Dorsey, Henry Demond ( 2015 )

/Y7S-/S
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
O D '
UKi NAL
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
WITH A PETITION
HENRY DORSEY, Appellant Pro S'e
V. NOV 20 2015
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Abel ^costa, Clerk
Trial Case No. 137DB6B
•182nd Judicial District Court
of Harris County Texas
Appellate No. 14-14-0071B-CR
Appellate Court - Fourteenth
District Court of Appeals
Trial Judge: The Honorable
Jeahhine Barr
PARTIES:
Henry Dorsey #1950821 The State of Texas
Connally Unit FILED IN
899
Kenedy,
FM 632
TX 781-19
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
APPELLANT
U'OV 20 2015
Abel Acosla, Clerk
Page 1 of'17
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
-IDENTITY OF PARTIES
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES !'
ment. Following the closing arguments of each party, the jury
then retired for deliberation. Later, the jury returned with
a punishment verdict of 55 years TDCJ.
ISSUE ONE UITH AUTHORITY
Whether the trial court erred by violating Mr. Dorsey's
right to confrontations of the medical expert witness who actually
the autopsy of the decedent under applicable Federal and Texas
Confrontation Clause provisions, rather than her supervisor who
merely attended the autopsy. Although the supervisor reviewed
and approved the final report?
In the case at bar, the State called Dr. Mary Auzalone,
Assistant Medical Examiner of the Harris County Institute of
Forensic Sciences, to testify at trial. (RR Vol .3 , p.23B , In 12).
She did not actually perform the__au_t opsy of the decedent in this
Page B of 17
case, although the autopsy was conducted under her direct super
vision. She testified she was present during the autopsy, made
various corrections to the report, and then co-signed the autopsy
report as the supervisor/reviewer when the report was completed.
(RR Vol• 3, p .242;ln 1 -7) .
Trial counsel properly objected to the admission of the
autopsy report, the related photos, and to the expert testimony
of this witness under Mr. Dorsey's confrontation clause rights.
(RR Vol.3, p.248, ln23 thru p.252, In 22). The trial judge over
ruled trial counsel's objections, and noted for the record that
Dr. Auzalone was present during the autopsy, though she did not
actually perform the autopsy. (RR Vol.3, p. 250, In 23-25; p.25.2,
In 5-7, 12-13; and 21 -22) .
The autopsy report was testimonial in nature. There is no
contention that the medical doctor who actually performed the
autopsy was unavailable:,• (though she resided and worked in the
Chicago, Illinois area at the time of trial). The trial court
erred by allowing this report in as evidence as well as Court of
Appeals abused its discretion by denying this error.
STANDARD
The appellant didn't have the right to cross-examine the expert
who actually done the test.)).
The sixth amendment's confrontation clause provides a crim
inal defendant the right to directly confront adverse witnesses.
See Md. v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, B46 (1990) "[F]ace -to-Face confront
ation enhance the accuracy of factfinding by reducing the risk that
Page 9 of-,17
a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person.") See
also Bullcoming v . H.M. ,1 31 S .Ct. 2705, 2716 (2011) [The] clause
does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the
court believes that questioning one witness about another's testi-j-
monial statements provides fair enough opportunity for cross-
examination) . The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part
that "in" all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to be confronted with the witness against him. See [pointer
v. Tex., 3B0 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
The Confrontation Clause applies only to that portion of a
criminal proceeding classified as the trial. See Gerstein v. Pugh
420 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1975) (adversary).
See case Craig , 498 U.S. at B45; see also Ky. v. Stinger, 4B2
U.S. 730, 737 (19B7) (Confrontation right designed to promote
truth-finding function of trial).-
See case U.S. v. Carthen, 6B1 F.3d 94, 99 (2nd Cir. 2012)
('Confrontation Clause prohibition against hearsay do not strictly
apply" in proceedings not part of criminal prosecution).
The Confrontation Clause protects a defendant's right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses, because the clause only provides
for the "opportu n.i ty; [to] cross examin[e]." See cases Del. v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam) "The Confrontation
Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination
not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish).
