Samantha Meagan Paciga v. State ( 2016 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
_________________
NO. 09-14-00424-CR
_________________
SAMANTHA MEAGAN PACIGA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 300816
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Samantha Meagan Paciga appeals her conviction for the offense
of driving while intoxicated. In one issue, Paciga argues that the trial court erred in
denying her motion for an instructed verdict because the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
1
I. The Evidence
On August 28, 2013, at approximately 11:00 p.m., an officer with the
Beaumont Police Department responded to a radio dispatch concerning a
suspicious vehicle near the intersection of Seventh Street and the I-10 service road
in Beaumont, Texas. When the officer arrived at that location, he observed a blue
Toyota Corolla that had left the service road and come to rest in a grassy area next
to a chain link fence, which separated the service road from a railroad yard.
According to the officer, the Toyota was located only a few feet from the fence,
and a portion of the fence appeared to have “just been knocked over.” A woman,
whom the officer later identified as Paciga, was sitting a few feet away from the
Toyota. No one else was in the vicinity of the vehicle except for a railroad
employee who had made the initial call to the police, and the officer testified that
he had no reason to believe that the railroad employee had been involved in the
accident in any way. No one else appeared at the scene claiming the vehicle.
At the scene, the officer approached Paciga and spoke with her. According
to the officer, Paciga stated that she had just left Club Heat and was heading home
to her residence in Groves, Texas. The officer testified that Club Heat is a local
night club, which is located on the service road of I-10 and is less than a mile from
the location of the accident. While speaking to Paciga, the officer noticed that
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Paciga appeared to be intoxicated: her speech was slow and slurred; she was
unsteady on her feet; her eyes were red and glassy; and she had an odor of an
alcoholic beverage emitting from her person. He also observed that Paciga had a
set of car keys in her hand. The officer testified that the keys were the “keys to the
vehicle[,]”although he acknowledged that he did not personally check to see
whether the keys actually started the Toyota.
The officer checked the registration of the Toyota and discovered that the
vehicle was registered to two individuals named Jonathan House and Daniel House
at an address in Groves, Texas. He testified that although Paciga’s name was not
listed on the vehicle registration, the address on the registration matched the
address on Paciga’s driver’s license.
The officer testified that given the fact that the Toyota was located “in a
grassy area adjacent to a fence that appeared to [have been] knocked over recently”
and that the grassy area was next to the service road, it was his opinion that the
Toyota would have had to have traveled down that road or the highway in order to
have made contact with the fence. Based on this conclusion, and due to Paciga’s
apparent intoxication, the officer requested assistance from another patrol unit, and
a second officer arrived at the scene a short time later. The second officer took
3
over the potential DWI investigation, while the initial officer continued the
investigation of the vehicle accident.
The second officer testified that on August 28, 2013, he was assigned to the
Beaumont Police Department’s DWI Select Traffic Enforcement Program. As a
member of that task force, he was trained to identify signs of intoxication, was
certified in the administration of field sobriety tests, and had performed such
testing on many occasions. At approximately 11:15 p.m. on the night in question,
he was dispatched to a location on the I-10 service road in reference to a car wreck.
He explained that in that location, the service road intersects with Seventh Street.
At or shortly after Seventh Street, the service road turns under the freeway,
allowing vehicles to turn around and go back in the opposite direction. When the
second officer arrived at the scene, he observed a blue Toyota Corolla that
appeared to have left the roadway near the turn-around on the service road. The
Toyota was “[l]ocated near the railroad tracks and sitting on a portion of the chain
link fence it had crashed through.” A white female was sitting next to the Toyota.
At trial, the second officer identified Paciga in the courtroom as the female he
observed sitting by the Toyota. He testified that no one else was in the vicinity of
the accident, aside from other law enforcement officers and a civilian “ride[-
]along” who was riding in his patrol car that night.
4
When the second officer made contact with Paciga, she was still sitting on
the ground next to the vehicle. She appeared disoriented and was unable to stand
up without assistance. He had Paciga walk with him to the front of his patrol car so
that their discussion would be recorded by his in-car camera. While Paciga was
walking to the front of the patrol car, she fell and required assistance standing up.
