Adam Clayton Tucker v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

NUMBER 13-21-00421-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
ADAM CLAYTON TUCKER, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva
A jury convicted appellant Adam Clayton Tucker of one count of intoxication
manslaughter, a second-degree felony enhanced to a first-degree felony. 1 See TEX.
1 The jury found that Tucker was previously convicted of involuntary manslaughter and indecency
with a child, both felonies other than state jail felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(b).
PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08. The jury assessed Tucker’s punishment at ninety-nine years’
imprisonment. In his sole issue, Tucker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On or about November 6, 2018, at approximately 9:15 p.m., a single-vehicle
motorcycle collision resulted in the death of 23-year-old Kelsey Benedict and
hospitalization of Tucker. Tucker was subsequently indicted for causing Benedict’s death.
At trial, he disputed that he was intoxicated, that he was driving the motorcycle at the time
of the accident, and that his actions were the “but for” cause of Benedict’s death. See id.
Although there were no witnesses to the accident, two bystanders attempted to
provide aid that evening and testified at Tucker’s trial: Nathan Blaine Burow and Gilbert
Garcia. Burow testified he was on his way home when he saw a man, later identified as
Tucker, “sitting down” on the side of the road, “waving for [him] to stop.” Burow testified
that after initially tending to Tucker, he returned to his vehicle to retrieve a flashlight. It
was then that Burow stumbled upon a saddle bag, which he picked up and threw toward
the motorcycle, noticing for the first time a woman, Benedict, underneath the motorcycle.
Garcia stopped to assist shortly after Burow. Garcia testified that Tucker was
“crying in pain, yelling,” and Garcia could smell alcohol on Tucker’s breath. Benedict was
“pinned underneath the motorcycle” about six to ten feet away from Tucker. Garcia
testified that he checked Benedict’s vitals but found no pulse and called 911. 2 When
2 Ted Thompson, 911 center communications manager for the City of Victoria, confirmed the city
received a call concerning the accident at approximately 9:41 p.m.
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asked about the road conditions that evening, Garcia stated there had been no
precipitation, there was no debris in the roadway, and the road was a “straight-ahead
road.”
Medical records admitted at trial indicated that Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
personnel arrived at the crash site at 9:48 p.m. and notated Tucker’s breath smelled of
alcohol. Tucker reportedly told EMS personnel that he did not know the involved female.
Tucker was transported to DeTar Hospital, where nursing notes with a time stamp of
11:26 p.m. also stated Tucker “smells of alcohol.” Tucker was described as conscious
and uncooperative, and he reportedly told hospital staff that the “other person involved in
[the] accident was [an] on and off girlfriend . . . but he could not recall her name.”
Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) Trooper Oscar Garcia Jr. arrived at the
hospital at 11:29 p.m. Trooper Garcia recalled smelling “the strong odor of alcohol in the
room itself” and emitting from Tucker’s breath and body. Trooper Garcia testified that
Tucker had “thick, tongue-tied, slurred speech, [and] glassy, red, bloodshot eyes,” and
Tucker was unable to answer questions about what had happened or how the accident
was caused. Trooper Garcia surmised that Tucker “was intoxicated by not having the
normal use of his physical faculties” and requested that Tucker consent to a blood draw.
Tucker consented, and a blood sample was taken at 11:55 p.m. On cross-examination,
Trooper Garcia conceded that he had used an expired kit to collect the blood sample.
Renee Hawkins, lead forensic scientist for the DPS toxicology crime laboratory in
Austin, testified that the expiration dates on blood collection kits concern the vacuum
capacity of the tube used to collect the blood sample:
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That means that the vacuum that is inside a blood tube that is used to collect
the sample from a person’s vein could start to be—to deplete. . . . That
would mean that instead of collecting the exact volume that the tube is
designed to collect, that it might start to collect less of that volume or be
capable of collecting less of that volume or it may not work at all.
Hawkins opined that the use of expired tubes in this instance did not compromise the
integrity of the samples collected. Hawkins explained that the tube used here was
designed to hold ten milliliters, there were six milliliters of Tucker’s blood in the tube, and
only two milliliters were needed to “complete all the testing.”
Tucker’s laboratory results indicated that he had a .069 BAC level and was positive
for oxycodone. Hawkins testified that, much like alcohol, oxycodone acts as a depressant
with sedative effects:
[I]t can affect you in a way that could create dizziness, drowsiness, fatigue.
