Victoria L Mann v. L Scott Propst ( 2020 )

Affirm in part, Reverse and Remand in part; Opinion Filed March 26, 2020
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-19-00432-CV
VICTORIA L. MANN, Appellant
V.
L. SCOTT PROPST, Appellee
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 366-00478-2018
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Schenck, and Carlyle
Opinion by Justice Myers
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of appellee L. Scott Propst, and
against his former wife, appellant Victoria Mann, awarding ownership to Propst of
disputed funds in a Texas Tomorrow Fund Account. In two issues, Mann argues
(1) the trial court erred by granting Propst judgment for the entire balance of the
account, less a sum awarded to Mann; and (2) the trial court erred by not granting
judgment in favor of Mann on her counterclaim for declaratory judgment relief
against Propst. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The lawsuit by appellee Propst against appellant Mann sought to partition
funds in a refund check they had received from an account at the Texas Tomorrow
Funds (TTF), which was established after their divorce for the benefit of their now-
deceased daughter, Jessica, born on September 25, 1991.
Under the terms of the parties’ Agreed Decree of Divorce of August 17,
1995, Mann was named the sole managing conservator of Jessica and Propst was
the possessory conservator who paid child support to Mann. The divorce decree
provided in part that Propst was obligated to pay to Mann child support of $250 per
month, with the first payment being due and payable on September 15, 1995, and a
like payment being due on the 15th day of each month thereafter until the date of
the earliest occurrence of certain events, which included Jessica reaching the age of
18 years, marrying, dying, and “further order modifying this child support.”
Approximately four years later on November 1, 1999, Mann and her then-
husband entered, as joint purchasers, into a TTF, Texas Prepaid Higher Education
Tuition Program Master Agreement to set aside money for Jessica’s college
education. Mann and her husband checked the payment option on the application
for “[m]onthly installments until graduation (through August 1 of the projected
year of high school graduation).”
The TTF master agreement included provisions addressing substitution,
assignment, and transfer, as well as termination of the agreement and the refund of
money paid. Article VII, called “TERMINATION AND REFUND,” provides in
subparagraph one that “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided herein, only the
–2–
Purchaser of Prepaid Tuition Contract may terminate the Prepaid Tuition Contract
or receive a refund of amounts paid in under the Prepaid Tuition Contract.”
Subparagraph six provides in part:
If the Beneficiary dies . . . after having graduated from high school but
prior to attending an institution of higher education or a private or
independent institution of higher education, a refund may be issued or
the benefits under such contract may be transferred to another
qualified beneficiary. If a change of beneficiary is not requested, a
lump sum refund may be made within 80 days of the date the Program
is notified of the death or disability to the Purchaser of the Prepaid
Tuition Contract, provided proof of death or disability is submitted in
a form acceptable to the Board.
Article VIII, called “SUBSTITUTION, ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER,”
provides in subparagraph two:
The Purchaser may transfer ownership of a Prepaid Tuition Contract
to another eligible Purchaser provided that the transfer is
accomplished without consideration (except as a part of a transaction
in which the transferee of the contract is assuming the transferor’s
obligation to a third party to pay the Beneficiary’s tuition and required
fees), and if the Beneficiary is a nonresident of Texas, the substitute
Purchaser meets the applicable Residency requirements.
The agreement defines a “Purchaser” as “the person or persons obligated to make
payments under a Prepaid Tuition Plan Contract.”
On March 26, 2002, Mann and Propst entered into an agreed order in a suit
to modify the parent-child relationship, with the parents becoming joint managing
conservators and Propst now serving as the primary joint managing conservator.
The 2002 order, approved as to form and substance by both parents, stated in part
that all payments of child support for the benefit of Jessica currently paid by Propst
–3–
to Mann “shall immediately cease.” The order included the following provisions:
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
The Court finds that the parties have entered into a written agreement
as contained in this Agreed Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child
relationship by virtue of having approved this Agreed Order as to both
form and substance. To the extent permitted by law, the parties
stipulate the agreement is enforceable as a contract. The Court
approves the agreement of the parties as contained in this Agreed
Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship.
