John Bryan Finch v. State ( 2020 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-18-00414-CR
John Bryan FINCH,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 81st Judicial District Court, Atascosa County, Texas
Trial Court No. 16-07-0222-CRA
Honorable Stella Saxon, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Beth Watkins, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Beth Watkins, Justice
Delivered and Filed: January 15, 2020
AFFIRMED
John Bryan Finch was convicted by a jury of murder. On appeal, Finch contends the trial
court erred in admitting a surveillance video of a fist fight and hearsay statements. Finch also
contends the trial court erred in reading testimony to the jury in response to a note sent by the jury
during deliberations. Finally, Finch contends the cumulative effect of all errors deprived him of a
fair trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-18-00414-CR
BACKGROUND
On June 18, 2014, the body of Lindsey Wadkins was found on the side of a dirt road. She
had been shot in the head, neck, and back.
Earlier that evening, Wadkins was at a trailer owned by Naomi Delgado and Brandon
Penny. In addition to Wadkins, Delgado, and Penny, also present were Finch, Matthew Garcia
a/k/a Turk, 1 Tommy Caldillo, and Samantha Jones. Turk and Penny, who were not charged with
any crime relating to Wadkins’s murder, testified at trial.
Viewing the testimony of Turk and Penny in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,
Wadkins, Finch, Delgado, and Jones were arguing about a fist fight in which Finch was involved
earlier that evening with Adam Ochoa. Wadkins was present during the fist fight, is also seen on
the video, and was instrumental in having a third person intervene to end the fight. During the
subsequent argument at the trailer, Wadkins threatened to call the police on Finch or to “take him
down.” While Wadkins was either in the restroom or outside, Finch, Delgado, Jones, and Caldillo
discussed beating her up and leaving her on the side of the road. At some point, Caldillo passed a
handgun to Finch, and Finch, Delgado, Jones, and Caldillo talked about “tak[ing] [Wadkins] out”
because she “might squeal or something.” Wadkins, Finch, Delgado, and Jones then drove away
together. When Finch, Delgado, and Jones returned without Wadkins, Finch told Turk he shot her.
Sometime later, Delgado also told Penny that Finch shot Wadkins. Finally, Finch told Billy
Martinez, a fellow inmate also referred to as BJ, that he shot Wadkins and provided details of the
offense that were not reported to the public.
After hearing all of the evidence, the jury found Finch guilty of murder. Finch appeals.
1
Because future quotes from the record refer to Garcia as Turk, we also will refer to him as Turk.
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SURVEILLANCE VIDEO
In his first issue, Finch asserts the trial court erred in admitting a surveillance video
showing a part of the fist fight between Finch and Ochoa which was the subject of the subsequent
argument between Wadkins, Finch, Delgado, and Jones. In his brief, Finch contends the trial court
erred in admitting the video because it should have been excluded under Rules 404(b) and 403 of
the Texas Rules of Evidence. The State responds Finch did not object to the admissibility of the
video under Rule 403; therefore, that complaint is not preserved for our review. The State also
responds the video was properly admitted as evidence of motive and relationship under Rule
404(b).
Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts “is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility
of evidence under Rule 404(b) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Dabney v. State,
492 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The trial court does not abuse its discretion unless
its determination lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
Here, the evidence at trial established Wadkins threatened Finch during an argument over
the fight depicted in the surveillance video. Immediately following the argument over the fight,
Finch, Delgado, Jones, and Caldillo discussed a plan to “take [Wadkins] out,” and Caldillo handed
Finch a gun. Accordingly, the fight depicted in the surveillance video was evidence relevant to
Finch’s motive to murder Wadkins. Because the video was evidence of Finch’s motive, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Finch’s Rule 404(b) objection.
After a trial court rules on whether evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), the trial court
“has ruled on the full extent of the opponent’s Rule 404(b) objection. The opponent must then
make a further objection based on Rule 403, in order for the trial judge to weigh the probative and
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prejudicial value of the evidence.” Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 169 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997) (internal citation omitted); see also Lopez v. State, 200 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). When the State sought to have the
video admitted at trial, Finch only objected to its admissibility under Rule 404(b). 2 He therefore
did not preserve a complaint that the trial court should have excluded the video under Rule 403 for
our review.
Finch’s first issue is overruled.
