Meagan Rena Work v. State ( 2020 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-19-00961-CR
Meagan Rena Work, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 167TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-DC-14-301864, THE HONORABLE P. DAVID WAHLBERG, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Meagan Rena Work was indicted for multiple offenses related to the
death of her two-year-old son, C.T. In cause number D-1-DC-14-302145, she was charged with
first-degree injury to a child causing serious bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(a)(1),
(e). In cause number D-1-DC-14-302146, she was charged with first-degree injury to a child by
omission causing serious bodily injury. See id. § 22.04(a)(1), (b)(1), (e). In cause number
D-1-DC-14-301864, she was charged with two counts of second-degree tampering with physical
evidence, a human corpse. See id. § 37.09(c), (d)(1). Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement,
appellant entered an open plea of guilty to the injury to a child by omission causing serious
bodily injury charged in cause number D-1-DC-14-302146 and the two counts of tampering with
physical evidence, a human corpse, charged in cause number D-1-DC-14-301864. As part of the
plea-bargain agreement, the injury to a child causing serious bodily injury charged in cause
number D-1-DC-14-302145 was dismissed. The trial court found appellant guilty of all three
offenses and, after hearing punishment evidence, sentenced appellant to confinement in the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice for thirty years for the injury to a child by omission and
twenty years for each of the tampering offenses, see id. §§ 12.32, 12.33, ordering the sentences
to be served concurrently, see id. § 3.03(a). In four points of error on appeal, appellant contends
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her second amended motion to suppress the
statements that she made to the investigating officers. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
Factual Background1
On the evening of September 10, 2014, Kevin Freed, a patrol officer with the
Cedar Park Police Department, met with a concerned citizen who had come to the police station
to make “an outcry about the welfare of a young child” because she believed the young boy,
two-year-old C.T., was missing and had been abused. The citizen showed the officer
photographs depicting the child with significant injuries that appeared, to the officer, to be
inflicted rather than naturally occurring. Officer Freed conferred with his supervisors, and they
determined that a welfare check on the child was warranted.
Officers eventually found the child’s mother, appellant, at around 10:00 p.m. later
that night at a residence on Cypress Lane, but C.T. was not with her. When the officers tried to
ascertain the boy’s location, appellant indicated that her son was with her friend in Sachse, which
she said was a city outside of Houston.2 The officers contacted Sachse Police to follow up on
1
The facts recited are taken from the testimony and other evidence presented at the
suppression hearing.
2
The record reflects that Sachse, Texas, is a city in the Garland/Plano area, not a suburb
of Houston. The Cedar Park officers testified that they were aware of this fact.
2
appellant’s information—to go to the friend’s home, find C.T., and conduct a welfare check on
him. The Sachse Police went to the friend’s house and discovered that C.T. was not there. They
conveyed that information to the Cedar Park Police, along with information that appellant had
texted her friend, while the Sachse Police were there, instructing her friend to tell the police that
C.T. was there. The Cedar Park officers confronted appellant with the fact that her son was not
at her friend’s home in Sachse, but appellant insisted that she had taken C.T. to her friend’s
house outside of Houston. The police remained unable to ascertain the child’s location or
condition. After contacting the on-call detective, a decision was made to transport appellant to
the Cedar Park police station to further the investigation.3
They arrived at the Cedar Park police station a few minutes after 11:00 p.m. (on
September 10th), and appellant was taken to the “soft interview” room, which is a room with a
“laid back environment” used for interviewing witnesses and victims, particularly children, that
has a loveseat and toys. Christopher Dailey, a detective with the Cedar Park Police Department,
began interviewing appellant around midnight. He informed her that she was “not under arrest”
but was “not free to leave.” He then gave her Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (holding that prior to custodial interrogation, law enforcement
officers must advise accused of certain constitutionally protected rights to secure Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination), which appellant indicated that she understood.
