Winnie Stacey Alwazzan v. Isa Ali Alwazzan ( 2020 )

Opinion issued March 26, 2020
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-16-00589-CV
———————————
WINNIE STACEY ALWAZZAN, Appellant
V.
ISA ALI ALWAZZAN AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES CO., LTD.,
Appellees
On Appeal from the 306th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 13-FD-0848
OPINION DISSENTING FROM DENIAL OF EN BANC
RECONSIDERATION
Appellant, Winnie Stacey Alwazzan (Winnie), moved for en banc
reconsideration of the panel’s majority opinion dated December 6, 2018.1 A majority
of the Court has voted to deny en banc reconsideration. I would grant it due to the
importance of the law at issue in this case and its interpretation and application by the
panel majority.
I believe the panel opinion and judgment are contrary to established
jurisdictional case law and contrary to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which require
that a panel issue an opinion that is “as brief as practicable but that addresses every
issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Here, the panel opinion fails to resolve the controlling issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Accordingly, it keeps alive a jurisdictional and legal dispute that should
have been resolved in accordance with law long ago.
This case involves subject-matter jurisdiction over four divorce actions in the
same marriage filed by Winnie against her husband Isa Ali Alwazzan (Isa) and a
Bahrani company owned in part by Isa’s family, International Agencies Co., Ltd.
(IACL). Winnie non-suited each of the first three actions. Two of those non-suits were
improper because Winnie non-suited after she and Isa had both appeared and all issues
had been resolved, but before a final decree of divorce had been entered. This appeal
is from the fourth action, which Winnie improperly filed in the Galveston County
1
Alwazzan v. Alwazzan, —S.W.3d —, No. 01-16-00589-CV, 2018 WL 6382061 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2018, no pet. h.).
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district court after the Harris County associate judge had ruled on the merits of every
issue in the divorce in the third action and all that remained was entry of the decree of
divorce. The disposition of this case is thus controlled by Hyundai Motor Co. v.
Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam), which prohibits a party from
taking advantage of a non-suit on issues that were already decided on the merits by
filing another suit on those issues.
Here, the Galveston County district court, in the decision on appeal, reversed an
earlier decision of that court by a visiting judge exercising jurisdiction over the divorce
suit filed in that county by Winnie after she non-suited the Harris County action. The
visiting judge found that Isa, who no longer lives in the United States, was adequately
served by publication in a Galveston County newspaper and that IACL was adequately
served by mail to an improper and incomplete address in Bahrain. The visiting judge
then, in the absence of both Isa and IACL, awarded Winnie half a billion dollars in
damages against IACL. Later, the presiding judge vacated all previous orders of that
court, dismissed Winnie’s petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and awarded
sanctions against Winnie for her improper actions in Galveston.
The majority dismisses the Galveston County divorce action on residency
grounds for refiling in some subsequent court. I would affirm the dismissal of the suit
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Hyundai. I would hold that the Galveston
County district court did not err when it concluded that it lacked subject-matter
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jurisdiction over this divorce action and granted Isa’s plea to the jurisdiction. I would
further hold that the Harris County associate judge’s December 21, 2012 report was a
final decision on the merits of all claims in the divorce, including the right to entry of
a final decree of divorce, and that none of those claims were subject to the April 10,
2013 non-suit Winnie filed just before filing suit in Galveston County. Accordingly, I
would hold that subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties’ divorce action not only
did not attach in Galveston County but could not attach and that the Galveston County
court correctly entered judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. I would
further hold, contrary to the panel majority, that all matters pertinent to the divorce
proceedings were properly adjudicated by the associate judge in the Harris County
district court, in which Winnie filed her third divorce action, as clearly demonstrated
by the record. Therefore, the divorce action was not subject to Winnie’s later invalid
non-suit. I would modify the trial court’s judgment solely to condition the award of
attorneys’ fees as sanctions on Winnie’s failure to prevail on appeal. I would affirm
the judgment of the trial court as modified.
