Stephanie Montagne Zoanni v. Lemuel David Hogan , 555 S.W.3d 321 ( 2018 )

Opinion issued July 19, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-16-00584-CV
———————————
STEPHANIE MONTAGNE ZOANNI, Appellant
V.
LEMUEL DAVID HOGAN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 246th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2010-34811-B
OPINION
This appeal requires us to determine whether the Defamation Mitigation Act
allows defamation claims to proceed to the jury, over objection, when a plaintiff has
not complied with the Act’s requirements for those claims, and the compliance
deadline has expired. The answer is no. We therefore reverse as to nine of the alleged
instances of defamation at issue in this appeal. Because we cannot determine what
part of the damages awarded pertain solely to the remaining four allegedly
defamatory statements (which Appellant Stephanie Zoanni does not challenge under
the Defamation Mitigation Act), we reverse for a new trial as to those statements.
Background
In this appeal, Zoanni challenges the jury’s findings that she defamed her ex-
husband, Lemuel David Hogan, on 13 occasions. Many of the statements at issue
surround an alleged incident in 2005. Zoanni contends that, when members of a
church’s youth group came over to their house, Hogan peered through an attic vent
at a young girl in the bathroom. Hogan says that he accidentally glanced through the
vent while looking for something in the attic.
On March 7, 2014, Hogan’s lawyers sent Zoanni a letter accusing her of
defaming him. The letter identified two specific publications, which included three
allegedly defamatory statements. Zoanni independently corrected one additional
statement. Hogan sent Zoanni no other request for correction, clarification, or
retraction. Hogan then sued Zoanni for defamation and to modify custody of their
daughter.
Although Hogan’s March 2014 letter referenced only 3 allegedly defamatory
statements, on the eve of trial, Hogan amended his petition and included 13 allegedly
defamatory statements in his proposed jury charge. When Hogan added these
2
allegedly defamatory statements to the jury charge, more than a year had passed
since the alleged statements were made. Hogan does not argue that he only recently
discovered the statements. Well more than 30 days had passed since Zoanni filed her
original answer in this lawsuit.
Under the Defamation Mitigation Act and its statute of limitations,1 Hogan
had a full year to send Zoanni a timely and sufficient request for correction,
clarification, or retraction as to each of the nine allegedly defamatory statements not
referenced in his March 2014 letter and not independently corrected by Zoanni. But
he did no such thing. He instead sought to recover on them, despite never requesting
their correction, clarification, or retraction, and despite the lapsing of the year-long
limitations period.
Zoanni sought a directed verdict on the basis that Hogan had failed to comply
with the Defamation Mitigation Act with respect to the nine statements not identified
in Hogan’s 2014 letter and not independently corrected by Zoanni. The trial court
ruled against her. Zoanni also objected to the jury charge, arguing that Hogan did
not comply with the Defamation Mitigation Act with regard to the nine allegedly
defamatory statements. She contended that it would be error to submit those
1
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.055(b); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 16.002(a).
3
instances of alleged defamation to the jury. The trial court overruled those
objections.
The jury found all 13 statements to be defamatory. The trial court asked the
jury to award damages for the first eight statements as a group, and the last five
statements as a group. The jury awarded $900,000 in past and future injury to
reputation and mental anguish for the first eight statements, and $1.2 million in past
and future injury to reputation and mental anguish for the last five statements, for a
total of $2.1 million in damages. The jury also found that these statements were made
with malice but awarded no punitive damages. Zoanni filed a motion for new trial
that again raised Hogan’s failure to comply with the Defamation Mitigation Act.
On appeal, Zoanni argues that (1) because Hogan did not comply with the
Defamation Mitigation Act with respect to nine alleged instances of defamation, the
judgment should be reversed and rendered in her favor as to those nine allegedly
defamatory statements; (2) the trial court erroneously failed to submit a mitigation
instruction on damages, the damages award is not supported by sufficient evidence,
and the award is too large and impermissibly includes punitive damages; (3) part of
the judgment improperly penalizes Zoanni for her opinions; (4) there is not legally
sufficient evidence that Zoanni published any of the complained-of police report
statements; and (5) the trial court erroneously excluded testimony based upon the
clergy privilege. We start with the Defamation Mitigation Act.
