Nathan Grider v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )


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  •                                  In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    __________________
    NO. 09-20-00190-CR
    __________________
    NATHAN GRIDER, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    __________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 88th District Court
    Hardin County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 23877
    __________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In a single issue, Nathan Grider asks the Court to reverse the trial
    court’s judgment because the trial court refused to dismiss Grider’s
    indictment after Rebecca Walton, Hardin County’s elected County
    Attorney, stepped in for the prosecutor in lieu of David Sheffield, the
    County’s elected DA. Because a county attorney’s duties include
    representing the State in district court either on the request of the DA or
    1
    in the DA’s absence, the trial court did not err in denying Grider’s motion
    to dismiss his indictment. For the reasons explained below, we will
    affirm.
    Background
    In July 2016, the grand jury indicted Nathan Grider for deadly
    conduct under an indictment that alleged Grider knowingly discharged a
    firearm toward a habitation while acting recklessly as to whether the
    habitation was occupied.1 In December 2017, Hardin County’s DA, by
    motion, asked the trial court to appoint a special prosecutor to prosecute
    Grider in the case after a conflict of interest had arisen in the DA’s office
    because a witness the State intended to call in the trial was being
    prosecuted by the DA’s office on felony charges in another case that was
    pending in the 88th District Court. The trial court, however, never ruled
    on the DA’s motion. The record contains neither an order recusing the
    DA and replacing the DA with an attorney pro tem, nor an order
    authorizing a special prosecutor to assist the DA in discharging that
    offices duties of prosecuting Grider on behalf of the State.
    1
    
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.05
    (b). The offense is a third-degree
    felony.
    2
    Even though the trial court never ruled on the DA’s motion, the
    appellate record shows that by October 2018, when Grider signed a plea
    agreement and agreed to plead guilty, Rebecca Walton was appearing for
    the State in Grider’s case despite the fact the trial court never signed an
    order substituting her as counsel of record in place of the DA. Around a
    year after Grider signed the plea agreement, his attorney moved to
    dismiss Grider’s indictment. In the motion, Grider argued the DA’s
    request to appoint a special prosecutor immediately disqualified any
    attorney subject to the control of the DA from prosecuting him on behalf
    of the State. According to Grider, the trial court should have recognized
    that it needed to appoint an attorney pro tem after the DA filed his
    motion asking the trial court to appoint a special prosecutor even though
    the DA had not asked the court to appoint an attorney pro tem. Grider
    claims that since the DA’s motion claims a conflict existed in his office in
    both prosecuting Grider and in prosecuting a witness it intended to call
    against Grider when his case was tried, the trial court needed to appoint
    an attorney pro tem.2 But Grider didn’t obtain a hearing on his motion to
    2
    Compare Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.07 (the rules of
    procedure governing the appointment of attorneys pro tem), with 
    id.
     art.
    3
    dismiss his indictment until August 2020. When the trial court heard
    Grider’s motion, the motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. Grider
    didn’t present any evidence in the hearing to support his motion. The
    trial court also didn’t explain why it found Grider’s motion to dismiss was
    without merit. After the trial court ruled on Grider’s motion, it
    announced the court would hear Grider’s plea. After considering the
    evidence relevant to Grider’s plea and Grider’s plea agreement, the trial
    court deferred adjudicating Grider’s guilt and signed an order placing
    Grider on community supervision for ten years. 3
    Analysis
    Grider complains that the trial court abused its discretion by
    denying his motion to dismiss his indictment. According to Grider, the
    conflict of interest the DA raised in his motion to appoint a special
    prosecutor required the trial court to appoint an attorney pro tem to
    replace the DA and prosecute him in place of the DA. As we understand
    Grider’s argument, Walton could not prosecute him as a special
    27.08 (the rules of procedure governing the appointment of special
    prosecutors).
    3
    The trial court granted Grider the right to file an appeal from its
    ruling on his motion to dismiss his indictment.
    4
    prosecutor at the DA’s request because doing so created the same conflict
    the DA had already raised in his motion since special prosecutors, when
    appointed under Texas law, remain subject to the control of the DA.
    Under Texas Law, “[e]ach district attorney shall represent the
    State in all criminal cases in the district courts of his district and in
    appeals” from those cases.4 Yet there may be occasions when a district
    attorney is legally disqualified from representing the State. 5 When
    district attorneys are not legally disqualified, they may request the
    district court where the case is filed to permit their recusal for good
    cause.6 This procedure allows district attorneys who have conflicts to
    avoid them and to avoid the appearance of impropriety by sometimes
    declining to participate on occasion in a case. 7 When the trial court
    approves the DA’s request to recuse for good cause (but not before), the
    district attorney’s office is deemed “disqualified.” 8
    4
    
    Id.
     art. 2.01; Coleman v. State, 
    246 S.W.3d 76
    , 81 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2008).
    5
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.08; Coleman, 
    246 S.W.3d at 81
    .
    6
    Coleman, 
    246 S.W.3d at 81
    .
    7
    
