Flores, Edward ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                 PD-0349-15
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    Transmitted 6/15/2015 1:54:23 PM
    June 17, 2015
    Accepted 6/17/2015 10:41:15 AM
    ABEL ACOSTA
    NO. PD-0349-15                                              CLERK
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    ***************************************
    EDWARD FLORES
    V.
    STATE OF TEXAS
    ***************************************
    From Appeal No. NO. 01-13-00295-CR
    Trial Cause No. 12-08-08659-CR
    Montgomery County
    ***************************************
    PETITIONER’S PETITION
    FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    ***************************************
    Scott Pawgan
    122 W Davis, Ste. 116
    Conroe, Texas 77301
    (936) 242-6975 Phone
    State Bar No. 24002739
    Attorney for Petitioner
    ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Parties to the Case…………………………………………………………………………….......ii
    Index of Authorities ……………………………………………………………………………..iii
    Statement Regarding Oral Argument ………………………...………………………………….iv
    Statement of the Case ……………………………………...…………………………………..….1
    Statement of Procedural History ………………………...………………………………………..3
    Ground for Review No. 1 ……...………………………………………………………………….4
    DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
    COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
    SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE GAINED AS THE RESULT OF AN
    ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
    Reasons for Review ……………………………………….……………………….......…4
    Concise Argument………………………………………………………………………...5
    Ground for Review No. 2 ……...…………………………………………………………………7
    DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
    COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY REGARDING THE
    TESTIMONY OF THE EXTENT OF THE METHAMPHETAMINE PROBLEM
    AND THE GENERAL DANGERS AND SOCIETAL COSTS OF
    METHAMPHETAMINE
    Reasons for Review ……………………………………….………………………...……7
    Concise Argument for Grounds for review Numbers 2 & 3……………………………....8
    Conclusion and Prayer…………………………………………………………………………….9
    Certificate of Service…………………………………………………………………………….10
    Certificate of Compliance.……………………………………………………………………….10
    Appendix Follows
    PARTIES TO THE CASE
    1.   Trial Judge:           Honorable William McAdams, Sitting by assignment
    for the 258th Judicial District Court of Polk County,
    Texas
    2.   Appellant:             Edward Flores
    Trial Counsel:         Jeremy Dishongh
    Chester Deandre Gibbs
    332 N. Main Street
    Conroe, Texas 77301
    Appellate Counsel:     Scott Pawgan
    122 W. Davis, Ste 116
    Conroe, Texas 77301
    2.   Appellee               The State of Texas
    Trial Counsel:         Rob Freyer
    Montgomery County Criminal District Attorney’s Office
    217 W. Phillips
    Conroe, Texas 77301
    Appellate Counsel:     William Delmore
    Montgomery County Criminal District Attorney’s Office
    217 W. Phillips
    Conroe, Texas 77301
    ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Ebarb v. State, 
    598 S.W.2d 842
    , 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ................................................................................... 5
    Ex Parte Lane, 
    303 S.W.3d 702
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ........................................................................................... 8
    Henderson v. State, 
    965 S.W.2d 710
    , 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) .................................... 6
    Hunter v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 102
    , 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).................................................................................. 6
    
    Hunter, 955 S.W.2d at 104
    .................................................................................................................................... 6, 7
    Lippert v. State, 
    664 S.W.2d 712
    , 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ................................................................................. 5
    Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 20–29, 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    , 
    44 Ohio Op. 2d 383
    (1968) .............................. 6
    Rules
    Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 66.3(c)..................................................................................................... 5
    Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 66.3(f) ................................................................................................. 5, 8
    iii
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    The issues addressed involve important questions of state law. Oral argument will
    ensure a full, and fair exposition of the importance of these questions and how they
    should be resolved.
    iv
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
    COMES NOW Edward Flores, Petitioner in the above entitled and numbered
    cause, by and through his counsel, Scott Pawgan, and petitions the Court of Criminal
    Appeals to review the decision by the Court of Appeals, and respectfully shows this
    Court the following in support of this petition.
    Statement of the Case
    On March 22, 2012. officers from Montgonery County Precinct Four Constables
    Office were serving a search warrant on Sammy Carollo’s residence, 22307 Smith Road.
    (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 47, 153, 164-165; Vol. 7, Page 114-15). While serving the warrant,
    the deputies serving as security on the outside of the property noticed a vehicle drive up
    the drive to the property the officers were searching (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 35, 47-48, 153,
    154, 169; Vol. 7, Page 16).