It can cause you to slow your reactions or increase your reaction time. And
it can also have effects on your muscular coordination, as well as your
balance and speech, vision. And it can affect your ability to concentrate on
more than one thing at a time.
Hawkins additionally testified to the absorption and elimination rate of oxycodone and
alcohol. Hawkins explained that alcohol impairment may begin “as soon as you start to
drink it, and your blood alcohol concentration starts to rise,” and the elimination rate for a
majority of the population is “.01 to .03 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters per hour.”
Hawkins testified that although the legal limit is .08, a “majority of studies with driving
show that .05 grams per 100 milliliters a person does not have the normal mental and
physical faculties.”
DPS Trooper Matthew Cornett, one of several officers on scene that evening,
testified that he arrived after Tucker had already been transported to the hospital. Trooper
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Cornett located a “saddle bag” containing “cans of Bud Light, unopened, cold to the touch”
in close proximity to the motorcycle. Trooper Cornett additionally noted that the
motorcycle’s “speedometer was locked at approximately 42 miles an hour,” indicating the
speed the motorcycle was traveling at the time it impacted the bar ditch. 3 Trooper Cornett
observed “no skids or brake marks” and nothing to demonstrate “jerking or aggressive[]”
maneuvering before the vehicle left the roadway. Rather, Trooper Cornett testified, “[t]he
tire marks in the grass show a gradual movement off the roadway.” Trooper Cornett
acknowledged on cross-examination that the air pressure in the motorcycle tires had been
below manufacturer recommendations at the time of the accident. Trooper Cornett
nonetheless identified Tucker’s intoxication as the cause of the accident.
In a statement to law enforcement two weeks following the accident, Tucker told
officers he left work between 5 and 6 p.m. and went to a strip club in Corpus Christi, where
Benedict was employed and where Tucker drank “numerous beers.” Tucker invited
Benedict to go back to Victoria with him so she could “ride his motorcycle.” Tucker
maintained his intentions with Benedict had been strictly platonic. En route to Victoria,
they stopped at a gas station in Refugio to purchase more alcohol. Tucker said that he
consumed a single oxycodone pill at some unspecified point between Corpus Christi and
Victoria. Tucker and Benedict engaged in sexual relations after arriving at Tucker’s
residence in Victoria. Afterward, Tucker allowed Benedict to drive his motorcycle to a
nearby store. According to Tucker, Benedict was driving when the accident occurred
3 The posted speed limit was 60 miles per hour.
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about eight minutes away from his residence. Tucker was unable to name anyone else
that he had ever let drive his motorcycle before.
Tucker’s daughter, Casey Tucker, and ex-wife, Christi Ann LeBeuf, described
Tucker as an experienced rider, and neither could recall an instance where Tucker had
allowed anyone else to drive his motorcycle. In November of 2018, Casey lived in an
adjoining residence located on the same property as her parents’ home. Although Casey
did not see her father the evening of the fatal collision, she recalled hearing his motorcycle
start up around 9 p.m. Casey and Christi visited Tucker in the hospital in the early hours
of November 7, 2018, and each testified they could smell the odor of an alcoholic
beverage on him. Christi described the odor as “strong” and indicated it could be smelled
“on his breath.”
Marleana Ayala, Benedict’s mother, testified that she was close with her daughter
and had spoken to her earlier on the day she passed. Ayala stated that while her daughter
enjoyed riding on the back of motorcycles, Benedict had never driven one.
Dawn Euton, co-owner of Victoria Harley-Davidson and the involved motorcycle’s
previous owner, testified that the motorcycle had been customized, and the additions
resulted in a motorcycle that was too powerful for a beginner rider to operate. Euton
further testified that she had been in a bike club with Tucker and his then-wife Christi;
Tucker was a skilled driver; and Euton had never known Tucker to allow anyone else to
drive his motorcycle. At some unspecified point after the accident, Euton confronted
Tucker, and he confessed to driving his motorcycle at the time of the accident:
Well, I remember—sometimes I—I’m turning into a mom, and I told him—I
told him how disappointed I was that he hurt Christi so much. And then I
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asked him—I just asked him point blank, you know, [“]Were you driving that
bike? You let somebody else drive it?[”] And he looked at me funny; and he
said, [“]No, I drive my bike. Nobody else rides my bike. And[”]—which is
true. So I said, [“]Okay.[”]
A jury found Tucker guilty and assessed punishment. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “we
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict” and determine whether,
based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Edward v. State,
635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979)); see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (adopting
the standard of review for a sufficiency challenge as set out by Jackson). “This familiar
standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in
the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts.” Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655; see Garcia v. State, No. PD-0679-21, 2023
WL 151989, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2023) (“If the record supports conflicting
inferences, the reviewing court must presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in
favor of the prosecution and defer to the jury’s factual determinations.”) (cleaned up). We
remain mindful that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.”