When cross-examining a witness, the defendant must be permit
ted to test both the witness's credibility and the witness's know-
Page 10 of 17
ledge of the material facts in the case.
See cases Olden v . Ky . , 4B8 U.S.' 227, 231 (19BB) (per curiam)
(Confrontation Clause violated when defendant accused of kidnapping
and rape not permitted to cross-examine complainant regarding co
habitation with boyfriend).
See case Davis v. Ala., 415 U.S. 30B, 316-17 (1974) (Confront
ation Clause violated when defendant not permitted to cross-examine
witness regarding possible prejudice and bias that may have caused
faulty identification of defendant).
See case U.S. v. Vega Molina, 407 F.3d 511, 523-24 (1st Cir.
2005) (Confrontation Clause violated because district court's
refusal to allow defendant to cross-examine co-conspirator about
possibility of being framed prevented defendant from presenting
defense).
See case U.S. v. Treacy , 639 F.3d 32, 44-45 (2nd Cir. 2011)
(Confrontation Clause violated when court precluded cross-examin
ation refused to show credibility of witness's.)
See case U.S. v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F3d 4B7, 503 (4th Cir. 2012)
(Confrontation right allows defendant to "ferret out falsehoods
and expose inconsistencies in a witness's testimony).
The 14th Court of Appeals of Houston in appellant's case in
its opinion on October 27, 2015 on page 4 stated appellant has not
argued that Herrera is incorrect or should be revisited in light
of more recent authority. See Herrera v. State, 367 S.W.3d 762, 773
(Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2012, No pet.).
Appellant Dorsey ask this Court to revisited Herrera v. 5tate
with the more recent authority because the cases he used in this
Page 11 of-17
petition is against what the constitution requires. He ask this
Court to use its power to give its opinion on this ground.
It has been determined by this Court that an autopsy photo
graph is not a testimonial statement. Herrera v. State Id.
This ground of error should be granted for relief.
ISSUE TUP hllTH AUTHORITY
Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel during the punishment phase of the trial by resting and
closing and not presenting any mitigation evidence?
Facts in the Record
After the conclusion of the State's punishment case, the
State rested. (RR vol.6, p.162, In 1-2). The trial court then
turned to the defense and remarkably, trial counsel then also
rested (RR Vol.6, p.164, In 16-17). Trial counsel called no
witnessed during the punishment phase of the trial (by they
either fact based to contradict the State's witnesses alleging the
impact of the victim's death or to show the limitations on their
claimed knowledge of the deceased, gang related testimony, or even
merely character witnesses to humanize and to support the defend
ant). Bottom line: there was absolutely no mitigation evidence
presented by trial counsel.
As a hole in the record see (RR vol. 6, p.166, In 14-15; RR Vol. 6,
p.166, In 2 thru p.175, In 3; RR Vol.6,p.175 In 2-3).
Trial counsel's failure to emphasize the defendant's good
character traits during closing argument at the punishment phase
of a trial has been found to be ineffective assistance of counsel.
How can this Court overlook Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
• ' " Page 12 of 17 '
688 (1984) the defendant must prove that his trial conunsel's
representation was deficient and that the deficient performance
.was so serious that it deprived him of a fair trial. Id. at 687 .
Counsel's representation is deficient if it falls below an object
ive standard of reasonableness. Id at 6 BB. A deficient perform
ance will only deprive the defendant of a fair trial if it prejud
ices the defense. Id at 691-92.
Appellant is clearly saying had counsel brought in mitigation
witnesses the outcome may have been different, he may not have got
ten the same judgment sentence. Every person under the constitut
ion has a right to effective assistance of counsel at every stage.
The failure to present mitigation evidence at the punishment
phase of the trial has been held by numerous courts to be a classic
example of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
See case Sonnier v. Quarterman, 476 F3d 349, 358 (5th Cir.
2007)(Counsel's failure to undertake more extensive discussions
with defendant's family and acquaintance was ineffective assistance
despite defendant's objection to further discussions.
See case Harries v. Bell, 417 F3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2005)
(Counsel's failure to investigatevand present mitigating evidence
of defendant's mental illness was ineffective assistance.