As the second officer spoke to Paciga, he observed that her eyes were red and
glassy, she had a slow reaction time when answering questions and performing
tasks, her speech was slurred, and she was unable to answer simple questions or
follow basic instructions. In addition, he noticed that she had a strong odor of an
alcoholic beverage coming from her breath and person. Based on these
observations, the officer concluded that Paciga was likely intoxicated.
The second officer stated that he asked Paciga to produce her driver’s
license. She had difficulty performing this task, but ultimately handed him her
license. He asked Paciga where she had been coming from that night, and she told
him that she “was coming from the city of Groves.” He then asked her where she
was going, and she stated that she was “going to Groves.” The second officer then
asked, “[Y]ou’re coming from Groves, going to Groves[?]” and, according to the
officer, Paciga responded, “Lowes to Winnie.” During this conversation, the
second officer noticed that Paciga was holding a set of car keys in her hand. He
5
later took the car keys from Paciga and gave them to the first officer. The second
officer testified that although he did not personally check to see if the keys were
would start the Toyota, the tow truck driver who arrived at the scene verified that
they would.
Based on the fact that the Toyota “crashed through” a fence adjacent to the
service road, the second officer testified that it was his opinion that the Toyota
would have had to have traveled down that road or the highway in order to hit the
chain link fence. He also testified that given the circumstances surrounding the
crash, including the fact that Paciga was the only person at the scene of the
accident when the police arrived and that she had a set of car keys in her hand, it
was his opinion that Paciga had been driving the vehicle at the time it crashed.
After speaking to Paciga, the second officer handcuffed her and placed her
in the back seat of his patrol unit so that he could transport her to an area with a
level surface to perform the standardized field sobriety tests. After Paciga was
placed in the back seat of the patrol unit, Paciga slipped her handcuffs in front of
her and began kicking the windows of the patrol unit. Shortly thereafter, the second
officer transported Paciga to a nearby parking lot where he administered three
standardized field sobriety tests to Paciga: (1) the horizontal gaze nystagmus test;
(2) the walk-and-turn test; and (3) the one-leg-stand test. The second officer
6
testified that Paciga exhibited six out of six possible clues of intoxication on the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test, six out of eight possible clues of intoxication on
the walk-and-turn test, and three out of four possible clues of intoxication on the
one-leg-stand test. Based on those results, he concluded that Paciga “had lost the
normal use of her mental and physical faculties” due to intoxication from the
consumption of alcohol and placed her under arrest for DWI. Thereafter, the
second officer requested a sample of Paciga’s breath, but she refused to give one.
At trial, the State introduced a copy of a video that was recorded by a
camera mounted on the dashboard of the second officer’s patrol unit on the night
of the accident. The video was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. The
video largely corroborates the second officer’s testimony. The video shows that the
second officer arrived at the scene of the accident at 11:17 p.m. The first
responding officer was already present at the scene when the second officer
arrived. In the video, Paciga can be seen walking from the location of the Toyota to
the front of the second officer’s patrol car with a set of car keys in her hand. As she
is walking, Paciga falls and has to take off her shoes to stand up again. Once in
front of the patrol car, the second officer asks Paciga, “Where are you coming from
tonight?” and Paciga responds, “Groves.” The second officer then asks, “Where
are you headed to?” and Paciga again states, “Groves.” He asks, “You came from
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Groves and you’re headed to Groves?” and Paciga states, “Yes.” The second
officer then asks Paciga where she thinks she is, and Paciga responds, “Close to
Winnie.” The second officer asks Paciga if she has had anything to drink that
night, and Paciga nods and appears to respond affirmatively. Approximately ten
minutes later, he takes Paciga to a nearby parking lot, where he administers three
standardized field sobriety tests to Paciga. At the conclusion of the third test, the
second officer places Paciga under arrest for DWI.
