Michael A. Powell v. Jenny Hodgkins, Executive Director, State Bar of Texas ( 2023 )

Motion to Review Further Orders Denied; Affirmed and Memorandum
Opinion filed March 9, 2023.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-22-00300-CV
MICHAEL A. POWELL, Appellant
V.
JENNY HODGKINS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, STATE BAR OF TEXAS;
STATE BAR OF TEXAS; CHRISTINA HOSCHLER, OIG
INVESTIGATOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; L.
BANDA, SGT. CORRECTIONAL OFFICER, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE; BOBBY LUMPKIN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; SHAREN WILSON,
CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS;
DIRECTOR, TARRANT COUNTY PUBLIC INTEGRITY UNIT; AND
DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 455th District Court
Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-21-001728
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Michael A. Powell appeals the trial court’s order declaring him a
vexatious litigant and dismissing his claims against appellee Sharen Wilson, the
Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney. For the reasons below, we affirm.1
BACKGROUND
Before Wilson was elected as the Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney,
she was the presiding judge of a criminal district court. Wilson presided over
Powell’s criminal trial, at which he was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a
child under fourteen years of age. See Powell v. State, No. 2-05-449-CV, 2008
WL 110181 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 10, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (per curiam) (affirming Powell’s conviction). Powell
currently is incarcerated.
In March 2021, Powell, acting pro se, filed an original petition in a Travis
County district court and named eight defendants, including Wilson. Powell
asserted jurisdiction under 42 United States Code section 1983, which provides
redress for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws”. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. In relevant part, Powell’s
petition states as follows:
• In March 2020, Powell was contacted by an investigator with the
Texas Office of the Inspector General. The investigator told Powell
that she was investigating an allegation that Powell had written
multiple threatening letters to Wilson.
• Powell denied sending threatening letters to Wilson. According to
Powell, this is the third time Wilson has baselessly accused him of
sending her threats.
• Powell alleged that Wilson “became incensed everytime [sic] [Powell]
had the audacity to ask other officials, attorneys, or legal aid
1
This case was transferred to this court from the Third Court of Appeals by Texas
Supreme Court Transfer Order, Misc. Docket No. 22-9025. Because of that transfer, we must
decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the Third Court of Appeals if our decision
otherwise would have been inconsistent with that court’s precedent. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
2
organizations to inquire into the veracity of his trial records, or the
integrity of Sharen Wilson’s participation in convicting him.”
• Powell asserted that Wilson has “committed multiple acts of fraud”
and “engaged in a multi-years long pattern of repeatedly making
allegations of unspecific threats against her person in order to invoke
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Disciplinary process
against” Powell.
• Powell “is of the belief that Sharen Wilson is trying to send him a
message — that she can do whatever she wants, and that he will be
suicided (killed), or injured if he continues to seek review of any
aspect of his criminal conviction.”
• According to Powell, “he has already been made aware by TDCJ of a
‘hit’ being put out on him upon his arrival into TDCJ subsequent to
his instant conviction. [Powell] believes that Sharen Wilson is/was
the chief architect of that threat.”
• Finally, Powell alleged that Wilson “has in fact blocked [Powell] from
utilizing the Public Integrity Office,” the purpose of which is “to
investigate, and correct the act(s)/actions of rogue governmental
officials like Sharen Wilson.”
Powell requested the following relief: (1) “to remove the negative mailing list
designation in [Powell’s] TDCJ records indicating he is not allowed to send mail,
sealed or unsealed, to the Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney’s Office,
and/or Tarrant County Public Integrity Unit”; (2) “to cause the State Bar or its
apparatus to actually investigate [Powell’s] complaint(s) against Sharen Wilson”;
and (3) “to prevent any complaints from Sharen Wilson . . . from triggering any
change of status in [Powell’s] current job, housing, schedule, or any other activity”
until that complaint is substantiated. Powell also asked that $5,000 in damages be
assessed against Wilson.
