Christopher Aaron Resendes v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                                         In The
    Court of Appeals
    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
    No. 07-16-00204-CR
    CHRISTOPHER AARON RESENDES, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    On Appeal from the 47th District Court
    Potter County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 70,061-A, Honorable Edward Lee Self, Presiding
    June 29, 2018
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PARKER, JJ.
    Appellant, Christopher Aaron Resendes, was convicted of possession of a
    controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of more than one gram but less
    than four grams.1 He was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment and a $2,000 fine. In
    his sole issue on appeal, he contends the evidence is insufficient to prove that the
    methamphetamine weighed one gram or more. We will affirm.
    1   See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.102(6) (West Supp. 2017), § 481.115(c) (West
    2017).
    Background
    On the morning of February 9, 2015, Amarillo police officers searched appellant’s
    residence pursuant to a search warrant. Officers found various drug paraphernalia,
    including a pipe and empty baggies with apparent methamphetamine residue. In their
    search of the hollow steel frame of appellant’s wheelchair, officers also found three small
    plastic baggies containing a crystal substance that appeared to be methamphetamine.
    A forensic scientist for the Texas Department of Public Safety Regional Crime
    Laboratory conducted an analysis on the three baggies of substance recovered from
    appellant’s wheelchair. She determined that the three items had “net weights” of 0.47
    grams, 0.55 grams, and 0.54 grams, respectively, and that all three contained
    methamphetamine.
    Appellant was charged with the offense of possession of methamphetamine with
    intent to deliver. Following a bench trial, he was found not guilty of the offense of
    possession with intent to deliver, but guilty of the lesser-included offense of possession
    of methamphetamine in an amount of more than one gram but less than four grams.
    Standard of Review
    In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that
    the methamphetamine seized weighed one gram or more. In determining whether the
    evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we apply the standard set forth in Jackson
    v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
     (1979). See Brooks v. State,
    
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under this standard, we are to consider all
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on
    2
    that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 
    443 U.S. at 319
    .
    Discussion
    To convict appellant of this offense, the State was required to prove, beyond a
    reasonable doubt, that the methamphetamine appellant possessed was, “by aggregate
    weight, including adulterants or dilutants, one gram or more but less than four grams.”
    TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c).2                       Although the weight of the
    methamphetamine was not challenged at trial, appellant contends such weight may be
    less than one gram because the weight of the packaging may not have been taken into
    account.
    At trial, the three baggies of methamphetamine found in appellant’s wheelchair
    were admitted into evidence. The State presented testimony from its expert, a forensic
    scientist, regarding her scientific analysis of the three items. She testified that the first
    step in her analysis is to “obtain a net weight.” She further testified that each of the three
    baggies contained methamphetamine and that the baggies had weights of 0.47 grams,
    0.55 grams, and 0.54 grams, respectively. She then affirmed, “All of the weights I’ve
    stated are the net weight.” Neither party asked the witness to explain what “net weight”
    meant.
    2 An adulterant or dilutant is “any material that increases the bulk or quantity of a controlled
    substance, regardless of its effect on the chemical activity of the controlled substance.” TEX. HEALTH &
    SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.002(49) (West 2017); see also Seals v. State, 
    187 S.W.3d 417
    , 420 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2005) (explaining that definition includes any substance added to or mixed with a controlled
    substance). The State does not challenge appellant’s argument that the plastic packaging at issue is not
    an adulterant or dilutant and should not be included in the aggregate weight.
    3
    Appellant argues that the State did not prove that the weight of the
    methamphetamine, removed from its packaging, was one gram or more. He further
    maintains that, without an explanation of what “net weight” means, no reasonable
    inference may be made that the methamphetamine would weigh at least one gram if
    removed from its packaging. We disagree.
    The State’s expert testified to a total net weight of 1.56 grams of
    methamphetamine. She did not define “net weight”; however, the term is one that persons
    of ordinary intelligence are perfectly capable of understanding. The term “net weight” is
    commonly understood to mean the weight of an item exclusive of its packaging. See Net
    Weight, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “net weight” as “[t]he total weight
    of a thing, after deducting its container, its wrapping, and any other extraneous matter.”).
    At trial, there was no evidence presented to suggest an alternative meaning or
    understanding of the phrase “net weight.”
    The factfinder may draw reasonable inferences and make reasonable deductions
    from the evidence. Smith v. State, 
    895 S.W.2d 449
    , 452 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, pet.
    ref’d). Here, the trial judge, as factfinder, was entitled to take language at its ordinary
    meaning. He could have reasonably inferred that when the expert used the phrase “net
    weight,” she meant the weight of the methamphetamine without any packaging.
    Moreover, we note that the trial judge personally inspected the evidence, and could
    have reasonably concluded that the weight of the packaging was negligible. See, e.g.,
    Beller v. State, 
    154 S.W.3d 836
    , 838 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d)
    (in case where State presented evidence that eight rocks of cocaine weighed 1.7 grams,
    4
    but rocks had flecks of dirt on them that were not weighed separately and were not
    adulterants or dilutants, court held that, based on jurors’ own inspections of the cocaine
    and the chemist’s testimony, jury reasonably could have concluded that the aggregate
    weight of the cocaine rocks was more than one gram).
    Based on the ordinary meaning of “net weight,” and on the reasonable inferences
    to be drawn therefrom, a rational factfinder could have found that appellant possessed at
    least one gram of methamphetamine.
    Conclusion
    We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Judy C. Parker
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-16-00204-CR

Filed Date: 6/29/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/5/2018