State v. Cesar Ramiro Arellano , 571 S.W.3d 422 ( 2019 )

NUMBER 13-17-00268-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
CESAR RAMIRO ARELLANO, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
of Victoria County, Texas.
OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant the State of Texas charged appellee Cesar Ramiro Arellano with a
driving while intoxicated Class A Misdemeanor because he had previously been
convicted of the same offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2017 1st C.S.). Arellano filed a motion to suppress. After the trial court
conducted a hearing on the matter, it granted Arellano’s motion. By four issues, which
we have reorganized, the State contends the trial court erred in: (1) concluding the
warrant was “facially invalid”; (2) concluding the State was barred from invoking the good
faith exception; (3) refusing to consider documentary evidence presented by the State;
and (4) failing to provide adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. 1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Arellano was arrested for the offense of driving while intoxicated. See id. § 49.04
(West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Officer Phillip Garcia of the Victoria Police
Department obtained a specimen of Arellano’s blood after applying for a search warrant.
Arellano filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the warrant was facially invalid because
it failed to meet the statutory requirements of Article 18.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st
C.S.). At the motion to suppress hearing, Arellano offered an eleven-page document
entitled “Affidavit for Search Warrant” into evidence without objection. The State
responded to Arellano’s argument by invoking the good faith exception contained within
Article 38.23(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.23 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
The trial court expressed concern about whose signature was on the warrant. The
State indicated a willingness to resolve that issue and offered to call in a witness. Instead,
the trial court instructed both parties to submit a brief summarizing their arguments. The
State submitted several documentary exhibits attached to their brief including a separate
affidavit from Officer Garcia where he attested to the identity of the magistrate and the
1 After filing Arellano’s brief, on January 28, 2019, Arellano’s counsel filed her motion to withdraw,
stating that she was sworn in as the Criminal District Attorney of Victoria County, Texas, and is thereby
disqualified from representing Arellano in this matter. After considering her motion, we hereby GRANT
counsel’s motion to withdraw.
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offense report. 2 Thereafter, the trial court granted Arellano’s motion to suppress. In
response to the State’s request, the trial court made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law to support its ruling:
I. Findings of Fact
....
g. The Trial Court reviewed [Arellano’s] Exhibit 1 and found that
the signature above the line indicating ‘Magistrate, Victoria
County’ was not in legible handwriting, nor was it
accompanied by any name identifying the magistrate in either
clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form.
h. During the hearing, neither the Trial Court nor the State could
identify the magistrate by the signature on the warrant in this
matter. The State offered no evidence on this issue.
i. During the hearing, the State called no witnesses. More
specifically, the State did not elicit any testimony from Officer
Garcia during the hearing . . .
II. Conclusions of Law
....
d. The Court finds that the signature on the search warrant
seeking Defendant’s blood is not legible and is not
accompanied by the magistrate’s name in either clearly
legible handwriting or in typewritten form.
e. The warrant in this case obtained by Officer Garcia is not
facially valid because it fails to comply with the requisites of
Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. 18.04.
f. In order to rely on the “good faith exception” to the
exclusionary rule codified in Tex. Code of Crim. Proc.
38.23(b), an officer must rely on a facially valid warrant. see
[sic] Miller v. State, 703 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi, 1985); McClintock v. State, 2017 WL 1076289 (Tex.
Crim. App., March 22, 2017).
...
2 This affidavit is separate from the probable cause affidavit attached to the search warrant.
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h. Officer Garcia did not testify during the hearing, and thus
presented no evidence to show whether he relied in “good
faith” upon the warrant in this case.
i. Although Officer Garcia did not testify at the hearing, the State
attached Officer Garcia’s affidavit to their brief to the Court.
j. Even if the Trial Court wished to consider the affidavit, as
within its discretion, the statements in the affidavits provide a
recitation of the statutory requirements for the “good faith
exception” with respect to a warrant.
This appeal followed.
II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, like any ruling on the admission of
evidence, is subject to review for abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587,
590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s conclusion and reverse the judgment only if it is outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement.” Id. Its ruling will be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and
is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d
410, 417–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We give almost total deference to a trial court’s
express or implied determination of historical facts and review de novo the court’s
application of the law of search and seizure to those facts. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853,
856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
B. Warrant Requirements
By its first issue, the State argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that
the warrant was facially invalid in violation of Article 18.04(5) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04.