Wilson filed a motion to declare Powell a vexatious litigant. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.051. Wilson also requested that the trial court
dismiss Powell’s claims under chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
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Code.2 In the motion, Wilson asserted that “Powell is vexatious because this is at
least his fifth suit claiming a conspiracy by Wilson to deny Powell postconviction
relief.” Wilson included with her motion exhibits showing Powell’s previous four
suits against her and those suits’ dismissals.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion in December 2021. On January
6, 2022, the trial court signed an order declaring Powell a vexatious litigant and
dismissing his claims against Wilson with prejudice. The trial court did not issue
an order ruling on Powell’s claims against the other seven defendants. Powell filed
a notice of appeal. After he filed his appellate brief, Powell filed a separate
“Motion to Review Further Orders,” which was carried with the case.
ANALYSIS
Powell filed a pro se appellate brief raising five issues that, read together,
raise three arguments:
1. the trial court erred by declaring Powell a vexatious litigant;
2. the trial court erred by dismissing Powell’s claims against Wilson; and
3. the trial court’s errors and omissions prevented Powell from properly
presenting his appeal.
In response, Wilson asserts that (1) this court does not have appellate jurisdiction
with respect to the trial court’s dismissal of Powell’s claims, and (2) the trial court
did not err in declaring Powell a vexatious litigant. We consider these arguments
below, beginning with the jurisdictional issue. We conclude the opinion with an
examination of Powell’s “Motion to Review Further Orders.”
2
Chapter 14 applies to a suit, other than one under the Texas Family Code, brought by an
inmate who files an affidavit or declaration of inability to pay costs. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. §§ 14.001-14.014. Under these provisions, the trial court may dismiss an inmate’s
claim, either before or after service of process, if it finds the claim is frivolous or malicious. See
id. § 14.003(a)(2).
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I. Appellate Jurisdiction
On appeal, Wilson asserts that this court has jurisdiction only with respect to
the portion of the trial court’s order declaring Powell a vexatious litigant — not the
portion dismissing Powell’s claims against Wilson. We agree.
Generally, a party only may appeal a final judgment. See Lehmann v. Har-
Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Tex-Fin, Inc. v. Ducharne, 492
S.W.3d 430, 436 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). An order is not
final unless it disposes of every pending claim and every party. Sabre Travel Int’l,
Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Tex. 2019). Here, because
the trial court’s order disposes of claims against only one of several defendants, it
is interlocutory, not final. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205; Tex-Fin, Inc., 492
S.W.3d at 436.
A party may appeal an interlocutory order when authorized by statute.
Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd., 567 S.W.3d at 736; see also, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 51.014. But in the absence of an authorizing statute, the court lacks
jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order. Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd., 567 S.W.3d
at 736.
Powell appeals the trial court’s order declaring him a vexatious litigant and
prohibiting him from filing, pro se, any new litigation in Texas without first
obtaining permission. A litigant is statutorily permitted to pursue an interlocutory
appeal from this prefiling order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 11.101(c) (“[a] litigant may appeal from a prefiling order . . . designating the
person a vexatious litigant”); see also, e.g., Silver v. State, No. 03-19-00537-CV,
2020 WL 742380, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 14, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this portion of Powell’s appeal. See Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.101(c).
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Powell also appeals from the portion of the trial court’s order dismissing his
claims against Wilson with prejudice under chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code. See id. §§ 14.003, 14.010. However, chapter 14 does not
permit interlocutory appeals from this type of dismissal. See id. § 14.101(c) (“An
order under this section is not subject to interlocutory appeal by the inmate.”); see
also, e.g., Douthit v. West, No. 14-20-00012-CV, 2021 WL 3359178, at *1-2 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing an
interlocutory appeal from a chapter 14 dismissal where the trial court’s order
“contains no language of finality, and all parties and claims in the trial court were
not disposed of”).
Therefore, we lack jurisdiction over the portion of Powell’s interlocutory
appeal challenging the trial court’s dismissal of his claims under chapter 14. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.101(c); Douthit, 2021 WL 3359178, at *1-
2. We overrule Powell’s arguments on this point and proceed to his issues
challenging the trial court’s vexatious litigant declaration.