****
CHILD SUPPORT
Based upon [Mann] being currently unemployed and unable to find
fulltime employment, [Propst] agrees, in lieu of direct payment to him
as obligee and primary joint managing conservator of [Jessica], that
[Mann] shall pay $200.00 per month as child support for the benefit of
[Jessica] into the Texas Tomorrow Fund, P.O. Box 13407, Austin
Texas 78711-3407, account number [ ], with the first payment being
due and payable on or before April 15, 2002, and a like $200.00
payment being due and payable on or before the 15th day of each
month thereafter until the first month following the date of the earliest
occurrence of one of the events specified below:
1. the child reaches the age of eighteen years . . . . ;
2. the child marries;
3. the child dies;
4. the child’s disabilities are otherwise removed for general purposes;
5. [Mann] and [Propst] remarry each other; or
6. further order modifying this child support.
****
Texas Tomorrow Fund Purchaser.
[Mann] agrees to execute and submit a “change of purchaser” form
–4–
(attached hereto as Exhibit A) to the Texas Prepaid Higher Education
Tuition Board, P.O. Box 13407, Austin Texas 78711-3407, to add
[Propst] as a joint purchaser on the Texas Tomorrow Fund, account
number [ ], by no later than April 1, 2002. [Mann] further agrees to
provide, within 10 days of receiving a statement, a copy of the Texas
Tomorrow Fund’s statement to [Propst] each time a statement is
provided. . . .
Handwritten and initialed by the court and both parties on page eleven of the
agreed order is the following provision: “IT IS ORDERED that [Mann] shall not
withdraw any money from the Texas Tomorrow Fund, account number [ ], except
by joint agreement, evidenced in writing, for the specific purpose of [Jessica’s]
college education.”
On March 29, 2002, pursuant to the agreed order, Mann signed a “Texas
Prepaid Higher Education Tuition Program Change of Purchaser” form––the same
form attached to the agreed order––that identifies Propst as the new joint purchaser
on the account. Propst signed the form as the “New Joint Purchaser,” and the word
“joint” was handwritten into the “CERTIFICATE OF CURRENT PURCHASER,”
where Mann certified she was relinquishing “all rights and responsibilities of the
Contract to the New Joint Purchaser.” It appears in the record as follows:
–5–
On September 4, 2009, the parties entered into a second agreed order further
modifying Mann’s child support obligations. The order provided in part:
IT IS ORDERED that [Mann] is obligated to pay and shall pay to
[Propst] support for [Jessica] of $330.66 per month payable under the
following terms and conditions. IT IS ORDERED that Respondent,
[Mann], shall continue to pay $190.00 as child support for the benefit
of [Jessica], into the Texas Tomorrow Fund, P.O. Box 13407, Austin,
Texas 78711-3407, account number [ ] with the first payment of
$190.00 per month due and payable on October 1, 2009 and a like
$190.00 payment being due and payable on the 1st day of each month,
thereafter until such time as the purchase price of $22,975.61 shall be
paid in full. Additionally, [Mann], shall pay as child support the
remainder of the total amount of child support due each month in the
amount of $140.66 as child support for the benefit of [Jessica], with
the first installment being due and payable on October 1, 2009 and a
like payment of $140.66 being due and payable on or before the 1st
day of each month thereafter until the first month following the date
of the earliest occurrence of one of the events specified below:
1. the child reaches the age of eighteen years or graduates from high
school, whichever occurs later, subject to the provisions for support
beyond the age of eighteen years set out below;
2. the child marries;
3. the child dies;
4. the child’s disabilities are otherwise removed for general purposes;
or
5. the date on which the child begins active service as defined by 10
U.S.C. Section 101 after enlisting in the armed forces of the United
States.
As before, the 2009 agreed order was approved as to form and content by both
parents.
