Daniel Lorenzo Wilson v. State ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                  ACCEPTED
    03-15-00328-cr
    6619835
    SEE AMEND BRF FILED                                               THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
    ON 9/10/15                                                                   AUSTIN, TEXAS
    8/24/2015 12:15:52 PM
    JEFFREY D. KYLE
    CLERK
    NO. 03-15-00328-CR
    FILED IN
    3rd COURT OF APPEALS
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR      AUSTIN, TEXAS
    THE   THIRD COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    8/24/2015 12:15:52 PM
    AUSTIN, TEXAS           JEFFREY D. KYLE
    Clerk
    DANIEL LORENZO WILSON,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    APPELLANT’S BRIEF
    On Appeal from the 264th District Court
    of Bell County, Texas,
    Trial Court Cause No. 72,334
    E. Alan Bennett
    State Bar #02140700
    Counsel for Appellant
    Sheehy, Lovelace & Mayfield, P.C.
    510 N. Valley Mills Dr., Ste. 500
    Waco, Texas 76710
    Telephone: (254) 772-8022
    Telecopier: (254) 772-9297
    Email: abennett@slmpc.com
    Identity of Parties and Counsel
    Appellant, pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(a), provides
    the following list of all parties to the trial court’s judgment and the names
    and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel.
    Daniel Lorenzo Wilson                                                Appellant
    Steven Streigler                                    Trial Counsel for Appellant
    P.O. Box 1683
    Belton, TX 76513
    E. Alan Bennett                             Appellate Counsel for Appellant
    510 North Valley Mills Dr., Ste. 500
    Waco, Texas 76710
    Michael Waldman                                      Trial Counsel for the State
    Assistant District Attorney
    Bob D. Odom                                  Appellate Counsel for the State
    Assistant District Attorney
    Bell County District Attorney’s Office
    P.O. Box 540
    Belton, Texas 76513
    Appellant’s Brief                                                          Page 2
    Table of Contents
    Identity of Parties and Counsel.............................................................................2
    Table of Contents ....................................................................................................3
    Index of Authorities ................................................................................................4
    Statement of the Case .............................................................................................6
    Statement Regarding Oral Argument ..................................................................6
    Issues Presented ......................................................................................................6
    Statement of Facts ...................................................................................................7
    Summary of the Argument ..................................................................................18
    Argument ...............................................................................................................19
    First Issue: The trial court abused its discretion by admitting
    photographs from the crime scene that were unfairly prejudicial. ............19
    A. This Court Reviews Evidentiary Rulings for an Abuse of Discretion
    ...........................................................................................................................19
    B. Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence May Be Inadmissible ............................20
    C. The State Offered Unnecessary & Unfairly Prejudicial Photographs
    ...........................................................................................................................21
    D. Under Erazo, the Photographs Should Not Have Been Admitted ....23
    E. The Error Affected Wilson’s Substantial Rights ...................................29
    Prayer ......................................................................................................................33
    Certificate of Compliance ....................................................................................34
    Certificate of Service .............................................................................................34
    Appellant’s Brief                                                                                                       Page 3
    Index of Authorities
    Texas Cases
    Aviles v. State, No. 05-07-00477-CR, 
    2008 WL 1850779
     (Tex. App.—Dallas
    Apr. 28, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) .... 28, 29
    Brown v. State, 
    875 S.W.2d 38
     (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no pet.) ..................
