Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Raymond Michael Read, Mark William Read, Owners, and Thomas I. Fetzer, II, Lienholder , 143 S.W.3d 165 ( 2004 )

Pinnacle Gas Treating Inc. v. Raymond Michael Read, et al.

  IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-00-00200-CV

     PINNACLE GAS TREATING, INC.,

                                                                         Appellant

     v.

     RAYMOND MICHAEL READ,

     MARK WILLIAM READ, OWNERS,

     AND THOMAS I. FETZER, II, LIENHOLDER,

                                                                         Appellees

From the 278th District Court

Leon County, Texas

Trial Court # 11745-A

DISSENTING OPINION AFTER REMAND

      This is a condemnation case. The principle issue the parties contend we must resolve is whether a duly elected district judge serving the county in which the case is filed can appoint condemnation commissioners, rather than the judge that is elected to the court to which the case is assigned. I disagree that this is the issue. There is a more narrow issue on which this case can be resolved. The issue is whether the appointment of condemnation commissioners by one elected judge for a case pending in another court is properly dismissed rather than simply proceeding to trial on the objections filed by the parties to the damages awarded by the appointed commissioners.

BACKGROUND

      In this case, Pinnacle sought to condemn an easement for a natural gas pipeline. The condemnation petition was filed with the district clerk who assigned it on a rotational basis to one of the district courts in Leon County. Pinnacle took the petition to the duly elected judge of one of the other district courts in Leon County, ostensibly upon the belief that any judge elected to any district court in Leon County could appoint the condemnation commissioners. Whereupon the judge, purporting to act as the judge of the court to which the case was assigned under the transfer of benches provisions of the constitution, statutes, rules, and local practice, appointed three condemnation commissioners to hear the matter for the purposes of determining damages. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.014 (Vernon 1984).

      The three commissioners noticed a hearing and, with all parties in attendance, proceeded to decide the issue of compensation due the landowners (Read). The commissioners duly made an award and returned it to the trial court. Pinnacle filed an objection to the award.

      Read filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the condemnation case because the commissioners were not lawfully appointed and therefore the condemnation proceeding was void. The landowners also sought damages for the wrongful entry upon their property under the writ of possession obtained by Pinnacle by paying the amount of the commissioner’s award into the registry of the court. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 21.021 (Vernon 1984).

      The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction thereby dismissing the condemnation proceeding and tried the claim for damages. Pinnacle appeals.

CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS

      Condemnation proceedings are for the protection of the landowner from having his property taken for a public use without adequate compensation in violation of the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const. art. I, § 17. The principle that I believe controls this case was first expressed by the Supreme Court of Texas in 1894. The landowner, which happened to be a railroad, claimed that the commissioners appointed were disqualified because they were not disinterested and therefore their appointment, and thus their award, was void. The Supreme Court held:

Under the law, the award could not be made the judgment of the court until after the expiration of 10 days from the time it was returned into court, and, during that time, plaintiff, by filing objections to it, would have been entitled to a trial de novo before a jury, by which objections it would have set aside the award, and thus have secured ample protection before the county court, with the right of appeal to the court of appeals if its rights were not fully protected by the judgment of the county court. Having failed to avail itself of so simple and effective a remedy, we see no reason why the rules of law by which such proceedings are held to be binding upon parties to them, when duly notified, should be departed from, and a collateral attack allowed to be made upon the proceedings of a court of competent jurisdiction. There is no error in the judgment of the district court or the court of appeals, and the judgments of those courts are affirmed.

Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ft. Worth & R.G. Ry. Co., 26 S.W. 54, 60 (Tex. 1894).

      Gulf addressed a collateral attack on the judgment arguing that it was void because the commissioners were disqualified. This is essentially the same as the attack by Read in this case. Read contends that because they were not lawfully appointed, the commissioners actions were void, and thus, Pinnacle’s objection to the award did not vest the trial court with jurisdiction to hear the condemnation suit. The Supreme Court rejected the idea that the commissioners actions were void and held that the trial de novo before a jury, which thus prevented the award by these allegedly disqualified commissioners from being entered as the judgment of the court, secured ample protection for the landowner.

