrong default
    judgment standard in granting its judgment to Citibank. Conclusion of law No. 2
    stated, “Defendant failed to appear for trial and default judgment was granted in
    favor of the Plaintiff.” Hirczy argues that this conclusion, coupled with the trial
    court’s findings of fact,4 reflects the trial court’s erroneous application of the
    4
    The trial court made the following findings of fact:
    1. Citibank N.A. filed [its first amended petition] against Defendant Wolfgang
    Hirczy (“Hirczy”) on May 15, 2012.
    4
    criteria for a no-answer default judgment. We disagree. In its finding of fact no. 3,
    the trial court noted that Hirczy had filed an original answer and finding of fact no.
    8 stated, “Defendant failed to appear for trial on August 19, 2013 and a post-
    answer default judgment was signed” (emphasis added).
    A post-answer default judgment occurs where a timely answer, that puts the
    merits of plaintiff’s claim at issue, is on file, but the defendant fails to appear at
    trial. Sharif v. Par Tech, Inc., 
    135 S.W.3d 869
    , 872 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing Stoner v. Thompson, 
    578 S.W.2d 679
    , 682 (Tex.
    1979)).5 If a defendant has filed such an answer, the defendant’s failure to appear
    2. Hirczy was served [with Citibank N.A.’s original petition] on October 24,
    2012.
    3. Hirczy filed his original answer in response to Citibank, N.A.’s petition on
    May 20, 2013.
    4. Hirczy’s answer contained a general denial and objection and plea of
    privilege.
    5. Citibank, N.A. filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on July 23, 2013.
    6. The Court set the case on its trial docket on August 19, 2013.
    7. Plaintiff appeared for trial and announced ready on August 19, 2013.
    8. Defendant failed to appear for trial on August 19, 2013 and a post-answer
    default judgment was signed.
    5
    In contrast, under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 239, “the plaintiff may . . . take
    judgment by default against [the] defendant if he has not previously filed an
    answer . . . .” TEX. R. CIV. P. 239.
    5
    at trial is neither an abandonment of the defendant’s answer nor an implied
    confession of any issues thus joined by the defendant’s answer. 
    Stoner, 578 S.W.2d at 682
    ; 
    Sharif, 135 S.W.3d at 872
    . Judgment cannot be entered on the
    pleadings; instead, the party seeking judgment must offer evidence and prove his
    case. 
    Stoner, 578 S.W.2d at 682
    .
    Proof of its breach of contract claim required Citibank to establish (1) the
    existence of a valid contract between Hirczy and Citibank, (2) performance by
    Citibank, (3) breach of the contract by Hirczy, and (4) damages sustained as a
    result of the breach. See Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Minckler, 
    345 S.W.3d 204
    , 208 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Winchek v. Am. Express Travel
    Related Servs. Co., 
    232 S.W.3d 197
    , 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007,
    no pet.). In its petition, Citibank alleged that it issued a credit card to Hirczy in his
    name, Hirczy received and used the card, Citibank performed under the contract by
    reimbursing merchants who accepted Hirczy’s credit card in payment, Hirczy
    breached the contract by defaulting on the payment obligation of the credit card
    agreement; and the outstanding balance of Hirczy’s credit card account was
    $15,831.33. Citibank’s requests for admissions sought Hirczy’s admission of the
    truth of each of these allegations.
    “Deemed admissions may be employed as proof, and once admissions are
    deemed admitted by operation of law and where the admissions fully support each
    6
    element of a cause of action, including damages, they will fully support a judgment
    based thereon.” Oliphant Fin., LLC v. Galaviz, 
    299 S.W.3d 829
    , 838 (Tex. App.—
    Dallas 2009, no pet.) (noting “unanswered requests for admissions are deemed
    admitted without the necessity of a court order and any matter thus admitted is
    conclusively established as being true”); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.2(c). Here, the
    record reflects that Hirczy failed to answer Citbank’s second requests for
    admissions and, therefore, Citibank’s requests were deemed admitted without the
    necessity of a court order.6 See Overstreet v. Home Indem. Co., 
    669 S.W.2d 825
    ,
    827–28 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 
    678 S.W.2d 916
    (Tex.
    1984); see also Rowlands v. Unifund CCR, No. 14-05-01122-CV, 
    2007 WL 1395101
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“[T]o the extent
    they address the elements of proof of a claim, deemed admissions provide
    uncontroverted proof of these elements as a matter of law.”). Accordingly, Hirczy
    is deemed to have admitted each of the elements of proof required to sustain the
    judgment for Citibank.
    At trial, the affidavit of Daniel Fisher, a Citibank document control officer,
    was admitted attesting that Hirczy incurred charges on his account; failed to make
    6
    Although Hirczy was not served with this petition and set of discovery requests, he
    made an appearance in the suit when he subsequently filed his answer. Under
    Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 121, an answer constitutes an appearance and
    “dispense[s] with the necessity for the issuance or service of citation upon [the
    defendant].” TEX. R. CIV. P. 121.
