Dorothy R. Schroeder v. LND Management LLC , 446 S.W.3d 94 ( 2014 )

Opinion issued August 12, 2014
In The
C ourt of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-13-00460-CV
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DOROTHY R. SCHROEDER, Appellant
V.
LND MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 4
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 12-CCV-049264
OPINION
Appellant, Dorothy R. Schroeder, challenges the portion of the county
court’s post-judgment order disbursing $4,000 of her $8,000 appeal bond funds as
damages to appellee, LND Management, LLC (“LND”), after LND prevailed in its
forcible detainer suit against her. In two issues, Schroeder contends that the county
court erred in granting, outside its plenary power, relief that is inconsistent with the
final judgment and lacks “sufficient legal or factual support.”
We vacate and dismiss in part, and reverse and render in part.
Background
After Schroeder defaulted on the terms of a deed of trust which secured
payment of the note on her real property located in Sugarland, the property was
posted for foreclosure and sold to LND at public auction. When Schroeder refused
to vacate the property, LND filed a petition for forcible detainer in a justice court.
In its petition, LND requested “back rent in the amount of $2,200 as calculated at
the time of filing [September 20, 2012],” “judgment for rent accruing from the date
of filing and becoming due thereafter,” reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs. The
justice court held that LND was entitled to possession of the premises, ordered that
LND recover from Schroeder $4,000 “as rent,” and set an appeal bond of $8,000.
Schroeder deposited $8,000 into the registry of the court, and she appealed to the
county court for a trial de novo.
At trial, the county court admitted into evidence a certified copy of a
substitute trustee’s deed showing LND as the owner of the property; a certified
copy of the deed of trust showing that Schroeder, by holding over following
foreclosure, was a tenant at sufferance; and an affidavit showing that LND sent
Schroeder a notice to vacate. LND asserted that it was “seeking a judgment of
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possession only.” The county court granted LND possession of the property and
ordered that each party bear its own costs. Schroeder surrendered the property to
LND, and neither party appealed.
Subsequently, Schroeder moved for disbursement of her appeal bond. At a
hearing on her motion, Schroeder argued that the full amount of her $8,000 bond
should be returned to her because LND “didn’t seek in their pleadings any money
damages” and “didn’t offer any evidence” regarding damages at trial in the county
court. She further noted that the county court did not, in its judgment, award LND
any damages or attorney’s fees. In response, LND conceded that “no money [had
been] awarded” and “[t]here really couldn’t be any past due rents or anything like
that awarded.” Nevertheless, LND requested that it be awarded the full amount of
Schroeder’s bond based on a “reasonable rent value” of “[one] percent of the sales
price” of the property for each of the eight months that she had occupied the
property after foreclosure. The county court declined, noting that LND “didn’t sue
for it” and explaining that it would not “award money [for] something that [was]
not pled.” The following discussion then took place:
[LND]: . . . I understand if you want to split the baby and
give half and half, or even some different . . .
percentage, but, Your Honor, I don’t think
[Schroeder is] entitled to . . . the fruits of holding
over the property for eight months.
THE COURT: Well, there is some argument there.
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[Schroeder]: There would have been, Judge, if they would have
brought it up at trial.
....
THE COURT: You want me to kill the baby. All right, I’m going
to split the difference between you guys. Four and
four. I think that’s fair. . . . That way I can give
everybody something. . . .
The county court then issued an “Order to Disburse Funds,” awarding
$4,000 to LND, “as use and occupancy on the property” from August 2012 through
March 2013, and returning the remaining $4,000 to Schroeder. It is from this order
that Schroeder appeals.
Disbursement Order
In her first issue, Schroeder argues that the county court “committed a clear
abuse of discretion when, acting without plenary jurisdiction, it signed a post-
judgment order inconsistent with, and constituting a material change in, substantial
adjudicated portions of the judgment.”
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law
subject to de novo review. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). A trial court retains jurisdiction for a minimum of
thirty days after it signs a judgment to vacate, modify, correct, or reform its
judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d); Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip.,
Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Tex. 2000); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c), (e)
(providing certain post-judgment motions extend period of plenary power). Once
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the trial court’s plenary power expires, it generally lacks jurisdiction to act and any
orders it issues are typically void. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605
(Tex. 2000). Outside its plenary power, the actions that a trial court may take with
respect to its judgment are limited. Custom Corporates, Inc. v. Sec. Storage, Inc.,
207 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Madeksho
v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols & Friend, 112 S.W.3d 679, 686 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (noting trial courts retain constitutional
jurisdiction to perform certain collateral duties).
