Vanessa Anderson v. American Risk Insurance Company, Inc. ( 2016 )

Opinion issued June 21, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-15-00257-CV
———————————
VANESSA ANDERSON, Appellant
V.
AMERICAN RISK INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 295th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2012-68212
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Vanessa Anderson appeals the trial court’s rendition of summary judgment
in favor of American Risk Insurance Company, Inc. (“ARIC”). Anderson brought
contractual and extra-contractual claims against ARIC related to an insurance
coverage dispute that arose after her house was damaged during a storm. After
paying the appraisal award, ARIC filed a traditional motion for summary judgment
on all claims. The trial court granted summary judgment and rendered a take-
nothing judgment. Anderson contends that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment because material issues of fact existed and payment of the
appraisal award did not preclude her claims. We affirm.
Background
Anderson’s residence in Spring, Texas was covered by an ARIC
homeowner’s insurance policy. During a storm on June 12, 2012, a tree fell
through the roof of her home. All told, after the storm, one bedroom and one
bathroom were destroyed by the tree, and the home had no water, power, or air
conditioning.
According to her summary-judgment affidavit, Anderson called ARIC to
report the loss that day, but she was only able to reach an answering service, which
told her that an ARIC representative would be in touch. On June 13, 2012,
Anderson called ARIC again and spoke with Chad Pleasant. Pleasant was not
aware that Anderson had called the day before and informed her that someone
would be out to inspect the loss. He further stated that Anderson would have to
submit receipts for expenses incurred in relation to the loss and that she was
responsible for any further damage to her home. According to Anderson’s
affidavit, Pleasant promised a return call, but did not call her back “right away.”
2
Anderson further averred that reimbursements from ARIC “were severely
delayed.”
ARIC’s summary-judgment evidence shows that, within three days of the
tree falling, Steve Mazey inspected the property on behalf of ARIC. Mazey
estimated the total loss at $58,784.05, a figure that included the actual cash value
of damage to the home as well as $500 to compensate for the loss of food in two
refrigerators and $1,688.66 to compensate for damage to the backyard fence. Less
the $2,500 deductible, the estimated total owed to Anderson under the policy was
$56,284.05. Mazey recommended an initial payment of $47,505.79 and a
completion payment of $8,778.26.
From June to September 2012, ARIC made a series of payments to
Anderson totaling $52,475.22. On June 15, 2012, ARIC issued Check No. 1289
for $500. On July 3, 2012, ARIC issued three checks to Anderson: Check No.
1354 for $47,005.79, Check No. 1355 for $500.00, and Check No. 1356 for
$172.52. On September 6, 2012, ARIC issued another two checks: Check No.
1544 for $3,081.00 and Check No. 1545 for $1,215.91.
Anderson lived at the apartment complex Marquis at Woodlands from
August 11, 2012, through October 10, 2012. According to her affidavit, she
accrued late fees because ARIC was slow to reimburse her though she was “very
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prompt about submitting” receipts. Anderson concludes her affidavit by
explaining:
There was very little to no response from carrier from the moment I
filed the claim. [Additional living expenses] were reimbursed
extremely slow or not at all. I owe relatives money for rent and
apartment complex rent and utilities. My credit is on the line for
unpaid debt.
On November 8, 2012, Anderson sent a demand letter to ARIC seeking
$300,000 to settle her claims: $200,000 for actual damages, $25,000 for mental
anguish, and $75,000 for attorney’s fees and expenses. On November 20, 2012,
she filed suit, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the common law
duty of good faith and fair dealing, various violations of Chapter 541 of the Texas
Insurance Code and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”), and violations of
the prompt payment provisions set forth in Chapter 542 of the Texas Insurance
Code.
ARIC answered and denied all of Anderson’s allegations. In May 2013, the
parties attempted mediation, but were unable to resolve the dispute. ARIC then
invoked its right to appraisal, as provided for under the policy, and designated
Scott Gerner as its appraiser.1 Anderson initially refused to participate in the
1
The appraisal provision of the policy provides:
Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the actual cash value, amount of
loss, or the cost of repair, either can make a written demand for appraisal.
Each will then select a competent, independent appraiser and notify the
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appraisal process, and ARIC filed a motion to compel appraisal. In September
2013, the trial court granted ARIC’s motion to compel appraisal, and Anderson
designated Darrin Snuggs as her appraiser. In December 2013, pursuant to an
agreed motion, the trial court appointed John A. Coselli, Jr. to serve as a neutral
umpire for the appraisal.