For ten years, from August 1, 2000 to August 1, 2010, Mann made the
required monthly payments under the agreement, for a total amount paid of
–6–
$22,975.61. Neither the 2002 nor the 2009 agreed orders, however, specified what
would occur if Jessica did not use the money in the TTF account, a situation that
arose when she died on December 6, 2017. TTF was formally notified of Jessica’s
death in a contract cancellation form signed by Mann on December 22, 2017. At
the time of her death, Jessica had not used any of the funds in the TTF account.
In January of 2018, Propst filed a lawsuit against Mann seeking a partition
of the funds in the TTF account. His original petition alleged in part: “Plaintiff
would show that ownership of the Texas Tomorrow Fund was vested in Plaintiff
by way of the Court Orders signed by the 366th District Court of Collin County,
Texas.” Mann responded with a general denial and a counterclaim for a
declaratory judgment regarding the “rights and interests of the parties” under the
TTF account agreement and the $22,348.61 in principal and the $27,489.99 in
earnings––comprising the $49,838.60 refund check provided by TTF, made jointly
payable to both Propst and Mann. Mann asked the court to declare that all of the
funds belonged to her and that the court order disbursement of the refund proceeds.
Mann also moved for summary judgment, which the court denied.
Following a bench trial at which both Mann and Propst testified, the trial
court signed a final judgment on January 16, 2019 that Propst and Mann were joint
owners of the TTF account; that Mann took out the account and paid in the sum of
$4,060, to which she was entitled to be reimbursed; and that the remainder of the
money paid into the account “was paid in as child support by agreement of the
–7–
parties.” The court granted judgment to Propst for the full amount of the TTF
account ($49,838.60), minus the $4,060 awarded to Mann. According to the
judgment, the $4060 was “a refund due [Mann] of the money that she paid in prior
to the parties’ first agreement for the monthly payments to be paid to the account
as child support.” The court ordered the parties to bear their own attorney’s fees
and costs.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court found:
After both sides rested and closed their cases the Court found, based
on the preponderance of the evidence, that both [Propst] and [Mann]
are joint owners of the Texas Tomorrow Fund account. The Court
noted that [Mann] paid $4060.00 initially into the account when it was
first created and is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of
$4060.00, she paid when she had the account established. The Court
found that the remainder of the money in the account in the amount of
$45,778.60 be awarded to [Propst] in that all but $4060.00 was paid as
child support by [Mann] to [Propst]. . . .
The Court finds that on March 26, 2002 that an order was entered in
the 366th District Court that stated, “VICTORIA LYNN MANN
agrees to execute and submit a ‘change of purchaser’ form to the
Texas Prepaid higher Education Tuition Board to add L. SCOTT
PROPST as a joint purchaser on the Texas Tomorrow Fund.” It was
also Ordered that “VICTORIA LYNN MANN shall pay $200.00 per
month as child support for the benefit of [Jessica] into the Texas
Tomorrow Fund . . . . and a like $200.00 payment being due and
payable on or before the 15th day of each month thereafter.”
On the 4th day of September 2009, the Court entered another Order
that required “VICTORIA LYNN MANN shall continue to pay
$190.00 as child support for the benefit of [Jessica] into the Texas
Tomorrow Fund”.
The Court after hearing the evidence at trial found that all monies paid
before March 26, 2002 were paid by Defendant [Mann] and all
payments made after March 26, 2002 were child support payments
–8–
made by [Mann] into the Texas Tomorrow Fund as child support for
the use and benefit of [Jessica], by Plaintiff [Propst].
The Court further finds that Plaintiff [Propst] and Defendant [Mann]
entered into an agreement in March 2002 and September 2009 in the
Family Court where [Propst] could have used the $200.00 in 2002 and
the $190.00 in 2009 as child support to pay bills for his family and the
child [Jessica] but elected to use those funds to deposit those funds in
the Texas Tomorrow Fund and as such he was the owner and entitled
to 100% of all those funds and the interest that accrued on those funds
from March 2002 until now. In addition, the Court finds that [Mann]
is not entitled to recoup funds she paid to [Propst] for child support.