The State also introduced a copy of a second video that was recorded by a
camera mounted in the back seat of the second officer’s patrol car on the night in
question. The video was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. The video
shows Paciga’s movements in the back seat of the patrol unit both before and after
her arrest. In the video, Paciga can be seen getting into the back seat of the patrol
car immediately following her arrest. Once in the back seat, Paciga asks, “Is my
sister’s car going to be left here?” The second officer responds that the vehicle is
going to be towed to a safe location. Paciga then says, “Am I going to have to pay
for towing? . . . . I just want – seriously, I would rather it just be here. . . . I can’t
pay for that.” The officer then explains that they cannot leave the vehicle at the
scene because she crashed into a fence on railroad property.
8
In addition, the State introduced a copy of the notice of suspension of
Paciga’s driver’s license (a DIC-25 form), and the notice was admitted into
evidence. In the bottom, right-hand corner of the notice, there is a photocopy of the
front of a driver’s license. The second officer testified that the driver’s license
depicted in the notice is the driver’s license that Paciga presented to him on the
night of the accident. The address on the driver’s license is the same address that
was listed on the vehicle registration for the Toyota. However, the driver’s license
also states that it expired on “01-08-08[,]” over five years before the accident in
question occurred. At trial, Paciga’s attorney introduced a photocopy of a second
driver’s license, which was admitted into evidence. Similar to the driver’s license
in the notice of suspension, the second driver’s license states that it is issued to
Paciga and bears the same driver’s license number as the license in the notice of
suspension. However, the second driver’s license indicates that it was issued on
“06/04/2012” and expires on “01/08/2015[.]” It lists a different address for Paciga
in Groves, Texas. On cross-examination, the second officer was shown the
photocopy of the second driver’s license, after which he acknowledged that Paciga
presented him with an expired driver’s license on the night of the accident.
However, he stated that he nevertheless considered the expired license to be a valid
form of identification and that when he ran the license through dispatch on the
9
night of the accident, he was told that Paciga did in fact have a valid driver’s
license that expired in 2015.
At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Paciga moved for an instructed
verdict of acquittal. In support of the motion, Paciga argued that there was no
evidence that Paciga operated a motor vehicle. In addition, and alternatively, she
argued that the only evidence tending to prove that Paciga operated a motor vehicle
were Paciga’s own statements to the police officers and that a defendant’s
extrajudicial admissions, without more, are insufficient to prove the corpus delicti
of the offense of DWI. After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court
denied Paciga’s motion.
Paciga did not testify at trial or call any witnesses to testify on her behalf,
and after closing arguments, the jury found Paciga guilty of driving while
intoxicated. The trial court sentenced Paciga to ninety days in jail, but suspended
her sentence and placed her on one year of probation. The trial court also assessed
a fine of $300. This appeal followed.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In her sole issue, Paciga argues that the trial court erred in denying her
motion for an instructed verdict of acquittal because the evidence is insufficient to
support her conviction for driving while intoxicated. Specifically, Paciga contends
10
that “[t]he evidence does not show beyond a reasonable doubt that [she] was
driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated.” 1 She also argues that her extrajudicial
admissions at the scene “fail[] to establish the corpus delicti to support a DWI
conviction.”
“A motion for instructed verdict is essentially a trial level challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence.” Smith v. State, No. PD-1615-14, 2016 WL 3193479,
*4 (Tex. Crim. App. June 8, 2016). We therefore treat an issue complaining about
a trial court’s failure to grant a motion for an instructed verdict as a challenge to
the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Gloede v. State, 328 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Tex. App.—
1
Paciga’s motion for an instructed verdict challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence showing that Paciga operated a motor vehicle, and asserted that the State
failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule with respect to the element of operation of a
motor vehicle. The motion did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
showing that Paciga was intoxicated at the time she operated the motor vehicle.
Nevertheless, Paciga argues in her brief on appeal that “[t]he evidence does not
show beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was driving a motor vehicle while
intoxicated.” Because a legal sufficiency point may be raised for the first time on
appeal, and because we are required to construe the arguments in Paciga’s brief
liberally, we will treat Paciga’s appellate issue as challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support both: (1) that Paciga operated a motor vehicle, and (2) that
Paciga was intoxicated at the time she drove. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9; Moff v.
State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“If a defendant challenges the
legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on direct appeal, the
appellate court always has a duty to address that issue, regardless of whether it was
raised in the trial court.”).