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Defamation Mitigation Act
Zoanni argues that Hogan did not comply with and, at all relevant times, could
no longer have complied with the Defamation Mitigation Act with respect to 9 of
the 13 allegedly defamatory statements at issue. She contends that Hogan’s failure
to comply with the Defamation Mitigation Act bars his recovery as to these
statements. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.
TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2016). When
interpreting a statute, the text is paramount. We thus interpret statutes in light of their
plain language. See Ineos USA, LLC v. Elmgren, 505 S.W.3d 555, 563 (Tex. 2016).
We seek to harmonize and effectuate all provisions of the statute. See In re Office of
Attorney Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2013); Meritor Auto., Inc. v. Ruan
Leasing Co., 44 S.W.3d 86, 90 (Tex. 2001).
B. Applicable Law
To prove defamation, a private individual must demonstrate (1) the
publication of a false statement of fact to a third party, (2) that was defamatory
concerning the plaintiff, (3) with the requisite degree of fault, and (4) damages, in
some cases. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 579 (Tex. 2017); see
5
also Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, No. 16-0098, 2018 WL 2182625, at *3
(Tex. May 11, 2018).
A plaintiff must also comply with the Defamation Mitigation Act (DMA),
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 73.051–062. The DMA applies to “a claim for
relief, however characterized, from damages arising out of harm to personal
reputation caused by the false content of a publication.” Id. § 73.054(a).
The DMA makes clear that:
(a) A person may maintain an action for defamation only if:
(1) the person has made a timely and sufficient request for a
correction, clarification, or retraction from the defendant; or
(2) the defendant has made a correction, clarification, or retraction.
Id. § 73.055(a) (emphasis added).
A request for a correction, clarification, or retraction is timely if it is “made
during the period of limitation for commencement of an action for defamation,”
which is one year after the day the cause of action accrues. Id. §§ 16.002(a),
73.055(b); see also Velocity Databank, Inc. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 456 S.W.3d 605,
609 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
Even if the DMA request is timely, if it is not made within 90 days after the
plaintiff receives knowledge of the publication, the plaintiff may not recover
exemplary damages. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.055(c).
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The DMA also sets forth specific requirements concerning the sufficiency of
a request. A request is sufficient if it:
(1) is served on the publisher;
(2) is made in writing, reasonably identifies the person making the
request, and is signed by the individual claiming to have been
defamed or by the person’s authorized attorney or agent;
(3) states with particularity the statement alleged to be false and
defamatory and, to the extent known, the time and place of
publication;
(4) alleges the defamatory meaning of the statement; and
(5) specifies the circumstances causing a defamatory meaning of the
statement if it arises from something other than the express
language of the publication.
Id. § 73.055(d) (emphasis added).
Another provision of the DMA allows for abatement in certain instances:
A person against whom a suit is pending who does not receive a written
request for a correction, clarification, or retraction, as required by
Section 73.055, may file a plea in abatement not later than the 30th day
after the date the person files an original answer in the court in which
the suit is pending.
Id. § 73.062(a). If not controverted, the abatement begins 11 days after the plea is
filed and continues until the 60th day after the request is served or a later day agreed
to by the parties. Id. § 73.062(b), (c).
C. Analysis
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation that is a matter of first
impression in our Court. On the facts of this case—where Hogan did not comply
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with the DMA and where, by the time he asserted the additional allegedly
defamatory statements, the statutory deadlines had expired so compliance was no
longer possible—the statute’s plain language precluded the non-compliant
defamation claims from proceeding to the jury. We need not address how the DMA
applies in other circumstances.