Mann filed a motion for new trial and an amended motion for new trial, both of
which were overruled by operation of law.
DISCUSSION
In her first issue, Mann argues the trial court erred by granting judgment for
Propst for the entire balance of the TTF account, less the $4,060 awarded to Mann.
In her second issue, she contends the trial court erred by not granting judgment in
her favor on her counterclaim for declaratory judgment relief. We will address
these issues together.
This case involves a dispute over money paid into the TTF account post-
divorce, and Propst brought a suit for partition of funds asserting his claim to the
TTF account balance. The purpose of a post-dissolution partition suit under the
Texas Property Code is to divide jointly owned property. See TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 23.001. Section 23.001 provides:
A joint owner or claimant of real property or an interest in real
property or a joint owner of personal property may compel a partition
of the interest or the property among the joint owners or claimants
–9–
under this chapter and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. Rule 772 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “An action seeking
partition of personal property as authorized by Section 23.001, Texas Property
Code, shall be commenced in the same manner as other civil suits, and the several
owners or claimants of such property shall be cited as in other cases.” TEX. R. CIV.
P. 772.
A petition for partition under the Property Code can be filed by any joint
owner or claimant of real property or any joint owner of personal property. See
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.001; McGehee v. Campbell, No. 01–08–1023-CV,
2010 WL 1241300, *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2010, no pet.)
(mem. op.); Johnson v. La Mesa Farms, Inc., No. 07–07–0241–CV, 2009 WL
35353, at *3 (Tex. App.––Amarillo Jan. 7, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In a
post-dissolution partition suit governed by the Property Code, the petitioner has the
burden of establishing that the property is jointly owned and the petitioner has a
present possessory interest in the property. See Manchaca v. Martinez, 148
S.W.2d 391, 391 (Tex. 1941); Savell v. Savell, 837 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
The parties, however, disagree on the appropriate standard of review for this
issue. Propst contends the standard of review is abuse of discretion because this is
a suit for partition, while Mann argues we should conduct a de novo review. It is
true that the rules of equity govern a trial court’s partition of property, see
–10–
Rodriguez v. Rivas, 573 S.W.3d 447, 451 (Tex. App.––Amarillo 2019, no pet.);
Bowman v. Stephen, 569 S.W.3d 210, 223 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st] 2018, no
pet.); McGehee, 2010 WL 1241300, at *3, and we review a trial court’s decision
granting or denying equitable relief for abuse of discretion. See Wagner & Brown,
Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 428–29 (Tex. 2008); Rodriguez, 573 S.W.3d at
451. But the issues in this case concern the interpretation of the agreed orders and
the master agreement––questions of law we review de novo. See, e.g., Henry v.
Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018) (trial court’s legal determinations
reviewed de novo); URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018)
(construction of unambiguous contract is a question of law reviewed de novo).
Thus, a party challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an
adverse finding on an issue on which it did not have the burden of proof must show
that no evidence supports the finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348
S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). We may sustain the legal sufficiency challenge only
when (1) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is
barred by rules of law or evidence from crediting the only evidence of a vital fact;
(3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4)
the evidence conclusively disproves a vital fact. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman,
118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003); Brandt Cos., LLC v. Beard Process Sols., Inc.,
No. 05–17–00780–CV, 2018 WL 4103210, at *10 (Tex. App.––Dallas Aug. 29,
2018, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (mem. op.); TRG-Braes Brook, LP v.
–11–
Hepfner, No. 05–17–01094–CV, 2018 WL 3434555, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas
July 17, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
We review de novo the trial court’s conclusions of law. See BMC Software
Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). We are not bound by
the trial court’s legal conclusions, but the conclusions of law will be upheld on
appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the
evidence. See Fulgham v. Fischer, 349 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. App.––Dallas
2011, no pet); Stable Energy, L.P. v. Newberry, 999 S.W.2d 538, 547 (Tex. App.––
Austin 1999, pet. denied); Westech Eng’g, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructors, Inc.,
835 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. App.––Austin 1992, no writ). Incorrect conclusions of
law do not require reversal if the controlling findings of fact support a correct legal
theory. Fulgham, 349 S.W.3d at 157; Westech, 835 S.W.2d at 196. Also,
conclusions of law may not be reversed unless they are erroneous as a matter of
law. Fulgham, 349 S.W.3d at 157; Westech, 835 S.W.2d at 196.
