Daniel Eugene Smith v. State ( 2004 )

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

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No. 06-04-00028-CR

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DANIEL E. SMITH, Appellant

 

V.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 71st Judicial District Court

Harrison County, Texas

Trial Court No.03-0315X

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Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            On December 30, 2003, Daniel E. Smith waived a jury trial and pled guilty to two counts of burglary of a habitation. The indictment further alleged Smith had been previously and finally convicted of a felony offense, burglary. Smith pled true to the enhancement allegation contained in the indictment. There was no negotiated plea agreement regarding punishment in this case.

            After admonishing Smith regarding the enhanced punishment range applicable in this case (five to ninety-nine years, or life), the trial court accepted Smith's guilty plea. The trial court then heard evidence and argument regarding punishment. The trial court ultimately sentenced Smith to imprisonment for life. Smith then appealed the trial court's judgment.

            On July 12, 2004, Smith's appellate counsel filed an Anders brief in which he professionally discussed the record, described the issues reviewed, and concluded there were no arguable grounds for appeal. As required by Anders, he also filed a motion to withdraw. Counsel sent Smith a copy of the appellate brief and informed Smith of his right to file a pro se response and of his right to review the record.

            This Court informed Smith at that time his response, if any, was due by August 11, 2004. As of this date, we have not received a pro se response.

            We have independently reviewed the record and the brief filed by counsel in this appeal, and we agree there are no arguable issues that would support an appeal in this case. Smith's guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given. With respect to punishment considerations, the trial court had before it evidence that Smith had a long history of drug abuse, that he stole as a means of supporting that drug habit, and that he had become involved with the Aryan brotherhood. These considerations do not lend themselves to a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in assessing Smith's punishment, especially since punishment was assessed within the range provided for by statute. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.32 (Vernon 2003) (first-degree felony punishment range is five to ninety-nine years or life); Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.42(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004–2005) (enhancement of second-degree felony to first-degree punishment range based on prior felony conviction); § 30.02 (Vernon 2003) (burglary of a habitation is a second-degree felony).             We affirm the trial court's judgment.

 

                                                                                    Jack Carter

                                                                                    Justice

 

Date Submitted:          September 22, 2004

Date Decided:             September 23, 2004

Do Not Publish

ate, whether successful or not, he shall be allowed out of the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees, in such proceedings.

Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §Â 243 (Vernon 2003) (emphasis added). "Personal representatives of estates shall also be entitled to all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by them in the preservation, safekeeping, and management of the estate . . . and all reasonable attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in connection with the proceedings and management of such estate, on satisfactory proof to the court." Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 242 (Vernon 2003).

In Drake v. Muse, Currie & Cohen, the Fifth Court of Appeals reviewed the propriety of a trial court's order granting an administratrix's reasonable attorney's fees expended by the administratrix of an estate in connection with contesting an application to probate a foreign will. 532 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1975), writ ref'd n.r.e. (per curiam), 535 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1976). The executor of the Texas will asserted that her contest of the foreign will "was an activity undertaken in 'the preservation, safe-keeping, and management of the estate.'" Id. at 374. The appellate court disagreed. It wrote,

While no one doubts the right of Mrs. Holt, as administratrix, to resist the application to probate the foreign will, we find no authority, either in the Probate Code or by decisions of courts of this state, which would impose upon her a legal duty to resist the application. It is entirely possible that the rights of the heirs of the estate may be altered if the foreign will is admitted to probate in Texas. However, the mere fact that the share of an heir is altered or exhausted does not of itself create a legal duty on the part of the administratrix to take action pursuant to § 242 of the Probate Code and to allow the resulting attorney's fees to be charged to the estate.

Id. (emphasis added). We find Drake to be both persuasive and dispositive in deciding Bobbie's first issue.

Bobbie contends Goolsby's failure to defend Lonie's will necessitated her coming to the estate's rescue. Bobbie's view, however, overlooks the fact that Goolsby had no legal duty as the estate's successor administrator to take action. This is because the claim of the plaintiffs who filed the action for a declaratory judgment did not constitute an attack on the validity of the entire will; rather, it involved only the construction of a particular provision of the will itself. The entire will was never under attack. The plaintiffs' claims sought only to alter or construe a specific provision of the will to correct what they argued was a scrivener's error (an error which would result in the failure of a specific devise within the will). If the plaintiffs who brought the declaratory judgment action had successfully prosecuted their claim, it would not have disposed of Lonie's will; it would have simply altered the identity of some of the persons who took under a specific devise in that will. The fact that Bobbie, as residuary devisee, otherwise stood to inherit this failed specific bequest does not thereby convert the declaratory judgment plaintiffs' claims into an attempt to thwart the terms of the will.

It may develop in the future that Goolsby might opt to protect himself by bringing an action to construe the terms of the will, rather than making a unilateral determination of the particular devise in question. However, he does not have an absolute duty to do so. Unless Goolsby had a legally imposed duty to act, Bobbie (acting in her capacity as a devisee under the will) could not step into Goolsby's shoes, purport to defend the lawsuit on behalf of the estate, and claim an absolute right to be reimbursed by the estate any attorney's fees expended in that effort.