The DMA allows a plaintiff to “maintain an action for defamation only if”
(1) he sends a timely and sufficient request for correction, clarification, or retraction,
or (2) the defendant nevertheless makes a correction, clarification, or retraction of
any statement. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.055(a) (emphasis added); see id.
§ 73.055(d)(3). To be timely, a request must be sent within one year after the day
the cause of action accrues—generally, within a year of the statement’s publication.2
Id. §§ 16.002(a); 73.055(b). To be sufficient, a request must identify each allegedly
defamatory statement “with particularity.” Id. § 73.055(d)(3). This “particularity”
requirement contrasts with the statute’s language (in the same sentence) permitting
the time and place of publication to be identified “to the extent known.” Id.; Ineos,
505 S.W.3d at 564.
2
A cause of action for defamation generally accrues when a statement is published
or circulated. Velocity Databank, Inc. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 456 S.W.3d 605, 609
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). The discovery rule applies to
toll that limitations period if the defamatory statement is inherently undiscoverable
or not a matter of public knowledge. Id. Hogan did not assert the discovery rule.
8
Accordingly, for Hogan to maintain an action for defamation as to each
statement at issue, he was required to send—within a year of each statement’s
publication—a request for correction, clarification, or retraction that identified, with
particularity, the allegedly defamatory statement. Hogan did not timely satisfy this
requirement and, by the time of the charge conference, he could no longer do so.
Only 4 of the 13 statements included in the jury charge met the statutory
requirements. On March 7, 2014, Hogan asked Zoanni to retract three statements,
and Zoanni independently corrected one other statement. Zoanni concedes that the
DMA was satisfied for these four statements.3
It is undisputed that Hogan never asked Zoanni to correct, clarify, or retract
any of the other nine statements. Nor did Zoanni do so on her own accord. And when
Hogan proposed including the nine additional statements in the jury charge, it would
3
We list these four statements below in the “Opinions Versus Facts” section of our
opinion. In light of Zoanni’s concession, we do not address whether Hogan’s March
2014 letter satisfies the DMA.
The dissent points to Hogan’s March 2014 letter and the parties’ 2014 Rule 11
Agreement, suggesting that Zoanni had prior notice of some of the nine allegedly
defamatory statements for which Hogan never requested correction, clarification, or
retraction. But neither the March 2014 letter nor the Rule 11 Agreement identified—
with particularity or otherwise—any of the nine statements at issue. To the contrary,
Hogan’s March 2014 letter referenced (1) an email that contained two allegedly
defamatory statements and (2) “one” allegedly defamatory blogpost (identified by
the post’s title). The Rule 11 Agreement, for its part, identified the sources of the
three allegedly defamatory statements referenced in Hogan’s 2014 letter. Notably,
only a few of the statements at issue in this appeal even appeared on Zoanni’s blog.
And the Rule 11 Agreement was not (and did not waive the requirement for) a
DMA-compliant request for correction, clarification, or retraction.
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have been impossible for him to comply with the statute: the year-long period to
send a timely request had lapsed for all of the nine statements.4 TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE §§ 16.002(a), 73.055(b).
Under the DMA’s plain language, Hogan may not maintain a defamation
action as to those nine statements. Hogan could “maintain an action for defamation
only if” he timely requested correction, clarification, or retraction of each specific
statement. See id. § 74.055(a) (emphasis added). By the time of trial, he did not and
could no longer do so for any of the nine alleged instances of defamation. Id.
§ 73.055(a) (requiring the identification of each statement “with particularity”); id.
§ 73.055(b) (requiring a timely request). Those claims should not have proceeded to
the jury over Zoanni’s objection. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has reached the same conclusion. See Tubbs v. Nicol, No. 16-20311, 675 F.
App’x 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2017) (“If a plaintiff does not make such a request before
the statute of limitations expires, she may not state a claim for defamation.”).