HEARSAY STATEMENTS
During Penny’s testimony, Finch objected to the admission of statements Delgado made to
Penny following Wadkins’s murder. On appeal, Finch contends the trial court erred in admitting
the statements because they were inadmissible hearsay and their admission violated his
Confrontation Clause rights. The State responds the trial court properly admitted the statements
as excited utterances. The State further responds the statements were not testimonial and,
therefore, not subject to Finch’s Confrontation Clause rights.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule for an abuse of discretion. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 743 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006). We review whether a statement is testimonial or non-testimonial de novo. Id.
at 742. “[T]he distinctive standards of review for hearsay objections and Confrontation Clause
2
After the trial court watched the video outside the presence of the jury, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Okay. And you’re seeking to offer this for what purpose?
[PROSECUTOR]: Proof to show relationship between the parties prior to the homicide and motive,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you’re seeking to keep it out why?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, because I don’t believe it shows motive, and I don’t believe
it has anything to do with the relationship between John Finch and Lindsey, at least this video
doesn’t.
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objections to the admission of excited utterances arise because the hearsay exception depends
largely upon the subjective state of mind of the declarant at the time of the statement, whereas the
issue of whether an out-of-court statement (excited or otherwise) is ‘testimonial’ under Crawford
depends upon the perceptions of an objectively reasonable declarant.” Id. at 743
B. Applicable Law
An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” TEX. R. EVID. 803(2). “The basis
for the excited utterance exception is a psychological one, namely, the fact that when a man is in
the instant grip of violent emotion, excitement or pain, he ordinarily loses the capacity for
reflection necessary to the fabrication of a falsehood and the ‘truth will come out.’” Zuliani v.
State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
in original).
“In determining whether a hearsay statement is admissible as an excited utterance, the court
may consider the time elapsed and whether the statement was in response to a question.” Id.
“However, it is not dispositive that the statement is an answer to a question or that it was separated
by a period of time from the startling event; these are simply factors to consider in determining
whether the statement is admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception.” Id. at 596.
“The critical determination is whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotions,
excitement, fear, or pain of the event or condition at the time of the statement.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Under the Confrontation Clause, a “testimonial” statement is inadmissible at trial unless
the declarant either takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination, or is unavailable and the
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Burch v. State, 401 S.W.3d 634, 636
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Testimonial statements are those “‘made under circumstances which
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would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
use at a later trial.’” Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has rejected any per se or categorical approach to
excited utterance and testimonial hearsay inquiries. Wall, 184 S.W.3d at 742. As the court
explained:
[T]he excited utterance and testimonial hearsay inquiries are separate, but related.
While both inquiries look to the surrounding circumstances to make determinations
about the declarant’s mindset at the time of the statement, their focal points are
different. The excited utterance inquiry focuses on whether the declarant was under
the stress of a startling event. The testimonial hearsay inquiry focuses on whether
a reasonable declarant, similarly situated (that is, excited by the stress of a startling
event), would have had the capacity to appreciate the legal ramifications of her
statement.
These parallel inquiries require an ad hoc, case-by-case approach. An inquiring
court first should determine whether a particular hearsay statement qualifies as an
excited utterance. If not, the inquiry ends. If, however, the statement so qualifies,
the court then must look to the attendant circumstances and assess the likelihood
that a reasonable person would have either retained or regained the capacity to make
a testimonial statement at the time of the utterance.
Id. at 742 (quoting United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2005)).
C. Analysis
At trial, Penny testified Delgado was “freaking out” upon returning without Wadkins, and
Delgado said Wadkins was dead. No objection was made to Penny’s testimony about this
statement by Delgado. Penny then testified he made everyone leave and tried to talk to Delgado
about what happened, but she was still “freaked out.” After everyone left, Delgado burned her
shoes and buried them because Jones called to tell her shoe marks would be at the crime scene.
Penny and Delgado then each took a shower and went to bed. After they were in bed, Penny
testified he again tried to talk to Delgado about what happened. He described Delgado as “real
skittish” and “incoherent, like, you know, you talk to somebody, they can’t answer you right away,
real out there, kind of.” Penny testified this was not Delgado’s normal behavior, and she was still
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upset. When the prosecutor asked Penny what Delgado told him, defense counsel objected on the
basis of hearsay, asserting the prosecutor had not established the excited utterance exception. After
the trial court overruled the objection, Penny testified Finch shot Wadkins three times and, after
Jones expressed concern about whether she was dead, Finch shot her four more times. On cross-
examination, Penny testified Delgado was “scared and stirred up” while they were talking in bed.
