Juan Jose Quintero v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
14-15-00252-CR
FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
8/24/2015 8:12:07 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Case No. 14−15−00252−CR FILED IN
__________________________________________________________________
14th COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
8/24/2015 8:12:07 PM
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
______________________________________________________________________________
JUAN JOSE QUINTERO,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee.
______________________________________________________________________________
Appealed from the 351st Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Number: 1390666
The Honorable Mark Kent Ellis, Presiding
__________________________________________________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, JUAN JOSE QUINTERO
__________________________________________________________________
Niles Illich
SBOT: 24069969
The Law Office of Niles Illich, Ph.D., J.D.
701 Commerce
Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 75202
Telephone: (972) 802−1788
Facsimile: (972) 236−0088
Email: Niles@appealstx.com
ATTORNEY FOR
APPELLANT JUAN JOSE QUINTERO
__________________________________________________________________
IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES AND COUNSEL
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Trial Court Judge: The Honorable Mark Kent Ellis
Appellant: JUAN JOSE QUINTERO
Trial Attorney: Mr. James Sims
440 Louisiana Street
Suite 200
Houston, Texas 77002
Appellate Counsel: Niles Illich
SBOT: 24069969
Law Office of Niles Illich, Ph.D., J.D.
701 Commerce
Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 75202
Direct: (972) 802−1788
Facsimile: (972) 236−0088
Email: Niles@appealstx.com
Appellee: THE STATE OF TEXAS
Trial and Appellate Counsel: Allan Curry
Mike Anderson
Devon Anderson
Joseph Allard (at trial)
Kristin Assaad (at trial)
Harris County District Attorney’s
Office
Criminal Justice Center
1201 Franklin
Houston, Texas 77002
ii
__________________________________________________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
__________________________________________________________________
Contents
IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES AND COUNSEL .................................................. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................................................v
STATEMENT OF CASE ...................................................................................... viii
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT ........................................... ix
ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................x
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................11
1. John Hermesch...................................................................................................11
2. Officer J. Bonnin ...............................................................................................14
3. Officer A. Barr ...................................................................................................14
4. Officer B. Tesfay ...............................................................................................15
5. Maria Hernandez ...............................................................................................15
6. Detective M. Stahlin ..........................................................................................15
7. Dr. Morna Gonsoulin .........................................................................................16
8. Karen Reyes .......................................................................................................17
9. Lois E. Williams-Rasmus ..................................................................................18
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................19
FIRST ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: The evidence was legally
insufficient to support the verdict because there was no evidence, circumstantial or
direct, to establish the required mental state. ...........................................................21
1. Standard of Review for a Legal Sufficiency Challenge ....................................21
iii
2. Rational Trier of Fact in a Legal Sufficiency Review.......................................22
3. Murder ...............................................................................................................23
4. Proof for Establishing Culpable Mental State ...................................................24
a. Law Governing Evidence of Culpable Mental State ......................................24
b. Cases Where Culpable Mental State was Established through
Circumstantial Evidence .......................................................................................24
c. The Culpable Mental State is a Required Element ........................................25
5. Facts of Quintero’s Case....................................................................................26
6. Application of Facts to Law ..............................................................................27
SECOND ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: The trial court committed
reversible error in denying Quintero a hearing on his motion for new trial because
it was timely filed and presnted. ..............................................................................31
1. Standard of Review............................................................................................31
2. Law ....................................................................................................................31
3. Facts ...................................................................................................................32
4. Analysis .............................................................................................................33
5. Error Analysis ....................................................................................................34
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................36
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................36
APPENDIX…………………………………………………………………….…37
iv
__________________________________________________________________
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
__________________________________________________________________
Cases
Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 906−07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) ...........................23
Butler v. State,
6 S.W.3d 636, 640–41 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) .............32
Clayton v. State,
235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ........................................................21
Hart v. State,
89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ..............................................................24
Herrera v. State,
367 S.W.3d 762, 770 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.)
........................................................................................ ……………23, 24, 28, 30
Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ....................................................... 22, 30
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318−19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979) ................................................21
Johnson v. State,
915 S.W.2d 653, 658 (Tex. App.―Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d) .............26
King v. State,
29 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). .........................................................32
v
King v. State,
953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........................................................34
Mason v. State,
905 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (enbanc) ........................................21
Mayreis v. State,
____ S.W.3d_____, No. 14-13-00769-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2746, *4 (Tex.
App.―Houston [14th Dist.] March 24, 2015, pet
ref’d.) .....................................24
Mendieta v. State,
706 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). .......................................................26
Moore v. State,
969 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ..............................................................24
Rozell v. State,
176 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ........................................................32
Saunders,
913 S.W.2d at 572. ...................................................................................................26
Smith v. State,
286 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). .......................................................31
Umanzor v. State,
No. 14-13-00958-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2281, *9−13 (Tex. App.―Houston
[14th Dist.] March 26, 2015, pet. ref’d.) (memo op.) (not designated for
publication). ................................................................................................... 25, 28
Will. v. State,
294 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) ...............25
vi
Statutes
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02................................................................................ viii, 11
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b) ...................................................................... 23, 27, 30
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a) ........................................................................ 23, 28, 30
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b); ....................................................................... 24, 28, 30
Rules
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.3 .................................................................................................34
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4(a) .............................................................................................33
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4(a). ............................................................................................31
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.6 .................................................................................................32
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) .............................................................................................34
vii
__________________________________________________________________
STATEMENT OF CASE
__________________________________________________________________
On August 12, 2013, the State of Texas indicted Juan Jose Quintero for the
murder of Ronald Stelly. 1 [CR 22]. The parties exchanged the ordinary and usual
discovery motions. Quintero’s trial began with voir dire on February 13, 2015. [1
RR 3]. A jury convicted Quintero four days later and on that same day sentenced
him to spend the remainder of his life in the custody of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice. [CR 149; 151; 1 RR 5; 5 RR 51].
At trial, the attorney for the State called nine witnesses and rested. [1 RR
3−4]. Quintero did not call any witnesses. The trial court presented the parties
with the jury charge and then submitted the case to the jury for deliberation. On
February 15, 2015, the jury found Quintero guilty. [4 RR 46]. That day the jury
sentenced Quintero to spend the remainder of his life in the custody of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. [CR 149; 151].
Quintero filed a motion for new trial, but the trial court denied the motion
because it was not argued to the Court within ten days of being filed. [CR 172−93;
210].
Quintero timely filed his notice of appeal. [CR 155].
