in the Interest of D.S., N.S., Children ( 2011 )


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  •                                  NO. 07-10-00184-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL A
    JANUARY 25, 2011
    IN THE INTEREST OF D.S., N.S., CHILDREN
    FROM THE 106TH DISTRICT COURT OF GARZA COUNTY;
    NO. 05-11-06063-CV; HONORABLE KEVIN C. HART, JUDGE
    Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
    OPINION
    On October 29, 2009, appellee, the Texas Department of Family and Protective
    Services, filed a petition seeking termination of the parental rights of the biological
    parents of D.S. and N.S. 1
    This was not the first such petition the department filed with respect to the
    parents’ rights to the children. In November 2005, the department filed a petition which,
    as amended, sought relief including termination.       Proceedings under that petition
    1
    In September 2009, the mother made a joint adoption agreement with the foster
    parents of D.S. and N.S. She also signed an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing her
    parental rights to the children. The court’s order terminated her parental rights because
    of her voluntary relinquishment. She does not appeal the order. We identify the
    children by their initials and the parents as the father and mother, pursuant to Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 9.8. Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
    culminated in a final order signed in September 2007, appointing the department
    permanent managing conservator of the children and the parents possessory
    conservators.
    The October 2009 petition was heard on March 11, 2010, after which the trial
    court rendered an order terminating both parents’ parental rights and continuing the
    department’s role as permanent managing conservator of the children. 2        The father
    appeals, arguing through four issues the evidence was insufficient to support findings
    that termination was in the best interest of the children, he received ineffective
    assistance of counsel at trial, his appearance by telephone at trial did not constitute
    meaningful participation, and the evidence was insufficient to support findings on two
    predicate grounds for termination. We will affirm.
    Background
    The department’s involvement with the father and mother dates to February 2005
    when it received a report of “neglectful supervision” of D.S., N.S., and three other
    children. According to the department, the father and mother allowed drug users in their
    home and were themselves involved in drug use, testing positive for methamphetamine.
    2
    The court found termination in the best interest of the children. It also found
    father: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or
    surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (2)
    engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in
    conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (3) had
    his parent-child relationship terminated with respect to another child based on a finding
    that father’s conduct violated Family Code § 161.001(1)(D) or (E); (4) constructively
    abandoned the children; (5) knowingly engaged in criminal conduct resulting in his
    conviction and confinement and inability to care for the children for not less than two
    years from the date of filing the petition. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
    161.001(1)(D),(E),(M),(N),(Q) (West Supp. 2010).
    2
    In August 2005, the father was arrested and charged with possession of
    methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Under a plea bargain agreement, he was
    sentenced to ten years confinement in prison. He remained incarcerated at the time of
    trial, having four times been denied parole. According to the department, the parents
    did not make progress complying with a service plan.
    The department obtained temporary managing conservatorship of D.S. and N.S.
    in December 2005.       The children were placed with relatives of the father from
    December 2005 until September 2006.              They were removed, according to the
    department, because of bruising from inappropriate spankings.           Three placements
    followed, the last with foster parents M.H. and G.H., where the children remained at the
    time of trial. At the hearing, the foster mother testified generally of the wellbeing of the
    children in her home. Both children were on a regimen of medications for treatment of
    ADHD.       The foster parents sought adoption of the children and entered an open
    adoption agreement with the mother on September 21, 2009.                 According to a
    caseworker, the children wanted to be adopted. Notes from D.S. and N.S. to the court
    requesting adoption were received in evidence. If the court terminated parental rights,
    the department’s expressed plan at the hearing was to transfer the case for adoption of
    the children by the foster parents. Should this plan fail, the department viewed the
    children as “very adoptable.”      The department contacted a relative of the father
    regarding possible placement for the children but, according to the caseworker, the
    relative was caring for her mother and lacked the resources or time to care for two
    children.
    3
    At the time of trial, D.S. was age eight and N.S. age six. Almost five years had
    passed since their last personal contact with their father. He had been incarcerated
    eleven of the preceding seventeen years.           The department indicated that while
    incarcerated the father wrote D.S. and N.S. six letters and submitted approximately
    fifteen letters to the caseworker. The father disputed the number of letters sent the
    children, believing the total about fifteen. In an order signed July 9, 2007, the parental
    rights of the father to another child were terminated. As predicate grounds for the
    termination, the court found the father committed acts listed in paragraphs (E), (F), (N),
    and (Q) of § 161.001. According to the caseworker, while incarcerated the father was
    able to perform the requirements of the service plan available in prison. Particularly, he
    completed “a FAME packet and a parenting packet,” a “drug class,” and a “parenting
    seminar.” The caseworker testified the father did not demonstrate a stable work history
    or provide stable family housing. The father testified he expected to be paroled to the
    home of his mother in Lubbock in November 2010. He added that his choice of two job
    prospects awaited.    According to the father, his mother is “mentally disabled” and
    unable to care for the children. Also her home is not large enough for the children. The
    father explained he needs time, “two or three months,” to begin work and find a home.