Appellant first repeated the Sachse story previously given to the patrol officers at the Cypress
Lane residence—that she had dropped C.T. off with her friend in Sachse. However, about
3
Over the course of the next few days, as the investigation evolved, appellant was held
in multiple locations, interviewed by officers from several law-enforcement agencies, and
arrested—at different times—for various offenses. During the course of the investigation, which
involved continuous attempts to find C.T., appellant’s explanation about what happened to her
son changed several times.
3
forty-five minutes into the interview, appellant admitted that she had lied about Sachse and said
that C.T. had been kidnapped from her truck outside a truck stop in Austin the week before.
After getting further information about that incident, Detective Dailey left the interview room.
Appellant was left alone in the soft-interview room for almost an hour, during
which time she moved to the loveseat to lie down. Detective Dailey returned with a map of the
area that appellant had described, and she pointed out the location where C.T. had been
kidnapped. The detective again left the room at about 2:30 a.m. (on September 11th), asking
appellant before he left if she needed to use the restroom. She said that she did, and the detective
found an officer to escort her to the restroom. After her restroom break, appellant returned to the
loveseat. Detective Dailey, his fellow detectives and officers, and officers from other
law-enforcement agencies coordinated to follow up on the information that appellant had
provided as well as to investigate other sources for information.
Detective Dailey returned just after 3:00 a.m. for about five minutes and asked
appellant a few additional questions. Appellant asked the detective if they had “figured anything
out or talked to anybody” who had information that could help them find C.T. When he told her
that they were “still working on it,” she asked, “You still don’t know anything?” The detective
told her that he would “let [her] know.” While the police efforts to find C.T. were ongoing,
appellant slept on the loveseat. As part of their efforts, police obtained search warrants for
appellant’s truck, which they considered to be a crime scene based on appellant’s statement that
C.T. had been kidnapped from there, and appellant’s cell phone in order to gain possible
information to assist in locating C.T.
About one and a half hours later, in the early morning hours of September 11th,
Lieutenant Chanse Thomas, another detective with the Cedar Park Police Department, joined
4
Detective Dailey in interviewing appellant. They woke up appellant at approximately 4:20 a.m.
and asked her if they could “talk to [her] a little bit more.” She said, “Yeah.” She told them that
she was not feeling good and felt like throwing up. Lieutenant Thomas offered her the trashcan,
and she explained that “that’s why [she] had it.”4 She did not indicate that she needed medical
assistance or say that she could not talk to them because she was not feeling well. Detective
Dailey asked appellant if she was hungry; she said that she was not and confirmed that she still
had water.5 He then again gave appellant Miranda warnings since the lieutenant had joined the
interview. Appellant orally confirmed her understanding of each of the constitutional rights.
Detective Dailey asked appellant if she “still want[ed] to talk to [them],” and she said, “Yes, sir.”
Lieutenant Thomas then asked appellant if she was hungry or if “food might help [her].” They
briefly discussed her pregnancy, and appellant told them that she was four months pregnant.
Lieutenant Thomas again asked appellant if she was hungry, and she said that she was “not really
hungry.” He told her that if she got hungry to let them know “so [they] [could] go get something
for [her].” In the ensuing interview, appellant persisted in her story that C.T. had been
kidnapped from her truck. A few minutes before 5:00 a.m., the lieutenant again asked appellant
if she wanted something to eat, and she declined. He asked if she was sure, offering “something
from Jack-in-the-Box, Whataburger, anything like that,” and she confirmed that she did not want
anything to eat. He also offered appellant water but noted, as she indicated, that she already had
some water. The detectives then left the interview room. A few minutes after they left, appellant
vomited intermittently for about five minutes into the trashcan.
4
The record indicates that, at some point after Detective Dailey left the room at around
3:10 a.m., appellant moved the trashcan close to her.
5
The record reflects that, before being taken to the soft-interview room, appellant had
been provided water.
5
About twenty minutes later, at 5:18 a.m., the detectives returned and confronted
appellant with the fact that the information that she had provided about the kidnapping conflicted
with information that the various law-enforcement officers had gathered in their efforts to find
C.T. They informed her that officers had talked with her boyfriend, Michael Turner, in the San
Saba County Jail, and he had told them that she let C.T. go with some people at a Chick-Fil-A.