Even so, some courts have concluded, and Hogan contends, that the statute
allows abatement—not dismissal—as a possible remedy. See Hardy v. Commc’n
Workers of Am. Local 6215, 536 S.W.3d. 38, 47 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet.
denied) (“If the plaintiff files suit without making a timely and sufficient request for
a correction, clarification, or retraction, the defendant may move to have the suit
4
Neither party argues that compliance was still possible.
10
abated until the request is made. . . . There is, however, nothing in these statutory
provisions or the legislative history to suggest it is the purpose of the DMA to
deprive a plaintiff of a defamation claim based on a failure to request a correction,
clarification, or retraction.”); Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. Jones, 538 S.W.3d. 781,
813 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. filed) (similar). They base this conclusion on
section 73.062 of the DMA, which provides:
A person against whom a suit is pending who does not receive a written
request for a correction, clarification, or retraction, as required by
Section 73.055, may file a plea in abatement not later than the 30th day
after the date the person files an original answer in the court in which
the suit is pending.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.062(a).
Interpreting the DMA to allow only abatement in this circumstance would
contravene the statute’s plain text. The abatement provision has a straightforward
application (and is not superfluous) before the year-long period to satisfy section
73.055 has passed. During that period, a plaintiff could still comply with section
73.055, even if he had not yet done so. Then abatement would make sense: one may
seek to abate while the plaintiff has a chance to comply with section 73.055.
But where, as here, the opportunity to comply with section 73.055 has passed,
the statute does not support abatement as the proper procedure. The DMA is clear
that one may maintain an action only if he sends a timely and sufficient request for
correction, clarification, or retraction. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.055. Once
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the deadline has passed, a plaintiff cannot maintain an action. If the court were
powerless to grant a directed verdict (or sustain objections) under these
circumstances, then what would happen? Would the court abate eternally? This
result would not effectuate the statute’s terms.
Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, when Hogan added the nine other
allegedly defamatory statements, abatement was also no longer an option. Id.
§ 73.062(a) (“A person. . . may file a plea in abatement not later than the 30th day
after the date the person files an original answer . . . .”) (emphasis added). Under
these circumstances, the statute would offer no relief at all. Section 73.055 does not
allow a plaintiff to send a request for correction, clarification, or retraction that
identifies only certain statements; avoid abatement with regard to the identified
statements due to that request; later amend his claims to contend that additional
statements were defamatory; avoid abatement because the time to abate has lapsed;
and then proceed to a jury on all statements despite failing to comply with section
73.055.
On its face, section 73.062 does not render meaningless section 73.055’s
concrete requirement that a plaintiff can maintain an action “only if” he complies
with the DMA. Nor does section 73.062 suggest that failure to request an
abatement―a request that, under the DMA, a defendant “may” make―somehow
excuses noncompliance with the DMA. Abatement is not the exclusive option (or,
12
in this case, even a possible option) when one has failed to and can no longer make
a timely and sufficient request as the DMA requires.
Likewise, the statutory language refutes Hogan’s argument that the loss of
exemplary damages is the remedy for failure to comply with the DMA. Cf. Warner
Bros. Entm’t, 538 S.W.3d at 812 (“[W]hen the statute is read in its entirety, giving
effect to all its provisions and considering the purpose of the statute, the consequence
for failing to timely make a request is not dismissal, but rather preclusion of recovery
of exemplary damages.”). The DMA specifically addresses exemplary damages: it
provides that a plaintiff may seek exemplary damages if he requests correction,
clarification, or retraction within 90 days of learning about the publication of an
allegedly defamatory statement. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.055(c).
Conversely, the DMA provides a one-year period to timely send a retraction request
and satisfy the DMA’s terms. So a request sent after 90 days from when the plaintiff
learns of the statement, but before 1 year from when a defamation claim accrues,
allows a plaintiff to proceed with a defamation claim. In that circumstance, the
plaintiff loses the right to recover exemplary damages but not the right to maintain
his claim. It cannot be that the remedy for failing to send a request throughout the
entire permissible year-long period (in direct contravention of the statutory
requirement) is the loss of exemplary damages, when the statute provides that a
13
plaintiff loses the right to those damages by failing to send a request in the 90-day
time period.