In contrast to the first portion of Section 243 (making provision for a potential or acting personal representative to defend a will), quoted above, at the time the declaratory judgment action was being prosecuted and defended, Bobbie--who was then no longer representative of the estate--could only fall within the second classification of persons who have the right to defend a will: "a devisee, legatee, or beneficiary in a will" who is acting in "good faith, and with just cause." Section 243 provides that this kind of defender of a will "may be allowed out of the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees, in such proceedings." Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 243 (emphasis added). "May" does not mean "shall" or "must be." The trial court had the discretion to either award attorney's fees or deny them under this section of the Probate Code. Skinner v. Moore, 940 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1997, no writ). Bobbie has done nothing to show that the trial court abused that discretion.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bobbie's request. We overrule Bobbie's first point of error.

Attorney's Fees in Connection with Contesting Removal As Dependent Administratrix

In her second point of error, Bobbie raises the following issue:

When an administrator makes a "good faith" challenge to her removal, isn't she allowed to collect her attorney fees which accumulates as a result of the challenge in accordance to any applicable statute, but particular §242 of the Texas Probate Code and/or Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code[?]

Bobbie asked the trial court to order the estate to reimburse her for $47,989.15 ⁽⁵⁾ in attorney's fees in connection with her challenge to being removed as the dependent administratrix of Lonie's estate.

In ruling on Bobbie's request, the trial court stated in a letter to the parties:

I have completed my review of all of your briefing and Mr. Belt's application for attorney's fees. At first reading, it would appear that Mr. Belt's request for attorney's fees should be granted only as to those efforts expended by him in defending "in good faith" any applications to remove Bobbie Washington. The only statutory authority of any import cited by Mr. Belt in support of his request for attorney's fees is Section 149c of the Texas Probate Code.

However, it is clear that Section 149c of the Texas Probate Code applies only to independent administrations. ⁽⁶⁾

I ruled during the removal hearing that Bobbie Washington's administration was not an independent administration and that ruling remains the same today.

Therefore, finding no statutory authority to allow me to grant Mr. Belt's application, it must be denied.

We note that Bobbie's written application (which was filed with the probate court) asking for $47,989.15 in attorney's fees fails to cite any statutory or caselaw authority to support her request.

Our review of the record does not show Bobbie preserved this claim for $47,989.15 in attorney's fees (for the removal contest) by specifically drawing the trial court's attention to a claim made (on appeal, but not before the trial court) pursuant to either Section 242 of the Probate Code or Section 37.004 (or Section 37.009) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Thus, this second issue was not preserved for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1).

Moreover, even if Bobbie had preserved this issue for our review by first making a timely request at the trial court level for $47,989.15 in attorney's fees (expended in connection with contesting her removal) pursuant to either Section 242 of the Texas Probate Code or the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, we would not be persuaded to rule in her favor. "Personal representatives" of an estate are "entitled to all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by them in the preservation, safekeeping, and management of the estate . . . and all reasonable attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in connection with the proceedings and management of such estate, on satisfactory proof to the court." Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 242. However, Bobbie's claim for attorney's fees expended in connection with her contesting her removal as administratrix involved neither the preservation or safekeeping of the estate, nor the "management of the estate" as that phrase is used in Section 242.

The Fourth Court of Appeals has previously held that attorney's fees expended in connection by one who contests his own removal as administrator of the estate, especially where "[t]he evidence fails to show that the contest for the administratorship was in the interest of the estate, but indicates it was rather in the interest of [the removed administrator]" should not be permitted. Dyess v. Rowe, 177 S.W. 523, 523 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1915), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 213 S.W. 234 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, judgm't adopted). We agree.

Here, the trial court had before it evidence that Bobbie had, while she was the dependent administratrix of this estate, been distributing money from the estate to herself without first obtaining the trial court's approval to do so. Upon discovering this conduct, the trial court ordered Bobbie to repay money to the estate. In addition, Bobbie had failed to file several annual accountings during her administration of the estate, accountings which are required for all dependent administrations. These acts suggest malfeasance. Cf. Tindall v. State, 671 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("It is thus apparent that when the fiduciary's omission or malfeasance is at the root of the litigation, the estate will not be required to reimburse the fiduciary for his or her attorneys' fees. Such fees are not necessarily incurred in connection with the management of the estate."); In re Higganbotham's Estate, 192 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Tex. Civ. App.--Beaumont 1946, no writ). As the Dyess court wrote, "[N]o estate should be made to pay for the luxury of a contest among heirs or legatees as to the administrator." 177 S.W. at 524.

The trial court properly held that Bobbie may not recover the attorney's fees incurred by her while contesting her removal as the administratrix. We overrule her second point of error.

