Christopher G. Carrington v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                               Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-13-00505-CR
    Christopher G. CARRINGTON,
    Appellant
    v.
    The State of
    The STATE of Texas,
    Appellee
    From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2008-CR-8418A
    Honorable Maria Teresa Herr, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
    Sitting:          Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
    Karen Angelini, Justice
    Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: October 1, 2014
    AFFIRMED
    Christopher Carrington appeals the adjudication of his guilt and revocation of his
    community supervision, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding of a
    violation of the terms of his community supervision. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    Carrington was charged with aggravated robbery and pled nolo contendere to the lesser
    included offense of robbery. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 (West 2011). On September 23,
    2009, Carrington was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for a term of seven
    04-13-00505-CR
    years and was fined $1,500. In February 2012, the State filed a motion to revoke Carrington’s
    community supervision and adjudicate guilt. The trial court denied the motion and amended the
    conditions of community supervision. The State moved to revoke Carrington’s community
    supervision for a second time in August 2012. Again, the court declined to revoke and instead
    amended the conditions of Carrington’s community supervision, adding a provision stating there
    would be “zero tolerance” for any more violations. On January 10, 2013, the State filed its third
    motion to revoke alleging that Carrington had violated Condition No. 1 of his community
    supervision by committing the offense of possession of a controlled substance and Condition Nos.
    10A, 10B, 10C, and 10I by failing to pay the full amount of administrative fees, attorney fees,
    court costs/fine, and crime stoppers fee due to date. Carrington pled “not true” to each alleged
    violation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found all of the alleged violations to be true,
    entered an adjudication of guilt, and revoked Carrington’s community supervision. The court
    sentenced Carrington to ten years’ imprisonment and imposed the $1,500 fine.
    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Carrington challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
    finding that he violated Condition No. 1 of his community supervision by committing the offense
    of possession of a controlled substance. In a proceeding to revoke community supervision, the
    State has the burden to prove the defendant violated a term of his community supervision by a
    preponderance of the evidence. Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    The State meets its burden when the greater weight of the evidence creates a reasonable belief that
    the defendant committed the violation alleged in the State’s motion to revoke. Id.; Torres v. State,
    
    103 S.W.3d 623
    , 625 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). In reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and defer to
    the trial court as the sole fact finder and judge of the witnesses’ credibility. Torres, 103 S.W.3d at
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    04-13-00505-CR
    625; Jones v. State, 
    589 S.W.2d 419
    , 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Our review of an order revoking
    community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.
    
    Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763
    .
    In his brief, Carrington asserts the State failed to prove he possessed a controlled substance.
    Specifically, Carrington argues the evidence presented at the hearing merely showed that a baggie
    of powdery substance was found “in the vicinity of Appellant’s cell phone,” and created no more
    than a mere suspicion that he was in possession of the controlled substance.                   However,
    Carrington’s brief contains no discussion of the law of possession and no citation to any authority
    on the legal issue. As such, the sole issue raised by Carrington could be considered waived for
    inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). In this instance we will, however, liberally
    construe the briefing and address the merits of the legal issue in the interests of justice.
    A person possesses a controlled substance if he exercises care, control, and management
    of the substance and knows the substance is contraband. Poindexter v. State, 
    153 S.W.3d 402
    , 405
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Brown v. State, 
    911 S.W.2d 744
    , 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). When the
    defendant is not in exclusive possession of the place where the contraband is found, it cannot be
    concluded that he had knowledge of or control over the contraband unless additional independent
    facts and circumstances affirmatively link the defendant to the contraband. 
    Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406
    . The affirmative links must be sufficient to show the defendant’s connection with
    the contraband was more than just “fortuitous.” 
    Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747-48
    (State must present
    facts and circumstances that, viewed in their totality, indicate the defendant’s knowledge and
    control over the drugs).
    Here, the record of the revocation hearing contains the following testimony in support of
    the court’s finding that Carrington knowingly possessed contraband: Officer Tim Coleman
    testified that Carrington was holding his cell phone when he stepped to the back of his vehicle
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    04-13-00505-CR
    during a roadside stop and the phone fell to the ground during the struggle that preceded
    Carrington’s arrest on outstanding municipal court warrants; Officer Ryan Luza testified that he
    recovered a cell phone and its back, a battery, and a small baggie with a white powdery substance
    on the ground by the cell phone in the location where the struggle occurred, and that Carrington
    later stated, “That fell out of my cell phone;” and a toxicologist testified that the powdery substance
    tested positive for methamphetamine. Although Carrington testified and denied any knowledge
    of the baggie of methamphetamine and denied making the inculpatory statement to Officer Luza,
    the trial court as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility could have believed the officers over
    Carrington. See 
    Torres, 103 S.W.3d at 625
    . The evidence that Carrington was present at the time
    and in the location where the baggie of drugs was found, the drugs were found next to the cell
    phone that Carrington dropped, and Carrington was heard to make an incriminating statement that
    the drugs were inside the cell phone combined to create an affirmative link sufficient to support a
    reasonable inference that Carrington knowingly possessed the contraband. See Evans v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 158
    , 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that while the defendant’s presence in or
    proximity to location where drugs are found is alone insufficient, when considered along with
    other direct or circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to the drugs it may be sufficient to
    establish knowing possession); Hyett v. State, 
    58 S.W.3d 826
    , 830 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (identifying several non-exclusive factors used by the courts in determining
    affirmative links). Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
    Carrington’s community supervision based on a finding that he knowingly possessed a controlled
    substance.
    In addition, at the revocation hearing Carrington conceded that he had not paid the full
    amounts of the various fees due under Condition Nos. 10A, 10B, 10C, and 10I of his community
    supervision, but stated that he had purchased a used car for $4,200 cash and was paying $62 per
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    04-13-00505-CR
    month in car insurance. Thus, the trial court could have found that the State proved that Carrington
    was financially able to pay more toward his court-ordered fees than he had paid and had therefore
    intentionally violated the payment conditions of his community supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
    PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 21(c) (West Supp. 2014). The trial court found the alleged violations of
    Condition Nos. 10A, 10B, 10C, and 10I to be “true,” and each of these violations would alone
    support the revocation of Carrington’s community supervision. See Smith v. State, 
    286 S.W.3d 333
    , 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Jones v. State, 
    571 S.W.2d 191
    , 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App.
    [Panel Op.] 1978)). Carrington does not challenge these grounds for the revocation.
    Based on the foregoing reasons, we overrule Carrington’s issue on appeal and affirm the
    trial court’s judgment.
    Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
    DO NOT PUBLISH
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