    He acknowledged a time of adjustment would be required for him to reunite with the
    children.
    Analysis
    Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Best Interest Finding
    4
    Through his fourth issue, the father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of
    the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that termination of the parent-child
    relationship was in the best interest of the children.
    When reviewing factual findings required to be made by clear and convincing
    evidence, we apply a standard of review that reflects this burden of proof. In re S.M.L.,
    
    171 S.W.3d 472
    , 476 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). A legal sufficiency
    review requires we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding
    to determine whether a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or
    conviction that the finding was true. 
    Id., (citing In
    re 
    J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266
    ). In doing
    so, we assume the fact finder resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding if a
    reasonable fact finder could do so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable fact
    finder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. 
    Id. However, because
    of the heightened standard, we must also be mindful of any undisputed evidence
    contrary to the finding and consider that evidence in our analysis. In re 
    J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266
    (“Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could
    skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence”).
    A factual sufficiency review, in a proceeding to terminate the parent-child
    relationship, requires consideration of the entire record to determine whether a
    factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true. In
    re C.H., 
    89 S.W.3d 17
    , 28 (Tex. 2002). “‘If, in light of the entire record, the disputed
    evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not credit in favor of the finding is so
    significant that a factfinder could not reasonably form a firm belief or conviction in the
    5
    truth of its finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient.’” In re H.R.M., 
    209 S.W.3d 105
    , 108 (Tex. 2006) (quoting In re J.F.C., 
    96 S.W.3d 256
    , 266 (Tex. 2002)). There is a
    strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the best interest of the child.
    In re R.R., 
    209 S.W.3d 112
    , 116 (Tex. 2006). It is also presumed that prompt and
    permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is in the best interest of the
    child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a) (West 2008).
    The Supreme Court of Texas has identified factors for consideration by the trier
    of fact in determining whether termination is in the best interest of a child, including: the
    desires of the child; the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;
    the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; the parental
    abilities of the individuals seeking custody; the programs available to assist these
    individuals to promote the best interest of the child; the plans for the child by these
    individuals or by the agency seeking custody; the stability of the home or proposed
    placement; the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing
    parent-child relationship is not proper; and any excuse for the acts or omissions of the
    parent.   Holley v. Adams, 
    544 S.W.2d 367
    , 372 (Tex. 1976).                However, these
    considerations are not exhaustive nor is proof of each a condition precedent to
    termination of the parent-child relationship. In re 
    C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27
    . The absence of
    evidence of some of the Holley considerations does not preclude the factfinder from
    reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best
    interest, particularly in the face of undisputed evidence that the parental relationship
    endangered the safety of the child. 
    Id. The best
    interest analysis evaluates the best
    6
    interest of the child, not the parent. In re S.A.P., 
    169 S.W.3d 685
    , 707 (Tex.App.--Waco
    2005, no pet.).
    The evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination may also be used
    to support a finding that the best interest of the children warrants termination of the
    parent-child relationship. In re 
    C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28
    ; In re P.E.W., 
    105 S.W.3d 771
    ,
    779 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2003, no pet.).     And a best-interest analysis may consider
    circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as
    the direct evidence. In re S.H.A., 
    728 S.W.2d 73
    , 86-87 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987, writ
    ref’d n.r.e.). A trier of fact may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past
    conduct and determine that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights.
    In re D.L.N., 
    958 S.W.2d 934
    , 941 (Tex.App.--Waco 1997, pet. denied), overruled on
    other grounds by In re 
    C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26
    .
