William Charles Gatewood, Jr. v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )


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  •                     In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    No. 06-22-00006-CR
    WILLIAM CHARLES GATEWOOD, JR., Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 5th District Court
    Bowie County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 21F0801-005
    Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef, JJ.
    Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
    OPINION
    On a November morning in 2020, Officer Aaron Jones of the Texarkana, Texas, Police
    Department responded to a report of a burglary in progress and witnessed the bizarre scene of
    William Charles Gatewood, Jr., partially naked, sitting on his porch, and yelling. The incident
    developed into violence by Gatewood, with multiple officers involved at the scene. Ultimately,
    Gatewood, despite his claim of involuntary intoxication, was indicted for the felony offense of
    burglary of his neighbor’s habitation with intent to commit, with an attempt to commit, or having
    committed aggravated assault. In a jury trial, Gatewood was convicted and sentenced to eight
    years in prison.
    In a single point of error, Gatewood argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to
    support the jury’s adverse finding on his affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. We
    affirm the trial court’s judgment because more than a scintilla of evidence supported the jury’s
    adverse finding.
    Here is the narrative in detail. On the fateful morning, Gatewood awoke and smoked
    what he believed to be a typical tobacco cigarette that he had found in a nearby ashtray. After
    smoking the cigarette, Gatewood took off his clothes and shaved his fingers until he was
    bleeding, because he believed that “stuff [was] crawling” out of his hands and body. Gatewood
    believed that, unbeknownst to him, the cigarette he smoked contained K2 synthetic marihuana.
    He claimed to have no memory of what happened from that point until after the police and
    emergency services arrived. He said he did not know how he arrived at his neighbor’s house,
    what happened when he got there, or “how it happened.”
    2
    Martha Williams, Gatewood’s neighbor from across the street, testified that, on that
    occasion, she saw a naked Gatewood in her backyard, looking at her shed and hot tub. She saw
    him leave her backyard and then come back with what she believed was a baseball bat. She
    testified that Gatewood struck the hot tub cover with the object, broke down her backdoor, and
    “came in the house.” Williams called Larry Rose, Gatewood’s nearby landlord, for help. Her
    grandson, Victor Owens, confronted Gatewood and told him to leave. As Owens tried to calm
    the agitated Gatewood, they both left the house through the front door. After exiting the house,
    Owens fell to the ground, and Gatewood got on top of Owens and started striking him with the
    flat, blunt side of an ax. Rose testified that he “ran up there and got a hold of Williams’s
    shoulder and . . . said, ‘William, quit or you’re going to kill him.’” Gatewood quit immediately.
    Gatewood returned to his house, where he stayed until the police arrived.
    Officer Jones was called to the scene about 7:30 a.m. When he arrived, Gatewood was
    naked, partially covered by a sweatshirt, and sitting on his porch. Gatewood was “steadily
    yelling[ and] screaming” about a woman who was allegedly at his neighbor’s house and whom
    Gatewood wanted the officer to bring back to Gatewood’s house. There was an ax lying at
    Jones’s feet, and Jones threw it off the porch into the yard. Jones testified that he was unable to
    calm Gatewood, and another officer, Thomas Shaddix, stepped in for Jones, who then went back
    across the street to Williams’s house to gather more information.
    Shaddix testified that, while Jones was across the street, Gatewood “began to escalate
    again,” told Shaddix to move off of his porch, threatened the officer, shoved Shaddix, and
    assumed a “fighting stance.” Shaddix then shot Gatewood with two JPX rounds, “a less-lethal
    3
    weapon” akin to pepper spray. Shaddix arrested Gatewood, placed him in a patrol car, and
    arranged for LifeNet emergency services to meet them at the jail to provide treatment to
    Gatewood for the effects of the JPX rounds. Jones testified that, despite Gatewood’s strange
    behavior, they did not attempt to obtain a blood or urine sample for drug testing.
