Patrick Earl Ruffin, Jr. v. State ( 2016 )

Opinion issued September 22, 2016.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00927-CR
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PATRICK EARL RUFFIN, JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 263rd Judicial District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1445769
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Patrick Earl Ruffin, Jr. was indicted for theft of property—a car he
rented from Dollar Thrifty—valued between $1,500 and $20,000. Ruffin pleaded
not guilty, but a jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment at 364 days’
confinement. In one issue, Ruffin contends that, while he breached the car rental
agreement, there was no evidence that he intended to deprive the owner of property
and, therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
Background
Ruffin rented a car from Dollar Thrifty on February 1, 2014. He paid $66.45
and signed a contract in which he agreed to return the car no later than February 3,
2014. Ruffin did not return the car by that date, and several weeks later, on March
27, 2014, Dollar Thrifty reported the car stolen. The Fort Lauderdale Police
Department recovered the car in Dania Beach, Florida on April 9, 2014, more than
two months after the agreed-upon return date.
Ruffin Rents the Car
At trial, Viann Rivera, a Dollar Thrifty rental agent, testified about Dollar
Thrifty’s rental procedures. To rent a car, a customer must provide a valid driver’s
license and credit or debit card to the agent, who then confirms that the name on the
license matches the name on the card, and inputs the information into Dollar
Thrifty’s system. The agent presents the customer with a rental contract for
signature, and the customer signs the contract, chooses a car, and proceeds to the
exit. At the exit checkpoint, an attendant requests the customer’s driver’s license
and rental contract to verify that the information on the driver’s license matches the
information on the contract. The attendant then scans a barcode on the contract and
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a barcode on the car to link that contract with that car. A camera photographs the
driver and the license plate, and then the gate opens allowing the customer to leave.
Rivera testified that she was the rental agent working on the evening of
February 1, 2014, when Ruffin rented the car from Dollar Thrifty. Ruffin provided
his Florida driver’s license and Visa card, which was charged $66.45 for a three-day
rental. He signed the contract, which required that he return the car to the same
location no later than February 3, 2014, at 10:00 p.m. On February 2, 2014, Ruffin
exchanged the original rental car for a gray 2013 Toyota Camry, but this exchange
did not alter the operative provisions of the contract.
Ruffin Fails to Return the Car
At trial, Louis Dixon, a Dollar Thrifty fleet agent, testified about Dollar
Thrifty’s procedures for handling cars that are not returned by the agreed-upon date.
When a car is at least five days overdue, Dollar Thrifty activates an automated phone
system that calls the customer every day to remind the customer to return the car.
The automated calls continue to be placed until the customer returns the car. When
the car is approximately 14 days overdue, Dollar Thrifty sends a demand letter to
the customer at the address listed on the customer’s driver’s license. The demand
letter states that the vehicle is overdue and should be immediately returned, or it will
be reported as stolen. After Dollar Thrifty sends the demand letter, a fleet agent
compiles an overdue packet, which the agent sends to the Harris County Sherriff’s
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Office to report the car stolen. The packet includes, among other items, a vehicle
description page with the car’s vehicle identification number, license plate, and unit
number, the demand letter, and relevant photographs and e-mails. Once the Harris
County Sheriff’s Office receives the packet, it treats the car as a stolen vehicle.
Dixon was the fleet agent charged with handling these procedures once
Ruffin’s vehicle was not returned as agreed. He testified that Dollar Thrifty
activated the automated phone system on the day after the car was due to be returned,
so that Ruffin began receiving phone calls reminding him to return the car beginning
February 4, 2014. Ruffin neither answered nor returned any of these phone calls.
Dixon also testified that Dollar Thrifty sent Ruffin a demand letter stating that the
car was overdue on February 18, 2014. The letter stated that the car would be
reported as stolen unless it was immediately returned, but Ruffin did not respond to
the letter. Dixon also testified that he began compiling and processing the overdue
packet to send to the Harris County Sheriff’s Office on March 9, 2014 and that he
reported the car stolen to the Sheriff’s Office on March 27, 2014.
The Discovery of the Car
The car was recovered by the Fort Lauderdale Police Department in Dania
Beach, Florida on April 9, 2014. The car had been in an accident, and its front
bumper was damaged.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence
In one issue, Ruffin argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction because the State failed to show that he intended to deprive Dollar Thrifty
of its property.
