Donnie Dale Carr v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                    ACCEPTED
    12-14-00335-CR
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    4/9/2015 11:47:30 AM
    CATHY LUSK
    CLERK
    No. 12-14-00335-CR
    RECEIVED IN
    12th COURT OF APPEALS
    IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF              APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS
    TYLER, TEXAS                      4/9/2015 11:47:30 AM
    CATHY S. LUSK
    Clerk
    DONNIE CARR
    Appellant,
    v.
    4/9/2015
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    Appellee
    On Appeal from the Seventh District Court of Smith County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 007-0863-14
    ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
    Austin Reeve Jackson
    Texas Bar No. 24046139
    112 East Line, Suite 310
    Tyler, TX 75702
    Telephone: (903) 595-6070
    Facsimile: (866) 387-0152
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    Attorney for Appellant
    Appellate Counsel:
    Austin Reeve Jackson
    112 East Line, Suite 310
    Tyler, TX 75702
    Trial Counsel:
    John Jarvis
    326 S. Fannin
    Tyler, TX 75702
    Attorney for the State on Appeal
    Michael J. West
    Assistant District Attorney, Smith County
    4th Floor, Courthouse
    100 North Broadway
    Tyler, TX 75702
    ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ................................................................. ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................... iii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iv
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 2
    ISSUE PRESENTED ...................................................................................................... 2
    STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................. 2
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................................................. 3
    ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 4
    I.      BY DENYING HIM HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
    ACCESS TO A LAW LIBRARY IN ORDER TO FURTHER HIS
    EXPRESSED DESIRE TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO SELF-
    REPRESENTATION,                         THE                  TRIAL                     COURT
    CONSTRUCTIVELY DENIED MR. CARR HIS STATE AND
    FEDERALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO ACT AS HIS OWN
    COUNSEL ....................................................................................................... 4
    Standard of Review ................................................................................................... 4
    The Facts at Trial ...................................................................................................... 5
    Applying The Law to These Facts ............................................................................ 8
    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .................................................................................. 10
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................... 10
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................................ 10
    iii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
    Bounds v. Smith,
    
    430 U.S. 817
    , 
    97 S. Ct. 1491
    , 
    52 L. Ed. 2d 72
    (1977) ...................................... 9
    Faretta v. California,
    
    422 U.S. 806
    , 
    95 S. Ct. 2525
    , 
    45 L. Ed. 2d 562
    (1975) .................................... 4, 9
    McKaskle v. Wiggins,
    
    465 U.S. 168
    , 
    177 S. Ct. 944
    , 
    79 L. Ed. 2d 122
    (1984) .................................... 4, 9
    TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
    Blankenship v. State,
    
    673 S.W.2d 578
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) ........................................................ 5
    Dunn v. State,
    
    819 S.W.2d 510
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) ........................................................ 9
    Scarbrough v. State,
    
    777 S.W.2d 83
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) .......................................................... 9
    TEXAS COURTS OF APPEAL:
    Alford v. State,
    
    367 S.W.3d 855
    (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) ............................. 4
    Birdwell v. State,
    