II. Vexatious Litigant Declaration
“Vexatious litigants are persons who abuse the legal system by filing
numerous, frivolous lawsuits.” Bierwirth v. Rio Rancho Props., LLC, No. 03-17-
00733-CV, 2018 WL 4610447, at * 3 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 25, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op.). As relevant here, determining that a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant
requires proof of two statutory elements:
(1) there is not a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will
prevail in the litigation against the defendant, and
(2) after a litigation has been finally determined against the
plaintiff, the plaintiff repeatedly relitigates or attempts to
relitigate, pro se, either
a. the validity of the determination against the same defendant
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as to whom the litigation was finally determined, or
b. the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues
of fact or law determined or concluded by the final
determination against the same defendant as to whom the
litigation was finally determined.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.054(2).
We review the trial court’s determination that a person is a vexatious litigant
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451,
459 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). The trial court abuses its discretion
when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard to guiding legal principles,
or without supporting evidence. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex.
1998).
However, because section 11.054 requires a trial court to make certain
evidentiary findings before it may exercise its discretion to declare a party a
vexatious litigant, we also review those prescribed evidentiary findings for legal
and factual sufficiency. See Connor v. Hooks, No. 03-19-00198-CV, 2021 WL
833971, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 5, 2021, pet. filed) (mem. op.). A legal
sufficiency challenge fails if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support
the finding. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex.
2002). When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on which
he does not have the burden of proof, we set aside the finding only if the evidence
is so weak as to make the finding clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v.
Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
Because a trial court may exercise its discretion to declare a party a
vexatious litigant only if the required showings are made, we imply findings that
those requirements have been met. See, e.g., Jones v. Markel, No. 14-14-00216-
CV, 2015 WL 3878261, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 23, 2015,
7
pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Aubrey v. Aubrey, 523 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.). These implied findings also are reviewed for legal
and factual sufficiency. See Jones, 2015 WL 3878261, at *5.
A. Reasonable Probability of Prevailing in the Underlying
Proceeding
The first section 11.054 element requires the trial court to find that there is
not a “reasonable probability” the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the
defendant. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.054. Addressing this
element, Wilson argues that Powell’s claims are barred by the doctrine pronounced
in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
Under the Heck doctrine, an individual who has been convicted of a crime
cannot bring a section 1983 claim that involves allegations inconsistent with the
validity of his criminal conviction, unless he proves that the conviction or sentence
“has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question
by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. Also termed the
“favorable termination” rule, this doctrine applies to all claims “for harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid.”
Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Heck,
512 U.S. at 486-87). Accordingly, “[t]ort claims, the success of which would
imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction, are not cognizable and must be
dismissed.” Cooper v. Trent, 551 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); see also Perry v. Kroll, No. 03-10-00197-CV, 2010 WL
5129132, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 15, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Here, legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
implied finding that Powell’s claims are barred by the Heck doctrine. See Connor,
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2021 WL 833971, at *2. Specifically, Powell’s claims against Wilson contain
allegations implying the invalidity of his conviction. Wilson presided as trial court
judge over Powell’s criminal trial and, in his original petition, Powell alleges that
Wilson has engaged in a pattern of behavior aimed at preventing Powell from
investigating the validity of his conviction:
• Wilson becomes “incensed” when Powell has “had the audacity to ask
other officials, attorneys, or legal aid organizations to inquire into the
veracity of his trial records, or the integrity of Sharen Wilson’s
participation in convicting him.”
• “Wilson is trying to send [Powell] a message — that she can do
whatever she wants, and that he will be suicided (killed), or injured if
he continues to seek review of any aspect of his criminal conviction.”
• Wilson “has in fact blocked [Powell] from utilizing the Public
Integrity Office,” the purpose of which is “to investigate, and correct
the act(s)/actions of rogue governmental officials like Sharen
Wilson.”
These allegations, taken together, suggest that Powell’s underlying conviction is
invalid — an invalidity that Powell is unable to investigate due to Wilson’s
continued actions.