For example, notwithstanding the expiration of its plenary power, a trial
court may act to enforce its judgment or correct clerical errors. See TEX. R. CIV. P.
308, 316, 329b(f). Further, “[f]unds on deposit in the registry of a trial court are
always subject to the control and order of the trial court, and the court enjoys great
latitude in dealing with them.” Madeksho, 112 S.W.3d at 686 (“Indeed, they must
have such jurisdiction; they cannot simply toss the money back out the clerk’s
window.”). A trial court “unquestionably ha[s] quasi in rem jurisdiction to
determine who owns funds tendered into [its] registry.” Id. (citing Bryant v. United
Shortline Inc. Assurance Servs., N.A., 972 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tex. 1998)). “[M]oney
cannot be paid out of the registry of a court except on written evidence of the order
of the judge of the court in which the funds have been deposited, authorizing the
disbursement of the funds.” Eikenburg v. Webb, 880 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Tex.
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App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (citing TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 117.121 (Vernon 2008)).
In performing its collateral duties, however, a trial court may not issue an
order outside of its plenary power that is inconsistent with the original judgment or
otherwise constitutes “a material change in the substantive adjudicative portions of
the judgment.” Custom Corporates, Inc., 207 S.W.3d at 839. And such post-
judgment orders may not require the performance of obligations in addition to “the
obligations imposed by the final judgment.” Id.; Bank One, N.A. v. Wohlfahrt, 193
S.W.3d 190, 194–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
Here, the county court signed its final judgment on April 4, 2013; its plenary
power expired on May 6, 2013; and it signed its disbursement order fourteen days
later, on May 20, 2013. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). Its plenary power having
expired, the county court possessed inherent power to issue an order disbursing the
funds from its registry, subject to the limitation that its order not be inconsistent
with its final judgment or impose obligations in addition to those reflected in its
final judgment. See Custom Corporates, Inc., 207 S.W.3d at 839; Cook v.
Stallcup, 170 S.W.3d 916, 920–21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (holding trial
court’s denial of motion to release funds from its registry constituted error because
action inconsistent with its final judgment); Madeksho, 112 S.W.3d at 686.
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LND, at trial in the county court, asserted that it was “seeking a judgment of
possession only,” and it presented evidence to support its alleged superior right of
possession. The county court granted possession to LND without awarding it any
damages or attorney’s fees. It further ordered that each party pay its own costs.
LND did not appeal. At the hearing on Schroeder’s motion to disburse her bond,
LND conceded that it could not “plead for past due rent or use and possession,”
and it admitted that it had not requested damages for unpaid rent. Nevertheless, the
county court, in its post-judgment disbursement order, granted LND $4,000 “as use
and occupancy on the property” from August 2012 through March 2013.
We conclude that the disbursement order, which imposes an obligation on
Schroeder to pay $4,000 in damages to LND, is wholly inconsistent with, and in
addition to, the obligations set forth in the county court’s final judgment, wherein it
awarded no damages to LND. 1 See Cook, 170 S.W.3d at 920–21; see also Custom
Corporates, Inc., 207 S.W.3d at 839. Accordingly, we hold that the county court
1
Although the justice court in its final judgment awarded LND $4,000 in damages,
it is well-settled that perfection of an appeal to a county court for a trial de novo
vacates and annuls the judgment of the justice court; the county court does not
review the justice court’s action. See Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 69–70
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). In a trial de novo in a
forcible-detainer proceeding in county court, a party is “permitted to plead, prove
and recover his damages, if any, suffered for withholding or defending possession
of the premises during the pendency of the appeal.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.11; see
Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
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erred in ordering that $4,000 of Schroeder’s bond funds be disbursed to LND,
rather than back to Schroeder.
We sustain Schroeder’s first issue. 2
Conclusion
We vacate the portion of the county court’s Order to Disburse Funds
directing that $4,000 of Schroeder’s bond funds be disbursed to LND, and we
dismiss that portion of the case. We reverse the portion of the Order to Disburse
Funds directing that only $4,000 of Schroeder’s bond funds be disbursed to her,
and we render an order directing that the Clerk of the Court shall pay the entire
$8,000 in the Registry of the Court to Dorothy R. Schroeder, including all interest
accrued thereon.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Sharp.
2
Having sustained Schroeder’s first issue, we do not reach her second issue, in
which she asserts that, “[t]he trial court, even if deemed to have acted within its
plenary jurisdiction, abused its discretion” in signing a post-judgment order
“without sufficient legal or factual support.”
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