The panel majority opinion, in my view, misconstrues Hyundai and rejects it as
inapplicable. It improperly decides that jurisdiction could have been established in
Galveston County if Winnie had lived there long enough to establish residency (which
she has never done). And it leaves the parties in legal limbo by failing to recognize the
finality of the 2012 Harris County divorce proceedings and failing to establish the
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court of proper jurisdiction over those proceedings, in violation of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 47.1, which expressly requires the resolution of all issues “raised
and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Both law and equity require a resolution to this case that recognizes Hyundai’s
preclusive effect on future re-litigation of issues non-suited by a party after final
resolution in a trial court, that fixes the court of exclusive jurisdiction over the
underlying divorce proceedings in this case, and that brings to an end this endless
relitigation of settled issues. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the panel opinion
and from denial of en banc reconsideration, and I set forth more fully below, in
response to the panel majority opinion, the grounds for applying Hyundai to dispose
of all issues in this case.
Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado
In Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
effect of the plaintiffs’ non-suit filed after the trial court had granted partial summary
judgment in favor of the defendant on several of the plaintiffs’ claims. See 892 S.W.2d
at 854. The Hyundai plaintiffs, who had been injured in a car accident, sued Hyundai
in Webb County and alleged several theories of liability. Id. Hyundai moved for partial
summary judgment, arguing that most of the claims were preempted by federal law,
and the trial court granted the motion. Id. The plaintiffs then non-suited their case in
Webb County and filed a new lawsuit against Hyundai in Duval County, raising claims
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identical to those claims raised in their first petition in Webb County, including the
claims on which the Webb County court had granted partial summary judgment. Id.
The Webb County court signed an order of non-suit. Id. Hyundai then requested the
Webb County court modify that order, arguing that the plaintiffs could not refile the
claims on which partial summary judgment had been granted. Id. The trial court agreed
with Hyundai, entering an order stating that the claims adjudicated by the prior
summary judgment were dismissed with prejudice. Id.
In addressing whether the trial court’s summary judgment order survived the
plaintiffs’ subsequent non-suit, the Texas Supreme Court noted the general rule that
plaintiffs have the right to take a non-suit at any time until they have introduced all of
their evidence other than rebuttal evidence and that a non-suit may have the effect of
vitiating earlier interlocutory orders. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 162. The court then stated,
however, that a trial court’s decisions on the merits, such as summary judgment orders
and partial summary judgment orders, are not vitiated by a subsequent non-suit.
Hyundai, 892 S.W.2d at 855. Noting that the plaintiff need not produce any evidence
in summary judgment practice, the court reasoned that if Rule 162, which governs
non-suits, “provided the only cut-off point after which a plaintiff could no longer take
a nonsuit,” then plaintiffs could essentially avoid any unfavorable summary judgment
ruling by requesting a non-suit after the trial court had ruled on the summary judgment.
Id. The court emphasized, “To give any force to the partial summary judgment
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provisions, those judgments must withstand a non-suit.” Id. (citing Wood v. Moers,
289 S.W. 1017, 1018 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1926, no writ) (“[W]ere the rule
otherwise, there would rarely, if ever, be such a result in a trial as judgment upon an
instructed verdict for the defendant, because in such cases, the plaintiff would probably
resort to a nonsuit, rather than suffer the consequences of an instructed verdict against
him.”)). Addressing the situation at hand, the court stated,
A partial summary judgment is a decision on the merits unless set aside
by the trial court. It becomes final upon the disposition of the other issues
in the case. Once a judge announces a decision that adjudicates a claim,
that claim is no longer subject to the plaintiff’s right to nonsuit. A nonsuit
sought after such a judicial pronouncement results in a dismissal with
prejudice as to the issues pronounced in favor of the defendant. . . . . The
dismissal is with prejudice as to the issues disposed of by the summary
judgment.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (reversing appellate court with
respect to finality of non-suit).
The doctrine established in Hyundai has been followed in numerous cases and
clearly applies here. It controls Winnie’s ability to non-suit her divorce action in the
Harris County court after the final ruling of the associate judge and to refile in
Galveston County court. See Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. El Naggar, 340
S.W.3d 552, 556–57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (stating that
court’s reasoning in Hyundai was “rooted in the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, which ‘promote judicial efficiency, protect parties from multiple lawsuits,
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and prevent inconsistent judgments by precluding the relitigation’ of matters that have
already been decided”) (quoting In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Tex.
