Vijayalakshmi Nadar v. Thinakar Nadar ( 2023 )

VACATE and DISMISS and Opinion Filed March 13, 2023
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-21-00647-CV
VIJAYALAKSHMI NADAR, Appellant
V.
THINAKAR NADAR, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law 3
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 003-02474-2021
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Breedlove
Opinion by Justice Breedlove
In a forcible entry and detainer suit, the trial court awarded possession of the
marital home to appellee Thinakar Nadar (“Mr. Nadar”) and ordered appellant
Vijayalakshmi Nadar (“Ms. Nadar”) to vacate the premises. The court also awarded
Mr. Nadar court costs and attorney’s fees. In three issues, Ms. Nadar challenges the
trial court’s jurisdiction and contends the trial court abused its discretion in rendering
judgment for Mr. Nadar. Concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
resolve issues regarding the disposition of marital property which was the subject of
a prior divorce decree, we vacate the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. and Ms. Nadar were divorced by final decree in the 469th Judicial District
Court of Collin County (469th Court). Although the 469th Court awarded the
parties’ marital home in Plano to Mr. Nadar, Ms. Nadar and the parties’ daughter
continued to live in the home, as they had since 2013. The 469th Court awarded the
parties’ home in Mumbai, India, to Ms. Nadar. The 469th Court also ordered that
the parties “execute any and all documents necessary and proper to fulfill the
division of property above awarded, and further have any writs, executions and
process, as many and as often as necessary, to fulfill the provisions of this Decree.”
More specifically, the 469th Court ordered Ms. Nadar to sign a special warranty
deed transferring her interest in the Plano home to Mr. Nadar and made a reciprocal
order requiring Mr. Nadar to sign any document required to transfer his interest in
the Mumbai property to Ms. Nadar. The parties did not do so.
On April 15, 2021, Mr. Nadar filed a forcible entry and detainer suit in the
Justice Court, Precinct 4, of Collin County. At a hearing on June 3, 2021, the court
awarded possession of the marital home in Plano to Mr. Nadar and ordered Ms.
Nadar to vacate the premises. The court’s judgment included awards of attorney’s
fees and costs and set the amount of an appeal bond. Ms. Nadar filed a statement of
inability to pay that Mr. Nadar did not challenge.
On June 22, 2021, Ms. Nadar appealed the trial court’s ruling to Collin County
Court at Law 3. At a trial on July 20, 2021, the court found in favor of Mr. Nadar
–2–
and awarded possession of the marital home to him along with court costs and
attorney’s fees, and set a supersedeas bond. The court also ordered Ms. Nadar to
vacate and surrender the home. Ms. Nadar filed a second affidavit of inability to
pay that Mr. Nadar did not challenge.
Ms. Nadar now appeals. In three issues, she complains that (1) the trial court
abused its discretion in granting possession of disputed marital property in a forcible
entry and detainer suit; (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resolve issues
regarding the marital property which was the subject of a prior divorce decree; and
(3) the trial court abused its discretion in requiring an appeal bond and charging for
an appellate record despite Ms. Nadar’s unchallenged pauper’s affidavit. Because
Ms. Nadar’s second issue is dispositive, we do not reach the remaining two issues.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
“Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a
case.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993).
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law that we decide de
novo. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 166
(Tex. 2013).
Jurisdiction of forcible detainer actions is expressly given to the justice court
of the precinct where the property is located. Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 708
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004 (Vernon
2000); TEX. R. CIV. P. 749 (Vernon 2012, repealed 2013); Home Sav. Ass’n v.
–3–
Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
However, where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of
a title dispute, the justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment and may be
enjoined from doing so. Id. at 709 (citing Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W.2d 194, 196
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Rodriguez v. Sullivan, 484
S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1972, no writ) (justice court judgment void
when possession depended on whether defendant complied with contract for deed);
Am. Spiritualist Ass’n v. Ravkind, 313 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1958,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same)).
Under the Texas Family Code, the court that rendered a decree of divorce
retains the power to enforce the division of property made in the decree. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 9.002; In re Marriage of Pyrtle, 433 S.W.3d 152, 160 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2014, pet. denied). A party affected by a divorce decree providing for the
division of property may request enforcement of that decree by filing a suit to
enforce in the court that rendered the decree. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.001; Pyrtle,
433 S.W.3d at 160. Specifically, “the court may render further orders to enforce the
division of property made in the decree of divorce . . . to assist in the implementation
of or to clarify the prior order.” Pyrtle, 433 S.W.3d at 160 (citing DeGroot v.
DeGroot, 369 S.W.3d 918, 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 9.006(a).
–4–
III. DISCUSSION
In response to Ms. Nadar’s challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction, Mr.