In an affidavit filed in support of ARIC’s summary-judgment motion,
Gerner averred that he attempted to contact Snuggs to coordinate appraisal on
multiple occasions between November 2013 and March 2014, but Snuggs never
responded. In April 2014, Anderson appointed a new appraiser, Max Judge.
According to Gerner’s affidavit, Judge initially informed Gerner that he did not
intend to inspect the property because repairs were already 70% complete.
Ultimately, however, Gerner and Judge both inspected Anderson’s property on
May 17, 2014. Gerner submitted his initial estimate to Coselli two days later and
other of the appraiser’s identity within 20 days of receipt of the written
demand. The two appraisers will choose an umpire. If they cannot agree
upon an umpire within 15 days, you or we may request that the choice be
made by a judge of a district court of a judicial district where the loss
occurred. The two appraisers will then set the amount of the loss, stating
separately the actual cash value and loss to each item.
If the appraisers fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the
umpire. An itemized decision agreed to by any two of these three and filed
with us will set the amount of the loss. Such award shall be binding on you
and us.
Each party will pay its own appraiser and bear the other expenses of the
appraisal and umpire equally.
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provided a requested room-by-room comparison on June 24, 2014.2 Coselli issued
the appraisal award on July 17, 2014, and Gerner co-signed that award on
August 1, 2014.
The appraisal award set the total replacement cost value for Anderson’s
home and other structures at $75,289.90. Less the $2,500 deductible and prior
payments, the net appraisal award payment due for dwelling and other structures
totaled $24,666.20.3 The appraisal award set the total additional living expenses
(“ALE”) owed at $21,000. Less prior payments and the amount above policy
limits, the net appraisal award payment due for additional living expenses totaled
$8,746.48.4 ARIC’s summary-judgment evidence shows that ARIC issued checks
to Anderson on August 8, 2014, in the amounts of $24,666.20 and $8,746.48, in
payment of the appraisal award.
In October 2014, ARIC moved for traditional summary judgment on all
claims. ARIC asserted that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
2
Anderson has not directed our attention to, nor have we found, any evidence in the
record showing whether and when Judge submitted his appraisal estimate or the
amount of Judge’s appraisal estimate.
3
ARIC reduced the gross appraisal award to account for two prior payments: Check
No. 1354 for $47,005.70 paid on July 3, 2012; and Check No. 1545 for $1,215.91
paid on September 6, 2012.
4
The policy limits compensation for additional living expenses to $12,500, and thus
ARIC reduced the gross appraisal award for ALE by $8,500 to bring the award
within policy limits. The gross appraisal award for ALE was further reduced to
account for three prior payments: Check No. 1355 for $500 paid on July 3, 2012;
Check No. 1356 for $172.52 paid on July 3, 2012; and Check No. 1544 for
$3,081.00 paid on September 6, 2012.
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Anderson’s breach of contract and extra-contractual claims because it fulfilled its
obligations under the contract by timely paying the appraisal award. ARIC further
asserted that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the extra-contractual
claims because there was a bona fide dispute about the amount of covered damages
and Anderson’s alleged damages are barred by the economic loss rule. Finally,
ARIC argued that no genuine issue of material fact existed on the
misrepresentation and fraud claims because Anderson had not identified any
particular false representation which she relied upon to her detriment.
Anderson’s response to summary judgment relied on only one additional
piece of evidence: Anderson’s own sworn affidavit. Anderson asserted in her
response that ARIC “failed to make any payments after conducting an
investigation and evaluation” and that material issues of fact existed on all claims.
Without stating its reasons, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of ARIC on all claims.
Discussion
Anderson contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
in favor of ARIC because material issues of fact prevent judgment as a matter of
law and payment of the appraisal award does not preclude her extra-contractual
claims.
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A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). If a trial court grants summary
judgment without specifying the grounds for granting the motion, we must uphold
the trial court’s judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious. Beverick v. Koch
Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet.
denied). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence
favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and
resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett,
164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).
In a traditional summary-judgment motion, the movant has the burden to
show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the trial court should
grant judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); KCM Fin. LLC v.
Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 79 (Tex. 2015). When the movant urges multiple
grounds for summary judgment and the order does not specify which was relied
upon to render the summary judgment, the appellant must negate all grounds on
appeal. McCoy v. Rogers, 240 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, pet. denied); Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894, 898
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 381 (Tex. 1993)). “If summary judgment may have been
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rendered, properly or improperly, on a ground not challenged, the judgment must
be affirmed.” Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898 (citing Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14,
23 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied)).
B. Breach of Contract
In her petition, Anderson alleged that ARIC was liable for breach of contract
because it failed “to pay appellant’s benefits relating to the cost to properly repair”
her property. ARIC argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Anderson’s breach of contract claim because the claim is precluded by ARIC’s
appraisal award payment.
Under Texas law, “[t]he essential elements of a breach of contract claim are
(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by
the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained
as a result of the breach.” Schlumberger Ltd. v. Rutherford, 472 S.W.3d 881, 892
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (quoting CCC Grp., Inc. v. S. Cent.
Cement, Ltd., 450 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no
pet.).
The Texas Supreme Court has long recognized the validity of appraisal
provisions, which “provide a means to resolve disputes about the amount of loss
for a covered claim.” In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d
404, 406–07 (Tex. 2011); see also Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 8
9
S.W. 630, 631 (Tex. 1888). Absent illegality or waiver, appraisal clauses are
generally enforceable. State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 888 (Tex.
2009) (“In the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, the parties having agreed that
the amount of loss shall be determined in a particular way, we are constrained to
hold that such stipulation is valid.” (quoting Scottish Union, 8 S.W. at 631));
Amine v. Liberty Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co., 2007 WL 2264477, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 9, 2007, no pet.) (“Appraisal awards made under the
provisions of an insurance contract are binding and enforceable . . . .”). Texas
courts indulge every reasonable presumption to sustain an appraisal award.
Franco v. Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 154 S.W.3d 777, 786 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
“Under Texas law, when an insurer makes timely payment of a binding and
enforceable appraisal award, and the insured accepts the payment, the insured is
‘estopped by the appraisal award from maintaining a breach of contract claim
against [the insurer].’” Blum’s Furniture Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds
London, No. 11-20221, 2012 WL 181413, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) (quoting
Franco, 154 S.W.3d at 787). By payment of the full amount of an appraisal award,
the insurer “complie[s] with every requirement of the contract, [and] it cannot be
found to be in breach.” Breshears v. State Farm Lloyds, 155 S.W.3d 340, 344
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).
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Here, the undisputed evidence shows that ARIC invoked the appraisal
process, as provided for under the policy, to determine the value of Anderson’s
claim. Both parties appointed appraisers and agreed upon an umpire. By
August 1, 2014, the appraisal award was set. One week later, ARIC tendered
payment of the appraisal award after accounting for the deductible, prior payments,
and policy limits. Accordingly, the summary judgment record conclusively shows
that ARIC fulfilled its obligations under the contract. See Scalise v. Allstate Tex.
Lloyds, No. 7:13-CV-178, 2013 WL 6835248, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2013)
(“[A]n insurer does not breach the insurance contract where, as here, it pays all
damages determined by the appraisal.”); Breshears, 155 S.W.3d at 344 (insurer
fulfilled every requirement of contract where it participated in appraisal process
and timely paid amount set by appraisal award).
The fact that ARIC did not pay the amount of the award earlier, alone, does
not raise a fact issue on Anderson’s claim for breach of contract. See Graber v.
State Farm Lloyds, No. 3:13-CV-2671-B, 2015 WL 3755030, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
June 15, 2015) (concluding insured “estopped from relying on the appraisal award
to demonstrate that [insurer] breached the Policy when it initially issued payment
to [insured] for an amount less than the appraisal”); Breshears, 155 S.W.3d at 343
(explaining that insured may not use the fact that appraisal award was different
than amount originally paid as evidence of breach of contract); Scalise, 2013 WL
11
6835248, at *5 (“[W]here the parties disagree on the amount of loss and submit to
the contractual appraisal process to resolve that dispute, and the insurer pays all
covered damages determined by the award, the insured may not then argue that the
initial failure to pay those damages equates to a breach of contract.”).
Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly rendered summary judgment
in favor of ARIC on Anderson’s breach of contract claim.