    The officers then flagged down the vehicle and gave the vehicle's driver hand and
    verbal commands to pull his vehicle toward the officers. (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 49, 161,
    170, 174; Vol. 7, Page 17) The officers testified that the driver was not free to leave the
    scene once he drove onto the property. (R.R. Vol. 6, Page 209)
    Upon driving onto the property, the driver then stopped the vehicle and exited the
    vehicle. (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 35, 48, 172; Vol. 7, Page 16-18) According to the officers,
    the driver then looked around and reached back into the vehicle and threw something
    over the vehicle. (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 35, 42, 174; Vol. 7, Page 18)
    The deputies then approached the vehicle and its driver, as well as approach the
    area where the driver supposedly thru the item over the vehicle. (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 48-
    1
    51, 174-175; Vol. 7, Page 1) The driver was identified as Appellant. (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages
    51, 169; Vol. 7, Page 17)
    In the area where the item was found, officers discovered a paper bag. Inside the
    paper bag was a white crystaline substance. (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 35-36, 49-51, 176) The
    substance later tested to be 137.49 grams of methamphetamine. (R.R. Vol. 6, Page 99)
    Appellant was immediately handcuffed and taken into custody. (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 54-
    55, 176; Vol. 7, Page 24).
    After Appellant was detained, he was asked by Constable Hayden why he was
    there. (Vol. 7, Pages 22-23) Appellant who, even though not free to leave and having not
    been mirandized allegedly stated he was “going to see Sammy.” (Vol. 7, Pages 22-23)
    The officers subsequently searched the truck Appellant was driving. (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages
    68). NO paraphernalia commonly associated with an individual dealing drugs was found
    during the vehicle search. (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 68, 77-80, 195).
    To establish the delivery element, the State called Phillip Cash to testify. Among
    the things Lt. Cash testified to was that the amount of methamphetamine would be
    enough to make addicts out of 670 people. (R.R. Vol. 6, Page119). In addition, over
    Appellant’s objection Lt. Cash was able to testify to such irrelevant facts such as the
    violence that is associated with the drug trade, (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 123-124) the
    wholesale and retail price of methamphetamine (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 131-132) and the
    drug distribution hubs (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 132-133). Even though there was testimony to
    these inflammatory and irrelevant facts, the State never established neither Appellant nor
    anyone at the property being searched had the requisite money to pay for the alleged
    2
    Methamphetamine, nor did the State ever establish that either Appellant or anyone at the
    property had engaged in any violence associated with drugs or drug dealing. As a matter
    of fact, as discussed above, Appellant, even though supposedly engaged in such a
    dangerous enterprise as drug dealing, did not have a weapon on him.
    During the States Closing arguments the State made an argument to convict
    Appellant so this will be the last day Applicant can think about selling that crap to our
    kids. (R.R. Vol. 7, page 108) Appellant objected to this argument but was overruled.
    (R.R. Vol 7, page 109-110)
    After Jury selection, but before testimony in guilt innocence started, the Court held
    a suppression hearing. (R.R. Vol. 5, Pages 197-296). The Court denied the motion to
    suppress. (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 6-7)
    The jury convicted Appellant of delivery of a controlled substance. The court then
    held a punishment hearing. At the conclusion of the punishment hearing, The Court
    sentenced Appellant to life in Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (Vol. 7, Page 51-52)
    From this conviction and sentence, Appellant appeals.
    On July 7, 2010, the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction in a
    memorandum opinion. (please see Appendix) The basis for the Court of appeals
    affirming the conviction was that the search was authorized under the plain view
    doctrine. From this opinion, Petitioner now requests this Petition be granted and this
    Court reverse the Court of Appeals.
    Statement of Procedural History
    This is an appeal of a conviction for the offense of Possession of a controlled
    3
    substance, pg 1, four to 200 grams. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
    During trial, the trial court denied Appellant’s Motion to Suppress Illegally Seized
    Evidence. Appellant went to the Court for punishment after a pre sentence investigation
    report was done and the Court held a punishment hearing. The Court assessed
    punishment at confinement for life in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice –
    Institutional Division. (R.R. Vol. 7, Page 51-52). The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed
    Appellant’s conviction and sentence in an opinion dated February 26, 2015. Appellant’s
    Motion for Rehearing was due on March 13, 2015. A motion for extension of time to file a
    motion for rehearing pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 49.8 was due by
    March 30, 2015. A motion for extension of time to file a motion for rehearing pursuant to
    Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 49.8 was filed March 30, 2015 and an extension was
    granted and a motion for rehearing was timely filed and denied on May 12, 2015.
    Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review is due by June 11, 2015. This petition is
    being timely filed.