    23 Bur. v
    . State, 
    88 S.W.3d 633
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ............................. 30, 31
    Chamberlain v. State, 
    998 S.W.2d 230
     (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)..........................28
    Craig v. State, 
    347 S.W.2d 255
     (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) .............................. 27, 28
    Davis v. State, No. 03-07-00305-CR, 
    2008 WL 3877696
     (Tex. App.—Austin
    Aug. 20, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ..........21
    Erazo v. State, 
    144 S.W.3d 487
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) .................. 21, 24, 26, 27
    Fuelberg v. State, 
    447 S.W.3d 304
     (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. ref’d) .........20
    Gallo v. State, 
    239 S.W.3d 757
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ......................... 19, 20, 21
    Haley v. State, 
    173 S.W.3d 510
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) .....................................30
    Miller-El v. State, 
    782 S.W.2d 892
     (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ........................ 23, 26
    Montgomery v. State, 
    810 S.W.2d 372
     (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g)
    ........................................................................................................................... 21, 26
    Narvaiz v. State, 
    840 S.W.2d 415
     (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) .................................21
    Reese v. State, 
    33 S.W.3d 238
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)..................... 24, 26, 27, 29
    Sandoval v. State, 
    409 S.W.3d 259
     (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) ..... 29, 30
    Shuffield v. State, 
    189 S.W.3d 782
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ................................20
    State v. Davis, 
    349 S.W.3d 535
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) .....................................32
    Appellant’s Brief                                                                                                        Page 4
    Terrazas v. State, No. 03-05-00344-CR, 
    2006 WL 2080381
     (Tex. App.—Austin
    July 28, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ............21
    Threadgill v. State, 
    146 S.W.3d 654
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ..............................20
    Texas Statutes
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1) .........................................................23
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(b) ....................................................................32
    TEX. PEN. CODE § 19.02(b)(1) ..................................................................................6
    Rules
    TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) ...........................................................................................32
    TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2.......................................................................................... 29, 30
    TEX. R. EVID. 403 .....................................................................................................20
    Appellant’s Brief                                                                                                Page 5
    Statement of the Case
    Daniel Lorenzo Wilson pleaded guilty to murder without the benefit
    of a plea bargain. (CR 15-22), (2 RR 7). See TEX. PEN. CODE § 19.02(b)(1). The
    Honorable Martha J. Trudo, presiding judge of the 264th District Court of
    Bell County, assessed his punishment at life imprisonment. (CR 25-26), (3
    RR 175). Wilson timely filed his notice of appeal. (CR 29).
    Statement Regarding Oral Argument
    Oral argument will not aid the Court’s decisional process in this
    appeal.
    Issues Presented
    First Issue:         The trial court abused its discretion by admitting
    photographs from the crime scene that were unfairly
    prejudicial.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                          Page 6
    Statement of Facts
    The indictment alleges that on or about December 9, 2013, Wilson
    “did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an
    individual, namely, Karen Edwards, by shooting her with a firearm and
    stabbing and cutting the said Karen Edwards with a knife.” (CR 4).
    Wilson pleaded “guilty” to the murder charge.1 (2 RR 7). The trial
    court rescheduled the case for a sentencing hearing. (2 RR 9).
    Janet Allman works for the Bell County Communications Center
    which handles 9-1-1 calls and dispatches emergency responders. (3 RR 7-8).
    The call center received a 9-1-1 call on the morning of December 9, 2013 at
    about 5:21. (3 RR 9) Allman identified a recording of that call which was
    admitted as State’s Exhibit 1. (3 RR 10) The caller reported that she had
    been held hostage and had seen her friend murdered. The shooter shot her
    in the leg, stomach and head. He held a gun to the caller’s head as well.
    The caller stated that he was drunk and passed out. She took the gun from
    1
    Wilson also pleaded “true” to allegations in a motion to adjudicate his deferred
    adjudication community supervision for possession of less than 1 gram of cocaine, a
    state jail felony. (2 RR 4-7). The trial court adjudicated his guilt and sentenced him to 2
    years’ confinement in a state jail. (3 RR 174). Wilson did not appeal from this judgment.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                                    Page 7
    him and ran away. She gave the address for his apartment. She urged the
    operator to tell the officers to turn off their sirens that she heard
    approaching because she feared they would awaken the shooter. She
    identified the shooter as Daniel Wilson. Officers arrived as she talked to the
    operator. (SX 1)
    Latasha Brown is the person who called 9-1-1. She recently relocated
    to Dallas County so she could “get myself together mentally.” (3 RR 12).
    She moved to Killeen near the end of 2012 after being paroled on her
    sentence for burglary of a habitation. (3 RR 12-13). She had a few jobs
    including a part-time job at a tire shop where she worked with Wilson. (3
    RR 13-14). She identified Wilson and Karen Edwards as being part of the
    group of friends that she routinely spent time with at that time. (3 RR 14).
    She identified Wilson as “a local drug dealer” and “a very cool person to
    hang out with.” “He was a very giving individual.” They barbecued,
    watched movies and went out. She spent more time with Wilson than
    anyone else. (3 RR 15). Brown had a cocaine habit in 2013 and used daily.
    Wilson was one of her main suppliers. (3 RR 16).
    Brown met Karen Edwards through Brown’s girlfriend Cynthia
    Anderson. (3 RR 12, 16-17). Edwards had been friends with Anderson’s
    Appellant’s Brief                                                        Page 8
    mother who passed away in 2012. Anderson referred to Edwards as Aunt
    Karen or Momma Karen or some similar term of endearment. Their
    families had known each other for a long time. (3 RR 16-17). Edwards lived
    two doors down from Wilson in the same apartment complex. Brown
    understood that “they had dated years before.” (3 RR 18). As far as Brown
    could see, Edwards and Wilson saw each other on a regular basis and “got
    along great.” Edwards “smoked crack cocaine” and prostituted herself or
    hustled money to support herself. Wilson “always helped her” when she
    needed money or anything. “Always.” He helped her with her rent several
    times. (3 RR 19).
