in Re: Arpin American Moving Systems, LLC , 416 S.W.3d 927 ( 2013 )


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  • GRANT; and Opinion Filed December 2, 2013.
    S   In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-13-01446-CV
    IN RE ARPIN AMERICA MOVING SYSTEMS, LLC, Relator
    Original Proceeding from the County Court at Law No. 1
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. CC-12-06104-A
    OPINION
    Before Justices O'Neill, Lang-Miers, and Evans
    Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
    Relator Arpin America Moving Systems, LLC filed this petition for writ of mandamus
    after the trial court ordered it to produce a corporate representative to provide testimony on two
    topics specified in a deposition notice. In order to obtain mandamus relief, relator must show
    both that the trial court has abused its discretion and that relator has no adequate appellate
    remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 
    148 S.W.3d 124
    , 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);
    Walker v. Packer, 
    827 S.W.3d 833
    , 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Relator has met this
    burden.
    Real parties in interest Mr. and Mrs. Greg Margosian filed this lawsuit against relator
    alleging negligence and deceptive trade practices arising from relator’s packing of the
    Margosians’ household goods for a move from Texas to the United Arab Emirates. Real parties
    in interest seek compensatory and exemplary damages.
    Real parties in interest served relator with a notice for the deposition of relator’s
    corporate representative. The notice included a request for testimony on specific topics. The
    two requests at issue are request 7(I) and request 15:
    7)    With regard to defendant Arpin, and for the time period from
    January 1, 2009, to the present: . . .
    I) what were its gross, total, revenues [collections, in U S
    Dollars] for calendar years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and
    2013; . . . .
    15) The various documents and tangible items produced by Arpin
    in response to Plaintiffs’s various Requests for Production,
    and identification of each (and every) of those documents
    and tangible items, and pertinent information to explain what
    each (and every) one of them is, and why each was
    produced, and how each relates to Arpin, and how each
    relates to Plaintiffs, and how each relates to Plaintiffs’s
    claims, and how each relates to Arpin’s pleadings or alleged
    defenses in this case.
    Relator filed objections to these requests. After a hearing, the trial court overruled the
    objections by written order dated October 7, 2013. Relator filed this petition for mandamus.
    Because real parties in interest seek exemplary damages, they are entitled to discovery of
    relator’s current net worth. See In re Islamorada Fish Co. Tex. L.L.C., 
    319 S.W.3d 908
    , 912
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding). But request 7(I) is much broader, seeking relator’s
    “gross, total, revenues” for a five-year period beginning in 2009. This request is overbroad, and
    the trial court should not have overruled relator’s objections to it. See, e.g., In re Ameriplan
    Corp., No. 05-09-01407-CV, 
    2010 WL 22825
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas, Jan. 6, 2010, orig.
    proceeding) (mem. op.) (real party in interest was not entitled to documents that do not show
    current net worth of relator, including income statements and old balance sheets); In re House of
    Yahweh, 
    266 S.W.3d 668
    , 673 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, orig. proceeding) (trial court abused
    its discretion by failing to limit net worth discovery to relators’ current balance sheet because
    earlier balance sheets would not be relevant to relators’ current net worth).
    –2–
    As to request 15, discovery regarding the methods of document collection and production
    invades the work-product privilege. In re Exxon Corp., 
    208 S.W.3d 70
    , 76 (Tex. App.—
    Beaumont 2006, orig. proceeding).        In Exxon, the plaintiffs sought “to depose an Exxon
    representative for the purpose of inquiring specifically into the process by which Exxon’s
    representative responded to the requests for production.” 
    Id. at 75.
    The court concluded that this
    request “necessarily and almost exclusively concerns the ‘mental impressions developed in
    anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or a party’s representatives’” subject to
    protection as work product under Rule 192.5, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 
    Id. In their
    response, real parties in interest contend that cases regarding document
    production are not applicable because the discovery method at issue is a deposition notice. But
    rules regarding the scope of discovery apply regardless of the discovery method. See, e.g., K
    Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 
    937 S.W.2d 429
    , 431 (Tex. 1996) (“We reject the notion that any
    discovery device can be used to ‘fish’.”). Real parties in interest also contend that relators failed
    to introduce any evidence at the hearing on their objections. But relators were not required to
    introduce evidence at the hearing when their arguments were questions of law. See In re Union
    Pac. Res. Co., 
    22 S.W.3d 338
    , 341 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (evidence not necessary to
    determine discoverability of settlement agreement). Finally, real parties in interest contend that
    because we denied an earlier petition for writ of mandamus filed by relator for lack of proper
    certification under Rule 52.3(j), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, relator is precluded from
    filing a new petition complaining of the same trial court order. We disagree. See, e.g., In re AIU
    Ins. Co., 
    148 S.W.3d 109
    , 199 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (“failure to grant a petition for writ
    of mandamus is not an adjudication of, nor even a comment on, the merits of a case in any
    respect, including whether mandamus relief was available”).
    –3–
    When a trial court orders discovery that exceeds that permitted by the rules of procedure,
    it abuses its discretion and the resisting party has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re CSX
    Corp., 
    124 S.W.3d 149
    , 151 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).
    Accordingly, we conditionally grant the relators’ petition for writ of mandamus. A writ
    will issue only in the event the trial court fails to vacate its “Order of the Court Regarding
    Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiffs’ Notice of Deposition of Corporate Representative of
    Defendant Arpin America Moving Systems, LLC and Motion for Protection” dated October 7,
    2013, as to items 7(I) and 15 of the notice, and to render an order granting relator’s objections to
    items 7(I) and 15.
    /Elizabeth Lang-Miers/
    ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
    JUSTICE
    131446F.P05
    –4–