    The department’s evidence showed the father had not provided the children with
    a stable home environment. Indeed, at the time of the March 2010 final hearing, he had
    been incarcerated eleven of the previous seventeen years. He was continuously jailed
    or in prison, for methamphetamine possession, since 2005. And D.S. and N.S. had not
    seen him since his arrest in 2005. The mother’s parental rights were terminated. The
    father’s parental rights to another child were terminated in 2007 on multiple predicate
    grounds. He anticipated release on parole or a release date before completion of his
    ten-year sentence, but he thus far was denied parole. The only living arrangement for
    the father on release was his mother’s home. But her disability and the size of her
    house meant the children would remain in placement, even after the father’s release,
    7
    until he was able to provide suitable quarters.      He had no other family placement
    options. While in prison, the father wrote the children and completed the portions of the
    service plan performable in prison.        Since 2005 the children occupied multiple
    placements. They were removed from the first placement after receiving punishment
    that produced bruises. At the time of trial, D.S. and N.S. had lived two years in the
    home of their foster parents.      The children performed satisfactorily in school but
    required medications for treatment of ADHD.          The foster parents made an open
    adoption agreement with the mother and sought adoption if the father’s parental rights
    were terminated. The children wished to be adopted.
    Considering all the evidence in relation to the best interest factors in the light
    most favorable to the court’s finding, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could have
    formed a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the best interest of D.S. and
    N.S. Moreover, viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that the disputed
    and undisputed evidence favoring and disfavoring the finding permits a reasonable fact-
    finder to form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the best interest of D.S.
    and N.S. Hence, the evidence supporting the court’s finding that termination of the
    father’s parental rights was in the best interest of D.S. and N.S. is legally and factually
    sufficient. See Holley, 
    544 S.W.2d 367
    ; In re S.M.L.D., 
    150 S.W.3d 754
    , 756 (Tex.App.-
    -Amarillo 2004, no pet.). We overrule his fourth issue.
    Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
    By his first issue, the father argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel
    at trial. As noted, in 2005 the department initiated a suit affecting the father’s parent-
    8
    child relationship with D.S. and N.S. In an amended petition filed March 8, 2007, the
    department, among other things, sought termination of the parent-child relationship.
    The pleading alleged such a result was in the best interest of the children and supported
    the allegation for termination with four predicate grounds under § 161.001(1). The suit
    resulted in an order signed September 15, 2007. The father’s parental rights to the
    children were not terminated; rather, the order appointed the department permanent
    managing conservator of the children and the father possessory conservator.
    According to the father, his counsel at the March 2010 hearing should have
    interposed res judicata as a bar to litigating issues tried in the April 2007 termination
    proceeding.      Because trial counsel did not raise the defense, and even elicited
    testimony of matters predating April 27, 2007, his representation was ineffective, the
    father argues.
    The Family Code requires appointment of counsel for representation of an
    indigent parent who opposes the termination of his parental rights. Tex. Fam. Code
    Ann. § 107.013(a)(1) (West 2008). The standard for reviewing the effectiveness of
    appointed counsel’s representation is that set forth by the United States Supreme Court
    in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    (1984). See
    In re M.S., 
    115 S.W.3d 534
    , 545 (Tex. 2003); In re J.O.A., 
    262 S.W.3d 7
    , 18 (Tex.App.--
    Amarillo 2008), aff’d as modified and remanded, 
    283 S.W.3d 336
    (Tex. 2009). The
    Strickland standard requires the complaining party to establish: (1) counsel’s
    performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
    complaining party. 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687
    ; In re 
    M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545
    ; In re
    9
    
    J.O.A., 262 S.W.3d at 18
    . An attorney’s performance is deficient if it falls below an
    objective standard of reasonableness.          
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688
    .      Deficient
    performance is prejudicial when, but for the attorney’s unprofessional conduct, there is a
    reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
    
    Id. at 694.
    A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
    the outcome. 
    Id. The provisions
    of Family Code § 161.004 bear on the father’s contention. That
    section provides:
    (a) The court may terminate the parent-child relationship after rendition of
    an order that previously denied termination of the parent-child relationship
    if:
    (1) the petition under this section is filed after the date the order
    denying termination was rendered;
    (2) the circumstances of the child, parent, sole managing
    conservator, possessory conservator, or other party affected by the
    order denying termination have materially and substantially
    changed since the date that the order was rendered;
    (3) the parent committed an act listed under Section 161.001 before
    the date the order denying termination was rendered; and
    (4) termination is in the best interest of the child.
    (b) At a hearing under this section, the court may consider evidence
    presented at a previous hearing in a suit for termination of the parent-child
    relationship of the parent with respect to the same child.
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.004(a),(b) (West 2008).