    Ground for Review No. 1
    DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
    COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
    PHYSICAL EVIDENCE GAINED AS THE RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH
    AND SEIZURE
    Reasons for Review
    1.     The Court of Appeals has decided an important question of state or federal
    law in a way that conflicts with the applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals
    4
    or the Supreme Court of the United States Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule
    66.3(c);
    2.     The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
    course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as
    to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals' power of supervision Texas
    Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 66.3(f).
    Concise Argument
    The Court of Appeals stated in their opinion that Appellant’s motion to suppress was
    properly granted since Appellant’s interaction with law enforcement was not a seizure but
    merely an encounter, until the controlled substances were found in the brown bag Appellant
    allegedly had thrown. Appellant would respectfully disagree with the Court of Appeals
    since any reasonable person seeing multiple law enforcement officers approaching them and
    waiving for the individual driving to stop, would feel compelled to submit to law
    enforcements show of authority.
    A person’s mere presence at a location being searched with a warrant does not
    supply constitutionally adequate grounds for reasonable suspicion. Lippert v. State, 
    664 S.W.2d 712
    , 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). An investigative stop is a seizure that is less
    intrusive than a full arrest. Ebarb v. State, 
    598 S.W.2d 842
    , 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
    Actions by the police that would communicate to a reasonable person that compliance
    with a police command is required constitutes a detention that must be justified by
    reasonable suspicion
    5
    When an officer has a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that criminal
    activity is afoot and a certain person is connected with the activity, the officer may make
    an investigative stop of that person even though grounds for arrest do not exist. Terry v.
    Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 20–29, 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    , 
    44 Ohio Op. 2d 383
    (1968). A
    mere request for an individual to stop or submit to a search does not constitute a “stop:
    and such a request need not be justified by reasonable suspicion” Hunter v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 102
    , 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Henderson v. State, 
    965 S.W.2d 710
    , 713 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d). Only if the officer conveyed a message that
    compliance was required has a consensual encounter become a detention. 
    Hunter, 955 S.W.2d at 104
    . Actions by the police that would communicate to a reasonable person that
    compliance with a police command is required constitutes a detention that must be
    justified by reasonable suspicion. 
    Id. In the
    present case, there was no reasonable suspicion for the police to detain
    Appellant when he drove upon Mr. Carollo’s property. There is nothing illegal or
    objectively could be considered illegal about driving onto someone’s property,
    particularly where there is no gate or do not enter signs. In addition, there were additional
    houses that attached to the driveway Appellant drove down, and Appellant could have
    very easily driven to where he did to get turned and return to a residence whose entrance
    he had inadvertently missed down the driveway closer to the main road.
    The actions by the police that day would have communicated to a reasonable
    person that compliance with the police command to stop Appellant’s truck was required,
    and thus the stop of Appellant’s vehicle constitutes a detention that must be justified by
    6
    reasonable suspicion. 
    Hunter, 955 S.W.2d at 104
    . There were multiple officers in the yard
    advancing on Appellant and waiving to Appellant to stop his vehicle. Given the number
    of officers, and that apparent show of force from the number of officers, waiving for
    Appellant to stop his vehicle would have compelled most any citizen to submit to the
    officers’ demands to stop the vehicle. Appellant was not trying to move or drive towards
    the officers, until the officers motioned and commanded Appellant to drive towards the
    officers, forcing Appellant to believe he had to submit to their authority.
    Since the initial interaction with police was not merely an encounter but a seizure
    lacking reasonable suspicion, as detailed in Appellant’s original brief in the Court of
    Appeals, this Court has erred in overruling Appellant’s third point of error. Appellant
    respectfully requests that this Court reconsider the Court of Appeal’s overruling of
    Appellant’s point of error number three and grant point of error number three and reverse
    Appellant’s judgment and sentence.
    Ground for Review No. 2
    DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
    COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY REGARDING THE
    TESTIMONY OF THE EXTENT OF THE METHAMPHETAMINE PROBLEM AND
    THE GENERAL DANGERS AND SOCIETAL COSTS OF METHAMPHETAMINE.
    Reasons for Review
    1.     The Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
    course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as
    to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals' power of supervision. Texas
    7
    Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 66.3(f).
    Concise Argument For Ground for Review Number 2
    The Court of Appeals stated in their opinion that Appellant’s issue was not briefed or
    error properly preserved for Appellate review. Appellant would respectfully disagree and
    assert that the issue was properly briefed and preserved for Appellant review.
