Bradley Bowen v. Virginia Graham ( 2022 )


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  •                                  In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-22-00414-CV
    No. 02-22-00417-CV
    No. 02-22-00418-CV
    No. 02-22-00419-CV
    No. 02-22-00420-CV
    No. 02-22-00421-CV
    No. 02-22-00422-CV
    No. 02-22-00423-CV
    No. 02-22-00424-CV
    No. 02-22-00425-CV
    ___________________________
    BRADLEY BOWEN, Appellant
    V.
    VIRGINIA GRAHAM, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 393rd District Court
    Denton County, Texas
    Trial Court Nos. 22-0356-393, 22-0356-393, 22-0356-393, 22-0356-393, 22-0356-393, 22-0356-393,
    22-0356-393, 22-0356-393, 22-0356-393, 22-0356-393
    Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Bradley Bowen has filed ten1 appeals challenging a variety of
    interlocutory orders entered in his divorce and child-custody case. He challenges an
    order withholding his income for child support, two sets of temporary child-custody
    orders, and seven orders quashing subpoenas. But none of the challenged trial court
    orders are final or appealable. See 
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014
    (a); 
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.001
    (e); Booker v. Mahmoudi, No. 05-18-01054-CV, 
    2018 WL 6322174
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 4, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding order
    quashing subpoena not appealable); In re K.K., No. 02-15-00141-CV, 
    2015 WL 4652774
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2015, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem.
    op.) (stating that “temporary orders in suits affecting the parent–child relationship are
    not appealable”). And appeals may be taken only from final judgments or appealable
    interlocutory orders.2 See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001);
    Bowen v. Graham, No. 02-22-00333-CV, 
    2022 WL 4545567
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth Sept. 29, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); cf. Booker, 
    2018 WL 6322174
    , at *1
    (dismissing for want of jurisdiction); K.K., 
    2015 WL 4652774
    , at *1 (similar).
    Appellant filed 11 notices of appeal, but two of his notices appear to challenge
    1
    the same trial court order.
    2
    But see Indus. Specialists, LLC v. Blanchard Ref. Co., 
    652 S.W.3d 11
    , 14 (Tex. 2022)
    (plurality op.) (questioning whether “[l]imiting appeals to final judgments can no
    longer be said to be the general rule” given the number of statutory exceptions for
    interlocutory appeals (quoting Dall. Symphony Ass’n, Inc. v. Reyes, 
    571 S.W.3d 753
    , 759
    (Tex. 2019))).
    2
    Accordingly, we notified Bowen of our concern that we lacked jurisdiction over
    his appeals, and we warned that we would dismiss the appeals unless, within ten days,
    he (or any other party) showed grounds for continuing them. See Tex. R. App. P.
    42.3(a), 44.3. More than 30 days have passed, but Bowen has failed to respond.
    Because none of Bowen’s attempted appeals challenge a final judgment or
    appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss all ten appeals for want of jurisdiction.3
    Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
    Even if Bowen were challenging final judgments or appealable interlocutory
    3
    orders, his appeals would still be jurisdictionally barred as untimely. See Mitchell v.
    Estrada, No. 02-22-00005-CV, 
    2022 WL 1183342
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr.
    21, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Guardianship of Fulbright, No. 02-16-00230-
    CV, 
    2016 WL 4395804
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 18, 2016, no pet.) (per
    curiam) (mem. op.)); see Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b).
    Generally, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the appealable
    judgment or order is signed, but an interlocutory appeal must be filed within 20 days.
    Tex. R. App. P. 26.1, 28.1(a). An appellant can request a 15-day extension if the
    request is filed within 15 days after the deadline for the notice of appeal, see Tex. R.
    App. P. 26.3, and such a request is implied if an appellant (1) files a tardy notice of
    appeal within the 15-day grace period and (2) reasonably explains the need for an
    extension. Jones v. City of Houston, 
    976 S.W.2d 676
    , 677 (Tex. 1998); Verburgt v. Dorner,
    
    959 S.W.2d 615
    , 617 (Tex. 1997); Terreforte v. Gonzalez, No. 02-22-00349-CV, 
    2022 WL 15076264
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 27, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
    Eight of Bowen’s notices of appeal challenge trial court orders signed between
    February 25, 2022, and September 14, 2022, so when Bowen filed his notices of
    appeal on October 24, 2022, the 20-day deadlines had already expired, as had the 15-
    day grace periods. Bowen’s other two notices of appeal challenge trial court orders
    issued on September 19, 2022, and September 26, 2022, so although Bowen’s October
    24, 2022 notices came after the 20-day deadlines had expired, the notices fell within
    the 15-day grace periods. However, Bowen did not reasonably explain his need for an
    extension, and when we asked him to file an explanation, he failed to respond.
    3
    /s/ Bonnie Sudderth
    Bonnie Sudderth
    Chief Justice
    Delivered: December 22, 2022
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-22-00423-CV

Filed Date: 12/22/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/26/2022