In arguing Delgado’s statements to Finch were not excited utterances, Finch points to
Penny’s testimony that an hour had elapsed from the time Delgado returned home and when she
told Penny that Finch shot Wadkins. Finch also points to the testimony that Delgado had burned
and buried her shoes and taken a shower in that time period. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held in Zuliani, however, that the period of time from the startling event to the declarant’s
statements is not dispositive. 97 S.W.3d at 596. The court also held the declarant’s statements
were admissible as excited utterances in that case despite the fact that twenty hours had elapsed
between the event and the statements. Id.; see also Ricketts v. State, 89 S.W.3d 312, 320 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d) (holding declarant’s statement to fiancé upon arriving home
that defendant shot the victim was admissible as an excited utterance even though shooting
occurred two hours earlier where fiancé testified declarant “got . . . excited” when she asked him
what happened). As previously noted, the question is whether the trial court was within the zone
of reasonable disagreement in determining Delgado was still dominated by the emotions of the
event. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596. Based on Penny’s testimony, we hold the trial court was within
the zone of reasonable disagreement and did not abuse its discretion in ruling Delgado’s statement
was admissible as an excited utterance.
Focusing on whether a reasonable declarant under the circumstances facing Delgado would
believe her statements would be used at a subsequent murder trial, we agree with the State that
Delgado did not comprehend the legal significance of her words. An objective witness telling her
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then-husband what happened for the first time would not reasonably believe the statement would
be available for use at a later trial. Burch, 401 S.W.3d at 636. Accordingly, we hold the trial court
did not violate Finch’s Confrontation Clause rights in admitting the statements.
Finch’s second issue is overruled.
RESPONSE TO JURY QUESTIONS
In his third issue, Finch contends the trial court erred in allowing testimony to be read to
the jury during deliberations. Finch argues the trial court did not make a sufficient inquiry into the
jury’s dispute to “identify the specific witness or portion which [the jury] found to be in conflict.”
Finch also argues the portions of testimony the trial court allowed to be read bolstered the State’s
case by focusing the jury “only on the of the [sic] portions of testimony which were damaging to
John Finch, and completely ignored the portions elicited through cross-examination which
discredited the subject testimony excerpts.” The State responds the trial court identified the
specific portions of testimony over which the jury had a dispute, and Finch did not preserve his
complaint regarding the failure to read responsive cross-examination for our review.
A. Jury Questions and Responses
In his brief, Finch only complains about the trial court’s ruling on his objection regarding
the response to Juror Note No. 5. However, that question and the trial court’s response must be
read in the context of the jury’s prior questions requesting testimony, and the trial court’s responses
to those questions.
Juror Note No. 1 stated:
Turk[’]s – Testimony
BJ’s Testimony
Date of Finch’s arrest
Date of [sic] Police received gun as evidence
The trial court sent the following response to the jury without objection:
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Members of the jury, the jury may have testimony about a disputed point in a
witness’ testimony read back to them. Please state exactly what your disagreement
as to the testimony is, and the court reporter will search her notes and read that
particular testimony back to you.
Juror Note No. 2 stated:
Turk[’]s testimony of Finch being threatened by Lindsy [sic] to call cops on Him.
The trial judge noted the jury “didn’t say it was a point in dispute,” but the trial judge was “going
to assume it is since I told [them].” Testimony was then read to the jury. Finch does not challenge
the trial court’s overruling of his objection to Juror Note No. 2 in his brief.
Juror Note No. 3 requested:
Can we have Turk[’]s and BJ’s complete testimony to compare them to each other.
The trial court sent the following response without objection:
Members of the jury, you may have read back the testimony about a particular
point in dispute and no other. Please certify that you disagree as to certain specific
testimony, and I will order the court reporter to search her notes to find the
testimony to be read back to you.
Juror Note No. 4 requested permission for the jurors to take a break. In response, the trial
court gave the jury a fifteen-minute break.
Juror Note No. 5 requested: 3
We want to hear Turk[’]s testimony on what was said when John, Naomi and Sam
returned home after the incident without Lydsey [sic].
Want to hear BJ testimony about Finch shooting Lyndsy [sic].
Want to [hear] BJ’s testimony that Finch told him about disposing of the body after
she was shot.
3
The record does not show how much time elapsed between the jury returning from its break and its sending of Juror
Note No. 5.