Appellant then described giving C.T. away to a man and woman, unknown to her, in a
Chick-Fil-A parking lot at the beginning of August. She told the detectives that she was on the
side of the road with C.T. asking for money and a place to stay when a man and woman pulled
over into the Chick-Fil-A parking lot. She said they discussed her situation, prayed together,
shared a meal, and then she gave C.T. to them. Appellant did not know their names, because she
did not ask, and said that they were “not from around here.” She described the couple, gave the
approximate ages of two children the couple had with them, and described their car. She told the
detectives that they could get the footage from the security camera at the Chick-Fil-A to confirm
her story and get information about the couple’s car. The detectives left the interview room at
5:55 a.m.
They returned over an hour later, at approximately 7:12 a.m., and woke up
appellant who was asleep on the loveseat. Lieutenant Thomas again offered appellant something
to eat, which she again declined. The detectives informed appellant that they were unable to
confirm her story; other officers did not locate video footage from the Chick-Fil-A security
camera showing a woman and child (appellant and C.T.) as she had described. The detectives
confronted her with the “farfetched” nature of her story, but she continued to insist that she had
given C.T. to this couple. She provided further details of the encounter with the couple and
described what C.T. was wearing when she gave him away. The detectives again expressed their
6
doubt about the Chick-Fil-A story and implored appellant to tell the truth about what had
happened so they could find C.T. After about an hour, the interview concluded. Detective
Dailey offered appellant water and a restroom break, which she indicated that she needed, and
Lieutenant Thomas offered her a breakfast taco, which she accepted. The lieutenant brought the
taco, and appellant was escorted to the restroom. After she returned, she did not unwrap or eat
the taco. Instead, she left the food untouched on the table and returned to the loveseat.
Appellant remained in the soft-interview room alone, resting on the loveseat, until Detective
Dailey returned at 8:48 a.m. and informed her that she was going to be charged with child
abandonment.6 Appellant asked some questions about what would happen to her—if she would
stay in jail until her son was found, if there was a way to bond out, and if she would get a trial.
The detective informed her that the answers to those questions were “beyond [his] scope”
because those were decisions that would be made by others.
Detective Dailey then brought in social workers from Child Protective Services
(CPS) who spoke with appellant. Appellant repeated the Chick-Fil-A story to the CPS workers.
When asked if “something bad happen[ed] to C.T.,” appellant explicitly denied that anything bad
had happened to her son and insisted that she was telling the truth. The detectives, who were
also present in the interview room, confronted appellant with inconsistencies between what she
had just told the CPS workers and what she had previously told them. One of the CPS workers
expressed to appellant that she found her story about giving C.T. away to strangers at
Chick-Fil-A difficult to believe. She also conveyed to appellant that everyone was concerned
about C.T. and wanted to find him and ascertain if he was safe. After appellant once again
6
The record reflects that the detective prepared a complaint, which was notarized, but no
arrest warrant or commitment order was issued.
7
insisted that she was telling the truth and “had told [them] everything,” the CPS worker asked if
appellant had any questions, and appellant responded that she did not. At 9:44 a.m., the
detectives and the CPS workers left the interview room.
Appellant remained in the soft-interview room alone for the next five hours, and
the record indicates that appellant slept during the interim. At approximately 3:11 p.m.,
Detective Dailey returned. He asked appellant if she had rested, and she indicated that she had,
expressing surprise that it was afternoon. He asked appellant if she wanted something to eat,
offering her “pizza or something,” and water. Appellant said that she would “try” the pizza and
asked to go the restroom. The detective left to get a female officer to escort her to the restroom.
While she was waiting for the escort, another officer entered the room and asked appellant if she
wanted some pizza. She explained that the detective was already arranging it. After the
restroom break, appellant was provided the pizza, which was cold, and a cup of water. She
picked at the pizza, eating only one or two bites. Appellant remained at the table for the next
half hour but did not eat.