C. Extra-Contractual Claims
1. Claim under Chapter 542 of Texas Insurance Code
Anderson’s petition alleged a violation of section 542.058 of the Texas
Insurance Code, which provides that an insurer shall pay damages, with interest,
and attorney’s fees if an insurer delays payment of a claim for longer than 60 days.
TEX. INS. CODE § 542.058. ARIC argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on Anderson’s section 542.058 claim because it is undisputed that ARIC
timely paid the appraisal award.
The insured bears the burden to establish its right to Chapter 542 remedies.
Republic Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex.
2004). To establish that right, the insured must prove that “(1) a claim was made
under an insurance policy, (2) the insurer is liable for the claim, and (3) the insurer
failed to follow one or more sections of the prompt-payment statute with respect to
the claim.” United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. AMJ Invs., LLC, 447 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex.
12
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. dism’d). That said, full and timely payment
of an appraisal award under the policy precludes an insured from recovery of
penalties under section 542.058 as a matter of law. In re Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins.
Ass’n, 308 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig.
proceeding).
Here, the summary judgment evidence demonstrates that the parties
participated in the appraisal process and that an appraisal award was determined on
August 1, 2014. It is undisputed that ARIC issued checks in full payment of the
appraisal award on August 8, 2014—well within the timeliness requirements of
section 542.058. Because the summary judgment evidence conclusively
demonstrates that ARIC fully and timely paid the appraisal award, Anderson is
precluded from maintaining her prompt payment claim as a matter of law. See In
re Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 308 S.W.3d at 563 (“Texas courts . . . have
concluded that full and timely payment of an appraisal award under the policy
precludes an award of penalties under the Insurance Code’s prompt payment
provisions as a matter of law.”); see also United Neurology, P.A. v. Hartford
Lloyd’s Ins. Co., No. H-10-4248, 2015 WL 1470296, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
2015) (collecting cases).
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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly rendered summary
judgment in favor of ARIC on Anderson’s prompt payment claim under section
542.058 of the Insurance Code.
2. Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Anderson alleged that ARIC breached its common law duty of good faith
and fair dealing “by denying [Anderson’s] claims or inadequately adjusting and
making an offer on [Anderson’s] claims without any reasonable basis, and by
failing to conduct a reasonable investigation to determine whether there was a
reasonable basis for these denials.” ARIC argues on appeal, as it did in the trial
court, that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Anderson’s common law
bad faith claim because there was no breach of contract, and even had there been,
there was a bona fide dispute about coverage.
Under Texas law, “[a]n insurer has a duty to deal fairly and in good faith
with its insured in the processing and payment of claims.” Republic Ins. Co. v.
Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. 1995). An insurer breaches this duty of good
faith and fair dealing “if the insurer knew or should have known that it was
reasonably clear that the claim was covered,” but denies or unreasonably delays
payment of the claim. Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 55–56 (Tex.
1997).
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However, “absent a breach of contract, the insured cannot maintain a
common law bad faith claim in Texas unless the insurer ‘commit[s] some act, so
extreme, that would cause injury independent of the policy claim’ or ‘fails to
timely investigate the insured’s claim.’” Graber, 2015 WL 3755030, at *5
(quoting Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341). “Evidence establishing only a bona fide
coverage dispute does not demonstrate bad faith.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Simmons, 963 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. 1998).
Here, ARIC’s payment of all covered damages extinguished any breach of
contract claim arising from the dispute. Thus, in order to avoid summary judgment
on her common law bad faith claim, Anderson had the burden to raise a genuine
issue of material fact that ARIC “commit[ed] some act, so extreme, that would
cause injury independent of the policy claim” or failed to timely investigate her
claim. See Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341. We conclude that Anderson did not present
evidence of an act so extreme that it caused injury independent of the policy claim.
See Scalise, 2013 WL 6835248, at *7 (finding no independent injury where insured
“made only those fairly routine allegations of a substandard (albeit timely)
investigation and initial undervaluation of his covered claim, the entirety of which
was timely paid upon issuance of the appraisal award”); see also Mid-Continent
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 709 F.3d 515, 521–22 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting
that “in seventeen years since [Stoker] appeared, no Texas court has yet held that
15
recovery is available for an insurer’s extreme act . . . .”). Rather, the summary
judgment evidence demonstrates only a bona fide dispute about the amount
necessary to compensate Anderson for covered damage to her home. See
Simmons, 963 S.W.2d at 44 (“Evidence establishing only a bona fide coverage
dispute does not demonstrate bad faith.”).