See case Hooks v. Workman, 6B9 F3d 1148, 1207-OB (10th Cir.
2012)(Counsel's failure to investigate reasonably available family
history evidence that might have mitigated defendant's sentence
was unreasonable.)
Page 13 of 17
See case Outten v. Kearney, 464 F3d 401, 419-23 (3rd Cir.
2006)(But for counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence of
defendant's excruciating life history, reasonable probability of
different sentence.)
Similarly, if counsel "entirely fails to subject the prosecu
tion's case to meaningful adversarial testing, the adversarial
process itself becomes presumptively unreliable.
See case Miller v. Martin, 481 F3d 468, 473 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Counsel's choice not to present any mitigating factors or object
ion and to remain silent at sentencing hearing for no apparent
reason warranted presumption of prejudice).
See case Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir.
2007)(Counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence at sentenc
ing of death penalty trial was ineffective assistance because
failure allowed prosecution to successfully argue there was nothing
to diminish defendant moral culpability eventhough such evidence
was readily available.)
See case Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F3d 10B6, 1111-13 (9th Cir.
2010)(Counsel's failure to presentmitigating evidence was ineffec
tive assistance because there was reasonable probability sentence
would have been different with mitigating evidence.)
See case Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F3d 1272, 1292-93 (11th Cir.
2008)(Counsel's failure to present significant mitigating evidence
of defendant's family history, mental health and drug abuse at
sentencing was ineffective assistance because reasonable chance
jury would not have received death penalty.) .
Page 14 of 17
In the State brief page of its opinion pg . 34, the record is
devoid of anything to indicate that any mitigation witnesses exi
sted, much less that such witnesses were available or would have
been helpful to the defense on sentencing had trial counsel present
ed them .
This is the appellant argument no investigation took place at
all in his behalf.
Please see case Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F3d 1215, 1235
(10th Cir. 2001)(ineffective assistance because counsel failed to
present mitigating evidence at penalty phase).
Please see case Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)
(Counsel's failure to investigate and present substantial mitigat
ing evidence during sentencing phase of capital murder trial was
prejudicial.)
Please see case Jones V. Ryan, 583 F3d 626, 646-47 (9th Cir.
2009)(Counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating
evidence prejudicial because it gave sentencing judge inaccurate
view of defendant's life.)
This honorable court can use its power to review claims of
ineffective counsel on appeal only in exceptional circumstances.
See other circuits cases.
U.S. Rodriguez, 675 F3d 48, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2012) (Claim of
ineffective counsel reviewed on appeal only in exceptional circum
stances.)
U.S. v. Stevens, 487 F3d 232, 245 (5th Cir. 2007) (Claim of.
ineffective counsel reviewed on appeal only in exceptional circum
stances .
Page 15 of 17
This Honorable Court should review this Error and Grant relief.
ISSUE NUMBER THREE UITH ARGUMENT
Whether the verdict was truely unanimous.
Facts in the Record
The jury was then properly polled. However, two jurors did
not answer affirmatively that the guilty verdict was indeed their
respective verdict. (RR Vol. 5, p.64, In 3-5; p.65, In 11-18).
The jurors were not ;instructed to retire again to consider
their verdict as required by Art. 37.05, to be fair, no party
objected. The trial judge also merely continued on with the stand
ard trial procedure. There appears to be no other reference to a
less than unanimous verdict anywhere in either the court clerk's
record or the court's reporter's record.
A verdict must be certain, consistent, and definite, it may
not be conditional, qualified, speculative, inconclusive, or ambig-
uous. See case Eads v. State, 598 Sw2d 304, 306 (Tex.Crim.App.
19B0) It is the duty of the trial judge to reject an informal or
insufficient verdict, call to the attention of the jury the infor
mality or insufficiency, and have the same corrected their consent,
or send them out again to consider their verdict. _I_d. The poll
ing was inconclusive. The trial judge should have sent the jury
panel out again to consider their verdict, but clearly failed to
do so .
The Court of Appeals didn't even go into detail on this
ground and denied it. Article 37.05 was not followed. This
ground should be granted on the merits.