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Beaumont 2010, no pet.). We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under
that standard, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
and determine, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom,
whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19).The jury is the sole judge of
the credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses. Id. In
this role, the jury may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony
presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991). Further, the jury is permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences
from facts as long as each is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Temple,
390 S.W.3d at 360. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume
that the jury resolved those conflicts in favor of the verdict and therefore defer to
that determination. Id.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence
in the record, regardless of whether it was properly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct and circumstantial evidence are
12
equally probative of an actor’s guilt, and “‘circumstantial evidence alone can be
sufficient to establish guilt.’” Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 359 (quoting Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). In a circumstantial evidence case, each
fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the defendant so long
as the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances
warrants the conclusion that the defendant is guilty. Id. (quoting Johnson v. State,
871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. “After
giving proper deference to the factfinder’s role, we will uphold the verdict unless a
rational factfinder must have had reasonable doubt as to any essential element.”
Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated “if the person is
intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2016). The term “operating,” as used in section
49.04(a) of the Penal Code, is not defined. See id. § 49.01 (West 2011); § 49.04;
Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). However, the Court
of Criminal Appeals has instructed that, for purposes of reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence for a DWI conviction, a defendant “operates” a vehicle when the
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the defendant took action to affect
the functioning of the vehicle in a manner that would enable the vehicle’s use.
13
Denton v. State, 911 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Whether a person
was operating a motor vehicle is a question of fact for the factfinder. Kirsch, 357
S.W.3d at 652.
The Penal Code defines “intoxicated” as “not having the normal use of
mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled
substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those
substances, or any other substance into the body[.]” Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
49.01(2)(A). The State is not required to establish the exact time that the defendant
was operating the vehicle to prove that she was driving while intoxicated. See
Kuciemba v. State, 310 S.W.3d 460, 462-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Weems v.
State, 328 S.W.3d 172, 177 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, no pet.). The State,
however, must show a “temporal link” between the defendant’s intoxication and
her operation of a motor vehicle—in other words, there must be proof from which
the factfinder can conclude that, at the time of the driving in question, the
defendant was intoxicated. Kuciemba, 310 S.W.3d at 462; McCann v. State, 433
S.W.3d 642, 649 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Such a finding
can be supported solely by circumstantial evidence. Kuciemba, 310 S.W.3d at 462.
14
A. Corroboration of Paciga’s Extrajudicial Statements
We first address Paciga’s argument that her extrajudicial admissions “fail[]
to establish the corpus delicti to support a DWI conviction.” We interpret Paciga’s
argument as asserting that the State failed to corroborate her extrajudicial
admissions to law enforcement officers on the night of her arrest and that her
admissions cannot therefore be used in establishing the corpus delicti of the
offense.
Under the corpus delicti doctrine, a defendant’s extrajudicial confession
does not constitute legally sufficient evidence of guilt unless the confession is
corroborated by independent evidence tending to establish the corpus delicti of the
offense. Miller v. State, 457 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Fisher v.
State, 851 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). To satisfy this rule, there must
be “evidence independent of a defendant’s extrajudicial confession show[ing] that
the ‘essential nature’ of the charged crime was committed by someone.” Hacker v.
State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The other evidence need not
be sufficient by itself to prove the offense; rather, “‘all that is required is that there
be some evidence which renders the commission of the offense more probable than
it would be without the evidence.’” Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000) (quoting Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. Crim. App.
15
1997)). The rule is satisfied “if some evidence exists outside of the [extrajudicial]
confession which, considered alone or in connection with the confession, shows
that the crime actually occurred.” Salazar v. State, 86 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002); see also Turner v. State, 877 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1994, no pet.) (“If there is some evidence corroborating the admission, the
admission may be used to aid in the establishment of the [corpus delicti].”).
The corpus delicti of any offense consists of the fact that the offense in
question has been committed by someone. Fisher, 851 S.W.2d at 303. The
perpetrator’s identity is not part of the corpus delicti and need not be corroborated
by independent evidence. Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993); Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The corpus
delicti of driving while intoxicated is that someone (1) operated a motor vehicle (2)
in a public place (3) while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a);
Layland v. State, 144 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.).