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Defense counsel objected that the jury was essentially asking for all the testimony to be read back
and that the jury did not say they had a conflict. The trial judge proposed to respond with the
following:
Ladies and Gentlemen[,] Are you in conflict as to this testimony?
Defense counsel did not object to the trial judge’s proposed response. Instead, defense counsel
stated he did not “mind asking them whether they have a conflict in the testimony, but they need
to tell us what their conflict is.” Defense counsel further argued, “There needs to be some
specificity as to what they’re asking us for.” The trial judge responded:
The Court is of the opinion that this will identify whether or not there is a
conflict. The Court has already instructed that I cannot have testimony read back
unless there is a conflict, and I think that the jury has just failed to note that for the
Court. But this will make it abundantly clear, depending on what their answer is.
The jury answered the question “yes.” The trial judge then instructed the court reporter to search
her notes.
After a brief recess, defense counsel argued the jury’s request regarding Turk’s testimony
was vague and “didn’t say what the dispute was about.” Defense counsel further argued the jury
should just be told to deliberate, asserting:
They’re going to come back time and time again with more questions because
we keep giving them those answers when all they have to say is we have a dispute
about so and so’s testimony and they get it read back.
The trial judge responded:
The Court finds that the testimony the court reporter has read back is responsive
to the question — to the request by the jury for testimony of Turk on what was said
when John, Naomi, and Sam returned home after the incident. And the jurors have
certified they’re in conflict about that testimony.
The court reporter then located the testimony responsive to the request for “BJ testimony about
Finch shooting Lindsey.” Defense counsel again objected asserting the jury was “not asking
anything specific” and the proper instruction was for them to continue to deliberate. Defense
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counsel made the “same objection” to the proposed testimony to be read regarding “BJ’s testimony
that Finch told him about disposing of the body after she was shot.” The trial court overruled the
objections, and the following testimony was read to the jury:
THE COURT: Be seated, please.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the court reporter has located the testimony
about which you indicated you were in dispute, and she will now read to you the
testimony that she found. The first testimony is testimony of Matthew Garcia
[Turk].
(Requested portion read back
by the court reporter.)
Q. “Okay. And so you stayed there, and at some point I guess someone comes
back.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Who comes back?
A. Sam, Naomi, and Finch.
Q. Okay. Lindsey never came back?
A. No.
Q. So do they come in the house, or what happens?
A. Yes. They came inside.
Q. Okay. So all three came inside?
A. Yes.
Q. And when they come back inside, what are they saying?
A. Naomi had -- was cussing and saying, like, “I hit that girl one time in the
mouth and she fell.”
Q. How are they acting at that point? What’s their mood?
A. Shocked. Like shocked.
Q. Okay. Who’s shocked?
A. Actually all three of them.
Q. Okay. So how do you describe that? How did you know they were
shocked? How are they acting?
A. You could tell by their eyes, the way Naomi was moving, the way Sam was
moving.
Q. Okay. What was Sam doing?
A. Saying, “I got to go home. I got to go home.”
Q. Okay. How was she acting?
A. Like nervous.
Q. And how about Naomi? How was she acting?
A. She didn’t seem nervous. She was just hyper and jittery.
Q. Okay. And how about the defendant, John Finch? How was he acting?
A. Like normal.
Q. Okay. And what did he say when they came back in?
A. That he shot her three times and then four more times.
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Q. He told y’all that?
A. Yes, ma’am.”
THE COURT: The reporter will now read to you the requested testimony of
Billy Martinez [BJ].
(Requested portion read back
by the court reporter.)
A. “And I remember trying to think, you know, if I had seen it. Because I was
[sic] watch the news a lot. But now — And I didn’t remember. And then he just
— He said he took — He even said he [sic] her name. He said he took her down
the road with two girls, and he said they got out — he told her to get out of the car
and took her to the back. And then he said he pushed her down and he pulled out
a gun. He said he shot her four times and then she looked up at him and said, “Oh,
my God,” and he said he shot her — he said he got back in the car. As they started
to drive away, he told them to stop, that he didn’t want the family to have an open
casket, and so he got out, when he shot her in the head. He didn’t say how many
times, but he said he shot her. And, you know, I can go into detail because I
remember, but —”
THE COURT: And there was additional testimony on that issue.
(Requested portion read back
by the court reporter.)
THE REPORTER: This is the question.
Q. “So he said he got out, took her to the back, and what did he do next after
he took her to the back?