A. Standard of Review
An appellate court evaluates sufficiency challenges to a jury’s finding of guilt
under a single standard: whether, after considering all the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795,
798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc); Gonzalez v. State, 337 S.W.3d 473, 478 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). “Circumstantial evidence is as
probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial
evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9,
13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004)). On appeal, the same standard of review is used for both circumstantial
and direct evidence cases. Id. The reviewing court must defer to the trier of fact to
fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw
reasonable inferences from the facts. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). The reviewing court should determine whether the necessary
inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the
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evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Hooper, 214
S.W.3d at 16–17. When the record supports conflicting inferences, an appellate
court presumes that the fact finder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and
defers to that resolution. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2793 (1979)).
B. Applicable Law
A person commits the offense of theft if he unlawfully appropriates property
with the intent to deprive the owner of the property. TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.03(a).
A person acts with intent regarding his conduct or a result of his conduct when “it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” TEX.
PENAL CODE § 6.03(a); see also Christensen v. State, 240 S.W.3d 25, 32 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). The intent of the accused may be
inferred from his words, acts, and conduct. Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002) (citing Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999)); Dominguez v. State, 125 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, “[t]he intent to deprive may be inferred from the
failure to return the property.” Amado v. State, 983 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d).
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C. Analysis
Ruffin asserts that his failure to return the rental car as agreed may constitute
a breach of contract but does not evidence an intent to deprive Dollar Thrifty of its
car. The State responds that the jury rationally convicted Ruffin because the
evidence that Ruffin never attempted to return the car for two months or responded
to Dollar Thrifty’s demands for its return supports an inference of intent.
Several courts have held that intent to deprive may be inferred where an
appellant fails to return property as agreed and provides no explanation to the owner.
See Rowland v. State, 744 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc)
(holding that appellant’s failure to return borrowed truck as promised and his failure
to contact owner with an explanation was circumstantial evidence of intent to
deprive); Davis v. State, No. 14–04–00610–CR, 2006 WL 177581, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (not designated for
publication) (holding that failure to return car to dealership after weekend test drive
and failure to explain or respond to numerous calls made by owner of vehicle
supported inference that defendant had requisite intent to deprive); Amado, 983
S.W.2d at 333 (intent to deprive could be inferred where complainant gave appellant
jewelry to give to his brother to fix and appellant never returned the jewelry to
complainant or explained); Nielsen v. State, 836 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1992, pet. ref’d) (finding sufficient evidence of intent to deprive when
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accused kept rental car past return date without contacting rental company and could
not be reached at provided address); see also Jackson v. State, No. 01-91-00458-CR,
1992 WL 105835, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 21, 1992, pet. ref'd)
(mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (holding rational jury could have found
appellant intended to deprive owner of car where car was not returned and recovered
11 days after appellant drove it from lot and 8 days after appellant’s last contact with
complainant).
In Rowland, the appellant had been charged and found guilty of the offense
of theft of an automobile after he failed to return a borrowed truck to the complainant
despite agreeing to do so in three days. Rowland, 744 S.W.2d at 611. The appellant
never contacted the complainant after taking the truck and the complainant was
notified by a wrecker service a month later that his truck had been found and it had
been stripped of its battery, jack, spare tire, alternator, and the complainant’s tools.
Id. In reversing the judgment of the court of appeals and affirming the trial court’s
judgment of conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the appellant’s
intent to deprive the complainant of his truck could be inferred from the fact that he
did not return the truck within the three days as promised and the fact that he failed
to return it at all. Id. at 613.
Similarly, in this case, the State presented evidence that Ruffin rented a
vehicle from Dollar Thrifty and never returned it, despite agreeing to do so within
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three days. Dollar Thrifty fleet agent Louis Dixon testified that Ruffin failed to
contact Dollar Thrifty to explain why he had not returned the car and ignored
numerous phone calls and a demand letter from Dollar Thrifty in which it informed
Ruffin that the car would be reported as stolen unless it was immediately returned.
Dixon explained that Dollar Thrifty only learned of the vehicle’s whereabouts two
months after it was taken because it was in an accident in Dania Beach, Florida.
Intent to deprive may be inferred from the circumstances, including “the
words, acts and conduct of the accused.” Banks v. State, 471 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
we conclude that a rational jury could have inferred that Ruffin had the requisite
intent to deprive based on the circumstances and Ruffin’s conduct. Rowland, 744
S.W.2d at 613. Accordingly, we hold that there was sufficient evidence upon which
a rational trier of fact could have found Ruffin guilty of theft beyond a reasonable
doubt and we overrule Ruffin’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Huddle.
Do Not Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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