William Neil Gallagher v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-21-00154-CR
No. 02-21-00155-CR
___________________________
WILLIAM NEIL GALLAGHER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 1607330D, 1607333D
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant William Neil Gallagher appeals his convictions for theft of property
of $300,000 or more, forgery of a financial instrument of the elderly, misapplication of
fiduciary or financial property of $300,000 or more, securing execution of a document
by deception, and exploitation of the elderly (two counts). See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§§ 31.03(e)(7), 32.21(e-1), 32.45(c)(7), 32.46(b)(7), 32.53(c). Gallagher entered an
open plea of guilty to all charges. The trial court sentenced him to (1) life
imprisonment for each of the offenses of theft of property of $300,000 or more,
misapplication of fiduciary or financial property greater than $300,000, and securing
execution of a document by deception and (2) ten years’ confinement for each of the
offenses of exploitation of the elderly and forgery of a financial instrument of the
elderly, with the sentences to run concurrently.
On appeal, Gallagher’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in
which he argues that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s motion and brief meet the
requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the
record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738,
744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel provided
Gallagher with copies of his brief and motion to withdraw, and he informed
Gallagher of his right to file a pro se response, to review the record, and to seek
discretionary review pro se should this court deny relief. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Gallagher filed a pro se response in which he argued that the
2
time he has spent thus far in prison is “enough to satisfy the sin/crime that [he]
committed.” The State agrees with counsel’s position that Gallagher has no
meritorious grounds upon which to advance an appeal, and it has declined to file a
response to counsel’s brief and motion to withdraw.
After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel fulfills the requirements of Anders
and files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous, this court is
obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if there is any
arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,
511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
After carefully reviewing the record and Gallagher’s pro se response, we agree
with counsel that this appeal is wholly without merit, as we have found nothing in the
record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,
827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw
and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: December 29, 2022
3