2008) (orig. proceeding)); Curry v. Bank of Am., N.A., 232 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (stating that party who has had claims “adjudicated
unsuccessfully cannot later non-suit his claims to avoid the judgment”); Yazdchi v.
Bank One, Tex., N.A., 177 S.W.3d 399, 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,
pet. denied) (“[I]t is well settled that a party may not escape the effects of an
unfavorable ruling on the merits by taking a nonsuit of its claims.”).
Here, Winnie and Isa, through his former counsel, participated in a trial on the
merits before the associate judge in the Harris County action on December 10, 2012.
The associate judge heard testimony from Winnie, admitted exhibits into evidence,
and considered the arguments of counsel. At the end of the trial, counsel for both
Winnie and Isa informed the associate judge that they had agreed to waive a de novo
hearing to the referring district court judge. Winnie’s counsel stated on the record in
open court, “[E]verybody is waiving appeal to the referring Court . . . so that we’re
trying it once,” and Isa’s counsel responded, “That is correct, Judge. That is our
agreement.” This agreement was made on the record prior to the start of any hearing
in the referring court.
The associate judge executed his written report on Winnie’s divorce petition on
December 21, 2012, entered it on January 11, 2013, and sent it to all counsel of record.
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The “Associate Judge’s Report” expressly pronounced, “Divorce is granted on the
grounds of cruelty and adultery.” It addressed conservatorship of the then-minor
children, payment of child support, and division of the parties’ community estate. The
Report awarded IACL “and its assets and liabilities,” among other property, to Isa.
The report pronounced that “W[ife] is granted a judgment against H[usband] in the
amount of $3,500,000 plus interest at the legal rate” and “a judgment of $75,000
against H[usband] for temporary spousal support arrearage plus interest at 6%.” The
Report specifically declared, “Judgment against [IACL] is denied,” and thereby denied
Winnie any recovery against IACL.
Winnie subsequently filed a request that the associate judge reconsider some of
his property awards and make “additional rulings.” In that motion, she requested that
the associate judge reconsider his findings of no liability against IACL. She asked that
a money judgment be awarded in her favor against IACL and Isa jointly and severally.
Winnie asserted that Isa “hides his money within [IACL] and withdraws it at his
whim,” and she claimed that IACL “is used as a sham to protect [Isa] from his
creditors.” The associate judge denied Winnie’s request on February 21, 2013, stating
that “[t]he judgment in favor of [Winnie] against [Isa] includes consideration of the
value of [IACL].”
On April 10, 2013, Winnie filed a notice of non-suit in the Harris County action,
and on the same day she filed her “Original Petition for Divorce” in the Galveston
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County action. The referring district judge of the Harris County court signed an “Order
on Notice of Non-Suit” on April 12, 2013, dismissing the Harris County action. The
Galveston County district court improperly exercised jurisdiction over the divorce
proceedings in the absence of Isa and IACL, who had never been properly served, and,
in their absence, adjudicated the exact claims the Harris County district court had
adjudicated, entered the final decree of divorce the Harris County court had been
prevented from entering by Winnie’s non-suit, and awarded Winnie half a billion
dollars against IACL. It was this judgment that the successor Galveston County district
judge vacated, sanctioning Winnie and dismissing her suit for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
I conclude that the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Hyundai applies to this
case. A full trial on the merits was held before a Harris County associate judge; the
parties affirmatively represented to the associate judge that they did not wish to seek
a trial de novo before the referring district court; that agreement was recorded in the
record and both parties abided by it in all subsequent proceedings before the associate
judge; the associate judge issued a written report that resolved issues of
conservatorship and property division and that awarded Winnie $3.5 million against
Isa but denied her recovery against IACL; Winnie sought additional rulings from the
associate judge concerning, among other things, IACL’s liability to her; and, after the
associate judge declined to reconsider its rulings or make any additional rulings,
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Winnie non-suited the Harris County action and filed an identical divorce proceeding
against Isa and IACL on the same day in Galveston County.