We interpret the parties’ agreed orders according to the law of contracts.1
See Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986) (marital property agreement
incorporated into final divorce decree is interpreted as a contract); In re P.D.D.,
256 S.W.3d 834, 844 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (“An agreed judgment
must be interpreted as if it were a contract between the parties and the
1
In fact, the 2002 agreed order provided that “[t]o the extent permitted by law, the parties stipulate
that the agreement is enforceable as a contract.”
–12–
interpretation is, accordingly, governed by the laws relating to contracts.”);
Chapman v. Abbot, 251 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 2007,
no pet.) (agreed divorce decree is a contract subject to usual rules of contract
interpretation); Soto v. Soto, 936 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. App.––El Paso 1996, no
writ) (consent judgments look for their interpretation to law of contracts). Our
primary concern when interpreting an agreement is to ascertain and give effect to
the parties’ intent as expressed in the agreement. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391,
393 (Tex. 1983); Chapman, 251 S.W.3d at 616. We examine the writing as a
whole in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions so that none
are rendered meaningless. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393; see also In re Serv. Corp.
Int’l, 355 S.W.3d 655, 661 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (“No single provision
taken alone will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be
considered with reference to the whole instrument.”); Doe v. Tex. Ass’n of Sch.
Bds., Inc., 283 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied)
(“Contractual provisions should be considered with reference to the entire
instrument; no single provision should control.”). Also, “[w]ords used in a
contract should be given their plain grammatical meaning unless it definitely
appears such a meaning would defeat the intentions of the parties.” Am. Realty
Trust, Inc. v. JDN Real Estate–McKinney, L.P., 74 S.W.3d 527, 532 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2002, pet. denied)
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court. Heritage
–13–
Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996). If the agreement can
be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, it is not ambiguous
and we construe it as a matter of law. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Breitenfeld, 167 S.W.3d
840, 841 (Tex. 2005); Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393; Broesche v. Jacobson, 218
S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). We
construe unambiguous contracts according to the plain meaning of their express
wording. Lyons v. Montgomery, 701 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1985). Unambiguous
contracts are enforced as written. Heritage Res., Inc., 939 S.W.2d at 121.
The trial court in this case concluded that all payments made into the TTF
account after March 26, 2002, the date the trial court signed the 2002 agreed order,
were child support payments made by Mann to Propst. We have held that the term
“child support” as used in chapter 154 of the Texas Family Code does not include
support for nondisabled persons who have turned eighteen and graduated from
high school. In re W.R.B., No. 05–12–00776–CV, 2014 WL 1008222, at *4 (Tex.
App.––Dallas Feb. 20, 2014, pet. denied) (trial court had no authority to order
reimbursement for post-majority support because mother failed to seek contractual
relief). “Child support, by definition, applies only to a child under the age of 18
years who has not yet graduated from high school or a high-school equivalent
program.” In re W.R.B., 2014 WL 1008222, at *4; see also In re H.L.B., No. 05–
18–01061–CV, 2020 WL 104623, at *4 (Tex. App.––Dallas Jan. 9, 2020, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (regardless of label placed upon it, father’s obligation to pay minor
–14–
child’s school tuition was not a contractual debt owed to mother; it was an
obligation undertaken to fulfill a duty owed directly to the minor and, as a result,
was a form of child support). Thus, post-majority support is not child support, but
“an agreement to pay a child’s college tuition after the child reaches the age of
majority can be enforced contractually.” In re H.L.B., 2020 WL 104623, at *4
(citing In re W.R.B., 2014 WL 1008222, at *4).