Nor did Anderson raise a fact issue on the question of whether ARIC failed
to timely investigate her claim. Within 15 days of receiving notice of a claim,
insurers are required to acknowledge receipt of the claim, commence investigation
of the claim, and request items and forms “that the insurer reasonably believes, at
that time, will be required from the claimant.” TEX. INS. CODE § 542.055(a)(1)–
(3). Here, undisputed summary judgment evidence shows that on June 15, 2012—
three days after Anderson reported the claimed loss—a representative of ARIC
inspected the property. Thus, the evidence conclusively shows that ARIC
acknowledged receipt and commenced an investigation of the claim within the
prescribed 15-day window.
In sum, because Anderson’s breach of contract claim fails and she has failed
to show that ARIC caused her to suffer some injury independent of her policy
claim or failed to timely investigate her claim, we conclude that there is no genuine
fact issue on Anderson’s common law duty of good faith and fair dealing claim,
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and thus the trial court did not err in rendering judgment as a matter of law on this
claim in favor of ARIC. See Graber, 2015 WL 3755030, at *7.
3. Bad Faith Claims under Texas Insurance Code and DTPA
Anderson’s petition alleged that ARIC violated Chapter 541 of the Insurance
Code and the DTPA by “failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt,
fair, and equitable settlement of . . . a claim with respect to which the insurer’s
liability has become reasonably clear,” and by “refusing to pay a claim without
conducting a reasonable investigation with respect to the claim.”
Under Texas law, an individual damaged by “unfair method[s] of
competition or unfair or deceptive act[s] or practice[s] in the business of
insurance” may bring a cause of action under the Texas Insurance Code. TEX. INS.
CODE § 541.151. “The prohibited conduct includes ‘failing to attempt in good
faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a claim with respect to
which the insurer’s liability has become reasonably clear.” Performance Autoplex
II Ltd. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 322 F.3d 847, 860–61 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
TEX. INS. CODE § 541.151). A violation of Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance
Code is also a violation of the DTPA. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.50(a)(4).
“Texas law holds that extra-contractual tort claims pursuant to the Texas
Insurance Code and the DTPA require the same predicate for recovery as a bad
faith claim under a good faith and fair dealing violation.” Broxterman v. State
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Farm Lloyds, No. 4:14-CV-661, 2016 WL 482882, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2016).
“When an insured joins claims under the Texas Insurance Code and the DTPA
with a bad faith claim, all asserting a wrongful denial of policy benefits, if there is
no merit to the bad faith claim, there can be no liability on either statutory claim.”
O’Quinn v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., No. 1:13-CV-471, 2014 WL 3974315, at *8
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2014).
As we concluded above, there is no merit to Anderson’s bad faith claim
given that she failed to present evidence of breach of contract, independent injury,
or untimely investigation. As a result of these same failings, there can be no
liability under Anderson’s Chapter 541 and related DTPA claims. See Graber,
2015 WL 3755030, at *7; O’Quinn, 2014 WL 3974315, at *8.
4. Misrepresentation and Common Law Fraud by Negligent
Misrepresentation
Anderson’s petition alleged that ARIC was liable for an intentional
misrepresentation and for common law fraud by negligent misrepresentation.
ARIC argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on such claims
because post-loss misrepresentations are not actionable and Anderson has failed to
plead a specific and material false representation.
To maintain a misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must substantively plead a
misrepresentation that was a producing cause of his actual damages. TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE § 17.50(a). To recover on a fraud claim, a party must prove that (1) a
18
material representation was made; (2) the representation was false; (3) when the
representation was made, the speaker knew it was false or made it recklessly
without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the speaker
made the representation with the intent that the other party should act upon it;
(5) the party acted in reliance on the representation; and (6) the party suffered
injury as a result. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341
S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc.,
297 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. 2009)).
Here, Anderson has neither alleged nor adduced summary judgment
evidence demonstrating “some specific misrepresentation by the insurer or agent
about the insurance” that was a producing cause of her alleged damages, as
required by section 17.50(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. She has
similarly failed to identify a particular material false representation, as necessary to
sustain her common law fraud claim. Because Anderson failed to adduce evidence
creating a fact issue on both claims, ARIC was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on her misrepresentation and common law fraud by negligent
misrepresentation claims.
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Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Huddle.
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