in Re Paula Cook ( 2016 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-16-00420-CV
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IN RE PAULA COOK
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Original Proceeding
356th District Court of Hardin County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 57,454
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this mandamus proceeding, Paula Cook contends that the trial court
abused its discretion when it expunged her lis pendens from the public record. See
generally Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 12.0071 (West 2014). We stayed the trial court’s
order and requested a response from the real party in interest, Charles M. Kibler Jr.
Kibler contends that Cook failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
the probable validity of her claim, as required to avoid his motion to expunge. See
generally id. § 12.0071(c)(2). We must decide whether Cook’s allegations of
breach of contract and breach of implied contract, which Kibler concedes assert
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claims for an interest in real property, will support a lis pendens since Cook
submitted uncontroverted proof of an exception to the statute of frauds. After
reviewing the petition, the response, and the mandamus record, we conditionally
grant Cook’s petition for writ of mandamus.
Cook sued Kibler, a lawyer, alleging in part that in the course of the lawyer-
client relationship, Cook took possession of and made substantial improvements to
a house owned by Kibler and allowed Kibler to move into a home owned by Cook
in reliance upon Kibler’s representations that he would prepare the documents and
quickly close the transactions. Cook alleged that Kibler committed fraud regarding
both real estate transactions, living rent free on Cook’s property while
misrepresenting to Cook that he would purchase Cook’s house and sell her his
house. Cook requested imposition of a constructive trust and specific performance
of the sale of the house to her at the alleged agreed price, and she filed a lis
pendens in the Hardin County real property records. Kibler moved to expunge the
lis pendens on the ground that the alleged transaction was subject to the affirmative
defense of the statute of frauds. See generally Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §
26.01(a), (b)(4) (West 2015); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 94. In response, Cook
produced her affidavit, in which she stated, in part:
Mr. Kibler owns the Skinner House. In late 2012, he offered to sell it
to me for an amount equal to his mortgage payoff plus $15,000. He
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offered to sell [it] to me at this price because he could not afford to
make the substantial necessary repairs and he wanted to move into
town. At that time, Mr. Kibler represented that the mortgage payoff on
the Skinner House was between $150,000 and $160,000.
I agreed to purchase the Skinner House from Mr. Kibler for $15,000
plus the mortgage payoff. Mr. Kibler, who also served as my lawyer
on this transaction, further promised to reduce our agreement to
writing, prepare the appropriate closing documents, and complete the
transaction as soon as possible.
In her affidavit, Cook stated that (1) she made repairs to the house, (2) Kibler was
aware that she intended to resell the house for a profit after she purchased the
property, and (3) she relied on Kibler’s promise to reduce their agreement to
writing and close the transaction. Cook’s affidavit also claims that Kibler now
seeks to profit from the extensive repairs Cook made to the property by requiring
her to pay $250,000 for the property, despite her repeated requests and his promise
to prepare the transaction documents.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel will apply to avoid the application of
the statute of frauds if application of the statute would plainly amount to a fraud
and the promise is to sign a written agreement which itself complies with the
statute of frauds. See “Moore” Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d
934, 938 (Tex. 1972). The doctrine applies to contracts for the sale of land. See id.
An oral promise to sign an instrument complying with the statute of frauds is
enforceable if: “(1) the promisor should have expected that his promise would lead
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the promisee to some definite and substantial injury; (2) such an injury occurred;
and (3) the court must enforce the promise to avoid injustice.” Nagle v. Nagle, 633
S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1982). A separate equitable doctrine, the constructive trust
exception, also applies to the rule that land titles may not rest in parol. Ginther v.
Taub, 675 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. 1984). The constructive trust exception is based
on a prior confidential relationship and unfair conduct or unjust enrichment. Id.
Cook’s pleadings invoke these exceptions to the statute of frauds. Kibler argues
that equitable estoppel does not apply to the sale or transfer of real property, but
the Texas Supreme Court has held that these doctrines can be applied in disputes
concerning real property. Id.; “Moore” Burger, Inc., 492 S.W.2d at 938.
Kibler argues that Cook’s affidavit fails to establish the probable validity of
her claim by a preponderance of evidence, as required to overcome a motion to
expunge. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 12.0071(c)(2). Kibler claims that in the
hearing on his motion to expunge, he provided live testimony that there was no
agreement. Kibler stated in open court, as follows:
Couple items in rebuttal, your Honor. There’s more to this, and I
won[’]t dispute that we had some negotiations about trying to sell the
Plaintiff my house. But the terms of those agreements go far beyond
the scope of just the sale of the house. It required the purchase of
another house. It required the payment of some other debts that I had.
There were lots of other pieces and moving parts to this deal. Okay.
It’s more than just, oh, I’ll give you so much money for your house.
It’s a much bigger deal than that. And that’s why we don’t have an
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agreement because we never agreed on all the side issues, okay, most
of which are in Plaintiff’s petition claiming that I owe for certain
things. You see what I’m saying.
“Unsworn factual statements and representations by an attorney can
constitute evidence supporting the trial court’s ruling, where the opponent to the
testimony waives the oath by failing to object ‘in circumstances that clearly
indicated each was tendering evidence on the record based on personal knowledge’
on the contested issues.” In re Estate of Arndt, 187 S.W.3d 84, 87 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (quoting Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex.
2005)). In this case, however, Cook did not allow Kibler to state facts to the court
without objection. Her counsel stated,
Let me just rebut that one second, your Honor, in terms of facts. We
have evidence on file, there is an affidavit of Ms. Cook attached
verifying everything that we have said in our response, a lot of which
is also in the complaint. He has no evidence. He’s just been arguing as
a lawyer.
Kibler did not make unsworn factual statements and representations without
objection; to the contrary, Cook brought the fact that Kibler was merely presenting
argument to the attention of the trial court. Kibler could have asked to be sworn as
a witness or to have the trial court accept his statement as an officer of the court as
evidence, but he did not do so. Because Cook’s uncontroverted affidavit
established the probable validity of her claim, the trial court lacked the discretion
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to grant Kibler’s motion to expunge the lis pendens. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §
12.0071(c)(2).
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy when interlocutory issues have arisen
concerning the issuance of notices of lis pendens. In re Collins, 172 S.W.3d 287,
297 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, orig. proceeding). We are confident that the
trial court will vacate its order of November 1, 2016, which granted Kibler’s
motion to expunge the lis pendens. The writ of mandamus shall issue only if the
trial court fails to do so.
PETITION CONDITIONALLY GRANTED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on November 17, 2016
Opinion Delivered December 29, 2016
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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