In the present case, the State presented evidence that at the scene Paciga
stated that she had just left Club Heat and was heading home to her residence in
Groves, Texas. This extrajudicial admission, to the extent it goes to show the
16
operation of a motor vehicle or that the accident had recently occurred,2 is
corroborated by the testimony of both officers at trial. Specifically, the first
responding officer testified that he was dispatched to the intersection of Seventh
Street and the I-10 service road in response to a report of a “suspicious vehicle” at
approximately 11:00 p.m. He arrived at the scene within seventeen minutes or less.
At the scene, he found a blue Toyota Corolla that had left the service road and had
come to rest in a grassy area next to a chain link fence. According to the first
officer, the Toyota was located only a few feet from the fence, and a portion of the
fence appeared to have “just been knocked over.” The second officer, who arrived
at the scene shortly after the first officer, described the Toyota as “sitting on a
portion of the chain link fence it had crashed through.” The crash site was on the
same service road and less than one mile away from Club Heat. Both officers
testified without objection that, in their opinion, the Toyota would have had to
have traveled down the service road or the highway to make contact with the fence.
2
We recognize that the time the accident occurred is not an element of
driving while intoxicated and is thus not part of the corpus delicti of the offense.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2016); Kuciemba v. State, 310
S.W.3d 460, 462-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Zavala v. State, 89 S.W.3d 134, 139
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). However, evidence of when the
accident occurred, to the extent it exists, is nevertheless relevant in showing that
the driver was intoxicated at the time he or she operated the vehicle, which is an
element of the offense and part of the corpus delicti. Kuciemba, 310 S.W.3d at
462; Zavala, 89 S.W.3d at 139; Layland v. State, 144 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.).
17
Both officers found Paciga sitting on the ground next to the Toyota with car keys
in her hand. Although neither officer personally checked to see if the keys started
the Toyota, the second officer testified that the tow truck driver who arrived at the
scene did. No one else was in the vicinity of the accident except for a railroad
worker who had initially reported the accident.
We conclude that this evidence tends to make it more probable that the
Toyota was operated and that the accident had occurred recently than Paciga’s
extrajudicial statement alone; therefore, it sufficiently corroborates Paciga’s
statement. See Rocha, 16 S.W.3d at 4; see also Lara v. State, 487 S.W.3d 244, 249
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. ref’d) (concluding that the defendant’s
extrajudicial admission that he was driving when his tire blew out was sufficiently
corroborated by other evidence showing the operation of a motor vehicle where
there was evidence that the vehicle in question was later found by police with a
damaged tire in the location where the defendant said he had left it and the
defendant had car keys in his pocket); Farmer v. State, No. 2-06-113-CR, 2006
WL 3844169, *1, 4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 25, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (concluding that defendant’s extrajudicial
admission that she was “coming from Denton and was on her way home to Van
Alstyne” was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence showing the operation of
18
a motor vehicle where there was evidence that the defendant was found next to the
vehicle approximately ten miles outside of Denton, the vehicle had a flat tire and
was in the middle of the interstate service road, the vehicle’s hazard lights were
flashing and the keys were in the ignition, and no one besides the defendant
approached the vehicle). Accordingly, Paciga’s extrajudicial statement may be
used in establishing the corpus delicti in this case. See Turner, 877 S.W.2d at 515.
B. Sufficiency Analysis
We next consider Paciga’s argument that the evidence is insufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) she operated a motor vehicle, and (2) she
was intoxicated at the time she operated the motor vehicle.
Considering Paciga’s statement at the scene that she had just left Club Heat
and was heading home to her residence in Groves, together with the independent
evidence of operation of a motor vehicle that corroborates this statement as set
forth above, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to show the
operation of a motor vehicle in this case. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Temple,
390 S.W.3d at 360; Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 652.
Further, we conclude that there is legally sufficient evidence to prove that
Paciga was the person who was operating the Toyota at the time of the accident.
As noted, the evidence shows that the first responding officer arrived at the scene
19
within seventeen minutes of receiving the dispatch. At the scene, the first officer
found a Toyota Corolla that had left the roadway and had come to rest next to a
chain link fence. A portion of the fence appeared to have just been knocked over.
