Christopher Cardell Ceasar v. State ( 2008 )

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Opinion issued July 3, 2008



In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NOS. 01-07-00769-CR

          01-07-01028-CR

CHRISTOPHER CARDELL CEASAR, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 177th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1098088

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          The appellant, Christopher Cardell Ceasar, appeals from the trial court’s judgment convicting him for the offense of aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 2003). The trial court assessed punishment at twenty-five years in prison after appellant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain with the State in which the punishment range was capped at thirty-five years. Appellant contends in a single issue on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial because the evidence showed that (1) he was mentally incompetent at the time of his plea and (2) he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for new trial. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background

          On December 22, 2006, appellant went to a used car lot, requesting to test drive a car. On the way to the car, appellant asked the salesman if the lot gave discounts to police officers, while raising his shirt and displaying a gold badge and a pistol on his waist band. The salesman turned on the car and started getting out to let appellant into the driver’s side. Appellant then pulled out the pistol, pressed it to the salesman’s side and told him to stay quiet and not call the police. Appellant drove away in the car.

          Three days later, at a fast food restaurant, appellant approached a customer, stated that he was a police officer, displayed a badge, and advised the customer to step outside. Once outside, appellant took the keys from the customer. Appellant fled the scene in the customer’s car. Later that same day, appellant and the customer’s car were taken into custody.

          On January 25, 2007, before appellant’s indictment, the trial court ordered a medical review prompted by appellant’s disclosure to his trial attorney that he was prescribed mood stabilizing medication prior to being arrested. Appellant was seen in the jail’s general clinic for diabetes and referred to the Mental Health Mental Retardation Authority of Harris County (MHMRA), but was not given a psychiatric evaluation.

          After he was indicted for aggravated robbery, appellant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain with the State in which the punishment range was capped at thirty-five years. The trial judge accepted the plea, ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI), and withheld sentencing until its completion. The trial court admonished appellant regarding the range of punishment and appellant’s right to a jury trial. In response to the court’s questioning, appellant stated that he understood these issues. Appellant affirmed that no one had promised him anything to cause him to enter the plea. Moreover, appellant confirmed that he had read and signed the plea papers in the case which, among other things, stated that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, was mentally competent, and knew what he was doing by entering a plea.

          Also during the plea proceeding, appellant stated that he had Bipolar Disorder and was taking medication for the disorder. The trial court ordered a Psychiatric and Medical Review, which resulted in appellant starting medication on June 19, 2007 for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Bipolar Disorder. On June 20, 2007, the trial court ordered a competency evaluation and appellant was found competent to stand trial. In the evaluation, appellant articulated that he decided not to take his case to trial because “if [he was] found guilty, [he] could get from five to ninety-nine years in prison.”

          At the sentencing hearing on August 16, 2007, the trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at twenty-five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Justice. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, asserting that he was incompetent at the time of his plea and did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s motion was supported by medical records and an affidavit from his psychiatrist stating that several months before appellant’s arrest, the psychiatrist diagnosed appellant with Bipolar Disorder and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and prescribed appellant medication. Appellant also offered an affidavit, stating that he was not on the proper medication at the time of his plea and thought that he would receive probation. The affidavit from the appellant’s psychiatrist states that individuals with Bipolar Disorder “often will not admit to others that they do not understand, will attempt to appear as if nothing is wrong and respond in the manner in which they believe the other person expects.”

          In response, the State offered an affidavit from appellant’s trial counsel stating that appellant was able to communicate clearly and that he asked relevant questions at the time of the plea. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing concerning the allegations in the motion for new trial. At the hearing, the trial court considered the court’s file, the submitted exhibits, and the arguments of counsel. The trial court denied the motion for new trial and certified that appellant’s case was a plea bargain case, but gave appellant permission to appeal the denial of the motion for new trial.

Dismissal of Duplicate Appeal

          Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal and was assigned appellate cause number 01-07-00769-CR. The trial court appointed appellate counsel to represent appellant on appeal. Appellate counsel filed a motion for new trial, which was heard by the trial court and denied. The trial court certified appellant’s case as a plea-bargain case, but gave appellant permission to appeal the denial of the motion for new trial. Appellate counsel filed a notice of appeal and was assigned appellate cause number 01-07-01028-CR. Both appellate cause numbers arise from trial cause number 1098088. Appellant and the State filed briefs under appellate cause number 01-07-00769-CR. No briefs were filed under appellate cause number 01-07-01028-CR. We conclude that appellate cause number 01-07-01028-CR is a duplicate appeal of trial cause number 1098088. For this reason, appellate cause number 01-07-01028-CR is dismissed.Denial of Motion for New Trial

          Appellant contends in a single issue that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial. Specifically, appellant asserts that he was incompetent at the time of his plea and he did not receive effective assistance of counsel.

A. Standard of Review

          A trial court’s ruling denying a defendant’s motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Escobar v. State, 227 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; we decide only whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 208. “A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no reasonable view of the record could support the trial court’s ruling.” Id.

B. Mental Incompetence

          To support his contention that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial, appellant asserts that he was incompetent at the time of his plea because (1) he was “not receiving his psychiatric medication” and (2) he “was not evaluated for mental illness and medicated until after the plea was taken.” A plea of guilty should not be accepted by the trial court unless the defendant appears mentally competent and enters the plea voluntarily. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 2007). A person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer “with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceeding” against him. Id. art. 46B.003(a) (Vernon 2006). A person is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. art. 46B.003(b).