1
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02.
viii
_________________________________________________________________
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT
__________________________________________________________________
Quintero requests oral argument. This case presents two unusual
circumstances. The first is a total lack of circumstantial evidence relating to the
mental state of the Appellant. The second is a denial by the trial court of a valid
motion for new trial that the trial court determined had been overruled by operation
of law fifty-one days after it had been filed because it was not argued within ten
days of the verdict. Accordingly, Quintero believes that oral argument will
facilitate this Court’s decisional process.
ix
__________________________________________________________________
ISSUES PRESENTED
__________________________________________________________________
FIRST ISSUE PRESENTED: Nine witnesses testified during trial. None of
these witnesses provided evidence of Quintero’s mental state. To
convict a defendant of murder there are required mental states.
Because there was no evidence, circumstantial or direct, of Quintero’s
mental state, is the evidence legally insufficient to support the verdict?
SECOND ISSUE PRESENTED: Quintero timely filed a motion for new
trial that was supported by his sworn testimony. This motion alleged
that Quintero’s attorney failed to investigate a legitimate claim for
self-defense and therefore did not elicit testimony to support such an
instruction during the trial and therefore could not ask for a jury
instruction on this. Quintero’s attorney emailed the court coordinator
concerning the motion for new trial and set the motion for hearing.
The trial court denied the motion without hearing on the basis that it
had not been argued to the court within ten days of the verdict being
announced. Did the trial court err?
x
To the Honorable Justices of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals:
Juan Jose Quintero presents this, his brief in support of his appeal.
_________________________________________________________________
STATEMENT OF FACTS
__________________________________________________________________
On August 12, 2013, the State of Texas indicted Juan Jose Quintero for the
murder of Ronald Stelly. 2 [CR 22]. Quintero’s trial began with voir dire on
February 13, 2015. [1 RR 3]. At trial, the attorney for the State called nine
witnesses and then rested. [1 RR 3−4]. Quintero’s attorney then asked for a
directed verdict. The trial court denied the request and Quintero rested. Neither
side objected to the jury charge as submitted to them by the trial court. [5 RR 46].
1. John Hermesch
As their first witness, the attorneys for the State called John Hermesch. [2
RR 14]. Hermesch testified that he is a life-long resident of Houston, that when he
works that he works on cellular phone towers for AT&T, that he had not used
drugs for eleven months, that he had several combined felony and misdemeanor
convictions for theft, and that he was affiliated with the Houstone [sic.] prison
gang and that the affiliation was manifest through a “713” tattooed on his face. [4
RR 14−16; 39; 44].
2
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02.
11
Hermesch testified that he was at the Astro Inn on June 4, 2013. [4 RR 16].
According to Hermesch, he was at the Astro Inn because it was “somewhere to
stay for the night.” [4 RR 19]. Although he typically stayed at the Covenant
House, a shelter for homeless and troubled youths, Covenant House had suspended
Hermesch for the night of June 4, 2013. [4 RR 49]. Hermesch testified that he met
a man with the nom de guerre “Black” at the Astro Inn. [4 RR 20−21]. Hermesch
testified that he and Black then used crack cocaine and then decided to “go get
some more.” [4 RR 21; 23; 47]. According to Hermesch, Black spoke with
Quintero about acquiring more crack cocaine in an area close to the second floor
room that Hermesch had secured. [4 RR 21−22]. Hermesch conceded that at all
relevant times he was under the influence of crack cocaine but contended that “it
didn’t impair [his] judgment.” [4 RR 58]. After this brief conversation, Quintero
left, entered a hotel room, and agreed that the drug sale should occur across the
street at a NAPA car store because there were too many police officers around the
hotel. [4 RR 24; 29]. Hermesch testified that Black was going to pay for the crack
cocaine and that Black “went around the corner” to complete the transaction with
Quintero. [4 RR 29].
Hermesch testified that Quintero was driving a car and that Quintero did not
want Hermesch to be part of the drug deal. [4 RR 29].
12
Hermesch testified that after approximately ten minutes that he returned to
the hotel room alone. [4 RR 31]. After sitting down, Hermesch got up and opened
the door and then “heard two gunshots fire off.” [4 RR 31]. Hermesch testified
that he roused his friend, Lamar Davis, and explained that he had heard two gun
shots and that he believed Black had been shot “because he was out there.” [4 RR
31]. Hermesch testified that he and Lamar walked towards the area where “the
exchange was supposed to occur.” [4 RR 33]. Hermesch testified that as he
approached the area where the exchange was to have occurred he did not see any
vehicles and then Davis suggested that going any further might be unwise and
apparently the two turned and began walking back to the hotel. [4 RR 34−35].
Hermesch testified that after he and Davis walked for about a minute that he
insisted that they “turn around” and go back to the location where the drug deal
was to have occurred. [4 RR 34−35].
After the pair turned around and walked out into the street, Hermesch and
Davis found a body “laying in the median or whatever.” [4 RR 36]. Hermesch
and Lamar then sought emergency assistance.
On cross-examination, Hermesch conceded that unspecified people had
blamed him for this shooting and even claimed that Hermesch had bragged about
committing the offense. [4 RR 49]. Hermesch then testified that “I did not see
him get shot.” [4 RR 51]. Hermesch testified that Stelly was killed, “not even five
13
minutes” after Hermesch left Black and Quintero. [4 RR 54; 59]. Hermech
testified later that he saw a car that was going to the site of the exchange and then
he heard two shots. [4 RR 54].
Hermesch testified that he did not ever see Quintero with a firearm. [4 RR
56].
2. Officer J. Bonnin
As their next witness, the attorneys for the State called Officer J. Bonnin of
the Houston Police Department. [4 RR 61]. Officer Bonnin testified to being on
duty on June 5, 2014 around 2:30 AM and to responding to a call for aid at the
Astro Inn. [4 RR 62−65]. Officer Bonnin testified that when he approached the
scene of the shooting that he saw two men trying to get his attention and then later
a man lying in the median. [4 RR 65−66]. According to Officer Bonnin, the man
lying on the median never spoke. [4 RR 67]. An ambulance arrived shortly after
Officer Bonnin and found the man on the median. [4 RR 68].
On cross-examination, Officer Bonnin testified that gunfire around the Astro
Inn is “very infrequent.” [4 RR 70]. Officer Bonnin testified that Lamar Davis
presented himself to the police as Roosevelt Davis. [4 RR 71].