    Recordings from two officers’ body cameras were admitted into evidence and played for
    the jury. The recordings show Gatewood yelling about bugs being on him, about a woman who
    cheated on him with the neighbor across the street, and about how he wanted the officer to
    retrieve the woman from the neighbor’s house. In the videos, Gatewood threatened to kill Victor
    Owens, pointed across the street, and admitted to “beating his ass” earlier, lamenting the fact that
    he did not kill him. Gatewood did not claim to remember the events shown in the recordings, but
    he was “embarrassed” by the videos because, he said, “It’s not me.”
    Gatewood claimed that, after smoking the cigarette that morning, he blacked out, and the
    next thing he remembered was riding in the police car. When asked about his actions and what
    might have caused them, Gatewood testified that one of his co-workers, identified only as Junior,
    had been at his house recently. Junior smoked K2, and “he had to have left [a K2 cigarette] in
    [the] ashtray.” Another of Gatewood’s co-workers, Billy Hill, was frequently at Gatewood’s
    house, and he “always” rerolled the cigarette butts in his ashtray into new cigarettes. Gatewood
    believed that Hill had rerolled one of Junior’s K2 cigarettes into a new cigarette and left it in the
    ashtray, that he (Gatewood) accidentally smoked that cigarette, and that the effects of K2 caused
    the incident.
    4
    Gatewood testified that Owens was his friend. He testified, and Owens agreed, that they
    remained friends after the incident in this case. Gatewood testified that, since the incident, the
    two of them had gone grocery shopping together, Owens had taken him to the “scale a couple of
    times to take scraps,” and Owens brought him a couple of beers just days before the trial.
    Rose, who said he knew Gatewood very well, testified that Gatewood’s actions were out
    of character for him because he was “normally quite a gentleman, really, really a nice guy.”
    Owens agreed, testifying that the Gatewood who attacked him “did not appear to be the same
    Mr. Gatewood [that he knew].” Owens believed that Gatewood had “ingested” something that
    morning because hitting someone with an ax “was not the act of a man in his right mind.”
    Gatewood claimed that nothing like this had ever happened to him before. However, on
    cross-examination, Gatewood admitted that several similar incidents had occurred in the recent
    past:
    • Gatewood acknowledged that, in 2019, the police were called to the home of Sandra
    Phillips, another of his neighbors, because he was banging on her door with a knife in
    his hand, saying that people were after him. He admitted that he was arrested for
    “public intoxication” after the event.
    • Gatewood admitted that, in 2020, he had been arrested twice for assaulting his
    girlfriend, but he claimed that they were “fictitious charges,” and he testified that he
    had not been convicted of any crime arising from those arrests.
    • Gatewood confirmed that, in May 2021, while he was out on bond for the underlying
    charge in this case, police were again called when he was “swinging a water ski” in
    front of his mother’s house. He claimed that he was protecting himself because
    “[p]eople were after [him],” but Officer Jones testified that Gatewood was “screaming
    and yelling at the top of his lungs” and “trying to fight people that weren’t there.”
    Jones arrested Gatewood and found in his possession a pipe and what he believed to be
    methamphetamine. Gatewood admitted that the police arrested him for possession of a
    controlled substance.
    5
    • Gatewood acknowledged that, in May 2021, he was walking around the neighborhood
    with a “large stick” when he was arrested again, but he testified that he was the one
    who called the police.
    • Gatewood admitted that he was arrested for trespassing two months later, in July of
    2021, for entering a different neighbor’s house “unannounced,” but he claimed that he
    was “running from people” and that he had been “knocking on the door for help.”
    Gatewood consistently denied that he was intoxicated during these previous events. Gatewood
    testified that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and was prescribed Seroquel to treat it,
    but that he did not take the medication on the day in question. He stated, “At that time, I was on
    a mood stabilizer and a depression pill.”1 He testified that he suffered from delusions that people
    were “after” him, that “something was going to happen,” and that he had to protect himself.
    Throughout the trial, Gatewood argued that he was not guilty because he was
    involuntarily intoxicated by K2 at the time of the events at issue.2 In connection with that
    defense, the jury was charged, in part, as follows:
    Involuntary intoxication is an affirmative defense. Therefore, the defendant must
    prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that both—
    1.      at the time of the conduct alleged, the defendant was involuntarily
    intoxicated; and
    2.     as a result of that involuntary intoxication, the defendant did not
    know his conduct was wrong.