      In 1935 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to reexamine the issue of the effect of the appointment of commissioners in violation of the condemnation statutes. The condemnation statutes, then as now, required the appointment of commissioners agreed upon by the parties. The county judge had failed to assign the commissioners agreed to by the parties. The Court held as follows:

By cross-assignment defendant complains of the action of the county judge in appointing certain commissioners, after he and a representative of the railway company had agreed upon certain other parties to be appointed. If this was erroneous, we do not think it was sufficient to invalidate the whole proceeding, and as defendant has full opportunity to contest the award of the commissioners on the question of damages, we do not see how he can be injured.

Fort Worth & D. N. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 84 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. 1935). Thus, again, the Supreme Court held that defects in the appointment of the commissioners did not invalidate the proceeding. The de novo trial after the commissioner’s award was considered the appropriate manner of correcting the defect, if any.

      The Galveston Court of Civil Appeals ruled on a related issue in a direct appeal of a dismissal of an award because only two of the commissioners had attended the hearing. After an objection to the award was filed, the landowner requested that the trial court dismiss the condemnation proceeding. The trial court dismissed the case and the condemning authority appealed. The court held:

Under the above authorities the judgment of the trial court dismissing this case must, we think, be reversed and the cause remanded to the County Court at Law of Harris County, with instruction to the Judge thereof to proceed to trial in the condemnation suits so consolidated.

City of Houston v. Stovall, 249 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.). These holdings are consistent with the Supreme Court’s later holding that “The right of appeal [by trial de novo] affords petitioner an adequate remedy for anything that may occur in the condemnation proceedings up to and including the award of the special commissioners.” Tonahill v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 446 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Tex. 1969); see also City of Bryan v. Moehlman, 282 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. 1955)(“We therefore hold that the respondents had an adequate remedy at law [by trial de novo] in the county court and by appeal therefrom.”); Jefferson County Drainage Dist. No. 6 v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1969, no writ)(“...having participated in the hearing [before the condemnation commissioners] and having appealed [by trial de novo] to the County Court at Law, all matters were properly before that court...”).

      The cases of Walling v. State, 394 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) and Matador Pipelines, Inc. v. Watson, 626 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. App.—Waco 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) are easily distinguishable. In both cases, two sets of three commissioners were appointed. In both cases it was the second set of commissioners that attempted to make the condemnation award. In both cases this court held that the second set of commissioners were nothing more than strangers to the proceeding and that their purported awards had no effect. In neither one of these two cases was the entire proceeding dismissed as argued for by Read. And in both cases the court expressed the opinion that it was proper to go forward in the pending condemnation proceeding. The underlying condemnation cases were not dismissed, therefore, it was unnecessary to file new condemnation proceedings as Read argues is required for a defect in the appointment process.

      Accordingly, I would hold that by taking an appeal by trial de novo to the district court by objecting to the condemnation commissioners’ award, the parties were in the proper procedural posture to proceed to a jury trial on the issue of the fair market value of the property taken by Pinnacle for a natural gas pipeline easement across Read’s property and damages to the remainder. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the condemnation suit and proceeding to a trial on the claim for damages for wrongful entry upon and possession of Read’s property. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

IMPLIED FINDINGS

      The majority relies heavily on their determination that Judge Sandel “impliedly found that there was no constitutional ‘exchange’ of benches.” Maj. slip op. at 5. The determination of this implied finding is supported by the same evidence against it. Judge Bournias impliedly found that under the system in place in Leon County, with multiple overlapping district courts, he was authorized to sit for Judge Sandel. Judge Sandel’s subsequent holding to the contrary is not entitled to the weight the majority gives it.

CONCLUSION

      For the reasons stated, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment. Because the majority affirms the judgment, I respectfully dissent.

                                                                   TOM GRAY

                                                                   Chief Justice

Dissenting opinion delivered and filed June 9, 2004