3. Officer A. Barr
The attorneys for the State then called Officer A. Barr, also a veteran
member of the Houston Police Department. [4 RR 73]. Officer Barr testified that
14
on June 5, 2013 that he was a member of the Crime Scene Unit and that he was
dispatched to the Astro Inn. [4 RR 75]. Through Officer Barr, the attorneys for the
State admitted photographs of the scene of Stelly’s death, and, among other items,
a five dollar bill, a bullet core, two bullet shell casings, and a shoe. [4 RR 77−78;
83; 91]. Neither the bullet core nor the five dollar bill was tested for fingerprints or
for evidence of DNA. [4 RR 88].
4. Officer B. Tesfay
Then the attorneys for the State called Officer B. Tesfay. [4 RR 96]. He too
was a police officer with the Houston Police Department. [4 RR 96]. Officer
Tesfay assisted in the recovery of video footage of the Astro Inn on the night of the
shooting. [4 RR 98].
5. Maria Hernandez
As their next witness, the attorneys for the State called Maria Hernandez, an
employee of the Astro Inn. [4 RR 104]. She testified that Stelly lived at the Astro
Inn and that Quintero checked into the hotel on the night Stelly died. [4 RR 108;
117−18]. She testified that from her office that she could not see the median where
Stelly died. [4 RR 125].
6. Detective M. Stahlin3
3
According to Detective Stahlin, “[t]he Houston Police Department doesn’t have the rank or
position of detective.” [4 RR 171]. Instead, he characterized himself as “an officer that
15
The attorneys for the State then called Detective Stahlin, of the Homicide
Division of the Houston Police Department. [4 RR 127; 136]. By the time that
Detective Stahlin arrived at the scene, Stelly’s body had been removed. [4 RR
136]. Detective Stahlin described arriving at the scene and speaking with different
people. [4 RR 136−41]. The people with whom he spoke did not provide useful
information. [4 RR 142−43]. Then he testified to the process of recovering the
security videos from the Astro Inn and he described what the jurors were shown on
these videos. [4 RR 145−50]. The security video showed Quintero checking into
the Astro Inn and driving a white car. [4 RR 150−51]. The video skipped to 2:19
AM, when it showed Quintero getting into a white car and backing it out of a
parking spot. [4 RR 151−52]. Detective Stahlin testified that the video showed
Quintero stopping the car at the Astro Inn’s exit to Cavalcade. [4 RR 153−54].
The last image on the video was a female passenger “leaning forward and
motioning to [Quintero.]” [4 RR 154].
Detective Stahlin testified that the video did not show Stelly’s death. [4 RR
155]. The video did show Stelly “following” the car. [4 RR 160].
Detective Stahlin testified that three people identified John Hermesch as the
person who had killed Stelly. [4 RR 176].
7. Dr. Morna Gonsoulin
investigates murders.” [4 RR 171]. Because he is referred to as a detective in the record, he will
be so addressed in this brief.
16
The attorneys for the State then called an assistant medical examiner, Dr.
Gonsoulin. [4 RR 186]. Dr. Gonsoulin performed the autopsy on Stelly’s body.
[4 RR 189]. She testified that Stelly had been shot just above his “buttocks crease”
and that the bullet damaged his internal organs and then exited through his
abdomen. [4 RR 189−92; 196]. According to Dr. Gonsoulin, Stelly had ingested
cocaine and PCP shortly before his death. [4 RR 197]. Dr. Gonsoulin testified that
a gunshot wound caused Stelly’s death. [4 RR 197−98].
8. Karen Reyes
As their next witness, the attorneys for the State called Quintero’s sister-in-
law Karen Reyes. [5 RR 3−4]. Reyes testified that she was with Quintero on June
5, 2013 at the Astro Inn. [5 RR 5]. She testified that Quintero was driving her car
on June 5, 2013. [5 RR 7].
Reyes testified to having taken “bars” of the prescription medicine Xanax
and to not remembering the evening of June 4, 2013 or the morning of June 5,
2013 very well. [5 RR 8−9].
Reyes testified that Quintero had a gun on June 4, 2013, but she was only
able to testify to this because Quintero had shown it to her “[e]arlier in the day.”
[5 RR 9]. According to Reyes the gun was a “medium black gun” but she could
not recall whether it was an “automatic or a revolver.” [5 RR 10]. She testified
that she left a room in the Astro Inn with Quintero because she wanted to go home.
17
[5 RR 10]. She then testified that she and Quintero encountered two people and
they then got into her car and “drove.” [5 RR 12].
Reyes testified that the car stopped and that she “just heard gunshots.” [5
RR 13]. She testified that when she heard the gunshots, Quintero was outside of
the car. [5 RR 13]. She testified that she saw “the black guy,” one of the people
they had seen at the hotel, and that after she heard the shots that they “just left.” [5
RR 13]. As they were leaving, she saw “the black man” by “the tree.” [5 RR 13].
On cross-examination, Reyes testified that she did not see the shooting and that the
events of that night were difficult for her to remember because she had ingested
Xanax. [5 RR 16−19].
9. Lois E. Williams-Rasmus
As their final witness, the attorneys for the State called Lois E. Williams-
Rasmus who identified Stelly as her son. [5 RR 24].
The attorneys for the State then rested their case, Quintero asked for a
directed verdict, which the trial court denied, and then Quintero rested his case. [4
RR 25].
18
__________________________________________________________________
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
__________________________________________________________________
In his first issue, Quintero contends that the evidence is legally insufficient
to support the verdict because there is no evidence of Quintero’s mental state at the
time of the shooting. To convict a person of murder obligates the attorney for the
State to establish the required mental state. Establishing the mental state is often
done through circumstantial evidence, but in this case there is no evidence—
circumstantial or direct—to support the verdict. Nine witnesses testified at trial.
Five of these witnesses were members of the Houston Police Department or the
Medical Examiner’s Office who arrived at the scene after the shooting had
occurred. One witness was present at the scene but had taken a sufficient amount
of prescription medicines to prevent her from remembering the events. Two others
were in a nearby hotel and heard shots but did not see the shooting. And the last
witness was the complaining witness’ mother. Other than an agreement to buy and
sell illegal drugs, there is no indication of the events surrounding this shooting.
Because there is no evidence to support the required mental state, the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the verdict.
In his second issue, Quintero contends that the trial court committed
reversible error in denying his motion for new trial because it was not argued
before the court within ten days of the verdict being announced. “Presentment,” in
19
the context of a motion for new trial, requires that the motion for new trial be
brought to the trial court’s attention within ten days of the verdict being announced
in open court. “Presentment” is satisfied when the motion is brought to the
attention of the court coordinator. Here, via email, the coordinator was aware of
the motion for new trial seven days after the trial court announced the verdict. The
trial court, however, specifically denied the motion on the basis that it was not
argued to the court within ten days. Did the trial court err?