    While the Court in its opinion, stated that Appellant had not identified particular
    testimony that was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, Appellant clearly identified in his
    statement of facts the irrelevant and prejudicial statements made by Lt. Cash. Appellant
    clearly identified among the things Lt. Cash testified to was that the amount of
    methamphetamine would be enough to make addicts out of 670 people. (R.R. Vol. 6,
    Page119). In addition, over Appellant’s objection Lt. Cash was able to testify to such
    irrelevant facts such as the violence that is associated with the drug trade, (R.R. Vol. 6,
    Pages 123-124) the wholesale and retail price of methamphetamine (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages
    131-132) and the drug distribution hubs (R.R. Vol. 6, Pages 132-133). (see Appellant’s
    brief at page 4).
    Appellant also clearly gave the Court of Appeals, in Appellant’s brief, authority on
    which the ground of error was based. That authority was Ex Parte Lane, 
    303 S.W.3d 702
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). (see Appellant’s brief at page 13).
    As far as preserving error for review, Appellant would contend that this issue was
    properly preserved. Appellant’s trial counsel made several relevancy objections to the
    complained of testimony. Those objections were overruled, thus preserving the
    complaints for Appellant review.
    8
    Because Appellant’s fourth point of error was properly preserved, and properly
    briefed, it was error for The Court of Appeals to overrule point of error number four
    without considering the error on its merits as briefed. Appellant requests that this court
    reconsider The Court of Appeal’s overruling of Appellant’s fourth point of error as not
    preserved and consider the point of error on its substantive grounds and then affirm the
    error.
    Conclusion and Prayer
    Petitioner prays that this Court grant this Petition for Discretionary Review and
    reverse the Ninth Court of Appeals opinion and remand the case to the trial court with an
    order of acquittal, remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider on the merit’s
    Appellant’s fourth point of error in Appellant’s Appeal Brief or other relief as this Court
    feels Petitioner is entitled.
    Respectfully submitted,
    __________________________
    Scott Pawgan
    122 W Davis, Ste. 116
    Conroe, Texas 77301
    (936) 242-6975 Phone
    State Bar No. 24002739
    Attorney for Petitioner
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    9
    I HEREBY CERTIFY that Petitioner’s Petition for Discretionary Review was
    filed through the State’s e-filing service and through the electronic service of the e-filer,
    copies of the Petition were served upon the 9TH District Attorney, Montgomery County,
    Conroe, Texas; and to the State prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 12405, Austin, Texas
    78711, on the 11th day of June, 2015.
    __________________________
    Scott Pawgan
    Attorney for Petitioner
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certify that the foregoing document was 2838 words as determined by an
    electronic word counting program.
    _________________________
    Scott Pawgan
    10
    APPENDIX
    Opinion issued February 26, 2015
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-13-00295-CR
    ———————————
    EDWARD FLORES, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 9th District Court
    Montgomery County, Texas 1
    Trial Court Case No. 12-08-08659-CR
    1
    The Supreme Court of Texas transferred this appeal from the Court of Appeals for
    the Ninth District of Texas. Misc. Docket No. 13-9042 (Mar. 26, 2013); see TEX.
    GOV’T CODE § 73.001 (authorizing transfer of cases). We are unaware of any
    conflict between our court’s precedents and those of the Ninth Court on any
    relevant issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Edward Flores was charged with possession of a controlled
    substance with intent to deliver, to which he pleaded not guilty. See TEX. HEALTH
    & SAFETY CODE § 481.112(a). Flores pleaded true to an enhancement paragraph
    reflecting a prior conviction for felony burglary of a habitation. A jury found him
    guilty, and the trial court assessed punishment at life in prison. In this appeal,
    Flores brings six issues challenging his conviction. We affirm.
    Background
    While law-enforcement officers were executing a search warrant on the
    residence of Sammy Carollo, Deputy T. Knox and Constable K. Hayden were
    serving as security on the outside of the property when they observed appellant
    Edward Flores driving up the driveway. Upon seeing the two law-enforcement
    officers, Flores stopped and got out of his truck. Hayden signaled for Flores to
    continue driving up the driveway to where the officers were located.
    As Flores got back in the truck to comply, he reached inside, grabbed a
    brown bag, and threw it over the truck into some bushes. As Knox searched for the
    thrown item, Hayden approached Flores and asked what he was doing at the
    property. Flores responded that he was there “to see Sammy.” By this time, Knox
    had recovered the brown bag, observed that it contained a clear bag of what he
    2
    thought was methamphetamine, and signaled for Hayden to make an arrest. Lab
    tests later confirmed that the bag contained 137.49 grams of methamphetamine.
    Flores was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to
    deliver. A jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison.
    This appeal followed.