Page 16 of 17
PRAYER
Petitioner prays for relief deem just.
DECLARATION
"I, Henry Dorsey, TDCJ #1950821, presently incarcer
ated in the TDCJ-CID at the Connally Unit in Karnes County,
Texas, declare under penalty of perjury under Chapter 132 of
Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code and 28 U.S.C. § 1746,
that the facts stated in this Petition for Discretionary
Review are true and correct and that I placed this document
in the prison mailbox on this date."
"Executed on this the /J day of November 2015."
-fey/ /*y^
Henry Dorsey, pro se
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
I certify that on this the //' day of November 2015, I
served the following parties with a true and correct copy of
this PDR by mail (U.S. Postal) through the prison mailbox in a
postage paid package to the address-written below:
Court of Criminal Appeals
P.O. Box 12308, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 7B711
Attn: Abel Acosta
Sincerely submitted;
fenry^ov4ey ^#1 950B21
Page 17 of 17
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 27, 2015.
In The
ifiourteentfj Court of Appeals
NO. 14-14-00718-CR
HENRY DEMOND DORSEY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1370868
MEMORANDUM OPINION
We consider three questions in this appeal from a conviction for murder:
(1) whether the admission of evidence violated appellant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause; (2) whether the verdict was truly unanimous; and
(3) whether appellant was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Finding
no error in connection with any of these stated issues, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
BACKGROUND
A fistfight broke out near the entrance to an after-hours nightclub. One of
the men involved in the fight pulled out a gun and fired multiple shots into the
crowd. Two of the bullets struck and killed the complainant. Surveillance footage
showed that the complainant had played no role in the fight and had merely been
standing in the background. The shooter ran off, but he was later caught and
identified as appellant.
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The complainant's body was sent to the medical examiner's office, where an
autopsy was performed by a new doctor participating in a forensics pathology
fellowship program. The fellow did not testify at appellant's trial. Testimony was
elicited instead from an assistant medical examiner who had supervised the fellow.
The assistant medical examiner testified that she was present for the complainant's
autopsy, she reviewed the fellow's autopsy report, and she co-signed the autopsy
report after making corrections to it.
At trial, the State offered into evidence a collection of photographs that were
taken during the autopsy. Appellant objected to the admission of these
photographs, claiming that the absence of the fellow deprived him of his rights
under the Confrontation Clause. Continuing with the same reasoning, appellant
also argued that the autopsy report should be excluded in the event that the State
sought its admission. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the
photographs, which were then published to the jury. The State never offered the
autopsy report into evidence.
In his first issue, appellant contends that the admission of certain evidence
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We review a trial court's ruling
admitting or excluding evidence for an abuse of discretion. See McCarty v. State,
257 S.W.3d 238, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Under this standard, the trial court's
ruling will be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and correct under
any applicable theory of law. See State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). We give the trial court almost complete deference in determining
historical facts, but we review de novo the trial court's application of law to those
facts. See Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that a defendant in a
criminal prosecution "shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." See U.S. Const, amend. VI. This right applies not only to in-court
testimony, but also to out-of-court statements that are testimonial in nature. See
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004). Whether an out-of-court
statement is testimonial is a question of law for the court to decide. See De la Paz
v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Appellant styles this issue by asserting that "the trial court erred by violating
[his] right to confrontation of the [fellow] who actually performed the autopsy."
Appellant addresses several points within this issue, beginning with a complaint
about the supposed admission of the complainant's autopsy report. But, as we
stated above, the State did not offer the autopsy report into evidence, and the trial
court did not admit it. Thus, even assuming that the autopsy report contained
testimonial statements, there was no violation of the Confrontation Clause.
Appellant then addresses the autopsy photographs, which were actually
admitted into evidence. But, in his own brief, appellant concedes that his trial
counsel's objection to the admission of these photographs "should fail upon
appellate review." "This is so," appellant explains, "because this Court has held
that an autopsy photograph is not a testimonial statement." See Herrera v. State,
367 S.W.3d 762, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2012, no pet.) ("An
autopsy photograph, however, is not a testimonial statement.") (citing Wood v.