Appellee's Request for Sanctions  

Finally, Goolsby has, by and through his attorneys, filed two requests asking this Court to levy sanctions against Bobbie for filing this appeal. Goolsby's first request was for $9,405.54, an amount that reflects what Goolsby's attorney charged to handle the appeal and to prepare the first motion for sanctions. Goolsby's second request was for attorney's fees charged in connection with the preparing and mailing of an "appellee's surreply brief" in this case; this second requested sanction was for an additional $3,350.00. Goolsby's requests for sanctions seek to recover attorney's fees under our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 45.

In pursuit of such relief, it is Goolsby's burden to show that Bobbie "had no reasonable ground to believe that the judgment would be reversed." In re Estate of Davis, 216 S.W.3d 537, 548 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2007, pet. denied); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Marks, 749 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1988, pet. denied). For this Court to award the requested amounts, we must first find that Bobbie's appeal was frivolous. Tex. R. App. P. 45. We do not reach such a conclusion. With respect to the first amount requested of $9,405.54, even though Bobbie's argument failed to persuade us that the trial court erred and even though the grounds upon which the appeal was prosecuted were based on a paper-thin foundation, we do not believe the record before us conclusively demonstrates Bobbie patently lacked any reasonable belief based in law that her appeal did not constitute an informed, good-faith challenge to the trial court's judgment or did not otherwise constitute an effort to create new law in this area of probate law. Cf. Davis, 216 S.W.3d at 548; Long Trusts v. Atl. Richfield Co., 893 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1995, no writ). Therefore, the initial amount of $9,405.54 is inappropriate under Rule 45.

With respect to the second amount of $3,350.00 requested in connection with Goolsby's attorney's fees for preparing and mailing a surreply brief, we also find sanctions to be inappropriate. Our Rules of Appellate Procedure do not expressly permit the filing of a surreply brief by an appellee; such filings are permitted at this Court's discretion. See generally Tex. R. App. P. 38.1, 38.2, 38.3, 38.7. In this case, we did not accept Goolsby's surreply brief for filing. We are not persuaded that Bobbie should be required to pay the costs of preparing a document for filing that was ultimately not accepted for filing with the appellate court.

Conclusion  

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying both of Bobbie's requests for attorney's fees. At this time, we decline the opportunity to grant the estate's motion for appellate sanctions against Bobbie.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Bailey C. Moseley

Justice

Date Submitted: April 30, 2009

Date Decided: June 30, 2009

1. This appeal is following a well-worn path. Several appeals involving Lonie's estate have been previously presented to this Court. In re Estate of Washington, 262 S.W.3d 903, 904 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2008, no pet.); In re Estate of Washington, No. 06-96-00010-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 4414 (Tex. App.--Texarkana Oct. 7, 1996) (not designated for publication), op. on reh'g, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 5333 (Tex. App.--Texarkana Dec. 3, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication); In re Estate of Washington, No. 06-08-00016-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2917 (Tex. App.--Texarkana Apr. 23, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re Washington, No. 06-98-00001-CV (Tex. App.--Texarkana Jan. 7, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

2. The Texas Supreme Court recently noted that "as early as 1848, a Texas testator has been able to opt for the independent administration of his estate, including the right to pick his own independent executor." Kappus v. Kappus, No. 08-0136, 2009 Tex. LEXIS 296, at *4 (Tex. May 15, 2009) (footnote omitted). The Kappus court further noted that an independent administrator may be removed by the county court when any of six statutory grounds for removal have been met. Id. (citing Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 149C(a)(1)-(6) (Vernon Supp. 2008). The difference between Kappus and the case now before us is that Bobbie is a dependent, rather than an independent, administratrix, as a matter of law. Washington, 262 S.W.3d 903. An administratrix in a dependent administration "can perform only a limited number of transactions without seeking a court's permission, such as paying taxes, voting stocks, insuring property, and releasing liens upon full payment." Eastland v. Eastland, 273 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 234(b) (Vernon 2003)).

3. Although Section 37.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is not mentioned further in her brief, we assume Bobbie is making reference to Section 37.009, which is the attorney's fees section of Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Even so, since there is no argument or rationale presented that the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is a basis for recovery of attorney's fees, we do not examine any claim of justification for the payment of attorney's fees under it. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).

4. We note that some of this amount also appears to relate to Bobbie's claim for attorney's fees in her second appellate issue. Neither the trial record nor Bobbie's appellate brief attempts to offer a breakdown of this total as it might be allocated between the separate claims. This failure, however, will not affect our resolution of the issues raised because the reasonableness of this undivided entirety has not been challenged by Goolsby.

5. Again, this likely includes amounts for attorney's fees and expenses incurred by Bobbie in connection with her first appellate issue (having to do with the declaratory judgment action). However, this failure to segregate the fees associated with these two distinct claims does not ultimately prevent us from disposing of the legal issues raised on appeal.

6. "An independent executor who defends an action for his removal in good faith, whether successful or not, shall be allowed out of the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees, in the removal proceedings." Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 149C(c) (Vernon Supp. 2008).