    Analysis
    In six issues, Flores contends that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to
    support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in making prejudicial statements to
    the jury; (3) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress physical
    evidence gained as the result of an illegal search and seizure; (4) the trial court
    erred when it denied his motion to suppress oral statements made in custody;
    (5) the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding the dangers and social
    costs of methamphetamine; and (6) the trial court abused its discretion when it
    permitted improper jury argument.
    I.    Legal sufficiency of the evidence
    In his first issue, Flores argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to
    support his conviction because no evidence establishes that he intended to deliver
    the methamphetamine.
    When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
    3
    rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
    reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789
    (1979); Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We must
    give deference to the factfinder to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the
    evidence, and draw reasonable inferences. Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 13 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2007).
    To prove possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the State
    must show that a defendant (1) exercised care, custody, control, or management
    over the controlled substance, (2) intended to deliver the controlled substance, and
    (3) knew that the substance in his possession was a controlled substance. TEX.
    HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.112(a); Parker v. State, 
    192 S.W.3d 801
    , 805 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). Intent can be inferred from
    circumstantial evidence, including the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant, as
    well as evidence that the defendant possessed the contraband; an oral expression of
    intent is not required. Patrick v. State, 
    906 S.W.2d 481
    , 487 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1995); Utomi v. State, 
    243 S.W.3d 75
    , 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007,
    pet. ref’d). Courts have considered several factors in determining whether such
    intent is supported by the evidence, including: (1) the nature of the location where
    the defendant was arrested; (2) the quantity of the drugs the defendant possessed;
    (3) the manner of packaging; (4) the presence, or lack thereof, of drug
    4
    paraphernalia (for use or sale); (5) the defendant’s possession of a large amount of
    cash; and (6) the defendant’s status as a narcotics user. 
    Utomi, 243 S.W.3d at 82
    .
    The expert testimony of law enforcement officers, experienced with illicit drug
    trafficking, also may be used to establish a defendant’s intent to deliver a
    controlled substance. 
    Id. Flores argues
    that, considering the above factors, the evidence fails to
    establish his intent to deliver because only trace amounts of drugs were found at
    the location where he was arrested, the drugs were not packed in a way that
    indicated future sales, no paraphernalia was present and no cash was recovered
    during the arrest, and there was no evidence that he was a drug user.
    The State, however, points to numerous factors that support the inference of
    intent. First, Flores was arrested at the end of a lengthy rural driveway leading to a
    residence that officers were concurrently searching for methamphetamine. That
    only trace amounts of methamphetamine were discovered inside the searched
    house does not refute the permissible inference that Flores intended to deliver the
    drugs there, possibly to resupply the house.
    Second, Flores possessed 137.49 grams of methamphetamine, a large
    quantity that indicated an intent to deliver. One of the State’s witnesses, Lieutenant
    Philip Cash, testified that the quantity was the equivalent of 670 doses of
    methamphetamine, which indicated that it was “not for personal use.”
    5
    Third, the methamphetamine was packaged in one large bag, in a quantity
    that Cash testified would typically be moved from one drug trafficker to another.
    Although Flores suggests that the lack of separate packing for small amounts of
    methamphetamine indicates that the methamphetamine was not for distribution,
    Cash testified that the packaging in this case merely indicated that had not been
    prepared for direct sale to a consumer on the street. We previously have held that
    bulk packaging may indicate intent to deliver when the quantity possessed is
    greater than typical for personal use. See Reed v. State, 
    158 S.W.3d 44
    , 49 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (large amount of liquid codeine
    packaged in large pint-sized bottle indicated intent to deliver when officer testified
    that drug was typically diluted in that manner before distribution).
    Fourth, while the officers found no drug-sale paraphernalia on Flores or
    inside his vehicle, there is also no evidence that they found drug-use paraphernalia.
    We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding, and the lack
    of drug-use paraphernalia allows an inference that Flores did not intend to use the
    methamphetamine himself. Accordingly, the absence of drug-use paraphernalia
    permits an inference of an intent to deliver. See 
    Reed, 158 S.W.3d at 48
    (stating
    that the absence of either drug use paraphernalia or drug sale paraphernalia can be
    considered in determining intent); Mack v. State, 
    859 S.W.2d 526
    , 529 (Tex.
    6
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (determining that absence of drug-use
    paraphernalia is circumstantial evidence suggesting intent to deliver).