At one point, at about 3:47 p.m., she retrieved the trashcan and positioned herself
over it. She burped (or heaved) once but did not appear to actually vomit. A few minutes later, a
uniformed officer entered the room and asked appellant if she was “doing alright.” She
responded, “Yeah,” but complained that she had dropped her bracelet. She located her bracelet
and retrieved the trashcan, holding it as she sat in the chair. She positioned herself over the
trashcan, but she did not vomit or heave further at that time. Ten minutes later, the officer
offered appellant more water, which she declined. She remained positioned over the trashcan,
heaving or spitting into the trashcan a few times, until, at about 4:10 p.m., Detective Dailey
returned. He asked appellant if she was “doing alright.” She said, “Yeah,” but that she was
8
“sick” and “queasy really bad.” Seeing the trashcan, he asked if she had been “sick” again, and
appellant said that she was “cramping” and “[felt] sick.” Appellant did not ask for medical
attention. The detective asked appellant if she wanted more water, which she declined. He then
informed her that they needed to ask her further questions but had to switch rooms.
Appellant was taken to the “hard interview” room (the normal suspect-
interrogation room) to meet with Robert Gutierrez, an FBI agent from San Antonio. When she
walked into the room, appellant was crying. Agent Gutierrez asked her why she was crying. She
told him that she was “hurting really bad” and “cramping really bad.” The agent sought
clarification about her condition and asked if this was due to her menstrual cycle. Appellant
informed him that she was pregnant. He immediately asked if she needed medical assistance,
which she declined, saying that she was “okay.” He indicated that he was “serious” about
getting her medical attention, and she repeated that she was “okay.”
The agent advised appellant of her constitutional rights, and she signed a form at
4:14 p.m. indicating that she understood the Miranda warnings and her rights. He then explained
the polygraph exam to her and asked if that was something that she would agree to do if it was
needed. Appellant equivocated in her response, saying, “Um, yeah, but . . . I mean, yeah.”
Agent Gutierrez sought to clarify her response, asking her what questions he could answer for
her “up front.” Appellant said that she did not know if she “need[ed] to try to talk to a lawyer or
what.” The agent responded, “Tell you what. We can talk about this here in a little bit — this
aspect” as he set aside the polygraph paperwork. He next asked appellant if she had any health
issues other than her pregnancy. She said, “No,” but then said that she was “borderline diabetic.”
He asked if she took medication for that, and appellant said, “No.” He then asked her if she had
slept today, and she responded that she had. He asked her if she felt rested and “felt okay,” and
9
she said, “Yes.” Agent Gutierrez then obtained general background information from appellant
and explained the FBI’s involvement in the situation. He told her that local, state, and federal
law-enforcement officers had an obligation to find C.T. Appellant explained the reasons that she
had given different stories about what happened to C.T. and repeated the Chick-Fil-A story to the
FBI agent.
After talking with appellant for about an hour, Agent Gutierrez reintroduced the
idea of appellant taking a polygraph. At approximately 5:20 p.m., he explained to appellant her
rights related to the polygraph, and appellant signed a consent to an interview with polygraph,
agreeing to submit to a polygraph examination. The agent asked appellant how she was feeling,
and appellant said that she was “okay.” He noted appellant’s hand on her side and told her that
he needed to understand how she was feeling. Appellant said she was cramping, and they
discussed her pregnancy. Appellant explained that she “passed out regularly,” was “constantly
sick,” and “cramp[ed] all the time.” Agent Gutierrez expressed that he “was not a doctor” and
that he was relying on appellant to communicate her status to him. Appellant said that she was
hurting but did not ask for, or express a need for, immediate medical attention. The agent
offered appellant a restroom break, which she declined. He briefly left the room to confer with
other officers. When he returned, he asked appellant how she was doing, and she said that she
was “okay.” They continued to discuss appellant’s story that she gave C.T. away to a couple at
Chick-Fil-A. At approximately 6:15 p.m., Agent Gutierrez offered appellant a break and asked
her if she needed to go to the restroom, and she indicated that she did.
