Antonio Alex Angulovillalta v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed July 25, 2022
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-20-00421-CR
ANTONIO ALEX ANGULOVILLALTA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F19-00739-P
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Nowell, and Goldstein
Opinion by Justice Goldstein
After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a
young child as charged by indictment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b). In his
sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
extraneous offenses. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The complainant in this case, J.C., is appellant’s first cousin. In December
2017, J.C. told her mother that appellant had abused her. The mother took J.C. to a
pediatrician and eventually reported the abuse to the police. Detective Chad Valline
of the Irving Police Department was assigned to the case. Detective Valline
scheduled a forensic interview of J.C., in which J.C. described multiple instances of
sexual abuse. In addition to J.C., Detective Valline scheduled forensic interviews
with three other children in appellant’s family, S.J., C., and J., all of whom were
appellant’s first cousins. Officer Valline testified that two of them, S.J. and C., also
disclosed sexual abuse by appellant.
At trial, the State offered Detective Valline’s testimony regarding what the
children reported. Appellant objected that the testimony regarding extraneous
offenses would be “more prejudicial towards my client than they are of probative
value to the jury.” The trial court overruled the objection. Detective Valline testified
that, of the four children interviewed, J.C., S.J., and C. reported sexual abuse by
appellant. J.C. and S.J. also testified at trial describing appellant’s sexual conduct.
The jury convicted appellant of one count of continuous sexual abuse of a
young child and assessed punishment at thirty years’ confinement. The trial court
entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced appellant accordingly. This appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting
Detective Valline’s testimony of extraneous offenses against other victims on
grounds that the testimony was substantially more prejudicial than probative. See
TEX. R. EVID. 403.
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I. APPLICABLE LAW
We review the trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence under an
abuse of discretion standard. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the zone
of reasonable disagreement. Id. If the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is correct under
any applicable theory of law, it will not be disturbed. Id.Rule 401 provides that evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 401.
“Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible.” Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235,
240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); TEX. R. EVID. 402. When determining whether
evidence is relevant, it is important for courts to examine the purpose for which the
evidence is being introduced. Layton, 280 S.W.3d at 240. “It is critical that there is
a direct or logical connection between the actual evidence and the proposition sought
to be proved.” Id.
Rule 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403; Gonzalez v. State,
544 S.W.3d 363, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “The probative force of evidence
refers to how strongly it serves to make the existence of a fact of consequence more
or less probable.” Id.–3–
Relevant evidence is presumed to be more probative than prejudicial.
Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). All evidence
against a defendant is, by its nature, prejudicial. See Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d
807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Rule 403 does not exclude all prejudicial evidence;
instead, it focuses on the danger of “unfair” prejudice. State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d
435, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has the
capacity to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground other than proof
specific to the offense charged. Manning v. State, 114 S.W.3d 922, 928 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003). The trial judge has substantial discretion in balancing probative value
and unfair prejudice. See Powell v. State, 189 S.W.3d 285, 288 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).
A rule 403 balancing test includes, but is not limited to, the following factors:
(1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with (2) the
proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to
suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse
or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given
undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of
the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume
an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). These
factors may blend together in practice. Id.–4–
II. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
Before analyzing the factors, we must consider the scope of appellant’s
arguments on appeal. At trial, Detective Valline testified, over appellant’s Rule 403
objection, that two children besides J.C. (namely, S.J. and C.) reported sexual abuse
during their forensic interviews. Other than identifying those children by name and
age, Detective Valline offered no additional details regarding what information they
disclosed in the interviews.1 Later, the State called one of those two children, S.J.,
to testify. Appellant’s counsel reurged the Rule 403 objection, which the trial court
again overruled. The State elicited extraneous-offense testimony from S.J., this time
specifically detailing how and when appellant sexually abused her. In this appeal,
appellant solely challenges Detective Valline’s testimony on Rule 403 grounds, and
does not challenge S.J.’s testimony on any evidentiary ground.2
Applying the Gigliobianco factors, we conclude the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting Detective Valine’s extraneous-offense testimony
regarding S.J. and C.’s disclosure of sexual abuse by appellant. Regarding the first
and second factors, Detective Valline’s testimony was probative on the question of
J.C.’s credibility. During voir dire, defense counsel asked questions suggesting that
1
This same information was contained in a State’s exhibit admitted over no objection with the names
and ages juxtaposed with the Appellant’s age.
2
It appears that appellant’s decision not to challenge S.J.’s testimony on appeal may have been
deliberate. As mentioned above, one of the factors in the Rule 403 analysis is the extent to which the
proponent needs the testimony. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. Here, appellant challenges Detective
Valine’s testimony, arguing in part that the State did not need it because the State was able to elicit the
same testimony from S.J.
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J.C.’s allegations were fabricated, placing J.C.’s credibility directly at issue. Counsel
continued that thread during opening statement, stating:
Now, yesterday we talked about whether or not children lie. So just
keep that in the back of your mind as well. When I say something
doesn’t make sense, why? Could be the child have been motivated by
somebody? Could they have been influenced? Could they not want to
get in trouble by somebody?
You guys are going to hear a lot about a very, very complicated family
history, as the State has said. There’s a lot of tension, a lot of bitterness,
a lot of anger that runs in this family. And I believe that after you hear
all of the testimony that is presented to you, you’ll understand the
complicated nature of this family and what may lead somebody to say
something about the Defendant that may not be true.