    Brown went to check on Wilson about every other day in late 2013
    because he had been injured when a car struck him while riding a bicycle.
    (3 RR 17). In December 2013, Brown and Anderson had several arguments.
    Brown stayed at Wilson’s house nearly the entire weekend of December 11.
    “We watched movies, drank beers, smoked cigarettes, ordered pizza. I was
    just hanging out. He was my escape from arguing and fighting and stuff
    like that.” Wilson lived less than a half mile from Brown and Anderson. (3
    RR 20). That Friday night, Brown testified that she was using drugs
    (cocaine) but Wilson was not. She got the cocaine from him though. (3 RR
    Appellant’s Brief                                                    Page 9
    21). She walked home around midnight and awoke around noon on
    Saturday. Issues still remained with Anderson so she went back to Wilson’s
    house that afternoon and they did the same things they had done the night
    before. (3 RR 22). She went home Saturday night and returned Sunday
    afternoon around 2:00 or 3:00. They played video games; she went to the
    store (with Wilson’s money) for beer and cigarettes; and Wilson ordered
    pizza. (3 RR 23).
    Karen Edwards came over to Wilson’s house around 11:30 that
    Sunday night.2 Brown was about to leave to go home. Wilson was in the
    bathroom. Edwards came inside and sat on the couch. (3 RR 24). Wilson
    came into the living room, and Brown headed to the bathroom. Wilson sat
    down next to Edwards, and they started talking. (3 RR 25). As Brown was
    closing the bathroom door, she heard a gunshot. (3 RR 25-26). She knew
    that Wilson had a gun because she had seen him cleaning it before. He kept
    it in a drop-down compartment in his sectional sofa. (3 RR 26). Brown
    never heard Wilson raise his voice. When Edwards had asked him for a
    cigarette, he told her that he did not have any. Then she asked for money to
    2
    Wilson kept the key to Edwards’s apartment so she would not lose it. She
    typically came by at night to let him know she was home and get her key. (3 RR 24).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                           Page 10
    buy a pack. She thought Wilson was joking around with Edwards. Then,
    she heard the shot, and Karen started screaming. “And the person that I
    saw was not Mr. Wilson. It couldn’t have been.” “I never seen him like
    that.” (3 RR 27). She explained that his eyes turned red and he had “a blank
    stare almost like it wasn’t him.” (3 RR 29). “[H]e was infuriated.” (3 RR 30).
    Brown walked back to the living room and saw Wilson sitting on the
    sofa holding his gun. Edwards was holding her leg where it appeared to
    Brown that she had been shot. (3 RR 28). Edwards asked Wilson to just let
    her go, and she promised not to tell anyone what he had done. Brown
    joined in and asked him to let her take Edwards home. (3 RR 30). Wilson
    told them, “I know you won’t say anything because you’re not leaving.”
    Then he started “rambling and mumbling under his breath.” (3 RR 31). He
    went and got a towel or rag and they tried to tie it around Edwards’s leg to
    stop the bleeding. (3 RR 31-32).
    And she just really kept screaming, just screaming like yelling,
    “Daniel, you shot me, you shot me. Daniel, you shot me. Oh my
    god, I can't believe you shot me.” And he's, “you shut up,” you
    know, be whatever, you know, be quiet, “I can't think. Just shut
    up,” you know, telling her to shut up. She continues screaming
    and once she kind of calms down a little bit, and he's standing
    there just like, you know, “I love you,” right? You know, he got
    calm. And I didn't understand that.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                         Page 11
    (3 RR 32).
    After Wilson “got calm,” he shot Edwards in the stomach. This was
    about thirty minutes after he shot her in the leg. (3 RR 32). Wilson was
    standing over Edwards as she sat on the sofa when he shot her the second
    time. He also unleashed a string of obscenities and told Edwards, “[Y]ou’re
    going to learn to stop playing with me.” (3 RR 33). At that time, Edwards
    “begged for her life, she wanted to call her kids, she wanted to talk to her
    momma one last time.” Brown “ran and got in the shower [and] nervously
    smoked a cigarette.” Then she heard a thump and Edwards screaming
    something to the effect “it’s leaving out of me, my life is leaving.” (3 RR
    34). Brown was scared and did not know what to do. Then she saw
    Edwards sliding backward across the floor to the bathroom door. (3 RR 35).