Powell’s previous pro se litigation also supports the trial court’s implied
Heck finding. See, e.g., Conroy v. Wilkerson, 626 S.W.3d 24, 34 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2021, no pet.) (reviewing the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s
claims were barred by the Heck doctrine, the court noted that the plaintiff “already
made repeated attempts to challenge his conviction on this very basis, through his
myriad collateral attacks”). Powell previously filed four lawsuits, each of which
alleges that Wilson engaged in illegal behavior that resulted in Powell’s
conviction:
• Michael A. Powell v. Sharen Wilson, et al., No. 4:07-cv-00587-Y, U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, filed October 2, 2007, and
9
dismissed with prejudice on July 14, 2008.
In this suit, Powell alleged that Wilson “personally altered transcripts in
private chambers and showed them to [the] jury to illegally convict,
personally altered, or by act of omission altered documentation and
transcript, personally altered documents to file to record to thwart appeal and
hide misconduct.”
• Ex parte Michael A. Powell, No. 4:09-cv-00240-Y, U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas, filed April 29, 2009, and dismissed with
prejudice on July 8, 2009.
In this petition for writ of mandamus, Powell alleged that Wilson “has been
accused of alteration of transcript, destruction of record and audio, also
where [Wilson] is guilty of manufacturing records and photo edits to thwart
appeal.”
• Michael A. Powell v. Sharen Wilson, et al., No. 4:11-cv-00090-A, U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, filed February 11, 2011,
and dismissed April 19, 2011.
In this suit, Powell asserted the following allegations against Wilson:
In this “hub and spoke conspiracy” it is Judge Sharen Wilson
who is most at fault. From beginning to end of process she did
intentionally, maliciously deny substantial rights to obtain
illegal conviction by manipulating existing law and using
illegal, non-judicial tactics such as manufacturing false
testimony and giving it to deliberating jury when state did not
meet burden of proof. Sharen began with tactics to thwart pro
se defense and used power to deny all discovery and conspires
to hide original statements, reports, [and] evidence favorable to
Michael Powell. Sharen Wilson manufactures pretrial
transcript and forges indictment that did not go before grand
jury.
• Michael A. Powell v. Sharen Wilson & Vallerie Allen, No. 067-278031-15,
67th District Court, Tarrant County, Texas, filed April 22, 2015, and
dismissed with prejudice on December 30, 2015.
In this suit, Powell alleged that Wilson “utiliz[ed] a laptop computer to alter
and manufacture transcript in trial cause #0955468 State of Texas v. Michael
Allan Powell.” Powell also alleged that Wilson “had met with the jury
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outside the presence of plaintiff, then defendant, and given portions of the
altered transcript to deliberating jury over their two day deliberations.”
Considering these lawsuits in conjunction with Powell’s allegations in the
underlying suit (which, in relevant part, challenge Wilson’s continued role in
preventing Powell from investigating the integrity of his conviction), the trial court
reasonably could conclude that Powell’s current claims imply the invalidity of his
conviction. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see also Conroy, 626 S.W.3d at 34.
Accordingly, the Heck doctrine mandated that Powell’s claims be dismissed
unless he produced evidence showing that his conviction or sentence “has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
Powell did not make this showing. Therefore, sufficient evidence supports the trial
court’s implied finding that Powell’s claims are barred by the Heck doctrine. See
id.Because the trial court’s Heck finding is supported by the appellate record,
we conclude that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
implied finding that there is not a reasonable probability Powell would prevail in
the litigation against Wilson. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.054(2);
Connor, 2021 WL 833971, at *2. We overrule Powell’s arguments on this point.
B. Repeated Litigation
Legally and factually sufficient evidence also supports the trial court’s
implied finding that Powell has repeatedly attempted to relitigate, pro se, the same
controversy against Wilson. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.054(2).