In this case, Jessica turned eighteen years of age on September 25, 2009, ten
months and seven days before Mann made her last monthly payment on August 1,
2010. Although payments made by Mann after Jessica reached the age of majority
were not “child support” as that term is used in chapter 154 of the Texas Family
Code, the parties had an agreement for the payment of post-majority support that is
enforceable contractually, and this is the question to which we now turn.
Mann argues that, to the extent she assigned an interest in the TTF account
to Propst in 2002, the evidence at trial (e.g., the master agreement, the divorce
decree, and the 2002 and 2009 agreed orders) showed that Propst received
consideration in the agreed orders. Mann further argues that this conclusively
disproves––given the anti-assignment provision in article VIII of the master
agreement permitting a transfer of ownership to another eligible purchaser only if
accomplished without consideration––that Propst gained an ownership interest in
the TTF account under section 23.001. Mann also points out that the TTF master
agreement allowed for a lump-sum payment to be made to the “purchaser,” defined
–15–
as “the person or persons obligated to make payments under a Prepaid Tuition Plan
Contract.” According to Mann, only she qualifies as a “purchaser” under the TTF
master agreement because, she presumes, she was the person “obligated” to make
the contractual payments. Alternatively, Mann claims there is no more than a
scintilla of evidence that Propst gained an ownership interest.
An anti-assignment clause is considered an affirmative defense and, like
other affirmative defenses, it can be waived. See Johnson v. Structured Asset
Servs., LLC, 148 S.W.3d 711, 719, 722 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2004, no pet.).
Moreover, affirmative defenses are waived if they are not pleaded or tried by
consent. Compass Bank v. MFP Fin. Servs., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 94; Land Title Co. of
Dall., Inc. v. F.M. Stigler, Inc., 609 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. 1980) (Rule 94 requires
all matters constituting avoidance or affirmative defense be pleaded to give
opposing party notice of defensive issues to be tried; failure to do so results in
waiver of affirmative defense); Barnett v. Coppell N. Tex. Court, Ltd., 123 S.W.3d
804, 816 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (issues raised by builder on appeal
in breach of contract action were waived where builder failed to plead issues as
affirmative defenses and failed to request proper jury questions); Frazier v.
Havens, 102 S.W.3d 406, 411 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)
(party waives affirmative defense if not pleaded or tried by consent). Mann did not
plead the anti-assignment clause as an affirmative defense or raise it in her answer,
–16–
and she does not argue the issue was tried by consent. Nor is there any indication
in the record that she brought the matter to the trial court’s attention. Accordingly,
to the extent Mann is relying on the anti-assignment provision as a matter of
avoidance or an affirmative defense, she waived the issue.
Additionally, even if we overlooked the fact that it was not pleaded or tried
by consent, a party may be estopped from asserting an anti-assignment provision if
she expressly or impliedly waived enforcement of it. See Johnson, 148 S.W.3d at
722. In Johnson, for example, we concluded, based on our review of Texas case
law, that any contractual provision, including an anti-assignment clause, can be
waived. Id. at 722. In Johnson, the purchase agreement contained an express
waiver of the anti-assignment provision in his structured settlement agreement. Id.
at 724. We held that Johnson expressly waived any contractual right he had to
assert the anti-assignment provision of his settlement agreement by executing the
purchase agreement containing a “waiver of restrictions on assignability”
provision. Id. But we also concluded that Johnson’s intention to yield or waive his
rights under the anti-assignment provision was demonstrated by his silence or
failure to object to Stone Street’s receipt of the monthly payments for
approximately eleven months. Id. at 724–25.