    10 S.W.3d 74
    (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999) ................................. 4, 9
    iv
    STATUTES AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(f) ................................................................ 5
    TEX. CONST. art. 1 § 10 ..................................................................................... 5
    U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI .................................................................................... 4, 9
    v
    No. 12-14-00335-CR
    IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TYLER, TEXAS
    DONNIE CARR
    Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    Appellee
    On Appeal from the Seventh District Court of Smith County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 007-0863-14
    TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT:
    COMES NOW, Austin Reeve Jackson, attorney for Donnie Carr and files
    this brief pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and would show the
    Court as follows:
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Donnie Carr seeks to appeal his conviction and sentence for the offense of
    delivery of a controlled substance rendered against him in the Seventh District
    Court of Smith County. (I CR 89).      After being indicted for this offense in the
    summer of last year, Mr. Carr entered a plea of “not guilty” and proceeded to trial
    by jury. (I CR 1, 89). Ultimately, the jury found him to be guilty and then im-
    posed punishment at confinement for life. (I CR 89). Sentence was pronounced
    on 14 October 2014 and notice of appeal then timely filed. (I CR 94, 102).
    ISSUE PRESENTED
    BY DENYING HIM HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AC-
    CESS TO A LAW LIBRARY IN ORDER TO FURTHER HIS
    EXPRESSED DESIRE TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO SELF-
    REPRESENTATION, THE TRIAL COURT CONSTRUCTIVE-
    LY DENIED MR. CARR HIS STATE AND FEDERALLY
    GUARANTEED RIGHT TO ACT AS HIS OWN COUNSEL.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    On 7 May of last year an officer with the Tyler Police Department was pa-
    trolling a local park when he came across Appellant, Mr. Donnie Carr, and another
    individual sitting on a picnic table. (VII RR 173). On the table near Mr. Carr and
    his companion were multiple syringes that appeared to have been recently used.
    (VII RR 174). Believing at least some of the syringes contained methampheta-
    mine, officers placed Mr. Carr under arrest for possession of a controlled sub-
    stance. (VII RR 178).
    2
    A tow truck was called to take possession of Mr. Carr’s vehicle. (VII RR
    182). When the driver of that truck arrived and entered Mr. Carr’s vehicle, he
    found a case in that car containing methamphetamine. (VII RR 185). These drugs
    formed the basis of the charge on which this appeal is based.
    After being charged with possession of a controlled substance, Mr. Carr
    elected to enter a plea of “not guilty” and proceeded with a trial by jury in the Sev-
    enth District Court of Smith County. (VIII RR 161). The jury found Mr. Carr to
    be guilty and sentenced him to be confined for life. (VIII RR 182). Sentence was
    pronounced on 8 October 2014 and notice of appeal then timely filed. (I CR 94,
    102).
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    A defendant has an absolute right to self-representation. As part of ensuring
    that that right is meaningful, a defendant must be given adequate access to a law
    library for the purpose of preparing his defense. In the instant case, Mr. Carr made
    clear his desire to represent himself, but only if he could have law library access.
    When the trial court acknowledged that desire but failed to ensure access to the
    county law library, a condition on which Mr. Carr was relying to exercise his right
    to self-representation, the court constructively denied him his right to self-
    representation.
    3
    ARGUMENT
    Standard of Review
    A trial court’s denial of the right to self-representation is reviewed for an
    abuse of discretion. Alfrod v. State, 
    367 S.W.3d 855
    , 861 (Tex.App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). The record, therefore, is reviewed “in the light most
    favorable to the trial courts’ ruling, and [the Court] will imply any findings of fact
    supported by the record and necessary to affirm the trial court’s ruling….” 
    Id. However, the
    denial of a proper request to proceed pro se is not subjection a harm
    analysis. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 
    465 U.S. 168
    , 
    177 S. Ct. 944
    , 
    79 L. Ed. 2d 122
    (1984); Miles v. State, 
    204 S.W.3d 822
    , 826 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Birdwell v.
    State, 
    10 S.W.3d 74
    , 78 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d).
    I.     BY DENYING HIM HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
    ACCESS TO A LAW LIBRARY IN ORDER TO FUR-
    THER HIS EXPRESSED DESIRE TO EXERCISE HIS
    RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION, THE TRIAL
    COURT CONSTRUCTIVELY DENIED MR. CARR HIS
    STATE AND FEDERALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO
    ACT AS HIS OWN COUNSEL.
    Standard of Review
    The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant’s right to self-representation.
    US. CONST. amend. VI; Faretta v. California, 
    422 U.S. 806
    , 821, 
    95 S. Ct. 2525
    , 
    45 L. Ed. 2d 562
    (1975). Additional protections for this right are also found in state
    4
    statute and the Texas Constitution. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(f); TEX.
    CONST. art. 1 § 10.
    The Facts at Trial
    To exercise the right to self-representation a defendant must first timely and
    unequivocally assert it.         Blankenship v. State, 
    673 S.W.2d 578
    , 583
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). In this case, Mr. Carr first made an attempt to raise the is-
    sue with the District Court on 2 September 2014, over a month before trial, but was
    told “today is not the day” to address attorney-client conflict issues. (II RR 8-10).
    Instead, the trial court set the case off a few weeks until 22 September. (II RR 10).
    On 22 September Mr. Carr raised several complaints regarding what he be-
    lieved to be the ineffective assistance being rendered by trail counsel and noted his
    desire to have the opportunity to review his discovery “so I can go over and come
    up with my own defense.” (III RR 9). This was the first indication he gave the
    court that he was looking “to defend myself,” a process being hindered by his lack
    of access to the jail’s law library:
    I haven’t had time to prepare nothing for my own defense. … I’ve
    told [my lawyer] I’m not guilty of this. I’ve pleaded not guilty. And
    he’s done nothing but try to get me to plead out.
    I’ve turned down every offer that he’s made for me. I made that clear.
    Like I said, I just – I don't have any access to a law library. I put in
    for a law library over at Low Risk where I’m housed. … And they re-
    fused me law library then, too.
    (III RR 8).
    5
    The case returned to court on 6 October. (VI RR 1). At that point, Mr. Carr
