Michelle Lee Hayes v. State ( 2020 )


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  •                     In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    No. 06-19-00138-CR
    MICHELLE LEE HAYES, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 71st District Court
    Harrison County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 17-0327X
    Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Having been placed earlier on deferred adjudication community supervision 1 for a period
    of ten years and ordered to pay a $2,500.00 fine, Michelle Lee Hayes judicially confessed to
    violating the terms and conditions of her deferred adjudication community supervision by
    consuming alcohol. As a result, the trial court adjudicated her guilt and sentenced her to fifteen
    years’ imprisonment.
    In her sole point of error on appeal, Hayes argues that her sentence violates the Eighth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution because it is grossly disproportionate to the crime.
    We find this issue unpreserved. However, because there was no plea agreement in this case, we
    modify the trial court’s judgment to delete the reference to a plea bargain. We affirm the trial
    court’s judgment, as so modified.
    Hayes admitted that she violated the terms and conditions of her deferred adjudication
    community supervision by consuming alcohol. On appeal, she argues that her sentence was
    grossly disproportionate to the crime she committed because she was addicted to alcohol and
    because revocation based on her admission was “too harsh.” The State argues that this issue is
    unpreserved. We agree.
    To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must first present the trial court a timely
    request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the desired ruling if not apparent from
    the context of the request, objection, or motion. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). Also, the trial court
    1
    On the underlying charge, Hayes entered an open plea of guilty and judicially confessed to intentionally or knowingly
    causing serious bodily injury to a child, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(e).
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    must have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the
    complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2).
    An appellant claiming a disproportionate sentence is not excused from preserving the error.
    See Stewart v. LaGrand, 
    526 U.S. 115
    , 119 (1999) (appellant waived Eighth Amendment
    complaint); Rhoades v. State, 
    934 S.W.2d 113
    , 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Duren v. State, 
    87 S.W.3d 719
    , 732 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. struck). Thus, “[a] constitutionality challenge
    based on application to the defendant’s case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Fluellen
    v. State, 
    104 S.W.3d 152
    , 167 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (citing Briggs v. State, 
    789 S.W.2d 918
    , 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Smith v. State, 
    10 S.W.3d 48
    , 49 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
    1999, no pet.)); see Garcia v. State, 
    887 S.W.2d 846
    , 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
    In this case, Hayes did not raise a disproportionate-punishment complaint when the trial
    court imposed her sentence, in a motion for new trial, or in any other type of post-verdict motion.
    Consequently, Hayes has forfeited her complaint that her sentence was grossly disproportionate.
    See Kim v. State, 
    283 S.W.3d 473
    , 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d). As a reviewing
    court, we should not address the merits of an issue that has not been preserved for appeal. Wilson
    v. State, 
    311 S.W.3d 452
    , 473 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (op. on reh’g) (per curiam); Sample v. State,
    
    405 S.W.3d 295
    , 300 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d). Since Hayes has not preserved
    this complaint, we overrule her sole point of error.
    Yet, the judgment must be modified. The judgment indicates that Hayes pled guilty to the
    underlying offense in exchange for ten years’ deferred adjudication and a $2,500.00 fine.
    However, the record shows that Hayes did not enter into a plea agreement with the State regarding
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    the adjudication. “Appellate courts ‘have the authority to reform judgments and affirm as modified
    in cases where there is non-reversible error.’” Walker v. State, 
    557 S.W.3d 678
    , 689 (Tex. App.—
    Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d) (quoting Ferguson v. State, 
    435 S.W.3d 291
    , 294 (Tex. App.—Waco
    2014, pet. struck) (comprehensively discussing appellate cases that have modified judgments)).
    Accordingly, we delete the judgment’s reference to a plea agreement.
    We modify the judgment by deleting the phrase “Terms of Plea Bargain 10 years deferred
    adjudication; $2,500.00 fine.” As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    Josh R. Morriss, III
    Chief Justice
    Date Submitted:       December 31, 2019
    Date Decided:         January 15, 2020
    Do Not Publish
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