In this case, Mann assigned an interest in the TTF account to Propst as part
of the March 26, 2002 agreed order. The parties agreed in the 2002 order that “in
lieu of direct payment to [Propst] as obligee and primary joint managing
–17–
conservator of [Jessica],” Mann would pay $200 per month into the TTF account,
with the first payment due April 15, 2002. The 2009 agreed order similarly
provided that Mann would continue to pay $190 per month “as child support for
the benefit of [Jessica]” into the TTF account, with the first payment due October
1, 2009, and a like payment due on the first day of each month thereafter until the
$22,975.61 purchase price was paid in full. According to Propst’s testimony at the
bench trial, he agreed to the payment by Mann of the monthly payments into the
TTF account because “I just wanted to make sure that my daughter when her time
was right, she was––she would be able to get an education, go to college.” He also
testified that “I could have used those funds, but I just wanted to make sure that,
you know, [the child] was able at the time to get an education.”
The parties further agreed, as part of the 2002 order, that Mann would
execute and submit a “change of purchaser” form adding Propst as a joint
purchaser on the account. Propst signed the change of purchaser form as a “joint
purchaser,” and in his deposition he testified that he was added as a joint purchaser
on the account as a “[s]afety precaution” against Mann cashing in the TTF
contract. As if to emphasize their intention to add Propst as a new joint purchaser
on the account, the parties interlineated the word “joint” into the change of
purchaser form.
Mann now argues, however, that, in effect, she did not have the authority to
do this because of the anti-assignment provision. The record shows that she
–18–
accepted the benefits of the divorce decree (i.e., lowering the child support she
otherwise would have owed to Propst) without invoking the anti-assignment
provision, only now seeking, on appeal, to void the assignment to Propst of a joint
interest in the account by relying on purported anti-assignment language that,
according to the record, she never brought to the trial court’s attention. Based on
the record in this case, Mann impliedly waived the anti-assignment provision.
We reach a similar conclusion regarding her reliance on the definition of
“purchaser.” As we explained in Johnson, contractual rights can be waived. See
id. at 722 (“Contractual rights can be waived,” and “[a] party can waive contract
provisions that are in the contract for his benefit.”); see also Watson v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., 530 F. App’x 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Under Texas law, a
party may waive a contractual right by intentionally relinquishing it or by engaging
in conduct inconsistent with that right.”). Mann agreed to give Propst an interest in
the TTF account as a “joint purchaser” and to relinquish all of her rights and
responsibilities in the contract to him, but now argues, after accepting the benefits
of the agreement, that she had no legal right to ever give the promised
consideration because he did not meet the definition of “purchaser.” We conclude
that this issue, too, has been waived.
Apart from the anti-assignment provision and the definition of “purchaser,”
Mann’s argument for why Propst did not have a joint ownership interest relies on
section 9.201 of the Family Code, which provides for the division of community
–19–
property not previously divided by the divorce decree. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.201 (authorizing trial court to order post-divorce division of community
property not divided in final divorce decree). Mann argues there is no evidence the
TTF account she established in 1999, or the money she paid into it through August
2010, was undivided property of the community estate, and thus the award of an
interest in the TTF account to Propst under 9.201 was reversible error. See
Fleming v. Fleming, No. 01–11–00635–CV, 2012 WL 6754994, at *4 (Tex. App.
––Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 28, 2012, no pet.) (discussing section 9.201 and stating
that ex-wife, as post-divorce petitioner, bore burden of proving trial court did not
consider or dispose of ex-husband’s alleged ownership interest). However, this
argument appears to be premised on the notion that Propst brought his partition
action pursuant to section 9.201. Section 9.201 does not apply to suits for partition
under section 23.001. See Mayes v. Stewart, 11 S.W.3d 440, 457 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), disapproved on other grounds, Agar
Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 143 n.4 (Tex. 2019);
Phillips v. Phillips, 951 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.); Carter
v. Charles, 853 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
Indeed, as other courts have stated, the right to partition is absolute. Phillips, 951
S.W.2d at 957; Ware v. Ware, 809 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. App.––San Antonio
1991, no writ).2
2
It is also worth noting, as Propst points out, that the TTF account was not established until over four
–20–
Mann points out, correctly, that there is no provision in the agreed orders
specifying what would happen to the TTF funds Mann had agreed to pay if Jessica
did not use them for college. Mann insists she fulfilled all of her obligations under
the agreed orders by making the required monthly payments, and that the trial
court, by awarding the money to Propst, treated the agreed orders as though they
provided that upon the death of Jessica without having used the funds in the TTF
account, Mann and Propst agreed any refund of the money Mann paid after the
2002 agreed order (and interest accrued thereon) would be Propst’s property. In so
doing, Mann argues, the trial court deprived her of her separate property and
violated the longstanding rule forbidding a trial court from rewriting a contract
under the guise of interpreting it. See, e.g., Calpine Producers Servs., L.P. v.