20
__________________________________________________________________
FIRST ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
__________________________________________________________________
In his first issue, Quentero contends that the evidence was legally
insufficient to convict him of murder because there was no evidence,
circumstantial or direct, to establish the culpable mental state.
1. Standard of Review for a Legal Sufficiency Challenge
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, intermediate-appellate
courts do not ask whether they believe the evidence at trial established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.4 Rather, they examine all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 This
review of the evidence includes both properly and improperly admitted evidence.6
Further, intermediate-appellate courts consider both direct and circumstantial
evidence, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in making
their determination.7
4
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318−19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).
5
Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Mason v. State, 905 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en
banc).
6
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
7
Id.
21
Under Jackson, appellate courts permit juries to draw multiple reasonable
inferences as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at
trial.8 However, juries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere
speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions.9
The Court of Criminal Appeals provided the following example of the
proper use of inferences:
A woman is seen standing in an office holding a smoking gun. There
is a body with a gunshot wound on the floor near her. Based on these
two facts, it is reasonable to infer that the woman shot the gun (she is
holding the gun, and it is still smoking). Is it also reasonable to infer
that she shot the person on the floor? To make that determination,
other factors must be taken into consideration. If she is the only
person in the room with a smoking gun, then it is reasonable to infer
that she shot the person on the floor. But, if there are other people
with smoking guns in the room, absent other evidence of her guilt, it
is not reasonable to infer that she was the shooter. No rational juror
should find beyond a reasonable doubt that she was the shooter, rather
than any of the other people with smoking guns. To do so would
require impermissible speculation. But, what if there is also evidence
that [all of] the other guns in the room are toy guns and cannot shoot
bullets? Then, it would be reasonable to infer that no one with a toy
gun was the shooter. It would also be reasonable to infer that the
woman holding the smoking gun was the shooter.10
2. Rational Trier of Fact in a Legal Sufficiency Review
8
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 16.
22
In Brooks, the Court of Criminal Appeals considered what it meant to be a
rational trier of fact. The Court of Criminal Appeals explained:
[a] hypothetical that illustrates a proper application of the Jackson v.
Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is [a] robbery-at-a-convenience-
store case:
The store clerk at trial identifies A as the robber. A properly
authenticated surveillance videotape of the event clearly shows that B
committed the robbery. But, the jury convicts A. It was within the
jury’s prerogative to believe the convenience store clerk and disregard
the video. But based on all the evidence the jury’s finding of guilt is
not a rational finding.11 (Emphasis original.).
3. Murder
Section 19.02(b) of the Penal Code defines murder as follows:
(b) A person commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; [or]
(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual;. . . 12
a. Definition of “Intentionally” and “Knowingly” in the Context
of 19.02(b)
A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is
his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.13
11
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 906−07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).
12
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b).
13
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a); Herrera v. State, 367 S.W.3d 762, 770 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
23
A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware his conduct is reasonably likely to cause the result.14
4. Proof for Establishing Culpable Mental State
a. Law Governing Evidence of Culpable Mental State
This Court has often written some variant of the following statement,
“[d]irect evidence of the elements of the offense, including the . . . culpable mental
state, is not required.” 15 Thus, proof of a culpable mental state may be inferred
from facts tending to prove its existence, typically: the acts, words, and conduct of
the accused.16
b. Cases Where Culpable Mental State was Established through
Circumstantial Evidence
One common method for determining that the circumstantial evidence
supports a finding that the accused had the required culpable mental state occurs
when the defendant testifies and the experts uniformly dispute the defendant’s
version of events. 17
14
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b); Herrera, 367 S.W.3d at 770.
15
Mayreis v. State, ____ S.W.3d_____, No. 14-13-00769-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2746, *4
(Tex. App.―Houston [14th Dist.] March 24, 2015, pet ref’d.).
16
Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d
4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that requisite mental state established through defendant’s
words, acts, and/or conduct.).
17
See e.g., Mayreis, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2746 at *10 (holding that circumstantial evidence of
require mental state was met when “[t]he medical examiner, forensic anthropologist, and treating
physician all found appellant’s explanation of [the complaining witness’] injuries impossible and
24
Another common method to find circumstantial evidence of the culpable
mental state is to consider the defendant’s conduct before during and after the
offense. 18 Recently, in Umanzor, an unpublished opinion, this Court affirmed a
conviction for murder when the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence of his culpable mental state because:
[a]lthough appellant claimed he was in fear for his life and for his
family, that fear does not undercut his intentional acts of retrieving a
firearm and loading it before engaging in the encounter with Reggie
and Boogie. Further, appellant admittedly chased after Reggie and
Boogie when they fled from his front porch, and appellant fired his
gun in their direction. Additionally, appellant lied to the police about
who the perpetrator was in an apparent effort to hide his involvement,
and appellant gave the murder weapon to his wife and told her to
“dump it,” which she did. 19
c. The Culpable Mental State is a Required Element
The homicide statues distinguish offenses based on the culpable mental state
required to establish their commission. The culpable mental state for manslaughter
is recklessness, which is “satisfied by evidence showing that the defendant
consciously disregarded a known substantial and unjustifiable risk that serious
testified that the injuries did not result from accidently administering improper CPR or
attempting to get [the complaining witness] to respond.”); see also Williams v. State, 294 S.W.3d
674, 683 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (holding jury could infer intent from
medical testimony that child's injuries were extensive, did not match appellant's explanation, and
must have been sustained during an episode of abuse).
18
Umanzor v. State, No. 14-13-00958-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2281, *9−13 (Tex.
App.―Houston [14th Dist.] March 26, 2015, pet. ref’d.) (memo op.) (not designated for
publication).
19
Id. at *9−10.
25
bodily injury would occur.”20 In contrast, “[t]he key to criminal negligence is the
failure of the actor to perceive the risk created by his conduct.” 21 Similarly, in
involuntary manslaughter, “the accused must be aware of the risk, and consciously
disregard it. In [criminally negligent homicide] it must be found that, though he
ought to have been aware of the risk, he was not.” 22
5. Facts of Quintero’s Case
Most of the witnesses in this case arrived after the shooting had occurred.
Hermesch, a felon and a member of a prison gang, testified that he and Black were
under the influence of crack cocaine, that they went to get more from Quintero,
that Quintero did not want Hermesch present for the sale, and that he never saw
Quintero with a gun. Hermesch also testified that he heard shots sometime
between ten minutes and two minutes after he left Stelly but that when he heard
them he was back in his room.