Delagarza v. State, 635 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2021, pet.
ref’d) (citing Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)). We measure
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the sufficiency of the evidence by comparing the evidence produced at trial against “the
essential elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge.”
Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Malik v. State, 953
S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
To establish intoxication manslaughter under a hypothetically correct jury charge,
the State was required to prove here that (1) Tucker (2) operated a motor vehicle in a
public place (3) while intoxicated, and (4) by reason of that intoxication, (5) he caused the
death of another by accident or mistake. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08; Matamoros
v. State, 500 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, no pet.). In other
words, the State was required to prove that Tucker’s intoxication caused the fatal result,
and not just his operation of his motorcycle. See Hanna v. State, 426 S.W.3d 87, 98 n.57
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[I]ntoxication manslaughter require[s] proof that it was the
intoxicated driving that caused the victim’s injuries.”); Matamoros, 500 S.W.3d at 65.
The penal code defines “intoxication” as “not having the normal use of mental or
physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug,
a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other
substance into the body.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(A). As for causation, the
penal code provides that “[a] person is criminally responsible if the result would not have
occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause,
unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct
of the actor clearly insufficient.” Id. § 6.04(a).
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B. Operation Analysis
Tucker first argues that the evidence at trial fails to establish that he—as opposed
to Benedict—was operating the motorcycle at the time of the accident. We disagree.
Although there were no witnesses at the time of the accident and Tucker denied
operating the motorcycle, the jury was free to determine what, if any, weight to give to
Tucker’s statements to law enforcement and medical personnel. See Queeman v. State,
520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The jury is the sole judge of the credibility
of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimonies, and the reviewing court must
not usurp this role by substituting its own judgment for that of the jury.”). In performing its
credibility determination, the jury could have considered Tucker’s inconsistent statements
regarding whether he knew Benedict; Tucker’s concession that he drove the motorcycle
at all other points in the evening; and Tucker’s admission to Euton that he was driving—
not Benedict. See id.; see also Gandee v. State, No. 13-18-00343-CR, 2019 WL 5609703,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 31, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“[O]ur standard of review requires that we resolve any
conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict.”). Other evidence also
supported the inference that Tucker had been driving: Euton, Casey, and Christi testified
that Tucker had never let anyone drive his motorcycle, and Tucker was unable to provide
the name of a single individual he had previously allowed to drive his motorcycle. See
Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at 723.
Given our standard of review and considering the evidence presented during trial
as well as the reasonable inferences that the jury was free to make from that evidence,
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we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish that Tucker was operating the
motorcycle at the time of the accident. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655; Curlee, 620
S.W.3d at 778.
C. Intoxication Analysis
Tucker next avers that the State failed to prove he was intoxicated at the time the
accident occurred. However, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Tucker was intoxicated at the time of the accident based on the following
evidence: Tucker admitted to having consumed multiple beverages in the hours leading
up to the accident and to taking oxycodone while enroute to Victoria, approximately one
hour before the accident. See Zavala v. State, 89 S.W.3d 134, 140 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.) (concluding that, though the precise time the accident
occurred was unknown, evidence that appellant had been drinking several hours prior
could be used to establish intoxication at the time of the accident); see also Gandee, 2019
WL 5609703, at *3 (concluding that the jury could have relied on appellant’s admission to
law enforcement that he consumed alcohol prior to the accident as evidence of
intoxication); Salazar v. State, No. 13-16-00645-CR, 2017 WL 6545991, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 21, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (same). The State presented evidence that both oxycodone and alcohol were
found in Tucker’s system three hours after the accident, and the State’s expert witness,
Hawkins, testified to the depressive effects and elimination rates associated with the
substances. Hawkins further opined that Tucker’s toxicology report supported the
inference that he had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties. See Burnett
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v. State, 541 S.W.3d 77, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The jury is permitted to consider
whether a defendant was intoxicated from ‘any other substance’ when there is evidence
that the defendant ingested a substance that caused him to become intoxicated or there
is sufficient evidence for a rational juror to infer such.”); Fulton v. State, 576 S.W.3d 905,
910 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, pet. ref’d) (concluding jury was entitled to believe expert’s
testimony concerning appellant’s toxicology report and explanations of the intoxicating
effects of alcohol consumption and its absorption and elimination rates); see also Embry
v. Martinez, No. 05-20-00022-CV, 2021 WL 2309983, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 7,
2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).