Wiser Oil Co., 169 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2005, no pet.).
But the trial court stated in its findings, and we have noted, that Mann
agreed in the March 26, 2002 order to execute and submit a “change of purchaser”
form adding Propst as a new joint purchaser on the TTF account. And Mann did,
in fact, submit such a form, relinquishing, according to the change of purchaser
form she signed, “all rights and responsibilities of the Contract to the New Joint
Purchaser.” The TTF final account summary dated January 10, 2018 clearly
identifies Propst as a joint purchaser on the account. Consequently, based on the
years after the divorce decree was signed.
–21–
record in this case, the trial court did not err in concluding Propst had a joint
ownership interest in the TTF account.
The next question concerns the trial court’s decision awarding judgment to
Propst of the full amount of the TTF account ($49,838.60), minus the $4,060
awarded to Mann. Here, too, we disagree with Mann that the court reversibly
erred. Mann argues there is nothing in the 2002 agreement stating that she agreed
to pay the money on behalf of Propst, nor is there any assertion she was acting as
Propst’s agent. However, the agreement specified that Mann was making the
payments to the TTF account “in lieu of” the payment of child support to Propst.
To the extent that the trial court was categorizing all of the payments made after
March 26, 2002, as statutory child support under Chapter 154 of the Texas Family
Code, this was error; but the record nonetheless supports that Propst was legally
entitled to the monthly payments specified in the agreed orders. Moreover, the
parties agreed those funds would be redirected towards the TTF account, and that
Mann would (and ultimately did) effect a change of purchaser on the account,
thereby relinquishing “all rights and responsibilities of the Contract” to Propst, the
“New Joint Purchaser.” Because the orders are worded in such a way that they can
be given a certain or definite legal meaning, we conclude the trial court did not err
in finding that Propst was entitled to 100 percent “of all those funds and the
interest that accrued on those funds from March 26, 2002, until now.” See, e.g.,
Fulgham, 349 S.W.3d at 157 (erroneous legal conclusion does not require reversal
–22–
unless the controlling findings of fact and the record will not support a correct
legal theory).
Yet, the question of accrued interest presents an additional problem. As part
of her counterclaim Mann prayed for “any interest or earnings thereto.” We have
determined that she is entitled to the $4,060 awarded by the trial court, based on
what she paid into the TTF account prior to the March 26, 2002 agreed order. The
court’s judgment, however, does not calculate any accrued interest regarding that
sum, and we have no basis in the record for making that determination. Because
the calculation of interest must be left to the trial court, we remand for entry of
judgment consistent with this opinion.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in
part. We remand for a determination of accrued interest on the $4,060 awarded to
Mann, but in all other respects the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.3 Mann’s two
issues are overruled.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
190432F.P05
3
The trial court also ordered that both parties should bear their own attorney’s fees and costs, and
neither party attacks that finding. Accordingly, we will not address the issue.
–23–
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
VICTORIA L MANN, Appellant On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
District Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-19-00432-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. 366-00478-
2018.
L SCOTT PROPST, Appellee Opinion delivered by Justice Myers.
Justices Schenck and Carlyle
participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED AND REMANDED in part. We
REVERSE that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding $4,060.00 to
appellant Victoria L. Mann and REMAND this cause to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the trial court’s
judgment is AFFIRMED. It is ORDERED that each party shall bear their own
costs of appeal.
Judgment entered this 26th day of March, 2020.
–24–