Agent Gutierrez left the room to get a female officer to escort appellant to the
restroom. While he was out of the room, appellant retrieved the trashcan, positioned herself over
it, and vomited a small amount. When Agent Gutierrez returned, he noticed the trashcan and
10
asked appellant if she had vomited. She confirmed that she had. He asked her how she was
feeling, and she said, “Okay.” He offered her water, which she accepted, and he left to get it.
When he returned with the water, they discussed how she was feeling. He expressed that he
could not tell how she was feeling by looking at her and again told her that it was “up to her” to
communicate how she was feeling. She conveyed that she was “okay” and, further, that she was
“okay” to do a practice polygraph, which began at approximately 6:36 p.m. After the practice
polygraph, appellant told Agent Gutierrez that she was comfortable continuing with further
relevant questions. The polygraph began at approximately 6:45 p.m. and lasted about
twenty-five minutes. Agent Gutierrez then again left the room to confer with other officers.
While he was out of the room, appellant positioned herself over the trashcan but did not vomit.
When the agent returned, he again asked appellant how she was doing, and she again said that
she was “okay.” He asked if she was still feeling “the same,” and she said that she was feeling
“shaky.” He advised her to take a drink of water, which she did. She then indicated that she
was “okay.”
Agent Gutierrez then sat down with appellant and, at about 7:12 p.m., informed
appellant that she was “not passing” the polygraph. He explained that law enforcement needed
to find C.T. For approximately the next hour, the agent reviewed the details of appellant’s
Chick-Fil-A story with her. He implored appellant to be honest and repeatedly attempted to
obtain additional information from her that would assist them in locating C.T. At 8:35 p.m.,
appellant was offered, and took, a restroom break. Agent Gutierrez again left the room. On his
return, he offered appellant a drink, which she declined. He again asked appellant how she
was feeling, and she again said that she was “okay.” The interview resumed, and appellant
revealed that she and Turner had planned to give C.T. away “to someone.” At around 9:00 p.m.,
11
Agent Gutierrez offered appellant an energy bar, which she accepted. She ate a few bites,
explaining to Agent Gutierrez that she had tried to eat earlier but felt sick. The interview
continued, and appellant adamantly insisted that nothing had happened to C.T.
At approximately 9:20 p.m., Lieutenant Thomas entered the room with an officer
who took a sample of appellant’s DNA by buccal swab. The lieutenant informed appellant that
they were going to put information out on the media to try to find C.T. He then formally arrested
her for endangering a child at 9:22 p.m. He expressed that law enforcement had concerns that
C.T. was “seriously injured” and, one last time, implored appellant to consider telling them the
truth. Lieutenant Thomas and Agent Gutierrez left the room, and appellant was then left with a
uniformed officer to await transport to the jail. The officer saw the trashcan and asked appellant
if she had vomited. She confirmed that she had earlier, and he asked why. She said that she was
sick. He asked if she was still sick, and she told him that she was “just pregnant.” Appellant left
the hard-interview room at 9:47 p.m.
She was transported to the Williamson County Jail, where she was booked into
the jail at approximately 10:20 p.m. (on September 11th) and charged with the felony offense of
abandoning or endangering a child. She was not booked into the jail for any other offense. The
record reflects that appellant was seen by medical personnel approximately fifteen minutes later.
The medical intake screening forms in the jail medical records, one of which appellant signed,
indicate that appellant was four months pregnant with a high-risk pregnancy and that she
responded “no” when asked if she was “currently experiencing pain.” The intake evaluation
form reflects that appellant was demonstrating “no acute distress” at that time. The record also
reflects that, for the duration of her stay in the Williamson County Jail, appellant was housed in
the infirmary in a “medical cell,” which had a bunk, shower, toilet, and desk.