    7
    the required payments on the account; defaulted on the account; the outstanding
    balance on the account was $15,831.33, and the account balance was due and
    owing as of the date of execution of the affidavit. Citibank also offered an account
    statement for the period from April 21, 2010 to May 20, 2010 reflecting a balance
    due of $15,831.33.
    Hirczy’s deemed admissions and the evidence at trial supported each
    element of Citibank’s breach of contract action. See 
    Minckler, 345 S.W.3d at 208
    (concluding credit card issuer was entitled to default judgment where deemed
    admissions and evidence at trial supported issuer’s breach of contract claim against
    cardholder); 
    Galaviz, 299 S.W.3d at 837
    –38 (finding creditor was entitled to
    default judgment because credit card account holder’s deemed admissions
    conclusively proved all elements of creditor’s breach of contract claim).
    Accordingly, we overrule Hirczy’s first issue.
    Hirczy’s second issue contends that, if permitted to stand, the trial court’s
    judgment would contravene federal law by allowing national banks to obtain
    judgments without the necessity of establishing a contractual basis for charging
    interest in compliance the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, Regulation Z,
    12 C.F.R. § 226, and the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85. Hirczy complains
    that without proof of the terms of the credit contract, “it is not even possible to
    determine whether a [Truth in Lending Act] violation occurred . . . .”
    8
    We find this argument unavailing for several reasons. First, Hirczy is not
    complaining that default judgment was improper because Citibank failed to
    provide disclosures related to credit terms mandated by federal banking law.
    Rather, he argues that, without evidence of the cardholder agreement, it is
    impossible to determine whether Citibank made the mandatory disclosures. This
    argument, alleging a hypothetical violation of federal law, is without merit.
    Second, we note that in failing to respond to Citibank’s first set of requests for
    admissions, Hirczy was deemed to have admitted that he received all applicable
    notices. 7 
    Galaviz, 299 S.W.3d at 838
    . Third, Hirczy did not raise this argument
    before the trial court in either his answer or his motion to set aside the default
    judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Thus, we overrule Hirczy’s second issue.
    In his third issue, Hirczy contends that the default judgment, if affirmed,
    would contravene federal and state policy favoring arbitration. He argues that
    Citibank’s failure to produce the cardmember agreement precluded him from
    7
    In failing to respond to Citibank’s requests for admissions that accompanied its
    amended petition, Hirczy admitted that he (1) was notified of all applicable
    interest rates, late-fees, over-limit fees and other fees and/or penalties that could be
    assessed on the account prior to use of the account, (2) the monthly account
    statements received by him for the account accurately set forth all transactions,
    purchases, payments, credits, debits, deductions, interest rates, late-fees, over-limit
    fees and/or other fees posted to the account, (3) was notified of all charges and/or
    amendments to the terms and conditions and/or cardholder agreement for the
    account, and (4) was notified of any changes to the applicable interest rates, late-
    fees, over-limit fees and other fees and/or penalties that could be assessed to the
    account. In failing to respond, these unanswered requests became deemed
    admissions. See Oliphant Fin., LLC v. Galaviz, 
    299 S.W.3d 829
    , 838 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
    9
    invoking the arbitration clause that was likely a provision under the contract.
    Hirczy’s argument, however, presupposes that there was an arbitration provision in
    the contract and that he would have exercised his right to arbitrate. Further, the
    record does not indicate that Hirczy attempted to serve Citibank with document
    requests that would have allowed him to obtain the contract. 8 Finally, a party’s
    contractual right to arbitration (if one existed) is not self-executing; a trial court
    does not err in failing to compel arbitration when nobody asked it to do so. Cf.
    Forged Components, Inc. v. Guzman, 
    409 S.W.3d 91
    , 100 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (noting presumption favoring arbitration arises only after
    party seeking to compel arbitration proves existence of valid, enforceable
    arbitration agreement) (citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 
    166 S.W.3d 732
    (Tex. 2005)). Consequently, we overrule Hirczy’s third issue.
    In his fourth issue, Hirczy contends that the absence of a reporter’s record
    requires reversal of the default judgment. Hirczy correctly notes that when a
    judgment is rendered after presentation of evidence to the court in the absence of
    the appellant and his attorney, the failure to have the court reporter present to make
    a record constitutes reversible error. See 
    Sharif, 135 S.W.3d at 873
    . However,
    Citibank states in its brief that all of the exhibits admitted at trial were included in
    8
    In his answer, Hirczy requested “a copy of the amended petition with whatever
    attachments so I can figure out how to respond.” Such a request does not
    constitute a request for the contract.
    10
    the clerk’s record and no live testimony was presented at trial. In his reply brief,
    Hirczy acknowledges that “the absence of a reporter’s record in this case is no
    longer an issue because [Citbank] avers in its brief that no oral testimony was
    presented at trial, and that all of the trial exhibits are included in the appellate
    record.” See 
    Galaviz, 299 S.W.3d at 837
    –38 (noting plaintiff may be awarded
    damages on liquidated claim without necessity of hearing or presentation of
    evidence and affirming award on contract claim based on deemed admissions).
    Thus, we conclude that Hirczy has abandoned this issue on appeal, and we need
    not address his fourth issue.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Jim Sharp
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Sharp, and Huddle.
    11