I would hold that the associate judge “announce[d] a decision that
adjudicate[d]” all of Winnie’s claims, such that her claims were no longer subject to
her right to non-suit. See Hyundai, 892 S.W.2d at 855; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 201.007(a) (setting out powers of associate judge, including powers to conduct
hearing, hear evidence, make findings of fact, formulate conclusions of law,
recommend order to be rendered, and, in certain situations, render and sign final order).
The actions of Winnie and her counsel in non-suiting the Harris County action and
immediately filing an identical action in Galveston County were clearly taken to avoid
the associate judge’s rulings following a trial on the merits which, although awarding
Winnie $3.5 million against Isa, awarded her no recovery against IACL. I would hold,
therefore, that Winnie’s subsequent non-suit of the Harris County action resulted in a
dismissal of the entire action with prejudice to its refiling in another county. See
Hyundai, 892 S.W.2d at 855 (“The dismissal is with prejudice as to the issues disposed
of by the summary judgment.”).
The only remaining question is what, if anything, was left to be adjudicated in
the Harris County action after the December 21, 2012 Final Report of the Associate
Judge issued and was entered on January 11, 2013. The answer is that nothing was
left. The panel majority’s argument that family court associate judges lacked authority
11
at that time to enter a final report is both incorrect and a red herring in that a final
report is not required for preclusion of relitigation of a non-suited issue; only
adjudication on the merits is required. See id.
Here, the parties agreed on the record in open court at the end of the trial before
the Harris County associate judge to waive a de novo hearing before the referring
court.2 The associate judge adjudicated all issues in the case but erroneously informed
the parties that only the referring court could grant the divorce by signing the decree.
The associate judge subsequently signed and filed his final report on December 21,
2012. Under Family Code section 201.007(e), that final report constituted a final order
of the referring court. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.007(e) (“An order signed
2
I note that Family Code section 201.015(g), governing a party’s right to a de novo
hearing before the referring court and the waiver of that right, provided that “[b]efore
the start of a hearing by an associate judge, the parties may waive the right of a de
novo hearing before the referring court in writing or on the record.” See Act of May
23, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1235, § 7, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 4150, 4152 (amended
2015) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015(g)). It is undisputed that
the parties’ agreement that they did not wish to have a de novo hearing occurred at the
end of the hearing before the associate judge, not before the start of the hearing.
Although the parties did not strictly comply with the statute, I construe their
unequivocal agreement on the record to waive a hearing before the referring district
court so that the parties are “trying it once” as a Rule 11 agreement; and I conclude
that by that agreement the parties waived their right to a de novo hearing. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 11 (“Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between attorneys
or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced . . . unless it be made in open
court and entered of record.”). I further note that, following the hearing before the
associate judge, neither party filed a written request for a de novo hearing before the
referring court. See Act of May 23, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1235, § 7, 2007 Tex.
Gen. Laws at 4152 (providing that party may request de novo hearing before referring
court by filing written request with clerk of referring court not later than seventh
working day after date party receives notice of substance of associate judge’s report).
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before May 1, 2017, by an associate judge under Subsection (a)(16) [providing that an
associate judge may sign a final order that includes a waiver of the right to a de novo
appeal to the referring court] is a final order rendered as of the date the order was
signed.”). Winnie then filed a motion for additional findings, which the associate judge
denied on February 21, 2013. Only after failing to get a favorable ruling on this motion
did Winnie file a non-suit in the Harris County district court and immediately file a
new divorce action in Galveston County. The Galveston County suit was improperly
filed.