    Brown tried to get her attention so they could jump out of a window and
    escape. (3 RR 35-36).
    And she's like, no, he's going to kill me if I try that. And I knew
    she couldn't walk, she had been shot in her leg. So I'm just like
    slide in here and we'll lock the door and I'll put you out the
    window. We'll go out the window and we'll make it out here
    and she's like no. She's crying. And it's a bit chaotic.
    Wilson was still standing in the living room holding the gun. (3 RR
    36). “He started waving it,” and Edwards screamed every time he raised
    Appellant’s Brief                                                            Page 12
    the gun. Brown thought he was taunting her. Wilson was saying, “I should
    kill you right now.” Edwards begged him to let her call her children and
    say goodbye before he killed her. Brown stepped out of the shower and
    tried to pick Edwards up, but she was too heavy. (3 RR 37-38). “Wilson got
    a little upset.” He picked Edwards up and tossed her aside like a sack of
    potatoes. (3 RR 38). “He told her to pray to her maker, and he shot her in
    the head, and she was still breathing. So he took a flashlight and smashed
    her face.” More than an hour passed between the time when he shot her in
    the stomach and when he shot her in the head. (3 RR 39). Apparently,
    Wilson struck her repeatedly with the flashlight because she was still
    breathing. (3 RR 39-40). Brown saw “chunks of brain matter, skin flying
    everywhere.” (3 RR 41-42). Then, because it appeared she was still
    breathing, Wilson threw her down and stepped on her neck. “[H]e grabbed
    a sword off of the table and just started chopping downwards.” (3 RR 42).
    Wilson opened the door and told Brown that she would help him
    dispose of the body or she would be next. He pointed his gun at her and
    pulled the trigger, but there were no bullets left in it. (3 RR 43). They
    moved the body to the front porch. (3 RR 44-45). They tried to carry it
    across the street but Brown kept dropping it because it was so heavy. Then
    Appellant’s Brief                                                    Page 13
    they grabbed Edwards’s legs and dragged her body behind a vacant house.
    (3 RR 45-46)
    Wilson ordered Brown back in his house. He told her to help him
    clean up the mess. He took off his clothes and told her to put them in a
    plastic bag. Brown asked to borrow a phone so she could get a ride to a
    store for some bleach to clean up. (3 RR 46). After that, they drank beers
    and smoked cigarettes. He gave her $5.00 for bleach and let her call a
    friend. She grabbed his gun and left. She testified that she “was high out of
    my mind that night.” (3 RR 47). She met her friend and went to another
    friend’s house. They smoked cigarettes, drank alcoholic beverages, smoked
    marijuana and used cocaine. (3 RR 48). Then, Brown changed clothes and
    put the clothes she had been wearing in a plastic bag because they still had
    “brain matter and blood” on them. (3 RR 48-49). She drank some more
    before a friend convinced her to call the police, which she did. (3 RR 49).
    Over objection, the State offered eighteen photographs in evidence
    from the crime scene. (3 RR 50-62). Brown concluded that this was totally
    out of character for Wilson and she had never him act anything like that
    before. (3 RR 63-64). She still has no idea why he got so upset that night. (3
    RR 68). He was “inebriated . . . but not drunk.” (3 RR 71).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                       Page 14
    Doctor Emily Ogden is a medical examiner with the Southwestern
    Institute of Forensic Sciences in Dallas. (3 RR 82), (SX 2). She performed the
    Edwards autopsy. (3 RR 84). The autopsy revealed a series of injuries
    consistent with those described by Brown. (3 RR 85-92), (SX 2). Toxicology
    results indicated the presence of ethanol, cocaine and marijuana in her
    system. (3 RR 92-93), (SX 2).
    Killeen Police Detective Rodney Wilmore responded to Wilson’s
    apartment as the crisis negotiator with the tactical response unit. (3 RR 99).
    Wilson ultimately surrendered to the authorities without incident. (3 RR
    101) Wilmore served as the lead investigator for the case. He described the
    crime scene and additional photographs and diagrams were admitted
    through him without objection. He agreed that Wilson cooperated with the
    responding officers. (3 RR 116).