We listed above Powell’s four previous pro se lawsuits, each of which
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asserted claims against Wilson.3 The gist of these claims was the same: Wilson
engaged in illegal conduct during Powell’s criminal trial that resulted in Powell’s
wrongful conviction. This theme also is present in the underlying case, in which
Powell asserts that Wilson is continuing to impede his ability to investigate his
conviction’s integrity. Read in conjunction with Powell’s other suits, it is clear
that he believes this investigation is necessary due to Wilson’s alleged unlawful
conduct at trial. Therefore, sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s second
section 11.054 evidentiary finding regarding repeated attempts to relitigate the
same controversy. See id.; see also, e.g., Donohue v. Bandera Cnty. Law Enf’t
Pers., No. 04-19-00273-CV, 2020 WL 86223, at *1-2, *4 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Jan. 8, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (section 11.052(2) finding sufficiently
supported by evidence showing the plaintiff previously had filed four lawsuits
regarding the same controversy); Lansink v. Lansink, No. 11-09-00036-CV, 2011
WL 693092, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 6, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (section
11.052(2) finding sufficiently supported by evidence showing the plaintiff
previously had filed two bills of review attacking final divorce decree); and Willms
v. Americas Tire Co., 190 S.W.3d 796, 799-800, 806 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006,
pet. denied) (section 11.052(2) finding sufficiently supported by evidence showing
the plaintiff previously had filed two lawsuits regarding the same controversy).
Because both section 11.054 findings are supported by sufficient evidence,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Powell is a vexatious litigant. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.054(2);
3
Powell’s four lawsuits were filed in both state and federal court. The applicable statutes
permit a court to consider both state and federal litigation in its vexatious litigant determination.
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.001(2) (“‘Litigation’” means a civil action
commenced, maintained, or pending in any state or federal court.”); see also, e.g., Yazdchi v.
Jones, 499 S.W.3d 564, 566-67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); Drum v.
Calhoun, 299 S.W.3d 360, 365-67 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
12
see also Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20; Leonard, 171 S.W.3d at 459.
III. Alleged Errors in Trial Court Proceedings
Powell also alleges that “errors and omissions” in the trial court prevented
him “from properly presenting his appeal.” However, Powell does not identify in
the record any alleged errors made by the trial court nor does he assert how these
errors limited his ability to present his appeal.
We construe pro se briefs liberally; however, pro se appellants nonetheless
are held to the same standard as appellants represented by counsel to avoid giving
them an unfair advantage. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181,
184-85 (Tex. 1978); Vaclavik v. Addison, No. 03-19-00528-CV, 2021 WL
1704249, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Holding
Powell to this standard, we conclude Powell has failed to raise any substantive
argument or support his position on this point with citations to legal authorities and
the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (requiring “argument for the contentions
made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”). We overrule
Powell’s third issue.
IV. Motion to Review Further Orders
After Powell filed his appellate brief, he filed a separate “Motion to Review
Further Orders” requesting we review the trial court’s orders granting three
motions: (1) Jenny Hodgkins’ plea to the jurisdiction; (2) Jenny Hodgkins’
“chapter 14” motion; and (3) the State Bar of Texas’s “chapter 14 T.T.C.A.”
motion. Powell’s motion was carried with the case.
Here, the appellate record contains the State Bar of Texas’s plea to the
jurisdiction premised on the Texas Tort Claims Act. However, the record does not
contain the other two motions Powell references, nor does it include the trial
13
court’s orders granting any of the three motions.
An appellant bears the burden of bringing forward a record sufficient to
demonstrate error. See Enter. Leasing Co. of Houston v. Barrios, 156 S.W.3d 547,
549 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); McAtee v. City of Austin, No. 03-10-00496-CV,
2013 WL 5855638, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 10, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.);
see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Here, because the appellate record does not
contain the orders Powell seeks to challenge, he has failed to sufficiently present
his issues for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); see also Enter.
Leasing Co. of Houston, 156 S.W.3d at 549; McAtee, 2013 WL 5855638, at *6.
Accordingly, we deny Powell’s “Motion to Review Further Orders” that was
carried with the case.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the portion of the trial court’s January 6, 2022 order declaring
Powell a vexatious litigant. We also deny Powell’s August 18, 2022 “Motion to
Review Further Orders.”
/s/ Meagan Hassan
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Hassan.
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