Maria Hernandez testified that Quintero was at the Astro Inn on the night of
the shooting, but testified that she could not see the location of the shooting from
her office. [4 RR 104; 125].
Detective Stahlin testified that the security video from the Astro Inn showed
Quintero at the Astro Inn, driving a white vehicle, and leaving the hotel around
20
Johnson v. State, 915 S.W.2d 653, 658 (Tex. App.―Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d).
21
Mendieta v. State, 706 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
22
Saunders, 913 S.W.2d at 572.
26
2:20 AM. [4 RR 151−52]. The video also showed Stelly walking in a direction
that appears to follow the car that Quintero was driving.[4 RR 160].
Finally, Karen Reyes, Quintero’s sister-in-law, testified that she had taken
bars of the Xanax and that she and Quintero were at the Astro Inn on the night of
the shooting. Reyes―the only witness to testify about a gun―testified that she
knew Quintero had a gun only because he had shown it to her earlier in the day. [5
RR 9−10]. She testified that shortly before the shooting that she was ready to go
home but that as she and Quintero left their room that they encountered two people
and that she and Quintero then “drove” for an unspecified distance. [5 RR 12].
She testified that she did not see the shooting, that when the car stopped she “just
heard shots,” and that Quintero was outside of the car at this time, and that she saw
“the black guy” by “the tree” as she and Quintero were driving away. [5 RR 13].
6. Application of Facts to Law
Here, the poverty of facts concerning Quintero’s mental state should have
prevented the jury from finding that Quintero “knowingly or intentionally” caused
the death of Ronald Stelly or that Quintero “intended” through some action to
“cause serious bodily injury” by committing “an act clearly dangerous to human
life that cause[d] the death of [Ronald Stelly].” 23
23
TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b).
27
Because murder is a result of conduct statute, the evidence had to have
shown that Quintero had a conscious objective or desire to cause the death of
Ronald Stelly; that Quintero was aware that his conduct would likely cause Ronald
Stelly’s death; or, that Quintero had a conscious objective or desire to cause
serious injury to Ronald Stelly and that to further that objective that Quintero
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life.24
The evidence presented here does not flatter Quintero. It shows that he was
in a hotel room that he had not paid for with his sister-in-law, that he was selling
drugs, that he left the hotel around 2:20 AM, that he had possessed a “medium
black gun” earlier in the day and probably around the time of the shooting, that he
did not want Hermesch present for the sale, not long after he left the hotel two
shots were fired from a gun, that Stelly died as a result of being hit by a shot that
entered above his “buttock crease,” and that Quintero was outside of the car when
the shooting occurred.
The facts of this case, however, distinguish it from a case like Umanzor, in
which this Court recently found that the sum of the appellant’s actions, viewed in
the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, permitted “a rational jury to have . . .
found [appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”25 Unlike Umanzor, in which
24
TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 6.03(a); 6.03(b); and 19.02(b); Herrera, 367 S.W.3d at 770.
25
Umanzor , No. 14-13-00958-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2281, *9−13.
28
this Court had evidence that the appellant retrieved a gun and loaded it, chased the
complaining witness, and then fired a shot, here the evidence is insufficient to
create an inference that Quintero had the required mental culpability. 26
Instead, this case requires circumstantial evidence and inferences from it to
establish that Quintero possessed a gun at the time of the shooting and that he fired
that gun. Reyes provided the only evidence that Quintero had possessed a gun
when she testified that Quintero drove to her to the scene, that he was outside of
the car when the shooting occurred, that Quintero had shown her a gun earlier at
some unspecified time earlier during the day of June 4, 2015, and that Stelly was
shot. Here, the combination of direct and circumstantial evidence combined with
the inferences there from is sufficient to establish that Quintero possessed a gun on
the morning of June 5, 2015 at the scene of the shooting.
The evidence, however, is not sufficient to show that Quintero fired this gun
or that Quintero shot Stelly and certainly it is not sufficient for a rational juror to
have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that, arguendo, when Quintero fired the
gun that it was his conscious objective or desire to cause the death of Stelly; that
when he pulled the trigger on the gun that he was aware that his act was reasonably
likely to cause the death of Stelly; or that it was his conscious objective or desire to
26
Id.
29
cause serious bodily injury to Stelly. 27 Specifically there was no evidence of what
occurred in the moments before the shooting. There is no evidence of any words
exchanged between Stelly and Quintero, no evidence of a conflict between them,
no evidence of a theft, etc.
The evidence in this case does not permit a rational juror to have concluded
that Quintero had a conscious objective or desire to cause the death of Ronald
Stelly; that Quintero was aware that his conduct would likely cause Ronald Stelly’s
death; or, that Quintero had a conscious objective or desire to cause serious injury
to Ronald Stelly and that to further that objective that Quintero committed an act
clearly dangerous to human life.28 In the words of the Hooper hypothetical, such
conclusions would “require impermissible speculation.”29 Because mere
speculation, even if it originates from circumstantial evidence and inferences there
from, cannot support a verdict, the evidence in this case was legally insufficient to
have supported the jury’s finding.
27
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16.
28
TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 6.03(a); 6.03(b); and 19.02(b); Herrera, 367 S.W.3d at 770.
29
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16.
30
__________________________________________________________________
SECOND ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
__________________________________________________________________
In his second issue, Quintero contends that the trial court erred in declining
to hear Quintero’s motion for new trial on the ground that the motion was not
argued to the trial court within ten days of the verdict being announced in open
court.
1. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a hearing on a motion for new
trial for an abuse of discretion. 30 The purpose of a hearing on a motion for new
trial is to (1) decide whether the case shall be retried; and (2) prepare a record for
presenting issues on appeal in the event the motion is denied.31
2. Law
A motion for new trial is timely filed when it is filed within 30 days of the
trial court pronouncing sentence. 32
When an accused presents a motion for new trial raising matters not
determinable from the record that could entitle the defendant to relief, the trial
court abuses its discretion in failing to hold a hearing. 33
30
Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
31
Id. at 338.
32
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4(a).