    again indicated to the court that he and his trial counsel had had continued prob-
    lems. (VI RR 10). Initially, Mr. Carr stated he wanted to fire his trial counsel and
    seek time to retain a new attorney. (Id.). As part of his discussion with the court
    on that issue, Mr. Carr returned once more to the denial of access to Smith Coun-
    ty’s inmate law library:
    But we never brought up the fact that I was held in Smith County for
    two-and-a-half months without access to a law library, without an at-
    torney. I requested to go to the law library so I could file motions
    with the Court, so I could file letters with the District Attorney’s Of-
    fice; and I was not able to do that.
    (VI RR 21-22). Repeatedly, he notes that the sheriff’s office “refused … to allow
    anybody to go to the library.” (VI RR 23, 24).
    After talking with the trial court, Mr. Carr ultimately decided that he would
    like “to file a request to defend myself pro se.” (VI RR 27-28). Mr. Carr recog-
    nized though that “the only way that I will be effective in me defending myself is if
    I’m allowed the rights that I think that I’m allowed – or supposed to be given to me
    as an American tax-paying citizen, Your honor. I need access to those laws – to
    that book. I need access.” (VI RR 32).
    In response, the trail court interrupted him and stated that, “under the Texas
    case law, if you choose to represent yourself [that] doesn’t guarantee you any bet-
    6
    ter access to any of the legal resources that I’ve just gone over with you. “ VI RR
    32). The trail court continued:
    If the jail lets you go to the law library, great. If they don’t let you go
    to the law library, that’s not, I guess, a complainable infraction, as I
    understand the law to be.
    Often, the jails around our state make law libraries available for de-
    fendants. But, under the law, there’s no legal requirement – federally
    or statewise – that they, basically, give them a legal education or make
    law books available to them. It’s really a convenience that’s offered
    up. It’s not a guaranteed right, if that’s one of the reasons that you’re
    thinking you want to represent yourself is to force the jail to give you
    something maybe they haven’t given to you at this point. Because
    that’s not going to happen.
    (VI RR 33) (emphasis added).
    Mr. Carr, who had recently read the Constitution (VI RR 31), recognized
    something inherently wrong with the judge’s comments and asked again if his only
    option was to proceed pro se in ignorance:
    So, in other words, with me being an American citizen, a taxpayer of
    this county, and I’m saying that I’m not guilty and I want to go to jury
    trial and I want to represent myself, then Smith County and this Court
    has no rights at all to give me any kind of access to any kind of law li-
    brary or any legal books or anything that I can use to file my motions
    with or anything like that?
    (VI RR 33). “I don't control that,” the court responded, “That’s what the law
    says.” (VI RR 34) (emphasis added).
    7
    As a result, Mr. Carr decided that, “if I’m not going to have any rights to a
    law library or anything like that,” he could not proceed pro se. (VI RR 60). “I
    won't sign [the waiver of right to counsel” under those conditions.” (VI RR 70).
    The next day, prior to jury selection, Mr. Carr changed his mind an initially
    elected to act as his own attorney. (VII RR 16). “I’ve asked for help with legal
    books or anything like that that I might go over or read, you know; and it was all
    refused,” he told the Court. (VII RR 17). “So I guess I’ll just have to do the best
    that I can.” (VII RR 17).
    He did not stick with this decision, however, and prior to jury selection
    asked that his original counsel be reappointed. (VII RR 41).
    Applying The Law to These Facts
    A reading of Mr. Carr’s comments to the trial court reveal that he absolutely
    desired to represent himself, but only if he had access to the necessary statutes and
    rules of evidence and procedure. (VI RR 27-28, 60, 70). The trial court though,
    not only took no steps to ensure that such access was permitted, but went so far as
    to say that Mr. Carr had no legal right to such access with the result being Mr.
    Carr’s forced and involuntary waiver of his right to proceed pro se. (VI RR 33, 60,
    70; VII RR 17).
    The law is clear that a defendant has a constitutional right to access to a law
    library in order to prepare his defense. This right was first recognized by the Su-
    8
    preme Court in Bounds v. Smith, 
    430 U.S. 817
    , 
    97 S. Ct. 1491
    , 
    52 L. Ed. 2d 72
    (1977). “In Bounds, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental constitutional
    right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the
    preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with ade-
    quate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Dunn
    v. State, 
    819 S.W.2d 510
    , 525 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). In the instant case, however,
    the trial court not only denied Mr. Carr this right, but did so as a means to denying
    him his right to self-representation under both federal and state law. See US.
    CONST. amend. VI; 
    Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821
    ; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(f);
    TEX. CONST. art. 1 § 10.
    If he desires to do so a defendant must be allowed to conduct his own de-
    fense. 
    Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834
    , 
    95 S. Ct. 2525
    ; Scarbrough v. State, 
    777 S.W.2d 83
    , 92 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). Further, the denial of the right to represent oneself
    is not subject to a harm analysis. 
    Birdwell, 10 S.W.3d at 79
    (citing 
    McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177
    ). Because the record before the Court shows that Mr. Carr desired to
    represent himself but only provided he could also exercise his right to access the
    jail’s law library, and that the trial court not only denied that request but told Mr.
    Carr he had no right to access the law library thereby forcing Mr. Carr to rely on
    appointed counsel, the Court should hold that Mr. Carr’s right to self-
    9
    representation under both federal and state law was improperly denied and remand
    the case for a new trial.
    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays, because the
    trail court denied Mr. Carr his right to access the county law library as a means by
    which to force him to waive his expressed desire to exercise his right to self-
    representation, that the Court reverse the judgment in this case and remand the
    matter for a new trial.
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ Austin Reeve Jackson
    Texas Bar No. 24046139
    112 East Line, Suite 310
    Tyler, TX 75702
    Telephone: (903) 595-6070
    Facsimile: (866) 387-0152
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I certify that a true and correct copy of this brief was delivered to counsel for
    the State by efile on this the 8th day of April 2015.
    /s/ Austin Reeve Jackson
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certify that this document complies with the requirements of Rule 9.4 and
    consists of 2,266 words.
    /s/ Austin Reeve Jackson
    10