Nadar argues that “[t]he district court that granted the divorce did not limit the
enforcement of its orders to that court only, nor by statute could it restrict [Mr.
Nadar] from seeking possession of the real property awarded to him by filing suit in
the justice court.” Mr. Nadar correctly argues that “[t]he justice court has by statute
original jurisdiction of forcible entry and detainer suits and eviction suits.”
However, the case before us is no typical eviction suit—instead, the nature of the
dispute unambiguously requires the court to review, interpret, and enforce the 469th
Court’s divorce decree. The County Court itself recognized this distinction at the
trial when Ms. Nadar attempted to explain how the transfer of title to the Plano
property was related to the transfer of title to the Mumbai property, responding,
“that’s all divorce stuff, and we don’t do divorces down here.”
Under Section 9.001(a) of the Texas Family Code, a party affected by a decree
of divorce providing for a division of property “may request enforcement of that
decree by filing suit to enforce as provided in this chapter in the court that rendered
the decree.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.001(a) (emphasis added). The Code further
provides that the “court that rendered the decree of divorce or annulment retains the
power to enforce the property division . . . .” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.002.
Although other courts may have jurisdiction over ancillary matters that do not
require the enforcement of a divorce decree, cases that involve an enforcement action
–5–
like the one brought in this case belong in the court that rendered the divorce decree.
See Griffith v. Reyes, 653 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.)
(holding that the court that renders the divorce decree has exclusive jurisdiction in
suits to enforce the decree).
In Griffith, the parties filed for divorce in the Medina County Court of Law,
and that court rendered the final divorce decree. Eight years later, the ex-husband
filed suit in the 216th Judicial District Court of Gillespie County, alleging his ex-
wife had failed to discharge certain debts she was required to discharge under the
divorce decree. Id. at 752. The ex-wife argued that pursuant to Chapter 9 of the
Texas Family Code, only the court that rendered the final divorce decree had
authority to enforce said decree. Id. at 748. The trial court agreed and dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. On appeal, the court held that because the 216th
Court was not the court that rendered the divorce decree, it did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over an action to enforce the terms of the decree. Id. at 747.
Like Griffith, the central issue in this case is a party’s failure to take an action
required by the divorce decree. Neither party has offered any evidence to show that
they complied with the divorce decree’s directive to “execute any and all documents
necessary and proper to fulfill the division of property” awarded by the 469th Court.
It is undisputed that although the divorce decree awarded the Plano home to Mr.
Nadar, the parties never transferred title to the property as the decree required them
to do. “A judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is a determination
–6–
only of the right to immediate possession of the premises and does not determine the
ultimate rights of the parties to any other issue in controversy relating to the realty
in question.” Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 710 (quoting Martinez v. Beasley, 572 S.W.2d 83,
85 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, no writ). Because the parties have not yet
taken the necessary steps to modify title to the marital home, eviction is not the
appropriate remedy for Mr. Nadar. Id. (internal citations omitted).
Further, the divorce made reciprocal awards, including awarding the Mumbai
property to Ms. Nadar, and required that the parties execute and deliver any
documents necessary to effectuate the provisions of the divorce decree. Ms. Nadar
asserts in this appeal, and Mr. Nadar does not challenge, that Mr. Nadar has failed
to deliver the necessary documents or transfer title to the Mumbai property to Ms.
Nadar, despite her requests. Ms. Nadar also asserts, and Mr. Nadar does not dispute,
material changes in the status of the properties since the divorce decree, numerous
potential ambiguities regarding the relationship between the properties awarded
under the divorce decree, as well as unforeseen barriers to effectuating the court’s
order. The remedy for these complaints is to seek clarification and enforcement of
the divorce decree. Pyrtle, 433 S.W.3d at 160. Under the Family Code, the power
to clarify and enforce a divorce decree belongs to the court that rendered the decree,
which, in this case, is the 469th District Court. Griffith, 653 S.W.3d at 751 (citing
Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011)).
–7–
Because we conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Nadar’s
claims, we sustain Ms. Nadar’s second issue. Given this disposition, we need not
discuss her remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
IV. CONCLUSION
We vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss this appeal.
/Maricela Breedlove/
MARICELA BREEDLOVE
JUSTICE
210647F.P05
–8–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
VIJAYALAKSHMI NADAR, On Appeal from the County Court at
Appellant Law No. 3, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 003-02474-
No. 05-21-00647-CV V. 2021.
Opinion delivered by Justice
THINAKAR NADAR, Appellee Breedlove. Justices Molberg and
Reichek participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is VACATED and this appeal is DISMISSED.
It is ORDERED that appellant VIJAYALAKSHMI NADAR recover her
costs of this appeal from appellee THINAKAR NADAR.
Judgment entered this 13th day of March 2023.
–9–