31
To “present” a motion in the context of a motion for new trial, the defendant
must give the trial court actual notice that he timely filed a motion for new trial and
requests a hearing on the motion for new trial.34 The presentment requirement
has been satisfied if the motion for new trial is brought to the attention of the
appropriate court coordinator. 35
3. Facts
Here, the trial court pronounced Quintero’s sentence in open court on
February 17, 2015. [5 RR 52]. Quintero filed his ten-page motion for new trial on
March 17, 2015. [CR 172–893]. Quintero supported his motion with a sworn
statement. [CR 187]. Quintero alleged that his attorney had been constitutionally
ineffective for failing to investigate the facts of his case which would have
permitted Quintero to ask for a self-defense instruction. [CR 172–80]. On March
24, 2014, Quintero’s counsel emailed Tramesha Randall, the Court Coordinator for
Quintero’s trial court and asked for a hearing. The two dates that Randall had
available were April 9, 2015 and May 5, 2015. [SCR 5]. On April 8, 2015, the
trial court entered an order denying Quintero’s motion for new trial without a
33
King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
34
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.6; Rozell v. State, 176 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
35
Butler v. State, 6 S.W.3d 636, 640–41 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d)
(concluding that presenting motion for new trial to court coordinator is sufficient to satisfy Tex.
R. App. P. 21.6’s presentment requirement).
32
hearing because the motion “was not presented to this Court within ten days of
filing, as required by Rule 21.4(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.”
[CR 196]. Then, on April 10, 2015, the trial court entered an order stating:
On April 9, 2015, this Court was presented with Juan Jose Quintero’s
Motion for New Trial. This Court denied a hearing on the Motion on
the basis that it was untimely presented to the Court. Specifically, this
Court found that the Motion was not presented, in the form of arguing
it to the Court, within ten days of it being filed and therefore was
overruled by operation of law and therefore Defendant was not
entitled to a hearing on the merits of the Motion.
[CR 210].
4. Analysis
Here, the trial court committed reversible error by denying Quintero’s
Motion for New Trial without a hearing. Quintero filed his motion 28 days after
the trial court pronounced his sentence in open court.36 [CR 172; 5 RR 52].
Quintero’s motion was supported with a sworn statement and it raised legitimate
issues concerning the quality of Quintero’s representation. [CR 172–85]. Seven
days after the Motion was filed, Quintero’s attorney emailed the appropriate court
coordinator and requested a hearing. [SCR 5]. The trial court then improperly
denied the motion because it had not been timely presented. [CR 209–10]. By
specifically holding that the motion was overruled by operation of law on April 10,
2015 because it had not been “presented, in the form of arguing [the motion for
36
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4(a).
33
new trial] to the Court, within ten days of it being filed. . .” the trial court
committed reversible error.
5. Error Analysis
Rule 44.2(b) provides that this Court may not reverse the trial court’s
decision without finding that the trial court’s decision affected Quintero’s
substantial rights.37 A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial
and injurious effect or influence on the final resolution of a case.38
Here, Quintero is serving a life sentence and he contends that his trial
attorney was constitutionally ineffective. The trial court’s erroneous decision
denied Quintero the opportunity to argue to the Court that his counsel was so
ineffective that he deserved a new trial.39 Because the Motion for New Trial and
the evidence supporting it argues that Quintero’s trial attorney never questioned
Quintero about the facts of this case and that this cost Quintero the opportunity to
present a self-defense argument, this error adversely affected Quintero’s
substantial rights and reversal is warranted.40
37
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
38
King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
39
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.3.
40
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
34
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Quintero asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s verdict and to render
acquittal, in the alternative, Quintero asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s
judgment and render a verdict for a lesser-included offense of murder and to
remand the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. Quintero also
asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s decision to deny a hearing on the motion
for new trial and to remand this case for a hearing on Quintero’s motion.
Respectfully Submitted
/s/ Niles Illich
Niles Illich
SBOT: 24069969
Law Office of Niles Illich, Ph.D., J.D.
701 Commerce
Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 75202
Direct: (972) 802−1788
Facsimile: (972) 236−0088
Email: Niles@appealstx.com
35
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This is to certify that this brief complies with Rule 9.8 of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure because it is computer generated and does not exceed 15,000
words. Using the word count feature included with Microsoft Word, the
undersigned attorney certifies that this brief contains 7,102 words. This brief also
complies with the typeface requirements because it has been prepared in a
proportionally-spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point Times New
Roman font for the text and 12-point Times New Roman font for the footnotes.
/s/ Niles Illich
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this the 31st day of May, 2015 that a true and
correct copy of this Brief was served on lead counsel for all parties in accord with
Rule 9.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Service was accomplished
through an electronic commercial delivery service and electronic mail as follows:
Harris County District Attorney’s Office
Alan Curry
1201 Franklin Street
Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002-1923
/s/ Niles Illich
36
APPENDIX:
Table of Contents
Tab One:
Judgment
Tab Two:
Orders on Motion for New Trial
Tab Three:
Statutes and Rules
37
TAB ONE
38
m CASE No 139066601010
INCIDENT NO./TRN: 916888O553AO0I
THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE 351ST DISTRICT
§
v. § COURT
§
QUINTERO, JUAN JOSE § HARRISCOUNTY, TEXAS
§
STATE ID No.:TX08534855 §
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BY JURY
Judge Presiding: Date Judgment
HON. MARK KENT ELLIS Entered: 02/17/2015
Attorney for State: Attorney for
ALLARD, JOSEPH Defendant: SIMS, JAMES M.
Offense for which Defendant Convicted:
MURDER
Charging Instrument: Statute for Offense:
INDICTMENT N/A
Date of Offense:
06/05/2013
Degree of Offense: Plea to Offense:
1ST DEGREE FELONY NOT GUILTY
Verdict of Jury: Findings on Deadly Weapon:
GUILTY YES, A FIREARM
Plea to 1 51 Enhancement Paragraph: Plea to 2"d Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph:
N/A N/A
Findings on 1 Enhancement
_
Findings on 2“d Enhancement/Habitual
sl
Paragraph: N/A Paragraph: N/A
Punished Assessed bv: Date Sentence Imposed: Date Sentence to Commence:
JURY 02/17/2015 02/17/2015
Punishment and Place of
Confinement: LIFE INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, TDCJ
THIS SENTENC E SHALL RUN CONCURRENTLY.
OF CONFINEMENT SUSPENDED, DEFENDANT PLACED ON COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FORN/A .
Fine: Court Costs: Restitution: Restitution Payable to:
$ N/A S $ N/A (see below) PAGENCY/AGENT (see below)
The age of the victim at the time of the offense was ___
Sex Offender Registration Requirements do not applyto the Defendant TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. chapter 62.
N/A .
If Defendant is to serve sentence in TDCJ. enter incarceration periods in chronological order.
From: 06/11/2013 to 02/17/2015 From: to
From: to From: to
Time Credited:
From: to From to
If Defendant is to serve sentence in county iaii or is uiven credit toward fine and costs, enter days credited below.
fcDAYSNOTES TOWARD FINE AND COSTS
All pertinent information, names and assessments indicated above are incorporated into the language of the judgment below by reference.