          A defendant may challenge his competency to stand trial in a motion for new trial on a plea of guilty. Godoy v. State, 122 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); Edwards v. State, 993 S.W.2d 171, 175 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. ref'd). When the competency issue is raised in this manner, the trial court does not look to see whether the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to competence, but applies the normal standard used in deciding a motion for new trial under which the trial court considers all the evidence presented, judges the credibility of witnesses, and resolves conflicts in the evidence. Godoy, 122 S.W.3d at 320; Edwards, 993 S.W.2d at 176.

          At the hearing on his motion for new trial, appellant presented evidence to support his contention that he was not competent at the time of his plea. Medical records and an affidavit from appellant’s psychiatrist state that several months before appellant’s arrest, the psychiatrist diagnosed appellant with Bipolar Disorder and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and prescribed appellant medication. In his affidavit, appellant states that he was not on the proper medication at the time of his plea and thought that he would receive probation. The affidavit from the appellant’s psychiatrist states that individuals with Bipolar Disorder “often will not admit to others that they do not understand, will attempt to appear as if nothing is wrong and respond in the manner in which they believe the other person expects.”

          The State contends that the record supports appellant’s competency at the time of his plea. An affidavit from appellant’s trial counsel states that appellant was able to communicate clearly and that he asked relevant questions at the time of the plea. The record contains written and oral admonishments supporting that the guilty plea was made voluntarily and knowingly by the appellant. Appellant sent a letter to the trial judge two days after the plea proceeding that argued for leniency in his case. The appellant supplied detailed information for the PSI report, which was completed before he was placed back on medication for Bipolar Disorder.

          We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the affidavits and medical records were insufficient to defeat the presumption that appellant was competent at the time of his plea. The trial court was entitled to balance the evidence in the affidavits against the record from appellant’s plea proceeding, including the trial court’s own observations of appellant at the time of the plea. Godoy, 122 S.W.3d at 321; see Kuyava v. State, 538 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); see also Edwards, 993 S.W.2d at 176. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion for new trial. Purchase v. State, 84 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d); see Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

          In further support of his contention that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial, appellant asserts that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not properly inform him about the proceedings and “counsel allowed appellant to enter a plea while unmedicated when counsel was aware of appellant’s mental illness.” To successfully challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we must determine “(1) whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and if not, (2) whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [appellant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)); see Ex parte Moody, 991 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Judicial review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be highly deferential to trial counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

          The affidavits of appellant and his trial counsel are in conflict. In his affidavit in support of his motion for new trial, appellant alleges that “[his] attorney promised [him] if [he] pled to a PSI [he] would receive ten years deferred adjudication from the judge.” He also alleges that his attorney did not prepare him for cross-examination or allow him to read the PSI report. In his affidavit, the trial counsel states that he fully advised appellant of the range of punishment in his case. The trial counsel also claims that he advised appellant of the procedures of a PSI hearing.

          The trial court, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, was free to disbelieve the assertions made by appellant that formed the basis of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Acosta v. State, 160 S.W.3d 204, 210–11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). Additionally, the record confirms that appellant was fully admonished orally and in writing when he entered his guilty plea, and he indicated that he understood the range of punishment. Appellant was asked if he had gone over the papers marked State’s Exhibit Number One with his attorney and appellant answered in the affirmative. State’s Exhibit Number One includes the PSI report, plea papers, and admonishments. Appellant was also informed by the trial court that the State would present testimony against him at the PSI hearing. We conclude that appellant’s affidavit testimony was contradicted by his testimony at his plea hearing. Furthermore, a defendant’s uncorroborated testimony that he was misinformed by counsel, without more, is not sufficient to show that his plea was involuntary. Fimberg v. State, 922 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d).

          Appellant also contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing appellant to plead guilty while unmedicated. In his affidavit, the trial counsel states that he was fully aware of appellant’s mental health background, but did not determine that competency or sanity were at issue in the case because appellant was able to communicate with him clearly. The record reflects that appellant signed written admonishments indicating he was competent and testified at the plea proceeding that he had discussed his case with counsel and understood counsel’s advice, the waivers and admonitions, and the significance and consequences of his plea. The trial court could have reasonably determined that appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective by not pursuing the issue of competency because appellant had the ability to consult with him and appellant understood the proceedings against him.

          Even if trial counsel had been deficient, appellant must show a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney’s deficient performance, he would not have pleaded guilty. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370; Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d at 536. Appellant makes no such showing. The record does not show that appellant ever entered a request to withdraw his plea although he was taking medication for Bipolar Disorder approximately four months before sentencing. In his competency evaluation, appellant states that he decided not to take his case to trial because if he was found guilty, he would face a maximum of ninety-nine years. This statement was made after appellant was on medication and shows that he had considered the consequences of his plea.

          Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that appellant failed to overcome the strong presumption that his trial counsel provided adequate assistance and that his plea was voluntarily entered. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion for new trial.

          We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                        Elsa Alcala

                                                                        Justice

Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Alcala, and Hanks.

Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P 47.2(b).