IDEA Public Schools v. Socorro Independent School District ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                           NUMBER 13-18-00422-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    IDEA PUBLIC SCHOOLS,                                                        Appellant,
    v.
    SOCORRO INDEPENDENT
    SCHOOL DISTRICT,                                                             Appellee.
    On appeal from the 389th District Court
    of Hidalgo County, Texas.
    DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Hinojosa
    Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
    Because the majority fails to give effect to the limitations found in the Family
    Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and fails to enforce the Texas Public
    Information Act (TPIA) as written, it erroneously allows IDEA Public Schools to withhold
    public records from the local school district that it may not properly withhold. For that
    reason, I dissent.
    “[I]t is the policy of this state that each person is entitled, unless otherwise
    expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of
    government and the official acts of public officials and employees.” TEX. GOV’T CODE
    ANN. § 552.001(a).    “The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to
    implement this policy” and “in favor of granting a request for information.” Id.
    FERPA limits the disclosure of student educational records but guarantees that the
    records are available to minor students and their parents. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a). A
    student is defined to be: “any person with respect to whom an educational agency or
    institution maintains education records or personally identifiable information but does not
    include a person who has not been in attendance at such agency or institution.”
    Id. § 1232g(a)(6) (emphasis added).
    Before the 2018 school year began, Socorro ISD sent two public information
    requests to IDEA seeking applicant data. IDEA responded to both by categorizing each
    request as implicating FERPA protected data, even though IDEA did not yet have any
    students because IDEA’s campuses were not yet completed.              IDEA responded to
    Socorro ISD’s second request by including a statement that the TPIA excludes FERPA
    protected materials from its purview.     IDEA further responded that the educational
    institution from whom the materials are sought is the sole arbiter of whether the materials
    are covered by FERPA and its determination is final. See B.W.B. v. Eanes Indep. Sch.
    Dist., No. 03-16-00710-CV, 
    2018 WL 454783
    , at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 10, 2018, no
    pet.) (holding that a dissatisfied records requestor may not ask the court to enforce
    2
    FERPA by second-guessing the school’s FERPA determinations, citing 20 U.S.C.
    § 1232g(g)).1 IDEA argues that because there is no private right of action under FERPA,
    Socorro ISD cannot compel IDEA to turn over the materials even if IDEA’s determination
    is erroneous. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 
    536 U.S. 273
    , 290 (2002).
    While I agree that there is no private right of action for damages for a violation of
    FERPA, id., I do not agree that IDEA’s clearly overbroad reading of FERPA is wholly
    unreviewable. “The meaning of a statute is a legal question, which we review de novo
    to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v.
    Summers, 
    282 S.W.3d 433
    , 437 (Tex. 2009); accord Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasy, 
    536 F.3d 383
    , 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (“There is no better or more authoritative expression of
    congressional intent than the statutory text.”) When possible, the words chosen by
    legislature are the surest guide to its intent. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 282 S.W.3d at
    437; Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 
    209 S.W.3d 644
    , 651–52 (Tex.
    2006). When the legislature has defined the words in the statute, we are bound to follow
    the definition rather than the common or ordinary meaning. See Entergy Gulf States,
    Inc., 282 S.W.3d at 437; see also Med. Ctr. Pharmacy, 536 F.3d at 395–96. Here,
    Congress defined a student to exclude persons who had not been in attendance at the
    school. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(6); Tarka v. Franklin, 
    891 F.2d 102
    , 106 (5th Cir.
    1989) (holding that person who was not admitted and was not “in attendance” to graduate
    1
    The majority relies on B.W.B. v. Eanes Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 03-16-00710-CV, 
    2018 WL 454783
    ,
    at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 10, 2018, no pet.), to hold we have no jurisdiction over the interpretation of
    FERPA. In that case, the dispute between a parent and the high school was over the school’s allegedly
    unauthorized disclosure of some student records and its withholding of other student records requested by
    the parents. Id. There was no dispute that the student was in attendance at the educational institution
    and student records were at issue. Here, IDEA admitted to the trial court that no students had been in
    attendance at IDEA at the time records were requested.
    3
    school was not a student).
    The TPIA is enforceable by Texas courts.           See    TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
    §§ 552.321, 552.3215. Based on the definitional limitations of FERPA which excludes
    from its definition of student those persons who have not been in attendance, I would hold
    that this Court has jurisdiction to enforce the TPIA and require production of materials
    that were not protected by FERPA at the time they were requested and at the time FERPA
    was invoked to protect them. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.
    GINA M. BENAVIDES
    Justice
    Delivered and filed the
    9th day of January, 2020.
    4