This cause was called for trial in HarrisCounty, Texas. The State appeared by her District Attorney.
Counsel / Warier of Counsel (select one)
0 Defendant appeared in person with Counsel.
Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to representation by counsel in writing in open court.
It appeared to the Court that Defendant was mentally competent and had pleaded as shown above to the charging instrument. Both parties
announced ready for trial. A jury was selected, impaneled, and swom. The INDICTMENT was read to the jury, and Defendant entered a plea to the
charged offense. The Court received the plea and entered it of record.
The jury heard the evidence submitted and argument of counsel. The Court charged the jury as to its duty to determine the guilt or innocence of
Defendant and the jury retired to consider the evidence. Upon returning to open court, the jury delivered its verdict in the presence of Defendant and
defense counsel, if any.
151
The Court received the verdict and ORDERED it entered upon the minutes of the Court.
Punishment Assessed hv Jury / Court / No election (select one)
Sjury. Defendant entered a plea and filed a written election to Itave the jury assess punishment. The jury heard evidence relative to the question of
punishment. The Court charged the jury and it retired to consider the question of punishment. After due deliberation, the jury was brought into Court, and,
in open court, it returned its verdict as indicated above.
CD Court Defendant elected to have the Court assess punishment. After hearing evidence relative to the question of punishment, the Court assessed
Defendant’s punishment as indicated above.
Election. Defendant did not file a written election as to whether the judge or jury should assess punishment. After hearing evidence relative to the
question of punishment, the Court assessed Defendant’s punishment as indicated above.
The Court FINDS Defendant committed the above offense and ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Defendant is GUILTY of the
above offense. The Court FINDS the Presentence Investigation, if so ordered, was done according to the applicable provisions of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 42.12 § 9
The Court ORDERS Defendant punished as indicated above. The Court ORDERS Defendant to pay all fines, court costs, and restitution as
indicated above.
Punishment Options (select one)
in State Jail or Institutional Division. The Court ORDERSthe authorized agent of the State of Texas or the Sheriff of this County to
take, safely convey, and deliver Defendant to the Director, Institutional Division, TDCJ . The Court ORDERS Defendant to be confined for the period
and in the manner indicated above. The Court ORDERS Defendant remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of this county until the Sheriff can obey the
directions of this sentence. The Court ORDERS that upon release from confinement, Defendant proceed immediately to the Harris County District
Clerk’s office. Once there, the Court ORDERS Defendant to pay, or make arrangements to pay, any remaining unpaid fines, court costs, and restitution as
ordered by the Court above.
—
0County Jail Confinement / Confinement in Lieu of Payment The Court ORDERS Defendant immediately committed to the custody of the Sheriff
of Harris County, Texas on the date the sentence is to commence. Defendant shall be confined in the HarrisCounty Jail for the period indicated above.
The Court ORDERS that upon release from confinement. Defendant shall proceed immediately to the Harris County District Clerk’s office. Once there,
the Court ORDERS Defendant to pay, or make arrangements to pay, any remaining unpaid fines, court costs, and restitution as ordered by the Court above.
ClFine Only Payment. The punishment assessed against Defendant is for a FINE ONI.Y. The Court ORDERS Defendant to proceed immediately to the
Office of the Harris CountyDistrict Clerk . Once there, the Court ORDERS Defendant to pay or make arrangements to pay all fines and court costs as
ordered by the Court in this cause.
Execution / Suspension of Sentence (select one)
IHh'he Court ORDERS Defendant’s sentence EXECUTED.
D The Court ORDERS Defendant's sentence of confinement SUSPENDED. The Court ORDERS Defendant placed on community supervision for the
adjudged period (above) so long as Defendant abides by and does not violate the terms and conditions of community supervision. The order setting forth
the terms and conditions of community supervision is incorporated into this judgment by reference.
The Court ORDERS that Defendant is given credit noted above on this sentence for the lime spent incarcerated.
Furthermore, the following special findings or orders apply:
DEADLY WEAPON.
THE COURT FINDS DEFENDANT USED OR EXHIBITED A DEADLY WEAPON, NAMELY, A FIREARM, DURING THE COMMISSION
OF A FELONY OFFENSE OR DURING IMMEDIATE FLIGHT THEREFROM OR WAS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE AND KNEW THAT
A DEADLY WEAPON WOULD BE USED OR EXHIBITED. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 42.12 §3G.
Signed and entered on 02/17/2015
MARK KENT ELLIS
JUDGE PRESIDING
Notice of Appeal Filed: 'BtfcAQiÿ IS,7015
Mandate Received: Type of Mandate:
__
Alter Mandate Received, Sentence to licgin Dale is:
Jail Credit:
Dcf Received on at DAM PM
By: . Deputy Sheriff of Harris County
Clerk: .1 REGGI.NS
Case Number:
Defendant: OUINTERO, JUAN JOSE
FN/KR04 C)CÿCJ I..CBT: v/ l.CBU: EN/KRI8:
w Right Thumbprint
152
TAB TWO
39
OPTV#
Cause No.: 139066601010
THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE 351 ST CRIMINAL
§
-v- § DISTRICT COURT
§
JUAN JOSE QUINTERO § OF HARRIS COUNTY
ORDER
Juan Jose Quintero’s Motion for New Trial was heard on this the day of
March. 2015.
\jJl6 n\L&
This Court FINDS that the Motion for New Trial was- presen ted to this Court within ten
days of filing, as required by Rule 21.4(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
A'ftecconsidering the Motion, the Response, and the argumentsÿ Court
GRANTS Juan Jose Qtrii new trial. TjdsTStJurt awards a new trial on the basis that
Quintero’s counsel wasÿrfSfltutionally ineffectTver ine to this conclusion, this Court
form) Imitted the exhibits attached to Quintero’s Motion.
ritTT
Signed on this the % day of l— , 201 5.
V-
VW %
v-<
The Honorable Mark Kent
13
196
Cause No.: 139066601010
THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE 351ST CRIMINAL
§
-v- § DISTRICT COURT
§
JUAN JOSE QUINTERO § OF HARRIS COUNTY
ORDER
On April 9, 2015, this Court was presented with Juan Jose Quintero’s Motion for New
Trial. This Court denied a hearing on the Motion on the basis that it was untimely presented to
the Court. Specifically, this Court found that the Motion was not presented, in the form of
arguing it to the Court, within ten days of it being filed and therefore was overruled by operation
of law and therefore Defendant was not entitled to a hearing on the merits of the Motion.
