in the Interest of P.C., a Child ( 2022 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-22-00329-CV
___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF P.C., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 231st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 231-698967-21
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant C.C. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parent–
child relationship with her son, P.C.1 The trial court found that the Department of
Family and Protective Services had proved three conduct-based grounds for
termination and that termination was in P.C.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). The trial court awarded permanent managing
conservatorship of P.C. to the Department. Mother timely appealed.
II. BACKGROUND
Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that he “has
been unable to identify any legally non-frivolous grounds for appeal” and that
Mother’s appeal is therefore frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45,
87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights
termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *2–3 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Counsel’s brief
meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record
and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal.
1
P.C.’s parent–child relationship with his father was also terminated, but no
appeal was filed on the father’s behalf.
2
We provided Mother the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record
and to file a pro se response, but she did not do so. The Department has agreed that
no meritorious grounds for appeal exist and thus has declined to file a responsive
brief.
III. DISCUSSION
When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate
record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-
00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op.); see Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We also
consider the Anders brief itself and, if filed, any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-
18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet.
denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(orig. proceeding).
We have carefully reviewed appointed appellate counsel’s Anders brief and the
appellate record. Having found no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this
appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parent–child relationship
between Mother and P.C.
Mother’s counsel remains appointed in this appeal through proceedings in the
supreme court unless otherwise relieved from his duties for good cause in accordance
3
with Family Code Section 107.016. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016; In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order).
IV. CONCLUSION
We agree with counsel that Mother’s appeal is frivolous; thus, we affirm the
trial court’s termination order.
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice
Delivered: December 22, 2022
4