Russel Dean Hanshaw v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                                  Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-17-00796-CR
    Russel Dean HANSHAW, 1
    Appellant
    v.
    The STATE of Texas,
    Appellee
    From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2014CR8144
    The Honorable Joey Contreras, Judge Presiding
    PER CURIAM
    Sitting:          Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
    Karen Angelini, Justice
    Irene Rios, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: March 14, 2018
    DISMISSED
    Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to the offense of
    criminal mischief ($20,000 to $100,000) and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment,
    suspended in favor of a five-year term of community supervision, in accordance with the terms of
    his plea-bargain agreement. According to the terms of his plea-bargain agreement, the amount of
    appellant’s “[r]estitution [is] to be determined through the community supervision office.”
    1
    The record before this court refers to the appellant as Russel Dean Hanshaw, however, the Texas Identification Card
    included in the clerk’s record reads Russell Dean Harshaw.
    04-17-00796-CR
    Following a restitution hearing, the trial court signed an order amending the conditions of
    appellant’s community supervision to include restitution in the amount of $48,380.00 and waived
    all fees. The trial court additionally entered an amended judgment of conviction which included
    the amount of restitution.
    The trial court signed a certification of defendant’s right to appeal stating that this “is a
    plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).
    After appellant filed a notice of appeal, 2 the trial court clerk sent copies of the certification and
    notice of appeal to this court. See 
    id. 25.2(e). The
    clerk’s record, which includes the trial court’s
    Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification, has been filed. See 
    id. 25.2(d). “In
    a plea bargain case ... a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised
    by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to
    appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). A plea bargain case is “a case in which a defendant's plea
    was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended
    by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant.” 
    Id. We must
    dismiss an appeal “if a
    certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.”
    
    Id. 25.2(d). After
    examining the record, we advised appellant that this appeal would be dismissed
    pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d), unless an amended trial court certification
    showing that he had the right to appeal was made part of the appellate record. See TEX. R. APP. P.
    25.2(d), 37.1; Daniels v. State, 
    110 S.W.3d 174
    (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, order). Appellant
    2
    The trial court imposed sentence in the underlying cause on October 30, 2017. Because appellant did not file a
    motion for new trial, the notice of appeal was due to be filed November 29, 2017. Although appellant’s notice of
    appeal was not filed until December 4, 2017, it can be considered timely filed as it was received within ten days after
    the filing deadline, sent to the proper clerk by United States Postal Service, placed in an envelope properly addressed
    and stamped, and deposited in the mail before the last day for filing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.2(b).
    -2-
    04-17-00796-CR
    filed a response and Request for Remand and Correction of the Trial Court’s Certification of
    Appellant’s Right to Appeal.
    Appellant first requests that we “reform the judgment and all court documents to reflect
    the true spelling of appellant’s surname as Harshaw.” Appellant’s Texas Identification Card,
    which is included in the record, indicates the spelling of appellant’s last name as “Harshaw” rather
    than “Hanshaw.”      Accordingly, appellant’s request that we reform the judgment and court
    documents to reflect the spelling of appellant’s surname as “Harshaw” is granted.
    “Appellant also requests that the certification of the right to appeal be remanded and
    ordered reformed to show either, that the trial court is permitting the appeal of the restitution, or
    that the restitution is an appealable [o]rder.”
    Generally, an order modifying probation cannot be appealed at the time of modification.
    See Basaldua v. State, 
    558 S.W.2d 2
    , 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). However, in this case, the
    sentencing was not complete until the restitution hearing. Bailey v. State, 
    160 S.W.3d 11
    , 14 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2004) (pointing out that the sentence was not complete until the date of the restitution
    hearing). Also, generally, an appellant may appeal a judgment at the time he is first placed on
    community supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.755(e). In this case, however,
    community supervision and restitution were part of the plea bargain agreement.
    Restitution is part of the sentence. 
    Id. art. 42.037;
    see Hanna v. State, 
    426 S.W.3d 87
    , 91
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“Restitution is not only a form of punishment, it is also a crime victim’s
    statutory right.”). In this case, the statutorily prescribed amount of restitution fell between $20,000
    and $100,000, as appellant pleaded nolo contendere to criminal mischief in that amount. See
    
    Hanna, 426 S.W.3d at 91
    (recognizing the amount of restitution must have a factual basis in the
    record). We therefore conclude appellant pled to a restitution range between $20,000 and
    $100,000. See Gutierrez v. State, 
    380 S.W.3d 167
    , 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (finding the law
    -3-
    04-17-00796-CR
    requires that a defendant who is charged and convicted of a crime be sentenced within the
    parameters of the statutorily applicable range). The trial court’s order of restitution for $48,380
    falls within the statutorily applicable range and within the terms of the plea agreement.
    Moreover, the record does not show appellant is appealing a matter raised by written
    motion filed and ruled on before trial, or that he has obtained the trial court’s permission to appeal.
    Under these circumstances, appellant has no right of appeal.
    Accordingly, appellant’s request that the trial court’s certification of right to appeal be
    remanded is denied, and this appeal is dismissed pursuant to Rule 25.2(d). See Chavez v. State,
    
    183 S.W.3d 675
    , 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (dismissing appeal without reference to the merits
    when the appellant's sentence did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and
    agreed to by the appellant, and did not satisfy any exception stated in Rule 25.2(a)(2)).
    PER CURIAM
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-17-00796-CR

Filed Date: 3/14/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/21/2018