Signed on this the day of APR 10 ',2015.
The Honorable Mark Kent Ellis
210
TAB THREE
40
PENAL CODE § 6.03. DEFINITIONS OF CULPABLE MENTAL STATES.
(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or
to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that
the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s
standpoint.
(d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor’s standpoint.
PENAL CODE § 19.02
(a) In this section:
(1) “Adequate cause” means cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage,
resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of
cool reflection.
(2) “Sudden passion” means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by
the individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of
the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation.
(b) A person commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual;
(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human
life that causes the death of an individual; or
41
(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of
and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or
attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the
death of an individual.
(c) Except as provided by Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a felony of the first
degree.
(d) At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether he
caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate
cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence,
the offense is a felony of the second degree.
TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 21 NEW TRIALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
21.1 Definition.
(a) New trial means the rehearing of a criminal action after the trial court has, on the
defendant's motion, set aside a finding or verdict of guilt.
(b) New trial on punishment means a new hearing of the punishment stage of a criminal
action after the trial court has, on the defendant's motion, set aside an assessment of punishment
without setting aside a finding or verdict of guilt.
21.2 When Motion for New Trial Required. --A motion for new trial is a prerequisite to
presenting a point of error on appeal only when necessary to adduce facts not in the record.
21.3 Grounds. --The defendant must be granted a new trial, or a new trial on punishment, for
any of the following reasons:
(a) except in a misdemeanor case in which the maximum possible punishment is a fine,
when the defendant has been unlawfully tried in absentia or has been denied counsel;
(b) when the court has misdirected the jury about the law or has committed some other
material error likely to injure the defendant's rights;
(c) when the verdict has been decided by lot or in any manner other than a fair expression
of the jurors' opinion;
(d) when a juror has been bribed to convict or has been guilty of any other corrupt conduct;
(e) when a material defense witness has been kept from court by force, threats, or fraud, or
when evidence tending to establish the defendant's innocence has been intentionally destroyed or
withheld, thus preventing its production at trial;
42
(f) when, after retiring to deliberate, the jury has received other evidence; when a juror has
talked with anyone about the case; or when a juror became so intoxicated that his or her vote was
probably influenced as a result;
(g) when the jury has engaged in such misconduct that the defendant did not receive a fair
and impartial trial; or
(h) when the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.
21.4 Time to File and Amend Motion.
(a) To File. --The defendant may file a motion for new trial before, but no later than 30
days after, the date when the trial court imposes or suspends sentence in open court.
(b) To Amend. --Within 30 days after the date when the trial court imposes or suspends
sentence in open court but before the court overrules any preceding motion for new trial, a
defendant may, without leave of court, file one or more amended motions for new trial.
21.5 State May Controvert; Effect. --The State may oppose in writing any reason the
defendant sets forth in the motion for new trial. The State's having opposed a motion for new
trial does not affect a defendant's responsibilities under 21.6.
21.6 Time to Present. --The defendant must present the motion for new trial to the trial court
within 10 days of filing it, unless the trial court in its discretion permits it to be presented and
heard within 75 days from the date when the court imposes or suspends sentence in open court.
21.7 Types of Evidence Allowed at Hearing. --The court may receive evidence by affidavit
or otherwise.
21.8 Court's Ruling.
(a) Time to Rule. --The court must rule on a motion for new trial within 75 days after
imposing or suspending sentence in open court.
(b) Ruling. --In ruling on a motion for new trial, the court may make oral or written
findings of fact. The granting of a motion for new trial must be accomplished by written order. A
docket entry does not constitute a written order.
(c) Failure to Rule. --A motion not timely ruled on by written order will be deemed denied
when the period prescribed in (a) expires.
21.9 Granting a New Trial.
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(a) A court must grant a new trial when it has found a meritorious ground for new trial, but
a court must grant only a new trial on punishment when it has found a ground that affected only
the assessment of punishment.
(b) Granting a new trial restores the case to its position before the former trial, including, at
any party's option, arraignment or pretrial proceedings initiated by that party.
(c) Granting a new trial on punishment restores the case to its position after the defendant
was found guilty. Unless the defendant, State, and trial court all agree to a change, punishment in
a new trial shall be assessed in accordance with the defendant's original election under article
37.07, § 2(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(d) A finding or verdict of guilt in the former trial must not be regarded as a presumption of
guilt, nor may it be alluded to in the presence of the jury that hears the case on retrial of guilt. A
finding of fact or an assessment of punishment in the former trial may not be alluded to in the
presence of the jury that hears the case on retrial of punishment.
TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 44 REVERSIBLE ERROR
44.1 Reversible Error in Civil Cases.
(a) Standard for Reversible Error. --No judgment may be reversed on appeal on the ground
that the trial court made an error of law unless the court of appeals concludes that the error
complained of:
(1) probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment; or
(2) probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of
appeals.
(b) Error Affecting Only Part of Case. --If the error affects part of, but not all, the matter in
controversy and that part is separable without unfairness to the parties, the judgment must be
reversed and a new trial ordered only as to the part affected by the error. The court may not order
a separate trial solely on unliquidated damages if liability is contested.
44.2 Reversible Error in Criminal Cases.
(a) Constitutional Error. --If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional
error that is subject to harmless error review, the court of appeals must reverse a judgment of
conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.
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(b) Other Errors. --Any other error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect
substantial rights must be disregarded.
(c) Presumptions. --Unless the following matters were disputed in the trial court, or unless
the record affirmatively shows the contrary, the court of appeals must presume:
(1) that venue was proved in the trial court;
(2) that the jury was properly impaneled and sworn;
(3) that the defendant was arraigned;
(4) that the defendant pleaded to the indictment or other charging instrument; and
(5) that the court's charge was certified by the trial court and filed by the clerk before it
was read to the jury.
44.3 Defects in Procedure. --A court of appeals must not affirm or reverse a judgment or
dismiss an appeal for formal defects or irregularities in appellate procedure without allowing a
reasonable time to correct or amend the defects or irregularities.
44.4 Remediable Error of the Trial Court.
(a) Generally. --A court of appeals must not affirm or reverse a judgment or dismiss an
appeal if:
(1) the trial court's erroneous action or failure or refusal to act prevents the proper
presentation of a case to the court of appeals; and
(2) the trial court can correct its action or failure to act.
(b) Court of Appeals Direction if Error Remediable. --If the circumstances described in (a)
exist, the court of appeals must direct the trial court to correct the error. The court of appeals will
then proceed as if the erroneous action or failure to act had not occurred.
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