    Here, § 161.004 has application because: (1) the department filed its live petition
    for termination of the parent-child relationship on October 29, 2009, a date after
    10
    rendition of the order denying termination; (2) the circumstances of D.S. and N.S. and
    the mother materially and substantially changed on September 21, 2009, when the
    mother signed an open adoption agreement and an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing
    parental rights to D.S. and N.S.; (3) on July 9, 2007, the parent-child relationship of the
    father and another child was terminated based on a finding that his conduct violated §
    161.001(1)(E); and, (4) as noted above, the evidence supported a finding termination
    was in the best interest of D.S. and N.S.
    Section 161.004(b) allowed the trial court to consider evidence at the second
    hearing presented in favor of termination at the previous hearing. See In re M.F., No.
    11-08-0276-CV, 2010 Tex. App. Lexis 3676, at *4 (Tex.App.--Eastland May 13, 2010,
    no pet.) (mem. op.) (reasoning despite claim of res judicata § 161.004 permits trial court
    to consider evidence of conduct preceding previous order denying termination). Thus,
    counsel for the father was not required to challenge the admissibility of evidence at the
    2010 hearing on the ground it existed at the time of the 2007 hearing.           With the
    authorization granted by § 161.004(b), such an objection would have lacked merit.
    Additionally, the father does not demonstrate how his counsel rendered
    ineffective assistance by adducing evidence of events occurring before April 27, 2007.
    In light of the function of § 161.004, something beyond failure to present a res judicata
    defense is necessary.     Otherwise, we presume counsel’s decision to present the
    evidence was reasonable. See In re H.R.M., 
    209 S.W.3d 105
    , 111 (Tex. 2006) (for
    ineffective assistance determination, court indulges in strong presumption of
    reasonableness including possible strategic reason).
    11
    We conclude the record before us does not establish the performance of the
    father’s trial counsel was deficient. His first issue is overruled.
    Meaningful Participation of the Father at Trial
    Before the termination hearing, the trial court denied the father’s request for a
    bench warrant authorizing his live appearance at the hearing.         He was, however,
    allowed to appear by telephone and was represented at the hearing by appointed
    counsel.
    Through his statement of appellate points filed in the trial court and his second
    issue on appeal, the father argues the trial court reversibly erred by denying his request
    for a bench warrant and the opportunity to appear live at trial. But this is not the issue
    the father argues in his brief. Rather, he complains his telephonic appearance was not
    meaningful because of malfunctioning telephone equipment, the occasional loss of the
    telephone connection, and interruptions of the proceeding as the trial court verified the
    father’s presence on the telephone line. These facts, the father argues without citation,
    mean he was denied meaningful participation in the hearing.
    The father’s presentation of his second issue is problematic. First, preservation
    of error concerning meaningful participation by telephone required the father to make a
    timely objection specifying the grounds for the objection at the earliest opportunity and
    obtain an adverse ruling from the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Moreover, we
    may not consider an issue that was not specifically presented to the trial court in a
    timely-filed statement of points. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405(i) (West 2008). While
    the record documents random problems with the telephone equipment or the quality of
    12
    the call, it does not contain a corresponding complaint by the father. And he did not
    identify this issue as a point for appeal in his statement of points. Second, an appellate
    brief must “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
    appropriate citations to authorities and the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Failure to
    cite supporting authority or advance a substantive analysis waives the issue on appeal.
    Sunnyside Feedyard, L.C. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
    106 S.W.3d 169
    , 173 (Tex.App.--
    Amarillo 2003, no pet.). The father presents no authorities or argument supporting his
    complaint that the trial court erred by denying his request for a bench warrant.
    But even had the father briefed any claimed error arising from the trial court’s
    denial of his request for a bench warrant or preserved error concerning the quality of
    telephone equipment or service, the issue would lack merit.
    An inmate has no absolute right to appear in person for the trial of a civil case,
    Armstrong v. Randle, 
    881 S.W.2d 53
    , 56-57 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1994, writ denied),
    but he may not be denied reasonable access to the courts. A prisoner requesting a
    bench warrant must justify the need for his presence; 3 it is not the obligation of the trial
    3
    In In re Z.L.T., the court noted:
    Texas courts of appeals have recognized a variety of factors that trial
    courts should consider when deciding whether to grant an inmate’s
    request for a bench warrant. These factors include the cost and
    inconvenience of transporting the prisoner to the courtroom; the security
    risk the prisoner presents to the court and public; whether the prisoner’s
    claims are substantial; whether the matter’s resolution can reasonably be
    delayed until the prisoner’s release; whether the prisoner can and will offer
    admissible, noncumulative testimony that, cannot be effectively presented
    by deposition, telephone, or some other means; whether the prisoner’s
    presence is important in judging his demeanor and credibility; whether the
    13
    court to go beyond the bench warrant request and independently inquire of the
    necessity of the inmate’s live appearance. In re Z.L.T., 
    124 S.W.3d 163
    , 166 (Tex.
