Tommy R. Yates and All Occupants of 9531 Cross Ridge, San Antonio, Texas 78263 v. Wiosa, Llc ( 2022 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-22-00083-CV
Tommy R. YATES and All Occupants of 9531 Cross Ridge, San Antonio, Texas 78263,
Appellant
v.
WIOSA, LLC,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2021CV04364
Honorable David J. Rodriguez, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 7, 2022
AFFIRMED
Appellant Renee L. Fleener, proceeding pro se, appeals the county court’s judgment
awarding appellee, WIOSA, LLC, possession of real property in the underlying forcible detainer
action. In what we construe to be Fleener’s sole issue, she complains that the county court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the right of possession because she possesses superior title.
We affirm.
04-22-00083-CV
I. BACKGROUND
The property that is the subject of this forcible detainer action is located at 9531 Cross
Ridge, San Antonio, Texas 78263 (the “Property”). On January 19, 2004, Tommy R. Yates
executed a deed of trust, which granted a security interest in the Property. Sometime thereafter,
Tommy 1 died. On February 11, 2019, a probate court signed a judgment declaring heirship
regarding Tommy’s estate. In the heirship judgment, the probate court found that Tommy died
intestate and that his sole heirs consisted of six children, the youngest two being Priscilla and
Christopher. Fleener contends that she was Tommy’s stepdaughter and is an older half-sister to
Priscilla and Christopher. According to Fleener, Priscilla gave her permission to occupy the
Property.
On October 5, 2021, WIOSA purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Thereafter, it
instituted a detainer action in the justice court. The justice court signed a judgment in WIOSA’s
favor and an eviction citation against all occupants of the property. Fleener, proceeding pro se,
appealed the justice court’s judgment to the county court. At the trial on WIOSA’s forcible
detainer action, the county court admitted as evidence the deed of trust, a substitute trustee’s deed
from the foreclosure sale, data relating to the Property’s potential rental income, the heirship
judgment, and emails Fleener sent to WIOSA’s counsel. Within the emails is an affidavit that
Fleener executed; it reads in relevant part, “I Renee Fleener state true fact [sic] took over as [h]ome
[o]wner at 9531 Cross Ridge, San Antonio, TX 78263[.] I went and added equity back to the
property by maintaining [four illegible words] siding of house and painting the inside and outside
of house.” In the county court trial, Fleener showcased this “affidavit of ownership,” as she termed
it, and testified that it established her superior title to the Property. The county court signed a
1
For the sake of clarity and brevity, we use first names when referring to members of the Yates family.
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judgment granting WIOSA possession of the Property and awarding it $7,300.00 in damages.
Fleener then filed this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
When a party challenges a county court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in a forcible detainer
suit, we review the county court’s ruling de novo. Chinyere v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 440 S.W.3d
80, 83 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). “Subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised
at any time, including for the first time on appeal.” Id.B. Applicable Law
In a forcible detainer suit, the trial court determines the right to immediate possession of
real property where there is no claim of unlawful entry. Lenz v. Bank of Am., N.A., 510 S.W.3d
667, 671 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a).
“Jurisdiction to hear forcible detainer actions is vested in justice courts, and on appeal, to county
courts for trial de novo.” Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). The sole “issue in a forcible detainer action is which
party has the right to immediate possession of the property.” Id. “[T]he merits of the title shall
not be adjudicated.” Id.; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e). Accordingly, to prevail in a forcible
detainer action, “the plaintiff need not prove title but merely present sufficient evidence of
ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession.” Chinyere, 440 S.W.3d at 82–
83.
Nevertheless, a question of title may be so intertwined with the issue of possession, so as
to preclude adjudication of the right to possession without first determining title. Williams v. VRM-
Vendor Res. Mgmt., No. 01-14-00272-CV, 2015 WL 3915636, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] June 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). In such cases, the county court is deprived of jurisdiction
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if resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to the determination of the right to immediate
possession. In re Gallegos, No. 13-13-00504-CV, 2013 WL 6056666, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Nov. 13, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
If, on the other hand, the issues of title and possession are not so intertwined, “a forcible-
detainer suit in justice court may run concurrently with another action in another court — even if
the other action adjudicates matters that could result in a different determination of possession
from that rendered in the forcible-detainer suit.” Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d
415, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Matters relating to possession may even
overlap in the two proceedings without affecting a county court’s jurisdiction to determine
immediate possession because “a judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is a
determination only of the right to immediate possession and does not determine the ultimate rights
of the parties to any other issue in controversy relating to the realty in question.” Id. (quoting
Lopez v. Sulak, 76 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.)).
B. Analysis
Liberally construing Fleener’s brief, we read her sole issue as complaining that her
“affidavit of ownership” vested her with superior title to the Property as compared to WIOSA, and
that this superior title somehow deprived the county court of jurisdiction. Fleener fails to direct
us to any legal authority — and we have found none — that supports her argument. Moreover,
Fleener’s testimony and “affidavit of ownership” fail to establish that issues of title and possession
are so intertwined so as to have deprived the county court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See
Williams, 2015 WL 3915636, at *2; Hong Kong Dev., Inc., 229 S.W.3d at 437. Accordingly, we
hold that the county court did not err in concluding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider WIOSA’s detainer action. Fleener’s sole issue is overruled.
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III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the county court.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
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