In light of these statements, the trial court could have concluded that Detective
Valline’s testimony was probative to rebut the defense’s fabrication theory and the
State needed the testimony for that purpose.3 See James, 623 S.W.3d at 547–48
(“[E]vidence of prior assaults and abuse makes it less likely that a complainant has
fabricated the charged offenses.”). Detective Valline’s testimony as to S.J.’s and C.’s
outcry also contextualized the charged offense and the extraneous offenses for the
jury. Specifically, Detective Valline testified regarding the respective ages of
3
Appellant contends that the State did not need Detective Valline’s extraneous-offense testimony
because there were no “vigorous” challenges to J.C.’s credibility. Appellant appears to argue that the
challenge to J.C.’s credibility was not serious enough at the time Detective Valline testified to warrant his
extraneous-offense testimony. We disagree. Counsel’s remarks during voir dire and opening statement
showed that the J.C.’s credibility would be a central issue in the case. Counsel offered no other defensive
theories during opening statement and asked the jury to “keep an open mind” and consider J.C.’s various
motivations for lying as it heard the evidence. Thus by the time Detective Valline testified, the State’s need
for extraneous-offense evidence was already established. See James v. State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 547–48 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) (where defendant introduced defensive theory of fabrication in voir dire
and opening statement, trial court did not err in admitting extraneous-offense evidence before victim’s
testimony).
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appellant and his victims and explained why appellant was not charged for the
extraneous offenses—namely, because appellant was under the age of seventeen
when he committed the extraneous offenses.4 See Brickley v. State, 623 S.W.3d 68,
82 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021, pet. ref’d) (no abuse of discretion in admitting
extraneous-offense evidence where said evidence “helped contextualize” the
evidence and explain why the victim delayed reporting the defendant’s conduct).
We now turn to the Rule 403 counterfactors. See Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d
870, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (first two factors in Rule 403 analysis are balanced
against the remaining four “counterfactors”). Regarding the third factor, the record
reveals that Detective Valline’s outcry-related testimony could have had little, if any,
tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis. As one of seven State’s
witnesses, Detective Valline’s testimony comprised only seventeen pages of the
entire trial transcript and neither consumed an inordinate amount of trial time nor
was repetitious of other evidence. Rather, the testimony formed the framework of
the investigation. And within his brief time on the stand, Detective Valline made
only two references related to extraneous offenses—first, that three children made
outcries of sexual abuse during their forensic interviews and second, that the other
two children were S.J. and C. Although the nature of the extraneous offenses may
have been prejudicial, Detective Valline did not offer any specific details regarding
4
We note that during pre-trial, appellant argued that extraneous offenses should be excluded in part
because they did not result in any charges and were “mere allegations.” Again, a State’s exhibit admitted
over no objection reflects this same information in comparative form.
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C.’s statements, thus limiting the emotional impact his testimony could have had on
the jury.5 Bargas v. State, 252 S.W.3d 876, 893 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, pet. ref’d) (extraneous-offense testimony from second victim that defendant
touched her sexually was more probative than prejudicial where State “spent
minimal time developing” the testimony and it was “neither lengthy nor graphic”);
McGregor v. State, 394 S.W.3d 90, 121 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.
ref’d) (concluding testimony of officers related to extraneous murder offense were
not prejudicial where the officers “did not spend a large amount of their testimony
dwelling on” the victim’s injuries).
Nor can we conclude, regarding the fourth factor, that Detective Valline’s
reference to S.J.’s and C.’s outcries of sexual abuse had any tendency to confuse the
issues or distract the jury from the main issues. The testimony was relatively brief,
and the trial court correctly instructed the jury that it could not consider extraneous
offenses unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed them
and, even then, it could only consider that evidence to the extent it bore on relevant
matters. See Price v. State, 594 S.W.3d 674, 681 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no
pet.) (evidence of extraneous sexual abuse offenses not confusing or distracting
5
Defendant acknowledges that Detective Valline’s testimony was limited to names, ages and statement
of outcry without specific facts of those allegations. We note that Detective Valline’s testimony related to
appellant’s conduct with S.J. was not nearly as graphic as the testimony offered by S.J. herself. Appellant,
however, does not challenge S.J.’s testimony on Rule 403 grounds.
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where trial court correctly instructed jury on elements of the crime charged and
extent to which jury was allowed to consider extraneous-offense evidence).
Appellant concedes the last two factors “probably had little effect on the jury”
but insists that the cumulative force of the extraneous-conduct evidence was unduly
prejudicial because he “could not cross-examine the accusers” and thus the jury
“heard names and ages but never heard from the accusers themselves.” Contrary to
appellant’s assertion, four children were interviewed and three made outcries. Two
testified at trial, both of whom underwent cross-examination. Only one child, C., did
not testify. On balance, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by
overruling appellant’s Rule 403 objection as to Officer Valline’s extraneous-offense
testimony.
Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
overruling appellant’s Rule 403 objection, we do not reach the State’s argument that
appellant was not harmed. We overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
200421F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ANTONIO ALEX On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial
ANGULOVILLALTA, Appellant District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F19-00739-P.
No. 05-20-00421-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice
Goldstein. Justices Molberg and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Nowell participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 25th day of July 2022.
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