State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 214-15 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.)). Appellant has
not argued that Herrera is incorrect or should be revisited in light of more recent
authority. Therefore, applying our prior precedent, we hold that appellant's rights
under the Confrontation Clause were not violated when the trial court admitted the
autopsy photographs.
Appellant finally complains in very general terms about the testimony of the
assistant medical examiner, who observed the autopsy, but did not perform it. The
argument is without merit because appellant never objected to any portion of the
assistant medical examiner's live testimony. He objected instead to the admission
of certain exhibits. Without a timely and specific objection, appellant forfeited this
complaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Thacker v. State, 999 S.W.2d 56, 61 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref d).
Moreover, even if he had objected, the argument would still fail because the
assistant medical examiner was questioned about her own observations and
opinions, not those of the fellow who performed the autopsy. Thus, the trial court
did not erroneously admit testimonial hearsay in violation of appellant's rights
under the Confrontation Clause. See also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305, 311 n.l (2009) (noting that the Confrontation Clause does not demand
"that everyone who laid hands on the evidence must be called").
UNANIMOUS VERDICT
In his second issue, appellant complains about an irregularity during the jury
polling process.
When the jury returned its verdict, the trial court asked the jurors to affirm
that they had all voted to find appellant guilty. Collectively, the jurors answered,
"Yes." Appellant then asked for the jurors to be polled individually. The poll
happened as follows:
CLERK: [J.L.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: It is.
CLERK: [J.R.], is this your verdict?
No [J.R.]?
[S.G.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: It is.
CLERK: [A.N.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: It is.
CLERK: [J.P.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: It is.
CLERK: [R.G.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: Yes.
CLERK: [D.V.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: Yes.
CLERK: [R.D.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: It is.
CLERK: [R.B.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: Yes.
CLERK: [K.P.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: Yes.
CLERK: [S.P.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: It is.
CLERK: And [S.M.], is this your verdict?
JUROR: Yes.
COURT: That's only 11.
Who did not answer? Who was not polled? What's your
name, sir?
JUROR: [R.V.].
COURT: What was your juror number in the panel?
JUROR: Fifty-five.
CLERK: Fifty-five, [R.V.], is this your verdict?
COURT: All right. So, members of the jury, we are going to recess
for the day and have you come back Monday morning.
We'll start on punishment on Monday morning. . . .
Appellant contends that the trial court ran afoul of Article 37.05, which
provides that the jury must retire again to consider its verdict if any juror, when
polled, answers that the verdict is not his own. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
37.05. Instead of calling for a recess, appellant argues that the trial court should
have retired the jury because "two jurors did not respond affirmatively to the
polled question." Appellant appears to be referring to J.R., who was called second
by the clerk, and R.V., who was called last. It is clear, however, that J.R.'s name
was called inadvertently. His name is marked on the strike list and he could not
have been an actual member of the jury. Twelve other names were called,
including R.V.'s, and each of those twelve jurors spoke on the record.
The court reporter did not record a verbal or nonverbal response from R.V.
when he was polled. However, the trial court continued the proceedings as though
R.V. had made an affirmative response, and appellant did not object to R.V.'s
response or nonresponse.
A defendant must timely object to error in the jury polling process, as error
of this type is subject to forfeiture. See Barnett v. State, 189 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006) (concluding that a defendant had forfeited any error by failing to
object when the trial court asked improper questions during the jury polling
6
process). Because appellant did not object when R.V. was polled, he forfeited any
claim that the trial court failed to comply with Article 37.05. Id.
Even if appellant had objected, his claim would still fail because the trial
court's obligation to retire the jury is triggered only when a juror answers that a
verdict is not his own. See Llorance v. State, 999 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding that a juror's procedural question did
not amount to an answer in the negative). Here, the record does not reflect that
R.V. gave a negative answer. The tenor of the trial court's closing remarks
suggests instead that R.V. gave an affirmative nonverbal answer that his verdict
was in accord with the other eleven jurors. We conclude that appellant's complaint
is without merit.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM
Appellant also contends that the assistance of his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. In two separate issues, each relating to the punishment
phase of his trial, appellant complains that counsel presented no mitigation
evidence and counsel's closing argument merely recited the evidence produced by
the State.