We are also unpersuaded by Hogan’s argument that the DMA does not bar his
claims because Zoanni did not challenge the sufficiency or timeliness of his March
2014 letter under section 73.058(c). Id. § 73.058(c) (“If a defendant intends to
challenge the sufficiency or timeliness of a request for a correction, clarification, or
retraction, the defendant must state the challenge in a motion to declare the request
insufficient or untimely served not later than the 60th day after the date of service of
the citation.”). In this appeal, Zoanni is not challenging the sufficiency or timeliness
of Hogan’s March 2014 request for correction, clarification, or retraction. She makes
no argument as to the three statements identified in that letter. To the contrary, she
concedes that Hogan satisfied the DMA with regard to those statements.
She instead argues that Hogan did not satisfy the DMA with regard to nine
other statements. It is undisputed that Hogan’s March 2014 letter did not identify
those nine statements at issue in this appeal. When Zoanni received the March 2014
letter, she had no way to know that Hogan would later allege other instances of
defamation. The DMA did not require Zoanni to divine that Hogan would later assert
that she also defamed him in other statements. To the contrary, the DMA required
Hogan to send requests for correction, clarification, or retraction that identified “with
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particularity” the statements he alleges are defamatory. Id. § 73.055(d). He did not
do so with regard to these nine statements.
Finally, the dissent’s view that one request for correction, clarification, or
retraction (of a particular publication) enables a plaintiff to proceed on any new or
distinct defamation claims against the same defendant cannot be reconciled with the
statute’s specificity requirement. Section 73.055 requires a plaintiff’s request to state
“with particularity the statement alleged to be false and defamatory and, to the
extent known, the time and place of publication.” Id. § 73.055(d) (emphasis added).
It also requires the request to allege the defamatory meaning “of the statement,” and
to “specif[y] the circumstances causing a defamatory meaning of the statement if it
arises from something other than the express language of the publication.” Id.
(emphasis added); see also id. § 73.057(c) (“If a request for correction, clarification,
or retraction has specified two or more statements as false and defamatory, the
correction, clarification, or retraction may deal with the statements individually in
any manner provided by Subsection (b).”) (emphasis added).
The legislature could have included an exception to the specificity
requirement. It could have said that identifying one statement with particularity
would suffice to support other allegations of defamation against the same defendant.
But it did not. The statute contains no exception to the specificity requirement when
15
a plaintiff happens to ultimately allege more than one instance of defamation—
whether related or not—against the same defendant.
The dissent focuses on a single use of the word “action” and argues that
“action” is distinct from “claim.” Id. § 73.055(a) (“A person may maintain an action
for defamation only if . . . .”). But the DMA’s “applicability” provision states that
the statute (and its requirement of a sufficiently specific and timely request for
correction, clarification, or retraction) applies “to a claim for relief, however
characterized, from damages arising out of harm to personal reputation caused by
the false content of a publication.” Id. § 73.054 (emphasis added).
The DMA’s use of the word “action,” read in the context of the statute as a
whole, does not nullify the statute’s requirement that a plaintiff must identify (in his
request for correction, clarification, or retraction) allegedly defamatory statements
with particularity. Nor does the term “action” allow a plaintiff to make an end-run
around the statute’s dictate that one may maintain an action for defamation only if
he sends a timely and sufficiently specific request for correction, clarification, or
retraction as to each allegedly defamatory statement. See, e.g., Jaster v. Comet II
Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 573 (Tex. 2014) (Willett, J., concurring) (“Because
these tools for analyzing isolated words have limitations, context becomes essential
to clarity.”); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002)
16
(“[C]ourts should not give an undefined statutory term a meaning out of harmony or
inconsistent with other provisions.”).