Moreover, several individuals testified to their observations regarding Tucker’s
intoxicated condition after the accident. See Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (noting that slurred speech and bloodshot eyes, among other things,
“would logically raise an inference that the defendant was intoxicated”); see also Garcia
v. State, No. 13-18-00373-CR, 2020 WL 1858285, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg Apr. 9, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (providing
that lay opinion testimony may be probative evidence of intoxication as “a witness does
not have to be an expert to testify that a person he observes is intoxicated by alcohol”).
A bystander at the scene testified that he smelled alcohol emanating from Tucker—an
observation also expressed by the responding EMS medics minutes later, staff at the
hospital, Trooper Garcia, and hours later, Tucker’s daughter and ex-wife. See Foley v.
State, 327 S.W.3d 907, 915–16 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, pet. ref’d)
(concluding evidence was sufficient to support intoxication element where evidence
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included testimony that appellant’s breath smelled strongly of alcohol). Trooper Garcia
described additional characteristics which, based on Trooper Garcia’s training and
experience, may also evidence Tucker’s state of intoxication: thick, tongue-tied, slurred
speech; and glassy, red, bloodshot eyes. See Kirsch, 306 S.W.3d at 745; Kinnett v. State,
623 S.W.3d 876, 899–900 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (providing that
generally, an officer’s opinion testimony based upon experience and the observed facts
that a defendant was intoxicated is sufficient to establish the element of intoxication); see
also Garcia, 2020 WL 1858285, at *3 (same).
Based on the aforementioned, we conclude that a rational factfinder could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Tucker was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655; Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015) (“Based on [the defendant’s] admission that he had been drinking, [the officer’s]
observation that [the defendant] appeared ‘very intoxicated,’ and the fact that no alcoholic
beverages were found in the vicinity, a factfinder could have reasonably inferred that [the
defendant] consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication somewhere other
than where he was found.”); Gibson v. State, 233 S.W.3d 447, 451–52 (Tex. App.—Waco
2007, no pet.) (holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that the
defendant was intoxicated where his vehicle left the road and struck a tree; a sample of
the defendant’s blood revealed the recent ingestion of methamphetamine, cocaine, and
two other drugs; forensic scientists testified how those drugs impaired motor skills and
judgment; and circumstances of the accident itself were indicative of a loss of normal
mental faculties).
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D. Causation Analysis
Finally, Tucker contends that the State failed to prove the requisite connection
between his intoxication and the resulting harm, namely, Benedict’s death. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.04(a), 49.08; Hanna, 426 S.W.3d at 98 n.57. However, “[t]he State
is not required to prove that intoxication is the sole cause of the accident,” Matamoros,
500 S.W.3d at 64, and we have already concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
show that Tucker was operating the motorcycle while intoxicated at the time of the
accident. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08. “Being intoxicated at the scene of a traffic
accident in which the actor was a driver is some circumstantial evidence that the actor’s
intoxication caused the accident, and the inference of causation is even stronger when
the accident is a one-car collision with an inanimate object.” Kuciemba v. State, 310
S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Thus, applying the necessary standard of
review, we now conclude the jury could have reasonably found Tucker’s intoxication
caused Benedict’s death, alone or concurrently with another cause, because Tucker was
too impaired to operate his motorcycle on a public road, causing him to lose control of the
motorcycle and collide into a bar ditch with Benedict as his passenger. See id.; see also
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.04(a), 49.08; Matamoros, 500 S.W.3d at 65 (“Based on the
evidence set out above, a reasonable factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that ‘but for’ appellant’s intoxication and operation of a motor vehicle on a public
street, the death would not have occurred.”).
We overrule Tucker’s sole issue on appeal.
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III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
CLARISSA SILVA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the
9th day of March, 2023.
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