    Finally, Flores did not have any cash in his possession at the time of his
    arrest. He suggests that this weighs against a finding of intent to deliver. Cash
    explained at trial, however, that large narcotics traffickers frequently keep money
    and drugs separated to prevent “rip offs” during the transactions. Consequently, he
    explained that it is not uncommon for no money to be recovered along with a large
    amount of drugs
    Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding,
    we conclude that a rational factfinder could have reasonably inferred that Flores
    possessed the 137.49 grams of methamphetamine with an intent to deliver it to
    another. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support his
    conviction for the offense of possession with intent to deliver a controlled
    substance. See 
    Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902
    .
    We overrule Flores’s first issue.
    II.   Trial court’s commentary on methamphetamine
    In his second issue, Flores contends that the trial court improperly
    commented on the weight of the evidence. Before the jury retired for deliberations,
    the court informed them that they would have access to all of the evidence at trial,
    except for the clear bag of methamphetamine recovered from the bushes. The court
    7
    explained: “I don’t feel comfortable sending that back. If you want it sent back, I
    will make it available. It’s just—it’s just a dangerous substance. I don’t want
    anybody getting hurt.” 2
    Judges are prohibited from making “any remark calculated to convey to the
    jury his opinion of the case.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.05. To constitute
    reversible error, the court’s comment must be reasonably calculated to benefit the
    State or to prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial. Clark v.
    State, 
    878 S.W.2d 224
    , 226 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.). In determining
    whether the comment was either reasonably calculated to benefit the State or to
    prejudice the defendant, we must examine whether the trial court’s statement was
    material to the case. 
    Id. A statement
    is material if the jury had the same issue
    before it. 
    Id. Furthermore, if
    we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    court’s error did not contribute to the conviction, we must hold that the error was
    harmless. 
    Id. 2 The
    State argues that Flores failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.
    Immediately after the jury retired for deliberations, defense counsel objected
    “to the court telling the jury that it’s a dangerous substance. [The] objection
    is that it’s a comment on the weight of the evidence.” The State contends
    this is different than Flores’s argument on appeal, that the court’s remarks
    were improper because they conveyed its opinion of the case. We conclude
    the objection was sufficient to alert the trial court to the concern raised on
    appeal.
    8
    Here, the court’s statement explained why the jury would not be permitted to
    take the methamphetamine into the jury room. This remark reflects an
    acknowledgement that the substance was, in fact, methamphetamine. But the
    disputed issue at trial was whether Flores intended to deliver the substance, not
    whether the substance actually was methamphetamine. Consequently, even if the
    court’s statement regarding the dangers of methamphetamine constituted error, we
    conclude, beyond any reasonable doubt, that it did not contribute to Flores’s
    conviction. See 
    id. We overrule
    Flores’s second issue.
    III.   Motion to suppress physical evidence and oral statements
    In his third and sixth issues Flores argues that the trial court erred in denying
    his motions to suppress physical evidence and oral statements.
    When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view
    all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v.
    Garcia-Cantu, 
    253 S.W.3d 236
    , 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We afford almost
    total deference to a trial judge’s determination of historical facts, especially when
    the facts are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. 
    Id. But we
    review
    de novo legal conclusions based on those facts. 
    Id. 9 A.
       Physical evidence
    Flores contends in his third issue that the trial court erred when it denied his
    motion to suppress the bag of methamphetamine because it was obtained as a result
    of an illegal search and seizure. He contends that the law-enforcement officers did
    not have reasonable suspicion to detain him when he drove up the driveway of the
    property where the officers were executing a search warrant.
    There are three types of interactions between citizens and law-enforcement
    officers: (1) consensual encounters; (2) investigatory detentions; and (3) arrests.
    State v. Woodard, 
    341 S.W.3d 404
    , 410–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Consensual
    encounters do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. 
    Id. at 411;
    Florida v.
    Bostick, 
    501 U.S. 429
    , 434, 
    111 S. Ct. 2382
    , 2386 (1991). Thus, officers are free to
    stop and request information from a citizen without justification. 
    Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411
    . A citizen may terminate such a consensual encounter at will. 
    Id. An encounter
    is consensual as long as a reasonable person would “feel free to
    disregard the police and go about his business.” 
    Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434
    . A
    citizen’s acquiescence to an officer’s request for information does not elevate a
    consensual encounter to a detention or seizure, even if the officer does not
    communicate to the citizen that the request may be ignored. 
    Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411
    .
    10
    No bright-line rule governs when a consensual encounter becomes a seizure,
    but the encounter generally is no longer consensual when an officer restrains a
    citizen’s liberty through force or showing of authority. 
    Id. “If it
    was an option to
    ignore the request or terminate the interaction, then a Fourth Amendment seizure
    has not occurred.” 
