in Re Yolanda Janet Davila, Relator , 510 S.W.3d 455 ( 2013 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-13-00103-CV
IN RE Yolanda Janet DAVILA
Original Mandamus Proceeding 1
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 22, 2013
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS CONDITIONALLY GRANTED
Relator Yolanda Janet Davila seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to
vacate temporary orders in a child custody modification suit. Because there was no evidence that
the child’s present circumstances would significantly impair the child’s physical health or
emotional development, as required by section 156.006 of the Texas Family Code, we
conditionally grant the relief requested. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.006 (Vernon Supp.
2012).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Relator Yolanda Davila and Real Party in Interest Julio Davila were divorced in Bexar
County, Texas in 2009. 2 At the time of the divorce, Yolanda and Julio were appointed joint
1
This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2008-CI-09835, styled In the Interest of J.D., A Child, pending in the
224th Judicial District, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Cathy Stryker presiding. However, the order
complained of was signed by the Honorable Peter Sakai, presiding judge of the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar
County, Texas.
04-13-00103-CV
managing conservators to now ten-year-old J.D., and Yolanda was given the exclusive right to
determine the primary residence. Since August of 2011, Yolanda has been on active duty and
stationed in Misawa, Japan. Although there were allegations raised of potential abuse by J.D.’s
stepfather, Yolanda’s husband, the United States Air Force ruled out any abuse by the stepfather,
and he and Yolanda were divorced in early December 2012.
On December 5, 2012, when Yolanda traveled to Texas to deliver J.D. for Christmas
vacation with Julio, Yolanda was served with a suit for modification. In spite of the fact that J.D.
was seeing a counselor in Japan, on December 22, 2012, Julio took the minor child to a
counselor in San Antonio.
On December 27, 2012, after the trial court denied Yolanda’s request to delay the
proceedings pursuant to Section 522 of the Serviceman’s Civil Relief Act, a hearing was held on
temporary orders. The trial court also denied Yolanda’s motion to strike the testimony of the
San Antonio counselor because she had not consented to the counseling as required by the
divorce decree. During her testimony, the counselor relayed her belief that J.D. did not want to
return to Japan because of his stepfather and recommended that J.D. remain in San Antonio with
Julio. After speaking to the child in chambers, the trial court ruled that J.D. would stay in San
Antonio and awarded his parents joint managing conservators without a designation of a primary
conservator. Yolanda’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
After learning of Julio’s intent to move to New Jersey, Yolanda filed an emergency
application for temporary restraining order attempting to keep the child within the jurisdiction of
the trial court. On January 18, 2013, the trial court denied the emergency application, lifted any
geographic restrictions imposed on the primary residence of the child, and modified the
2
For purposes of this opinion, and to avoid confusion, we refer to the parties by their first names.
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temporary orders designating Julio as the conservator with the exclusive right to determine the
primary residence of the child.
Yolanda subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the temporary
orders as a violation of the standard set forth in § 156.006(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code,
which provides in pertinent part:
(b) While a suit for modification is pending, the court may not render a temporary
order that has the effect of changing the designation of the person who has the
exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child under the final
order unless:
(1) the order is necessary because the child’s present circumstances
would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional
development[.]
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.006(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). On
February 15, 2013, this court issued an order expressing serious concern regarding the relief
sought and provided the respondent and the real party in interest until March 1, 2013 to file a
response to the petition. No response was filed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available only in limited circumstances.
See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A writ of mandamus
will issue to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when
there is no adequate remedy at law. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135
(Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). For example, a writ of mandamus will issue to correct an order
of the trial court that the court had no power to render and which is, therefore, void. See
Faulkner v. Culver, 851 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
Mandamus relief is appropriate when a trial court issues an order after its plenary power
has expired because the order is void. In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 68-69
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(Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig.
proceeding). Specifically, when a trial court erroneously reinstates a case after its plenary power
has expired, there is no adequate remedy by appeal and mandamus is the appropriate remedy.
Estate of Howley v. Haberman, 878 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding); S. Main
Bank v. Wittig, 909 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding).
Relief may be granted to set aside an order issued on the merits of a case after the trial court's
plenary power expires. In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding).
TEXAS FAMILY CODE SECTION 156.006
Section 156.006(b) limits a trial court’s authority to render temporary orders that have
“the effect” of changing the person with the exclusive right to designate primary residence under
a final order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.006(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2006); In re Levay, 179
S.W.3d 93, 95 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, orig. proceeding). To determine if temporary
orders effectively change the person with the exclusive right to designate primary residence, we
must examine the temporary orders in relation to the final order. In re Ostrofsky, 112 S.W.3d
925, 929 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding). This determination does not
turn on the trial court’s characterization of its ruling, but on the substance of the temporary
orders. See id. (temporary order changed person with the exclusive right to determine primary
residence even if it did not expressly state it). When the temporary orders “deprive[ ]” a
custodial parent “of any discretion inherent in the right to determine the [child’s] primary
residence,” they have “the effect” of changing the designation of the person with the exclusive
right to designate a child's primary residence. In re Levay, 179 S.W.3d at 96; In re Ostrofsky,
112 S.W.3d at 929.
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04-13-00103-CV
Here, there is no evidence that the child’s present circumstances will significantly impair
the child’s physical health and emotional development. See In re Levay, 179 S.W.3d at 96; In re
Sanchez, 228 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding). During the
hearing, the trial court judge specifically stated that he was trying to “respect the wishes of the
child” regarding with which parent the child was to reside. The court further reiterated that it
was not going to delve into whether the child was “abused or not abused, and [whether he was]
in danger or not.” This is precisely what section 156.006 requires. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 156.006(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Accordingly, by failing to apply the test set out in section
156.006, and make a finding as to the child’s present circumstances impairing his physical health
and emotional development, the trial court abused his discretion in modifying conservatorship in
a temporary order. Id.
CONCLUSION
Having determined that Relator Yolanda Janet Davila is entitled to relief, we
conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the trial court is ordered to
vacate its January 18, 2013 order. Mandamus will issue only if the trial court fails to comply
with this order within fourteen days.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
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