A. He said he pushed her down and he pulled his gun out. She seen the barrel
of the gun. She said, “Oh, my God,” and he said he shot her.
Q. Did he say what he did next?
A. He said he got back in the car and they started to drive off. And he said, “I
don’t want her family to have a fucking closed casket. Stop.” And he got out and
he said he went and shot her in the head.”
THE COURT: And then the last issue that you had for the reporter to search
has been found in Mr. Martinez’s testimony.
(Requested portion read back
by the court reporter.)
Q. “Did he say where did they go after that?
A. Oh, yeah. He did said [sic] say that they wanted to go get a carpet or
something to roll her up in and — you know, so they could get rid of the body.
Q. And did they do that and try to come back?
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A. They tried to.
Q. And what happened?
A. But he said when they came back, the cops were there and stuff, lights, so
they just kept on going.”
THE COURT: That completes the readback of the testimony. Please continue
your deliberations in the jury room. We will be in recess.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Article 36.28 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
In the trial of a criminal case in a court of record, if the jury disagree as to the
statement of any witness they may, upon applying to the court, have read to them
from the court reporter’s notes that part of such witness testimony or the particular
point in dispute, and no other . . . .
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 36.28. “When the jury asks the trial court to read back certain
disputed testimony, the trial court judge must first determine if the jury’s inquiry is proper under
Article 36.28.” Thomas v. State, 505 S.W.3d 916, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “If it is proper,
the trial court must then interpret the communication and decide what sections of the testimony
will best answer the inquiry.” Id. “The trial court has discretion to decide what sections of the
testimony will best answer the query, and limit the testimony accordingly.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). “However, if a trial court reads too much or too little testimony to the jury, such
a response may serve to bolster the State’s case unnecessarily.” Id. “An appellate court should
not disturb a trial court judge’s decision under Article 36.28 unless a clear abuse of discretion and
harm are shown.” Id.
“Complaints about error in the reading of trial testimony must be preserved by objection at
the time of the reading.” Id. at 924. “To preserve error, a party must object and state the grounds
for the objection with enough specificity to make the trial judge aware of the complaint, unless the
specific grounds were apparent from the context.” Id. “The objection must be sufficiently clear
to give the judge and opposing counsel an opportunity to address and, if necessary, correct the
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purported error.” Id. “If a trial objection does not comport with arguments on appeal, error has
not been preserved.” Id.
C. Analysis
First, the record does not reflect Finch made any objection to the trial court’s failure to
include portions of the testimony elicited through cross-examination. Accordingly, this complaint
is not preserved for our review. Id.
With regard to whether the jury disagreed regarding the testimony requested in Juror Note
No. 5, the trial court sent numerous instructions to the jury in response to prior notes informing
the jurors they needed to disagree as to the testimony of the witness before any testimony could be
read back. In response to those instructions and in response to an additional question regarding
whether they were in dispute over the testimony requested in Juror Note No. 5, the jury responded
they were in dispute. Article 36.28 requires only that the jury disagree about a witness’s testimony.
It does not require the jury to state the nature of their disagreement in a particular manner. Howell
v. State, 175 S.W.3d 786, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“The statute requires that the jury disagree;
it does not require that the jury use any particular words to express that disagreement.”).
Accordingly, we cannot hold the trial court abused its discretion in determining the jurors
disagreed as to the testimony they were requesting. See Thomas v. State, 505 S.W.3d at 923.
With regard to the trial court’s interpretation of the jury’s notes and its selection of the
testimony that best answered the jury’s inquiry, we again hold the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. See id. From our review of the record, the trial court selected the sections of testimony
that were directly responsive to the discrete facts about which the jury was in dispute.
Finch’s third issue is overruled.
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CUMULATIVE ERROR
In his fourth issue, Finch alludes to other error occurring at trial; however, he fails to
provide argument and authority regarding those errors. 4 TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring an
appellant’s brief to “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”). Therefore, he has waived any complaints
about those errors. See Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding
that point of error inadequately briefed presented nothing for review). And, we have overruled the
issues Finch adequately briefed. Accordingly, Finch’s fourth issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Beth Watkins, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
4
Finch does provide citations to authorities to support the following assertion, “In closing the State also improperly
argued that acquitting John Finch would allow him to ‘walk[] down the stairs with you and become[] a member of
this community again.” We hold, however, that this one sentence is not an adequate argument to challenge the State’s
closing argument.
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