    Id. We consider
    the totality of the circumstances to determine
    whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have felt free to
    ignore the request or terminate the interaction. 
    Id. Although courts
    consider the
    surrounding circumstances, including the time and place, the officer’s conduct is
    the most important factor in determining whether an encounter was consensual or a
    Fourth Amendment seizure. 
    Id. Initially, the
    burden is on the defendant to rebut the presumption of proper
    conduct by law enforcement and show that a seizure occurred. 
    Id. at 412.
    If the
    defendant meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that
    the seizure was nevertheless supported by either reasonable suspicion or probable
    cause, whichever is applicable. 
    Id. An officer
    may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes
    only if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is violating the law.
    Ford v. State, 
    158 S.W.3d 488
    , 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “Reasonable
    suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined
    with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude
    11
    that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal
    activity.” 
    Id. Whether an
    officer had reasonable suspicion depends on the totality
    of the circumstances. 
    Id. at 492–93.
    Flores contends that the brown bag of methamphetamine that he threw was
    obtained as a result of an unlawful detention. To this end, he characterizes the
    interaction with the officers as a detention from the moment the officers waved at
    him. Therefore, he argues that he was detained by the officers at a time when they
    did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the detention, and that the drugs that he
    threw into the bushes were recovered as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation.
    In spite of Flores’s characterization of the entire encounter as a detention,
    the totality of the circumstances indicates that no Fourth Amendment seizure
    occurred until after the brown bag of methamphetamine was thrown into the
    bushes. The officers testified that Flores stopped his truck “immediately” upon
    turning onto the property and making eye contact with them. At that time, Flores
    exited the vehicle and the officers motioned for him to drive forward. Instead, he
    grabbed the brown bag and threw it into the bushes. Under these circumstances, the
    officers’ actions–merely motioning to Flores to drive forward–did not amount to
    force or a show of authority which restrained Flores’s liberty. See 
    Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411
    .
    12
    Consequently, the encounter had not yet escalated to a detention when
    Flores threw the bag of methamphetamine into the bushes, and no justification was
    necessary for the officers to motion Flores forward. See 
    id. We overrule
    Flores’s third issue.
    B.     Oral statements
    In his sixth issue, Flores argues that the trial court erred in denying his
    motion to suppress his oral statement to Constable Hayden that he “was there to
    see Sammy.” He asserts that this statement was made while he was in custody, and
    before he received Miranda warnings.
    The Fifth Amendment requires a defendant subjected to custodial
    interrogation must receive Miranda warnings, and the failure of law enforcement
    to advise the defendant of those rights prohibits the later use of those statements
    against him. See Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 3138
    (1966).
    Here, the parties dispute only whether Flores was in custody at the time he
    told Hayden that he “was there to see Sammy.” The determination of whether a
    defendant is in custody requires a court to “examine all of the circumstances
    surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there
    [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated
    with a formal arrest.” Estrada v. State, 
    313 S.W.3d 274
    , 294 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2010). This is an objective determination, and the primary question is whether a
    13
    reasonable person would perceive the detention to be a restraint on his movement
    comparable to formal arrest. State v. Ortiz, 
    382 S.W.3d 367
    , 372 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2012).
    A routine stop does not automatically place a person in custody for Miranda
    purposes, but such a stop may escalate from a non-custodial detention into a
    custodial detention when formal arrest ensues or a detainee’s freedom of
    movement is restricted to the degree associated with a formal arrest. 
    Id. at 372.
    Thus, in State v. Ortiz, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a routine traffic
    stop had escalated beyond a detention at the time the suspect was questioned by the
    police, because: (1) officers expressed their suspicion that Ortiz possessed drugs or
    knew that his wife was in possession of drugs; (2) the detention had escalated
    beyond that of a routine traffic stop because at least two police cars and three
    officers, as opposed to the usual one car and two officers, were present when he
    made the statements; (3) officers handcuffed him when a pat-down revealed
    something illegal or dangerous in his wife’s possession; and (4) after he was
    handcuffed, officers informed him that something illegal had been found on his
    wife, signaling that he was under detention for something more serious than a
    speeding infraction. 
    Id. at 373–75.
    In this case, the officers approached Flores to speak with him after he threw
    the brown bag into the bushes. As one of the officers searched for the bag, Flores
    14
    told the other that he “was there to see Sammy.” At the time Flores made the
    statement to Hayden, there had been no formal arrest and his freedom of
    movement was not restricted in any manner. Examining all the circumstances, we
    conclude that a reasonable person would not have determined that the detention
    was a restraint on his movement comparable to a formal arrest. See 
    id. at 372.
