Lutheran Gordon v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-22-00120-CR
LUTHERAN GORDON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 6th District Court
Lamar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 29573
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Lamar County jury convicted Lutheran Gordon of possessing more than four, but less
than two hundred, grams of methamphetamine, a second-degree felony.1 After Gordon pled true
to the State’s punishment enhancement allegations, the trial court sentenced him to forty years’
imprisonment. In his sole point of error on appeal, Gordon argues that the jury’s finding of guilt
was not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Because the record reveals sufficient evidence
of guilt, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Standard of Review
“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hartsfield v.
State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). “Our rigorous [legal
sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323
S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction
of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve
conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
1
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115 (Supp.).
2
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007))).
In our review, we consider “events occurring before, during and after the commission of
the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common
design to do the prohibited act.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). It is not required that
each fact “point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative
force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id.“Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a
defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone.” Paroline v. State, 532
S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d
805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Guevara v. State, 152
S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004))).
“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Williamson, 589 S.W.3d at 298 (quoting Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one
that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase
the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). Here, to obtain a conviction under the relevant statute and the
indictment, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gordon
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(1) intentionally or knowingly (2) possessed (3) four or more, but less than two hundred, grams
(4) of methamphetamine, including any adulterants or dilutants. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (d).
II. The Evidence at Trial
Jeremy Helms, a patrol officer with the Paris Police Department, testified that he knew
Gordon had outstanding warrants for his arrest when he spotted Gordon during his patrol. Helms
activated his body camera, stepped out of his patrol unit, and asked Gordon to walk towards him.
Gordon immediately ran, prompting Helms to chase him with the patrol unit. Helms testified,
and his body-camera footage showed, that Gordon was carrying a blue shirt as he was running
away.
Helms said that Gordon ran into a “gravel and dirt” parking lot at an apartment complex,
tripped, and fell to the ground. According to Helms, Gordon left the shirt on the ground but got
back up and continued running. Although the body-camera footage did not show the moment
that Gordon dropped the blue shirt, it showed him running away from the shirt, which was on the
ground just a few feet away. Helms apprehended Gordon, arrested him, and placed him in the
back of his patrol unit. Helms went to retrieve the dirtied blue shirt and then noticed a clear,
plastic bag containing a “clear crystal-like” substance on the ground in the general proximity of
where Gordon had dropped the shirt. The Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory
tested the substance, which weighed 5.81 grams, and confirmed that it contained
methamphetamine.
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Helms admitted that he never saw Gordon throw the plastic bag but testified that he
believed it was recently deposited because it was clean and dry even though it “had been raining
off and on all day” and the parking lot was “damp.” Although Helms testified that it was
possible that the bag could have been thrown earlier in the day by someone else, he believed it
“highly unlikely.”
III. The Jury’s Verdict of Guilt Is Supported by Legally Sufficient Evidence
“Possession” is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39). To obtain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the
State must show that the accused not only “exercised actual care, control, or custody” of the
controlled substance, but that he was conscious of his connection with it and “possessed it
knowingly.” Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Smith v. State, 118
S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
“[E]vidence which affirmatively links [the accused] to [the drugs] suffices for proof that
he possessed it knowingly,” Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747, because it tends to show “that the
accused’s connection with the contraband was more than just ‘fortuitous,’” Gill v. State, 57
S.W.3d 540, 544 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (quoting Harris v. State, 994 S.W.2d 927,
933 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref’d)). Even so, the State must demonstrate that “the accused
was aware of the object, knew what it was, and recognized his or her connection to it.” Smith,
118 S.W.3d at 842 (citing Gill, 57 S.W.3d at 544). For this reason, the mere presence of the
accused at the location where contraband is found is not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish
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his knowing possession. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Evans v.
State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
“When the contraband is not in the exclusive possession of the defendant, a fact[-]finder
may nonetheless infer that the defendant intentionally or knowingly possessed the contraband if
there are sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such an inference.” Tate, 500
S.W.3d at 413–14. Under the links test, if combined with other evidence, the accused’s presence
or proximity may be sufficient to establish knowing possession. Id. at 414. Some factors that
may be legally sufficient, either alone or in combination, to circumstantially establish an
accused’s knowing possession of contraband include:
(1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the
contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the
accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of
narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or
narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements
when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the
defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband;
(10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether
the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were
found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed;
(13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and
(14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt.
Id. at 414 (quoting Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12); see Smith, 118 S.W.3d at 842; Nguyen v.
State, 54 S.W.3d 49, 53 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d), overruled on other grounds by
Fagan v. State, 362 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d).
It is the logical force of the links, rather than the number of links, that is dispositive.
Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162; Smith v. State, 176 S.W.3d 907, 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet.
ref’d). Also, the links need not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis but the defendant’s
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guilt. See Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413; Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 748. Even though the factors in the
links test guide us, “ultimately the inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson: Based on the
combined and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, was a
jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).
Here, there was no evidence of several of the links test factors. Gordon (1) was not under
the influence of drugs when arrested, (2) possessed no other contraband or narcotics, (3) made no
incriminating statements, (4) did not smell of contraband, (5) did not own an apartment attached
to the parking lot, (6) was not in an enclosed space, and (7) was not found with a large amount of
cash. Even so, six factors supported the jury’s verdict.
When Helms spotted Gordon and asked him to stop, Gordon immediately fled, indicating
a consciousness of guilt.2 The body-camera footage established that Gordon was the only person
present in the parking lot during Helms’s chase and search of the ground. The plastic bag
containing methamphetamine was found in plain view, relatively close to where Gordon’s shirt
was found after he had dropped it.3 From these facts, and Helms’s testimony that the bag was
clean and dry even though the dirt and gravel parking lot was dirty and damp, the jury could
infer that Gordon had access to the plastic bag and had kept it in a clean, dry place before
dropping it on the ground, either on his person or wrapped in the shirt. The jury could have also
found that Gordon fell intentionally for the purpose of distracting Helms by dropping his shirt on
2
Gordon argues that he fled because he had outstanding warrants, but the jury could have determined it was also
because he was carrying contraband.
3
Gordon notes that Helms was unable to state exactly how far the drugs were found from the shirt, but the body-
camera footage shows that the items were in the same vicinity.
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the ground while attempting to rid himself of the contraband and that the act of falling was a
furtive gesture.
“[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the jury’s
guilty verdict.” Id. at 417. Considering the cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in
the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the jury’s verdict that Gordon
intentionally or knowingly possessed more than four, but less than two hundred, grams of
methamphetamine is supported by legally sufficient evidence. As a result, we overrule Gordon’s
sole point of error.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: February 13, 2023
Date Decided: March 10, 2023
Do Not Publish
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