    The burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
    he comes within the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication.
    1
    The record is unclear when, in relation to the events of this case, Gatewood was diagnosed with schizophrenia and
    when he was prescribed medication for it.
    2
    In Gatewood’s closing arguments, he tried to argue that, in the alternative, he suffered from a “psychotic episode,”
    but the trial court sustained the State’s objection because there was “no testimony to that effect.”
    6
    “Intoxication” means a disturbance of the mental or physical capacity
    resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body.
    “Intoxication” is involuntary if the intoxication is (1) the result of the
    introduction of a substance into the defendant’s body without his knowledge or
    (2) the result of the defendant’s introduction of a substance into his body under
    circumstances in which the defendant neither knew nor should have known, with
    the exercise of reasonable care, that the substance had a tendency to cause
    intoxication.
    We now examine Gatewood’s claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to support
    the jury’s rejection of his involuntary intoxication defense.
    Insanity is an affirmative defense to prosecution, and involuntary intoxication that causes
    insanity is included within the affirmative defense of insanity. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01;
    see Mendenhall v. State, 
    77 S.W.3d 815
    , 817–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Torres v. State, 
    585 S.W.2d 746
    , 748–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Involuntary intoxication is an affirmative defense
    to a criminal indictment if, at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant “has exercised no
    independent judgment or volition in taking the intoxicant . . . and, as a result of his intoxication[,]
    he did not know that his conduct was wrong.” Farmer v. State, 
    411 S.W.3d 901
    , 912 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2013).
    “When [a court of appeals] considers the legal . . . sufficiency of the evidence in dealing
    with those few instances in criminal cases in which the burden of proof is a preponderance of the
    evidence, such as affirmative defenses, [the court is] to use the civil standards for legal . . .
    sufficiency.” Afzal v. State, 
    559 S.W.3d 204
    , 207 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d)
    (quoting Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (Cochran
    J., concurring)). When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the rejection of
    7
    a criminal defendant’s affirmative defense, we employ a two-step process. Matlock v. State, 
    392 S.W.3d 662
    , 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
     (Tex.
    2005)). First, we examine the record to determine whether “more than a mere scintilla” of
    evidence supports the jury’s rejection of the defense. In doing so, we disregard all evidence that
    supports the affirmative defense unless a reasonable fact-finder could not. Id. at 669. Second, if
    no evidence supports the jury’s rejection of the affirmative defense, we then determine whether
    the defendant established the affirmative defense as a matter of law. See id. at 669–70. If the
    record reveals evidence supporting the affirmative defense but that evidence was subject to a
    credibility assessment and was evidence that a reasonable jury was entitled to disbelieve, the
    court does not consider that evidence in the matter-of-law assessment. See id. at 670. “Only if
    the appealing party establishes that the evidence conclusively proves his affirmative defense and
    that no reasonable jury was free to think otherwise, may the reviewing court conclude that the
    evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s rejection of the defendant’s affirmative
    defense.” Id. (quoting Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    289 S.W.3d 828
    , 830 (Tex.
    2009)).
    Gatewood contends that he was intoxicated by K2 through accident, inadvertence, or
    mistake. See Farmer, 411 S.W.3d at 913 (Cochran, J., concurring). By finding Gatewood
    guilty, the jury necessarily rejected his involuntary intoxication defense. Therefore, we review
    the evidence to determine whether there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the jury’s
    rejection of his involuntarily intoxication defense and, if there is not, whether Gatewood proved
    the defense as a matter of law.
    8
    Although not squarely on point, the facts of this case are similar to those of Peavey v.
    State, 
    248 S.W.3d 455
     (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d). Peavey was convicted of driving
    while intoxicated (DWI) and evading arrest. He testified that he drank a glass of wine with his
    boss’s son before his arrest. 
    Id. at 461
    . He claimed to have no memory from the time he drank
    the wine until he woke up in jail. 