    Psychologist Dr. Stephen Thorpe testified for the defense. He
    performed a clinical interview of Wilson and conducted a battery of
    psychological tests. (3 RR 121-22). He opined that Wilson has an IQ of 76
    which places him in the “borderline range of intelligence.” On the
    achievement test, Wilson demonstrated a fifth or sixth grade level of
    reading and math which placed him somewhere in the range of an 11- to
    Appellant’s Brief                                                       Page 15
    13-year-old. (3 RR 122). Dr. Thorpe determined that Wilson suffered from
    “some type of psychosis schizophrenia” characterized by “very bizarre
    hallucinations, delusional beliefs, paranoid ideation.” His history also
    indicated that he had experienced depression, anxiety and substance abuse
    issues. (3 RR 125). Dr. Thorpe was struck by the fact that Wilson had not
    been previously diagnosed or treated for his schizophrenia until he was
    arrested in this case. (3 RR 126). The treatment regimen has resulted in
    significant improvement for Wilson. (3 RR 126-27).
    On cross-examination, Dr. Thorpe agreed that prior evaluations and
    reports had not detected any psychological or mental health issues for
    Wilson. (3 RR 139-40). He testified that long-term cocaine use “can have a
    significant impact organically on the brain.” Prolonged alcohol abuse can
    likewise have an adverse effect. (3 RR 140). Those effects could present
    themselves in a manner very similar to schizophrenia. (3 RR 140-41).
    In closing arguments, the defense asked the trial court to take
    Wilson’s diagnosis and substance-abuse problems into account and assess
    a lesser punishment. (3 RR 165-69). The State asked for a life sentence. (3
    RR 173-74).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                      Page 16
    The trial court assessed Wilson’s punishment at life imprisonment.
    (CR 25-26), (3 RR 175).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                  Page 17
    Summary of the Argument
    Latasha Brown testified in graphic detail regarding the manner in
    which Wilson carried out this offense. Nevertheless, the State also offered
    seven graphic photographs through Brown that depicted Edwards’s
    injuries or the implements Wilson used to inflict them. A few of these
    focused on the bloodied results of Wilson’s conduct including “blood and
    skin and brain matter.” Because Wilson pleaded guilty and because Brown
    described the events leading to Edwards’s death in graphic detail, the
    admission of these photographs was unnecessary, and the probative value
    of these photographs was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
    prejudice. Thus, the court abused its discretion by admitting these
    photographs.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                    Page 18
    Argument
    First Issue:        The trial court abused its discretion by admitting
    photographs from the crime scene that were unfairly
    prejudicial.
    Latasha Brown testified in graphic detail regarding the manner in
    which Wilson carried out this offense. Nevertheless, the State also offered
    seven graphic photographs through Brown that depicted Edwards’s
    injuries or the implements Wilson used to inflict them. A few of these
    focused on the bloodied results of Wilson’s conduct including “blood and
    skin and brain matter.” Because Wilson pleaded guilty and because Brown
    described the events leading to Edwards’s death in graphic detail, the
    admission of these photographs was unnecessary, and the probative value
    of these photographs was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
    prejudice. Thus, the court abused its discretion by admitting these
    photographs.
    A. This Court Reviews Evidentiary Rulings for an Abuse of Discretion
    Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed under an
    abuse-of-discretion standard. Gallo v. State, 
    239 S.W.3d 757
    , 762 (Tex. Crim.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                      Page 
    19 Ohio App. 2007
    ); Fuelberg v. State, 
    447 S.W.3d 304
    , 315 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014,
    pet. ref’d).
    A photograph is generally relevant and admissible if verbal
    testimony regarding what is depicted in the photograph is also admissible.
    See Threadgill v. State, 
    146 S.W.3d 654
    , 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
    B. Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence May Be Inadmissible
    Under Rule of Evidence 403 however, relevant evidence is
    inadmissible if the probative value of the evidence “is substantially
    outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
    misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
    needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403
    favors the admissibility of relevant evidence, and it is presumed that
    relevant evidence is more probative than prejudicial. Shuffield v. State, 
    189 S.W.3d 782
    , 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    [A] proper Rule 403 analysis by either the trial court or a
    reviewing court includes, but is not limited to, the following
    factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential
    to impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the
    time needed to develop the evidence; (4) the proponent’s need
    for the evidence. In the context of the admission of
    photographs, we also consider the factors set out in Narvaiz.
    Those factors include the number of photographs, the size,
    Appellant’s Brief                                                            Page 20
    whether they are in color or are black and white, whether they
    are gruesome, whether any bodies are clothed or naked, and
    whether the body has been altered by autopsy.
    Erazo v. State, 
    144 S.W.3d 487
    , 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Narvaiz v.