1. Applicable Law
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In September 2015, the Legislature amended Article 18.04 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure by adding a fifth element to the list of requisites for a valid search
warrant. This additional requirement requires the warrant to contain the name of the
issuing magistrate in clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form along with the
magistrate’s signature. HOUSE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, Bill
Analysis, Tex. H.B. 644, 84th Leg. R.S. (2015). 3
A search warrant shall be sufficient under article 18.04 of the code of criminal
procedure if it contains the following requisites:
1. that it run in the name of “The State of Texas”;
2. that it identify, as near as may be, that which is to be seized and
name or describe, as near as may be, the person, place, or thing to
be searched;
3. that it command any peace officer of the proper county to search
forthwith the person, place, or thing named;
4. that it be dated and signed by the magistrate; and
5. that the magistrate’s name appear in clearly legible handwriting or in
typewritten form with the magistrate’s signature
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04 (emphasis added). A search warrant must be
“clearly sufficiently specific to meet the mandates of the Fourth Amendment, the Texas
Constitution, and article 18.04 of the Code.” Ramirez v. State, 345 S.W.3d 631, Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Miller v. State, 703 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1985, pet. ref’d) (holding that a search warrant lacking any of the required
elements of article 18.04 is facially invalid). However, “[a] warrant that does not contain
3 The amendment “would add to existing search warrant requirements that the name of the
magistrate issuing the warrant appear in clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form on the warrant”
because “[a] magistrate’s signature on such warrants may not always be clearly legible, which can increase
the risk of forgery or inadequately informing individuals of who has authorized the search warrant.” HOUSE
COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 644, 84th Leg. R.S. (2015).
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the basic information required by art. 18.04 can nevertheless be valid so long as the
warrant incorporates by reference [an] affidavit and said affidavit does contain all of the
information required by art. 18.04.” Turner v. State, 886 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1994, pet ref’d).
2. Discussion
Here, the search warrant was signed by a magistrate; however, the magistrate’s
name does not appear in clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form with the
magistrate’s signature as required by article 18.04(5). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 18.04(5). Moreover, the attached affidavit incorporated in the warrant also lacks the
magistrate’s name in clearly legible handwriting or typewritten form. Because article
18.04(5) requires that the “magistrate’s name appear in clearly legible handwriting or in
typewritten form with the magistrate’s signature,” and the search warrant before us does
not meet this requirement, we conclude the warrant does not comply with the
requirements of 18.04 and is therefore facially invalid. See Turner, 886 S.W.2d at 864;
Miller, 703 S.W.2d at 353. Accordingly, we overrule the State’s first issue.
C. Good Faith Exception
By its second issue, the State claims that the trial court erred by concluding the
State was prevented from invoking the good faith exception of article 38.28 of the code
of criminal procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23.
The Texas good faith statutory exception provides an exception to the exclusion
of unlawfully obtained evidence only if the law enforcement officer was acting in good
faith reliance upon a warrant. State v. Molden, 484 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Austin
2016, pet ref’d). In executing a warrant, that officer “act[s] in objective good faith reliance
upon” the warrant, “as long as the warrant is facially valid.” McClintock v. State, 541
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S.W.3d 63, 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In this case, Arellano’s blood was obtained as a
result of a facially invalid warrant in violation of article 18.04 of the code of criminal
procedure. See Molden, 484 S.W.3d at 610. Because the “good faith exception” requires
a facially valid warrant, and here, by contrast, no valid search warrant existed, the “good
faith exception” is inapplicable to this case. See id.; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.23. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in applying the exclusionary
rule in this case. We overrule the State’s second point of error.
D. State’s Documentary Evidence
By its third issue, the State contends that it was plain error for the trial court to fail
to consider “any of the documentary evidence offered by the State” following the motion
to suppress hearing. According to the State, “if [Arellano] is allowed to submit
documentary evidence then the State must be allowed to do so as well.”
Here, the trial court made it clear that it did not consider the State’s documentary
evidence when it concluded that the warrant was facially invalid. However, because the
warrant was facially invalid, it was unnecessary for the trial court to consider any of the
State’s evidence. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04(5). Nonetheless, “a trial
judge may use its discretion in deciding what type of information he considers appropriate
and reliable in making his pre-trial ruling.” Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 539 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it
rejected the State’s documentary evidence. Id. We therefore overrule the State’s third
issue. 4
4 Additionally, in its fourth issue, the State complains that the trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law are “wholly inadequate on the potentially dispositive issue in this case” as the trial court
failed to address: (1) whether it believed Officer Garcia’s testimony through his affidavit; (2) the offense
report; (3) whether it believed the magistrate was a neutral and detached magistrate, or (4) whether the
warrant was issued on probable cause. Because we determined that the warrant was facially invalid, this
issue is not dispositive. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
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III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled the State’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
21st day of February, 2019.
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