    Id.
    8
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.07(b-1); Coleman, 
    246 S.W.3d at 81
    .
    5
    Article 2.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure addresses when a
    trial court may appoint an attorney to perform the duties of the
    prosecutor on behalf of the State. 9 The attorney appointed under article
    2.07 is called an “attorney pro tem.”10 Article 2.07(a) provides that the
    appointment of an attorney pro tem may arise “whenever an attorney for
    the state is disqualified to act in any case or proceeding, is absent from
    the county or district, or is otherwise unable to perform the duties of the
    attorney’s office, or in any instance where there is no attorney for the
    state[.]”11 As outlined in article 2.07, the trial court is authorized to
    “appoint, from any county or district, an attorney for the state or may
    appoint an assistant attorney general to perform the duties of the office
    during the absence or disqualification of the attorney for the state.” 12 An
    attorney pro tem steps into the role of the district or county attorney with
    all of that position’s functions and responsibilities. 13
    9
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.07.
    10
    Coleman, 
    246 S.W.3d at 82
    ; Marbut v. State, 
    76 S.W.3d 742
    , 748
    (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. ref’d).
    11
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.07(a).
    12
    
    Id.
    13
    State v. Rosenbaum, 
    852 S.W.2d 525
    , 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
    (Clinton, J., concurring).
    6
    Compared with an attorney pro tem, a special prosecutor, “with the
    consent of the district attorney, assists the district attorney in the
    investigation and prosecution of a particular case, but the district
    attorney is responsible for the prosecution, control, and management of
    the case.”14 The special prosecutor doesn’t need to be appointed by the
    trial court or take a constitutional oath of office when he or she acts with
    the permission of the district attorney. 15 The district attorney doesn’t
    need to be absent, disqualified, or recused, or otherwise unable to
    perform, and the trial court doesn’t need to approve his or her
    appointment.16
    The prosecutor in this case asked the trial court to appoint a special
    prosecutor given the conflict in both prosecuting Grider on the one hand
    and a witness it intended to call if Grider’s case went to trial, which as
    we understand the DA’s motion is the conflict the DA perceived. Yet the
    motion the DA filed was never heard, the record does not show the DA
    obtained a hearing on the motion, and the motion was never ruled on by
    14
    See id.; Stephens v. State, 
    978 S.W.2d 728
    , 731 (Tex. App.—Austin
    1998, pet. ref’d).
    15
    Stephens, 
    978 S.W.2d at 731
    .
    16
    
    Id.
    7
    the court. Perhaps the conflict the DA feared was resolved by some
    change in circumstances, such as Grider’s guilty plea, a plea by the
    witness in the other case, or other circumstances none of which Grider
    presented evidence to describe. Simply put, the record currently before
    us fails to show much about the nature of the conflict either when the DA
    filed the motion, when Grider entered a plea agreement, or when the trial
    court accepted Grider’s plea and enforced the plea agreement he made
    with    the      prosecutor   representing   the   State,   Rebecca   Walton.
    Consequently, on this record we can’t say that Grider met his burden to
    prove the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
    dismiss.
    Besides Grider’s failure to meet his burden of proof, the trial court
    did not need to appoint an attorney pro tem or a special prosecutor before
    allowing Walton, as Hardin County’s Attorney, to prosecute the case
    against Grider in the 88th District Court. Article 2.02 of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure defines a county attorney’s duties. 17 A county
    attorney represents the State in all criminal cases under examination or
    prosecution in their “said county,” aids the district attorney when
    17
    See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.02.
    8
    requested in the prosecution of any case on behalf of the State in district
    court, and represents the State alone “in the absence of the district
    attorney.”18 Here, perhaps the DA chose to be absent due to the conflict
    his office identified in the motion he filed more than three years before
    the trial court heard and then denied Grider’s motion to dismiss. Or
    perhaps Walton appeared and began representing the State around
    October 2018, over a year and half after the DA filed the motion because
    the DA was absent and attending to other matters, so Walton having
    represented the State in negotiating the plea agreement then continued
    to represent the State because she was the attorney who was familiar
    with the negotiations that led to Grider’s plea. Regardless of why the DA
    chose to be absent in Grider’s case, article 2.02 authorized Walton as the
    elected County Attorney to prosecute Grider because Grider failed to
    meet his burden of proof to demonstrate why the County Attorney was
    either disqualified due to a purported conflict or unauthorized to
    represent the State.19
    18
    
    Id.
    19
    
    Id.
    9
    Because Grider failed to meet his burden of proof, we overrule
    Grider’s sole issue.
    Conclusion
    Having considered the record and determined that Grider failed to
    establish an abuse of discretion occurred, the trial court’s judgment is
    AFFIRMED.
    _________________________
    HOLLIS HORTON
    Justice
    Submitted on March 23, 2022
    Opinion Delivered November 2, 2022
    Do Not Publish
    Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-20-00190-CR

Filed Date: 11/2/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/4/2022