    2003). In bench warrant cases, if a court determines a pro se inmate in a civil suit may
    not appear personally, it may, however, allow the inmate to appear by telephone,
    affidavit, or deposition. In re D.D.J., 
    136 S.W.3d 305
    , 314 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2004,
    no pet.). Here, not only did the father appear by telephone but he was represented by
    appointed counsel. On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
    the father’s request for a bench warrant. See In re 
    Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165
    (order
    denying bench warrant reviewed for abuse of discretion).
    This case was tried to the bench and the record indicates throughout the
    proceeding the trial court was conscious of the father’s participation by telephone. At
    times when the father said he was unable to hear, the court directed witnesses and
    counsel to speak loudly. At one point during testimony the telephone connection was
    lost, briefly restored, and lost again. The court substituted telephones and allowed the
    witness to be re-questioned.      The father testified at length on direct and cross-
    examination. There is no record indication his testimony was hindered or otherwise
    limited by use of a telephone. Throughout the hearing the father was freely permitted to
    interrupt the proceeding if he had difficulty hearing or if a problem with the telephone
    trial is to the court or a jury; and the prisoner’s probability of success on
    the merits.
    
    124 S.W.3d 163
    , 165-66 (Tex. 2003). In its order denying the requested bench warrant,
    the trial court considered these factors as well as whether the father was represented by
    counsel.
    14
    occurred. The court accommodated the father’s telephone-related complaints. At the
    conclusion of evidence, the father made no complaint of his participation by telephone
    or otherwise indicated he was unable to participate in any portion of the hearing.
    “A trial court’s inherent power includes broad discretion over the conduct of its
    proceedings.” State ex rel. Rosenthal v. Poe, 
    98 S.W.3d 194
    , 199 (Tex.Crim.App.
    2003); see Tex. R. Evid. 611 (“[t]he court shall exercise reasonable control over the
    mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make
    the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid
    needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
    embarrassment”). This record does not demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion
    conducting the termination hearing with the father appearing by telephone. The father’s
    second issue is overruled.
    Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Certain Predicate Grounds
    By his third issue, the father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
    evidence supporting two of the predicate grounds for termination found by the trial court.
    In its written termination order, the trial court made findings supporting
    termination according to paragraphs (D), (E), (M), (N), and (Q) of § 161.001(1). The
    father, however, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination under
    paragraphs (D) and (E) of § 161.001(1), and raises no appellate complaint regarding the
    trial court’s findings under paragraphs (M), (N), or (Q). “Only one predicate finding under
    section 161.001(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination.” In re A.V. and
    J.V., 
    113 S.W.3d 355
    , 362 (Tex. 2003). If multiple predicate grounds are found by the
    15
    trial court, we will affirm based on any one ground because only one is necessary for
    termination of parental rights. In re S.N., 
    272 S.W.3d 45
    , 49 (Tex.App.--Waco 2008, no
    pet.). We are bound by the unchallenged findings supporting termination under
    paragraphs (M), (N), and (Q). 4 See Perez v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
    Servs., 
    148 S.W.3d 427
    , 434 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2004, no pet.); In re L.M., 
    104 S.W.3d 642
    , 647 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). See also In re A.C., No. 07-07-
    0354-CV, 2008 Tex. App. Lexis 2718, at *2 (Tex.App.--Amarillo April 16, 2008, no pet.)
    (mem. op.). We therefore need not address the father’s challenges of the sufficiency of
    the evidence supporting termination under paragraphs (D) and (E).
    Additionally, the evidence at trial included an order terminating the parent-child
    relationship of the father and another child under § 161.001(1)(E). This fact also is a
    predicate ground for termination, § 161.001(1)(M), and the trial court included such a
    finding in its order. The father suggests no basis for challenge of this finding on appeal
    and we see no meritorious basis in the record. Thus, regardless of the scope of the
    father’s sufficiency complaint, at least one predicate ground supports termination of the
    parent-child relationship between the father and D.S. and N.S. We overrule his third
    issue.
    4
    Flowers v. Texas Dep’t of Human Resources, Tarrant County Welfare Unit, 
    629 S.W.2d 891
    , 893 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
    16
    Conclusion
    Having overruled the father’s four issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of
    the trial court.
    James T. Campbell
    Justice
    17