    State, 
    840 S.W.2d 415
    , 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Montgomery v. State, 
    810 S.W.2d 372
    , 389-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g)) (footnotes
    omitted); see Davis v. State, No. 03-07-00305-CR, 
    2008 WL 3877696
    , at *5
    (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 20, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication); Terrazas v. State, No. 03-05-00344-CR, 
    2006 WL 2080381
    , at *6
    (Tex. App.—Austin July 28, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication). “The availability of other means of proof and the
    circumstances unique to each individual case must also be considered.”
    Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 762.
    C. The State Offered Unnecessary & Unfairly Prejudicial Photographs
    Wilson objected to eighteen photographs that were admitted through
    Brown as sponsoring witness. This issue focuses on seven of these
    photographs.
    Wilson objected to the admission of the following photographs:
    1. State’s Exhibit 3      aerial view of neighborhood
    Appellant’s Brief                                                       Page 21
    2. State’s Exhibit 7     Edwards’s body in backyard
    3. State’s Exhibit 8     closer view of body
    4. State’s Exhibit 9     close-up of Edwards’s face and chest
    5. State’s Exhibit 10    house and yard where body left and pathway
    from Wilson’s apartment
    6. State’s Exhibit 11    Wilson’s apartment building
    7. State’s Exhibit 13    bloodstains where Brown dropped the body
    8. State’s Exhibit 14    pool of blood on sidewalk
    9. State’s Exhibit 16    walkway to apartment
    10. State’s Exhibit 20   Wilson’s and Edwards’s apartment doors
    11. State’s Exhibit 21   view from Wilson’s door to house where body
    left
    12. State’s Exhibit 22   close up of view in State’s Exhibit 21
    13. State’s Exhibit 23   sectional sofa in Wilson’s apartment
    14. State’s Exhibit 24   Wilson’s living room and entryway
    15. State’s Exhibit 25   sword “used to chop up” Edwards’s body (3
    RR 61)
    16. State’s Exhibit 31   flat-screen television with “blood and skin
    and brain matter” on it (3 RR 61)
    17. State’s Exhibit 34   flashlight “used to smash Miss Edwards’ face
    in” (3 RR 61-62)
    Appellant’s Brief                                                    Page 22
    18. State’s Exhibit 35      close-up view of bloody flashlight
    Wilson’s appellate complaint challenges the admission of State’s
    Exhibits 4, 7, 8 and 15-18.
    D. Under Erazo, the Photographs Should Not Have Been Admitted
    Probative Value
    The challenged photographs do have probative value with regard to
    the extent of the injuries suffered by Edwards and the culpable mental state
    with which Wilson acted. However, because Wilson pleaded guilty, neither
    of these was contested.
    Evidence of the “circumstances of the offense” is admissible during
    the punishment phase. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1). The
    circumstances of the offense include the extent of a victim’s injuries “so
    long as a factfinder may rationally attribute moral culpability to the
    accused for that injury.” Miller-El v. State, 
    782 S.W.2d 892
    , 896 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1990); Brown v. State, 
    875 S.W.2d 38
    , 40 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no
    pet.).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                      Page 23
    Ability to Impress Factfinder in Irrational Manner
    The nature of the photographs themselves is relevant to this issue. See
    Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 494-95; Reese v. State, 
    33 S.W.3d 238
    , 242 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2000). 3 The challenged photographs are color photographs whose
    actual size is unclear from the record on file. Actually, however, they were
    much larger in the eyes of the trial court because they were projected on a
    screen.4 (3 RR 53).
    State’s Exhibit 9 is a close-up of Edwards’s face and chest depicting
    dirt or some other substance on her face. This exhibit was completely
    unnecessary as her identity was not at issue and other photographs were
    admitted depicting the location and condition of her body.
    State’s Exhibits 13 and 14 depict blood pooled on the sidewalk. These
    bloody photographs were completely unnecessary as Brown testified
    3       The photographs held unfairly prejudicial in Erazo and Reese were admitted
    during the punishment phase as were the photographs at issue in this appeal. See Erazo
    v. State, 
    144 S.W.3d 487
    , 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Reese v. State, 
    33 S.W.3d 238
    , 239
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
    4      The record is silent regarding the size of the screen, but it was assuredly much
    larger than the exhibits themselves. The record reflects that the lights were turned off to
    view the documents on screen, and both the prosecutor and Brown used a laser pointer
    on several occasions to identify certain details in the photographs depicted on the
    screen. (3 RR 53-60).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                                   Page 24
    regarding how they dragged the body from Wilson’s apartment to the
    house across the street and the State offered other photographs depicting
    the path they took dragging the body and the place where they left the
    body.
    State’s Exhibit 25 depicts the sword “used to chop up” Edwards’s
    body. (3 RR 61) The admission of this photograph was unnecessary as
    Brown graphically described Wilson’s actions with the sword.