I would hold that the written “Associate Judge’s Report” executed by the Harris
County associate judge on December 21, 2012, and entered on January 11, 2013, was
the final order and judgment of the court and became effective the day it was executed
by the associate judge. All that was missing was the act of titling that final judgment
on Winnie’s divorce petition as a Final Decree of Divorce—a purely ministerial act
not material to the judgment. Because all issues pertinent to the divorce were disposed
of by the judgment, they may not now be relitigated, and any subsequent filings re-
urging the issues adjudicated in the December 21, 2012 Associate Judge’s Report must
be dismissed with prejudice. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.007(e) (providing that
order signed by associate judge under section 201.007(a)(16) prior to May 1, 2017, “is
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a final order rendered as of the date the order was signed”);3 Hyundai, 892 S.W.2d at
855 (“Once a judge announces a decision that adjudicates a claim, that claim is no
longer subject to the plaintiff’s right to nonsuit. A nonsuit sought after such a judicial
3
In 2007, the Texas Legislature amended Family Code section 201.007. That section,
as amended, permitted an associate judge to sign a final order including a waiver of
de novo appeal to the referring court as authorized by section 201.015 of the Code,
but it did not expressly state that the associate judge had authority to render a decision.
Thus, at the time of the parties’ hearing before the Harris County associate judge in
December 2012, Family Code section 201.007(a)(16) allowed an associate judge to
“sign a final order that includes a waiver of the right of appeal [for a trial de novo
before the referring district court] pursuant to Section 201.015.” Act of May 25, 2007,
80th Leg., R.S., ch. 839, § 1, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1748, 1749 (amended 2017)
(current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.007(a)(16)); see also Act of May 23,
2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1235, § 7, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 4150, 4152 (amended 2015)
(current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015(a), (g)) (providing that, after
hearing before associate judge, party may request de novo hearing before referring
court, but also providing that parties may waive right to de novo hearing).
In 2017, however, following a decision of this Court holding that under Family Code
section 201.007, as amended in June 2007, an associate judge of a family court had
the power to sign a final order but not to render a final decision, the Texas Legislature
again amended section 201.007 to make clear that associate judges had had such
power at all times subsequent to the addition of new subsection 201.007(a)(16) in June
2007. See Act of May 28, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 912, § 1.03(a), 2017 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 3718, 3720 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.007(e)); see
also Gerke v. Kantara, 492 S.W.3d 791, 792–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, no pet.).
Current section 201.007(e), effective September 1, 2017, clarifies the intent of the
Legislature in amending section 201.007 in 2007. It provides, “An order signed before
May 1, 2017, by an associate judge under Subsection (a)(16) is a final order rendered
as of the date the order was signed.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.007(e). The
Legislature also amended section 201.007(c) in 2017 to provide that “[a]n order
described by Subsection (a)(14) or (16) that is rendered and signed by an associate
judge constitutes an order of the referring court.” See Act of May 28, 2017, 85th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 912, § 1.03(a), 2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3718, 3720 (current version at
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.007(c)).
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pronouncement results in a dismissal with prejudice as to the issues pronounced in
favor of the defendant.”) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, I would further hold
that the Galveston County court did not err in dismissing the divorce action filed by
Winnie in that court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I agree with the panel majority’s sanctions ruling and its amendment of the
judgement with respect to attorneys’ fees, and I join that part of the opinion.
Conclusion
I would hold that the Galveston County court did not err when it concluded that
it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this divorce action and granted Isa’s plea to
the jurisdiction. I would also hold that the Harris County associate judge’s December
21, 2012 report was a decision on the merits of all claims in the divorce action and that
these claims were not subject to Winnie’s April 10, 2013 non-suit but became final
upon the disposition of all the issues in that case by the associate judge. Therefore, I
would affirm the judgment of the Galveston County trial court granting Isa’s plea to
the jurisdiction, dismissing all claims on the merits of the divorce, awarding sanctions
against Winnie, and vacating all other orders of that court.
I would modify the trial court’s judgment solely to condition the award of
attorneys’ fees as sanctions on Winnie’s failure to prevail on appeal. I would affirm
the judgment of the trial court as modified.
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Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice
Panel consisted of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Higley.
En banc reconsideration was requested. See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.7.
The En Banc Court consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes, Lloyd, Kelly,
Goodman, Landau, Hightower, and Countiss.
A majority of the Court voted to deny en banc reconsideration.
Justice Keyes, joined by Justice Lloyd, dissenting from denial of en banc
reconsideration.
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