Both officers testified that the Toyota would have had to have traveled down the
service road or the highway to make contact with the fence. At the scene, Paciga
was sitting next to the Toyota with car keys in her hand, and there is some
evidence that a tow truck driver who came to the scene checked that those keys
started the Toyota. No one else was in the vicinity of the accident except for the
railroad worker who had initially called the police, and no one else came to the
scene at any point to claim the Toyota. While at the scene, Paciga stated that she
had just left Club Heat and was heading home to her residence in Groves, Texas.
Furthermore, Paciga referred to the Toyota as her “sister’s car” and expressed
concern over paying the costs associated with towing the Toyota from the scene.
The first officer also checked the registration for the Toyota and although Paciga’s
name was not listed on the registration, he discovered that the vehicle was
registered to the same address listed on Paciga’s expired driver’s license. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational
factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Paciga was the driver
20
of the Toyota and that she was operating a motor vehicle when the accident
occurred. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360.
We also reject Paciga’s argument that the evidence is insufficient to show
that she was intoxicated at the time she drove. As noted, the State is not required to
present evidence of the exact time that the defendant drove, and the temporal link
between a defendant’s intoxication and the time of her driving can be established
solely by circumstantial evidence. See Kuciemba, 310 S.W.3d at 462. Here, the
evidence shows that the first responding officer arrived at the intersection of
Seventh Street and the I-10 service road within seventeen minutes of receiving a
report concerning a “suspicious vehicle” at that location. At the scene, the first
officer observed Paciga sitting next to the Toyota, which had been involved in a
one-car collision with a chain link fence. According to that officer, the fence
appeared to have “just been knocked over[,]” and Paciga told him at the scene that
she had “just” left Club Heat and was heading home to her residence in Groves,
Texas. From this evidence, a rational factfinder could reasonably infer that Paciga
was involved in a one-vehicle accident shortly before the first officer arrived at the
scene.
The record contains testimony from two officers that Paciga exhibited signs
of intoxication when they each spoke with her at the scene. They testified that
21
Paciga had slurred speech, was unsteady on her feet, had red, glassy eyes, and had
an odor of alcohol emitting from her breath and person. The second officer also
testified that Paciga had a slow reaction time when answering questions and
performing tasks, and was unable to answer simple questions or follow basic
instructions. After observing these signs, the second officer administered three
standardized field sobriety tests to Paciga. Paciga exhibited multiple clues of
intoxication in response to each test. Based on the results of the field sobriety tests,
the second officer concluded that Paciga “had lost the normal use of her mental
and physical faculties” due to intoxication from the consumption of alcohol. There
is no evidence that there were any alcoholic beverages or beverage containers in
the Toyota or in the vicinity of the accident, or any other evidence tending to
suggest that Paciga drank to intoxication between the time of the accident and the
time officers arrived at the scene.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude
that a rational factfinder could have concluded that Paciga was intoxicated at the
time she was driving and that her intoxication caused the Toyota’s collision with
the chain link fence. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Kuciemba, 310 S.W.3d at 462
(“Being intoxicated at the scene of a traffic accident in which the actor was a driver
is some circumstantial evidence that the actor’s intoxication caused the accident,
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and the inference of causation is even stronger when the accident is a one-car
collision with an inanimate object.”); Scillitani v. State, 343 S.W.3d 914, 916-20
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (concluding that there was
sufficient evidence that the defendant was intoxicated at the time he drove where
the evidence showed that the defendant was found at the scene of an accident, the
accident involved a one-car collision with a fence pole, there were no skid marks
on the road, the defendant admitted to driving the vehicle, the defendant exhibited
multiple clues of intoxication in response to field sobriety tests administered at the
scene, and the defendant’s breath samples showed a blood alcohol level above the
legal limit; the court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the defendant was
not found in the vehicle at the scene, there was no evidence as to whether the
engine of the vehicle was still warm or running when the officer arrived, and there
was no evidence as to whether any alcoholic beverages or containers were found in
the vehicle or at the scene). We overrule Paciga’s sole issue and affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
_____________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
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Submitted on July 27, 2015
Opinion Delivered November 2, 2016
Do not publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
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