    State’s Exhibits 34 and 35 depict the bloodied flashlight Wilson “used
    to smash Miss Edwards’ face in.” Again, these exhibits were cumulative of
    Brown’s graphic testimony regarding Wilson’s actions that night.
    Finally, State’s Exhibit 31 depicts Wilson’s flat-screen television
    covered with “blood and skin and brain matter.” (3 RR 61) This
    photograph is grossly prejudicial and, at best, marginally probative. It
    belies logic or common sense to say that the probative value of this
    photograph in particular is not substantially outweighed by the danger of
    unfair prejudice.
    And collectively, the challenged photographs appealed to the trial
    judge’s emotions and encouraged her to make her punishment decision on
    Appellant’s Brief                                                       Page 25
    an emotional basis without regard to the logical probative force of the
    evidence. See Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 495; Reese, 33 S.W.3d at 242.
    Time Needed to Develop Evidence
    The State did not devote an inordinate amount of the trial to the
    admission of the complained-of photographs or the testimony describing
    them. Id..
    The State’s Need for This Evidence
    There are three questions that the reviewing court should
    answer when addressing this factor: “Does the proponent have
    other available evidence to establish the fact of consequence
    that the [photograph] is relevant to show? If so, how strong is
    that other evidence? And is the fact of consequence related to
    an issue that is in dispute?”
    Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 495-96 (quoting Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390).
    The relevant facts of consequence sought to be established by the
    photographs were Wilson’s culpable mental state and the extent of
    Edwards’s injuries. See Miller-El, 782 S.W.2d at 896. However, Wilson
    pleaded guilty, and the other unchallenged evidence unquestionably
    established the extent of Edwards’s injuries. Therefore, the complained-of
    photographs were offered as additional proof of undisputed issues. See
    Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 496; Reese, 33 S.W.3d at 242.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                        Page 26
    Weighing the Factors
    Considering (1) the graphic nature of the photographs and the
    emotional impact they doubtless had on the trial judge; (2) the fact that
    Wilson pleaded guilty to the offense; and (3) the State’s limited need to
    establish the undisputed facts regarding the extent of Edwards’s injuries or
    Wilson’s culpable mental state; the probative value of the challenged
    photographs was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
    prejudice. See Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 496; Reese, 33 S.W.3d at 242-43. Although
    the photographs did have probative value and the State used a limited
    amount of time to introduce them in evidence, “these factors are not
    enough to overcome the prejudicial qualities of the photograph[s] and the
    State’s limited need for the photograph[s] in the context of the
    [undisputed] issues.” See Reese, 33 S.W.3d at 243.
    Similar Cases
    Counsel has located other decisions in which similar photographs
    were ruled admissible in the face of a Rule 403 (or similar) objection. These
    cases are all distinguishable.
    In Craig v. State, 
    347 S.W.2d 255
     (Tex. Crim. App. 1961), the trial court
    admitted four color photographs that “exhibited a gory scene created by
    Appellant’s Brief                                                         Page 27
    blood and brain matter from the deceased’s wounds.” 5 Id. at 261. The
    Court held that the photographs were not impermissibly “inflammatory
    and prejudicial” because they tended to refute the defense’s theory of the
    case that the victim’s death was accidental. See id. at 261-62. Craig is
    distinguishable from Wilson’s case because the cause of death was
    disputed.
    In Chamberlain v. State, 
    998 S.W.2d 230
     (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), the
    appellant complained about the admission of eight color photographs, one
    of which depicted “a close up of the victim’s face with brain matter
    extruded through the large wound on the side of the head.” Id. at 236-37.
    Chamberlain is distinguishable because the defendant in that case contested
    his guilt. Id. at 236-37.
    Finally, in an unpublished memorandum opinion in Aviles v. State,
    No. 05-07-00477-CR, 
    2008 WL 1850779
     (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 28, 2008,
    pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication), the appellant
    complained of the admission of four crime-scene photographs and seven
    5      This is how the Court of Criminal Appeals phrased Craig’s contention regarding
    what the photographs depicted. Craig v. State, 
    347 S.W.2d 255
    , 265-66 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1961).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                              Page 28
    autopsy photographs. Id. at *7. Two of the crime-scene photographs
    depicted “the street with blood, tire tracks, and a portion of brain matter.”
    Id. Two of the autopsy photographs provided a “graphic” depiction of the
    victim’s head injuries in which the “entire top of the head was split open”
    and the brain “expelled out of the head.” Id. at *8. Aviles is likewise
    distinguishable because the defendant contested his guilt.