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). Under Strickland, the
defendant must prove that his trial counsel's representation was deficient, and that
the deficient performance was so serious that it deprived him of a fair trial. Id. at
687. Counsel's representation is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Id. at 688. A deficient performance will only deprive the defendant
of a fair trial if it prejudices the defense. Id. at 691-92. To demonstrate prejudice,
there must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. Failure to make
7
the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats
the claim of ineffectiveness. Id. at 697. This test is applied to claims arising under
both the United States and Texas Constitutions. See Hernandez v. State, 726
S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
Our review of defense counsel's performance is highly deferential,
beginning with the strong presumption that counsel's actions were reasonably
professional and were motivated by sound trial strategy. See Jackson v. State, 877
S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). When the record is silent as to counsel's
strategy, we will not conclude that the defendant received ineffective assistance
unless the challenged conduct was "so outrageous that no competent attorney
would have engaged in it." See Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). Rarely will the trial record contain sufficient information to
permit a reviewing court to fairly evaluate the merits of such a serious allegation.
See Bone v. State, 11 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In the majority of
cases, the defendant is unable to meet the first prong of the Strickland test because
the record on direct appeal is underdeveloped and does not adequately reflect the
alleged failings of trial counsel. See Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007).
A sound trial strategy may be imperfectly executed, but the right to effective
assistance of counsel does not entitle a defendant to errorless or perfect counsel.
See Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Isolated
instances in the record reflecting errors of omission or commission do not render
counsel's performance ineffective, nor can ineffective assistance of counsel be
established by isolating one portion of trial counsel's performance for examination.
See McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled
on other grounds by Bingham v. State, 915 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Moreover, it is not sufficient that the defendant show, with the benefit of hindsight,
that his counsel's actions or omissions during trial were merely of questionable
competence. See Mata, 226 S.W.3d at 430. Rather, to establish that counsel's acts
or omissions were outside the range of professionally competent assistance, the
defendant must show that counsel's errors were so serious that he was not
functioning as counsel. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 495 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995).
We begin with appellant's complaint that his trial counsel produced no
mitigation evidence during the punishment phase of trial. To prevail on such a
claim, the record must affirmatively demonstrate that mitigation witnesses were
available to testify and that their testimony would have benefited the defense. See
Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Wade v. State,
164 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The record
is silent on these points. Appellant did not file a motion for new trial or otherwise
establish that mitigation evidence existed. His complaint is therefore without merit.
In a related issue, appellant also complains about counsel's performance in
closing arguments. During his argument to the jury, counsel openly confessed that
he "simply chose not to put on a case for you in punishment." Counsel then
sympathized with the complainant's family and expressed regret that the
complainant had been caught in the fray of a shooting. Counsel said that appellant
was still a human being though, not a monster, and counsel implored the jury to
choose its own sentence, without offering a recommended sentence.
In his brief, appellant argues that counsel's performance was deficient
because counsel recited the State's evidence and never emphasized appellant's
own good character traits. But, as we mentioned earlier, the record does not
contain any mitigation evidence that counsel could emphasize. Furthermore, the
record is silent as to counsel's reasons and strategies during closing argument. We
could not deem counsel constitutionally ineffective without speculating as to his
motivations, which we are not permitted to do. See Lumpkin v. State, 129 S.W.3d
659, 665 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref d). Appellant has not
shown that his counsel's performance fell below the range of reasonable
professional judgment, or that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance. See
Jagaroo v. State, 180 S.W.3d 793, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005,
pet. ref d) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where counsel sympathized with
the complainants during closing arguments); see also Martin v. State, 265 S.W.3d
435, 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (explaining that counsel
may reasonably choose to recite facts that the jury would have remembered
anyways so that counsel might convince the jury to put aside those facts with
rhetorical devices such as empathy).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
/s/ Tracy Christopher
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher and Donovan.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
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