We hold that Hogan cannot recover on the nine statements at issue. The trial
court erred in submitting those claims to the jury over Zoanni’s objection.
Damages
Because we sustain Zoanni’s challenge to 9 of the 13 statements at issue in
this case, and because we cannot determine what part of the damages award is based
on the 4 remaining statements, we reverse the entire damages award. We cannot
determine the extent to which the damages award rests on legally invalid bases; nor
can we evaluate the substance of Zoanni’s arguments challenging damages premised
on the collective bases of liability—some of which are not legally viable. In sum,
we cannot be sure that reliance on invalid bases of liability exerted no significant
influence on the jury’s damages award. See Indian Oil Co. v. Bishop Petrol. Inc.,
406 S.W.3d 644, 660 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (where
damages could not be allocated between amounts for which the defendant was liable
and amounts for which he was not, remittitur was not a suitable remedy).
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Opinions Versus Facts5
For the four remaining statements in the case, we address Zoanni’s contention
that they represent opinions rather than facts, and thus that Hogan may not premise
defamation claims on them. They are not statements of opinion.
An opinion cannot support a claim for defamation. Dall. Morning News, Inc.
v. Tatum, No. 16-0098, 2018 WL 2182625, at *3 (Tex. May 11, 2018); Johnson v.
Phillips, 526 S.W.3d 529, 535 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. filed)
(first citing Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex. 2013); then citing Carr v.
Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex. 1989) (“[A]ll assertions of opinion are
protected by the first amendment . . . .”)). To be actionable, a statement must assert
a verifiable fact. Tatum, 2018 WL 2182625, at *3; Neely, 418 S.W.3d at 62. We
classify a statement as fact or opinion based on the statement’s verifiability and the
context in which the statement was made. Tatum, 2018 WL 2182625, at *3 (“[E]ven
when a statement is verifiable as false, it does not give rise to liability if the ‘entire
context in which it was made’ discloses that it is merely an opinion masquerading
as a fact.”); Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 581 (Tex. 2002). Whether a statement
presents a fact or an opinion is a question of law to be decided by the court. Johnson,
526 S.W.3d at 535.
Zoanni contends that the following four statements are opinions:
5
Based on our above holding, we do not reach Zoanni’s other arguments.
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(1) From a Facebook post and blog: “Growing concerns for my baby
girl!...What a good dad DOES NOT do: He doesn’t film young girls in
his youth group going to the bathroom and getting into the shower thru
the bathroom air vent in his house (caught and admitted to) . . . .”
(2) From a blog: “In my Facebook blast I did several weeks ago I said he
was caught and admitted to the camera in the bathroom. Let me be 100%
clear, he was guilty, but did not admit to the camera in the bathroom but
I know it was there. . . .”
(3) From Zoanni’s email: “David Hogan still has severe issues. . . . Please
tell me if you think it[’s] right that a minister who is involved in child
porn is put back into a church as children[’s] pastor after one year visiting
another pastor once a month and an online course as his rehab??”
(4) From Zoanni’s email: “David Hogan still has severe issues... There is an
open Sex Crimes case with Harris County Precinct 4, Case Number 13-
98077. . . . I filed a report on him last summer.”
In context, each statement presents a verifiable fact. Whether Hogan filmed
girls in his youth group or admitted to filming them, was involved in child
pornography, or was the subject of an open sex crimes case, are facts that are
objectively verifiable. These are not statements of opinion. See Tatum, 2018 WL
2182625, at *3; Johnson, 526 S.W.3d at 536-40; Neely, 418 S.W.3d at 62.
We overrule Zoanni’s third issue.
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Conclusion
We reverse and render judgment that Hogan take nothing on his defamation
claims premised on the nine statements barred by the DMA. We remand for further
proceedings on the four statements remaining at issue (all of which are listed above
in the “Opinion Versus Facts” section). See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(b).
Jennifer Caughey
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Caughey.
Jennings, J., dissenting.
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