    Nor
    were any of the factors present that led the Ortiz Court to hold that a routine traffic
    stop had escalated to a formal arrest. At the time he made his statement, Flores was
    not questioned by an unusual number of officers, handcuffed, or made aware that
    the officers had discovered the methamphetamine. See 
    id. at 373–75.
    Because Flores was not in custody at the time he made the contested
    statement, the trial court did not err when it denied the motion to suppress the
    statement.
    We overrule Flores’s sixth issue.
    IV.   Admission of testimony regarding methamphetamine
    In his fourth issue, Flores argues that the trial court erred when it allowed
    testimony regarding the dangers and social costs of methamphetamine.
    During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, Lieutenant Phillip Cash, a
    narcotics officer, testified to matters regarding methamphetamine, such as its
    production and addictive qualities. Flores argues generally that Cash’s testimony
    was similar to testimony in Ex parte Lane, 
    303 S.W.3d 702
    (Tex. Crim. App.
    15
    2009), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals held that testimony regarding the
    societal problems caused by methamphetamine was irrelevant and unfairly
    prejudicial at the punishment phase of a trial for unlawful possession of a
    controlled substance. 
    Lane, 303 S.W.3d at 714
    –15.
    A complaint is not preserved for appeal unless it was made to the trial court
    “by a timely request, objection or motion” that “stated the grounds for the ruling
    that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to
    make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were
    apparent from the context.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Furthermore, a defendant’s
    brief must “contain a clear and concise argument for the objections made, with
    appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). The
    failure to present argument and authorities results in waiver of the point of error.
    See Cardenas v. State, 
    30 S.W.3d 384
    , 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
    The State charitably identifies several objections to Cash’s testimony based
    on relevance, but much of Cash’s testimony that elicited objections was later
    admitted without objection. That testimony generally discussed particulars of the
    methamphetamine trade, including how the drug is produced, how money is
    handled, and the danger of violence for its participants. Under such circumstances,
    there can be no reversible error in admitting the evidence. See Leday v. State, 
    983 S.W.2d 713
    , 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
    16
    Moreover, Flores does not identify any particular testimony that should be
    deemed irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial like the testimony in Lane. In that case,
    the court declined to hold that all testimony regarding the dangers and societal
    costs of drug use was irrelevant at the punishment stage of a trial for possession or
    delivery of controlled substances, but held that the particular testimony at issue
    was irrelevant because it went beyond the context for the offense and unfairly
    prejudiced the defendant. See 
    Lane, 303 S.W.3d at 714
    –15. Specifically, the
    narcotics officer in Lane testified that he was familiar with people who had died
    from methamphetamine, including a woman who used the drug during her
    pregnancy, and that the community has to subsidize the costs of “health care, clean
    up, and theft associated with methamphetamine” because its users are typically
    unemployed and steal to get drug money. 
    Id. at 713.
    Flores does not point to any
    testimony that compares to the testimony in Lane, and he makes no meaningful
    argument that the entirety of Cash’s testimony was irrelevant or prejudicial.
    Because he has failed to adequately brief the issue for review or demonstrate
    that it was preserved in the trial court, we overrule Flores’s fifth issue. See TEX. R.
    APP. P. 33.1(a), 38.1(i).
    V.    Closing argument
    In his fifth issue, Flores contends that the trial court erred when it overruled
    his objection to improper jury argument. Flores asserts that the prosecutor’s
    17
    statement during closing argument, directed to him, that “[t]oday will be the last
    day you can ever think you can sell that crap to our kids,” was nearly identical to
    prohibited argument in Lane in which the prosecutor stated that the defendant was
    bringing drugs into the county to poison children and turn them into addicts. See
    
    Lane, 303 S.W.3d at 711
    –12.
    However, Flores’s specific objection at trial was to the prosecutor getting
    too physically close and speaking directly to him. Flores did not object to the
    statements as improper jury argument. A defendant’s failure to object to jury
    argument or pursue an adverse ruling to his objection forfeits his right to complain
    about the argument on appeal. Threadgill v. State, 
    146 S.W.3d 654
    , 670 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2004). Furthermore, the point of error on appeal must comport with the
    objection made at trial. Clark v. State, 
    365 S.W.3d 333
    , 339 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2012).
    Because Flores did not object to the prosecutor’s statements as improper jury
    argument, he has forfeited the issue on appeal. See 
    Threadgill, 146 S.W.3d at 670
    .
    We overrule Flores’s fifth issue.
    18
    Conclusion
    Having overruled Flores’s six issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Michael Massengale
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Lloyd.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    19