    Unlike, these cases, Wilson admitted his guilt and did not in any
    manner dispute the cause of death or the extent of Edwards’s injuries.
    Thus, these cases do not offer support for the admission of the complained-
    of photographs.
    For the foregoing reasons, the trial court abused its discretion by
    admitting the challenged photographs in evidence.
    E. The Error Affected Wilson’s Substantial Rights
    This is non-constitutional error so harm is assessed under Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Reese, 33 S.W.3d at
    243; Sandoval v. State, 
    409 S.W.3d 259
    , 287 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no
    pet.). Rule 44.2(b) requires reversal if the error affected the defendant’s
    Appellant’s Brief                                                      Page 29
    substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Wilson’s substantial rights were
    affected by the erroneous admission of these prejudicial photographs.
    A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial
    and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
    verdict. In assessing the likelihood that the jury’s decision was
    adversely affected by the error, an appellate court should
    consider everything in the record, including any testimony or
    physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the
    nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of
    the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection
    with other evidence in the case. The reviewing court may also
    consider the jury instructions, the State’s theory and any
    defensive theories, closing arguments, voir dire and whether
    the State emphasized the error.
    Haley v. State, 
    173 S.W.3d 510
    , 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (footnotes
    omitted); accord Sandoval, 409 S.W.3d at 287-88.
    [I]f the reviewing court has “a grave doubt” that the result was
    free from the substantial influence of the error, then it must
    treat the error as if it did. “Grave doubt” means that “in the
    judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels
    himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.”
    Thus, “in cases of grave doubt as to harmlessness the petitioner
    must win.”
    Burnett v. State, 
    88 S.W.3d 633
    , 637-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting
    O’Neal v. McAninch, 
    513 U.S. 432
    , 435-37, 
    115 S. Ct. 992
    , 994-95, 
    130 L. Ed. 2d
     947 (1995) (other citations omitted); accord Sandoval, 409 S.W.3d at 288.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                           Page 30
    The State advised the trial court at the beginning of the sentencing
    phase that it would be relying on a number of exhibits. (3 RR 6).
    The State relied primarily on photographs as its physical evidence.
    The other two significant pieces of physical evidence were the 9-1-1
    recording and the autopsy report. Notably, the 29 unchallenged
    photographs were rather innocuous in comparison to the 7 that form the
    basis of Wilson’s appellate complaint. These prejudicial photographs were
    projected before the trial judge on a large screen, thus magnifying their
    prejudicial effect. These photographs appealed to the trial judge’s emotions
    and encouraged her to improperly make her punishment decision on an
    emotional basis without regard to the logical probative force of the
    evidence.
    The erroneously-admitted photographs were indelibly etched in the
    mind of the trial judge. After viewing these photographs, this Honorable
    Court will at best find itself “in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of
    the error.” See O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 435, 115 S. Ct. at 994; Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at
    637-38. If so, the Court must find, as Wilson contends, that the error
    affected his substantial rights. Id.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                          Page 31
    Summary
    The trial court abused its discretion by admitting photographs in
    violation of Rule 403. This error cause Wilson to suffer harm. Therefore, the
    Court should reverse the judgment as to punishment and remand this
    cause for a new punishment trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(b);
    TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d); State v. Davis, 
    349 S.W.3d 535
    , 540 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2011).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                      Page 32
    Prayer
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant Daniel Lorenzo
    Wilson prays that the Court reverse the judgment and remand this cause to
    the trial court for further proceedings and grant such other and further
    relief to which he may show himself justly entitled.
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ Alan Bennett
    E. Alan Bennett
    SBOT #02140700
    Attorney for Appellant
    Sheehy, Lovelace & Mayfield, P.C.
    510 N. Valley Mills Dr., Ste. 500
    Waco, Texas 76710
    Telephone:        (254) 772-8022
    Fax:        (254) 772-9297
    Email:      abennett@slmpc.com
    Appellant’s Brief                                                    Page 33
    Certificate of Compliance
    The      undersigned     hereby     certifies,    pursuant     to   Rule     of
    Appellate Procedure       9.4(i)(3),     that    this   computer-generated        brief
    contains 5,942 words.
    /s/ Alan Bennett
    E. Alan Bennett
    Certificate of Service
    The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of this
    brief was electronically served to counsel for the State, Bob Odom,
    bob.odom@co.bell.tx.us, on August 24, 2015.
    /s/ Alan Bennett
    E. Alan Bennett
    Appellant’s Brief                                                             Page 34