    Id.
     Peavey further claimed that his boss’s son must have
    drugged the glass of wine. 
    Id. at 462
    . Peavey requested an instruction on the voluntariness of
    his actions, which the trial court denied. 
    Id. at 459
    . On appeal, the court determined that Peavey
    did not produce evidence warranting a voluntariness instruction, holding that Peavey’s claim that
    he must have been drugged was unsupported by the evidence and was “mere speculation.” 
    Id. at 465
    . As a result, the trial court did not err in denying the instruction. 
    Id.
     at 465–66. Other
    courts have similarly held that a defendant’s speculation that he was, or had to have been,
    drugged is insufficient evidence to warrant an involuntary intoxication instruction. See Quinn v.
    State, No. 01-12-01147-CR, 
    2014 WL 60713
    , at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 7,
    2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Lewis v. State, No. 05-12-00837-CR,
    
    2013 WL 5888117
    , at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 31, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication); Harris v. State, No. 02-09-00177-CR, 
    2011 WL 754396
    , at *4 (Tex.
    App.—Fort Worth March 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also
    Ellison v. State, Nos. 05-04-00257-CR & 05-04-00258-CR, 
    2005 WL 553387
    , at *2 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas Mar. 10, 2005, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Alexander v.
    9
    State, No. 03-01-00263-CR, 
    2002 WL 436993
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 21, 2002, no pet.)
    (mem. op., not designated for publication).3
    Ignoring all the evidence that supports the affirmative defense of involuntary
    intoxication, as we must, we find there is more than a scintilla of evidence on which a jury could
    have rejected Gatewood’s claim of involuntary intoxication. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 669.
    Gatewood testified that Junior smoked K2, that Junior had been at Gatewood’s house recently,
    and that Hill, who was often at his house, consistently rerolled the cigarette butts in his ashtray.
    Gatewood argued that Junior must have left a K2 cigarette butt in the ashtray and that Hill must
    have rerolled it and left it in the ashtray. Based on that evidence, the jury could have rejected his
    involuntary intoxication defense, reasoning that Gatewood’s intoxication, if any, was voluntary4
    because he should have known through the exercise of reasonable care that the cigarette that he
    took from the ashtray could contain K2. See Farmer, 411 S.W.3d at 907–08 (no voluntariness
    instruction where defendant failed to verify which prescription medication he was taking
    “although he knew that he was prescribed medications that could have an intoxicating effect”).
    Furthermore, the evidence also established that Gatewood had experienced prior episodes of
    similar violent conduct where he denied being intoxicated. Based on that evidence, the jury
    could have believed that Gatewood was not intoxicated during the events of this case because his
    actions were similar to his prior unintoxicated incidents. Therefore, there is more than a scintilla
    3
    “Although unpublished cases have no precedential value, we may take guidance from them ‘as an aid in developing
    reasoning that may be employed.’” Rhymes v. State, 
    536 S.W.3d 85
    , 99 n.9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet.
    ref’d) (quoting Carrillo v. State, 
    98 S.W.3d 789
    , 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d)).
    4
    Insanity caused by voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the commission of a crime. TEX. PENAL
    CODE ANN. § 8.04(a).
    10
    of evidence to support the jury’s rejection of Gatewood’s affirmative defense of involuntary
    intoxication. See id.
    Even if there was less than a scintilla of evidence, Gatewood failed to prove, as a matter
    of law, his affirmative defense. Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 669–70. The only evidence in support
    of his defense was his own self-serving, speculative, or uncorroborated testimony that he did not
    remember the episode and that K2 must have been in the cigarette that he smoked, but we do not
    consider that evidence because it was subject to the jury’s credibility assessment and reasonable
    disbelief. See id. at 70; Peavey, 
    248 S.W.3d 455
    .
    Accordingly, we overrule this point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Josh R. Morriss, III
    Chief Justice
    Date Submitted:         September 9, 2022
    Date Decided:           September 28, 2022
    Publish
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-22-00006-CR

Filed Date: 9/28/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/28/2022