12
Throughout the night, law-enforcement officers from multiple agencies continued
their investigation and their efforts to find C.T. As part of those efforts, officers repeatedly
interviewed Turner in jail. Eventually, Turner admitted that C.T. was dead and led officers to a
location in Travis County where he and appellant had buried the two-year-old child. Police
recovered a child’s body buried at that location.
At approximately 4:40 a.m. on September 12th, after police had recovered the
child’s body (which they believed to be C.T. but had not yet confirmed), appellant was
interviewed at the Williamson County Jail by Anthony Nelson, a detective from the Austin
Police Department, and Lieutenant Thomas. Before the interview began, Detective Nelson gave
appellant Miranda warnings, and she orally confirmed that she understood her rights; she agreed
to talk with the detectives. Appellant initially repeated the Chick-Fil-A story—that she had
given C.T. to the couple at Chick-Fil-A—until the detectives confronted her with the fact that
they knew that C.T. was dead, that Turner had taken them to the burial site in Southeast Austin,
and that they had found C.T.’s body. Appellant then told the detectives that C.T. had died after
having a seizure. She explained that C.T. had a seizure “for no reason” and that she and Turner
had taken him to the hospital but did not go inside because they feared authorities would take
C.T. because of injuries on his body, which she claimed were inflicted by her father several
weeks before the seizure. Appellant told the detectives that they sat outside the hospital for
about an hour while C.T. was seizing, but that he started looking better so they returned to their
motel room and went to bed. She said that when she woke up, C.T. was dead.
During the interview, appellant described a “fluid-filled” bump that C.T. had on
his forehead above his eye, which worsened over time to the extent that the child’s nose and eye
had also swelled. She attributed the bump to C.T. being injured, though she did not know how or
13
by whom, approximately two weeks before his death while C.T. was with her father, who was
watching C.T. while appellant was at work. Appellant also told the detectives that Turner had
buried C.T. but later dug up the child’s body, and the two of them found a different burial site
where Turner again buried C.T. The interview lasted approximately two and a half hours, ending
at about 7:00 a.m. At no point during the interview did appellant express discomfort, exhibit
nausea, or vomit.
Testimony from the suppression hearing reflects that, throughout the day (of
September 12th), discussions took place between the Cedar Park Police Department and the
Williamson County District Attorney’s Office about dropping the charge of abandoning a child
against appellant because, as Detective Nelson explained,
The charges that she was held for in Williamson County, being abandoning the
child, were false, and we all knew they were false because now we know the
child’s body is in the ground in a grave in Austin, Travis County, Texas. So we
could not in good conscience allow those charges in Williamson County to go
forward. So she was going to be charged [by the Austin Police Department] with
tampering with physical evidence, [for] burying her child.
Later that evening (of September 12th), at approximately 6:40, appellant was
transported from the Williamson County Jail to the Travis County Jail by officers from the
Austin Police Department. At that time, less than twenty-four hours after appellant was booked
into the Williamson County Jail for abandoning a child and less than forty-eight hours after
Detective Dailey informed her that she was not free to leave in the soft-interview room—all
Williamson County charges were disposed of.7 When the APD officers met appellant at the jail,
7
Defendant’s Exhibit #3, the Williamson County Prisoner Transfer Information Sheet,
which was admitted during the original suppression hearing, reflects that “All Williamson
County Charges are disposed of” and that the inmate did not need to return to Williamson
County. In addition, the comments section of the form specified “Do Not Return.”
14
she had an insulin tube with her, given to her by the Williamson County Jail medical personnel.
When one of the transporting officers asked what she had, appellant explained that it was insulin.
The officer then asked if she was diabetic, and appellant told the officer that she was
“borderline” Type I diabetic but was “not insulin dependent.” Before placing her in the patrol
car, the transporting officers informed appellant that she was under arrest for “tampering with
evidence” and advised her that the child-abandonment charge had already been dropped.
During the transport to the Travis County Jail, in response to questions from the
transporting officers, appellant provided information about C.T.’s medical records, which was
then given to the medical examiner to assist in identifying the body recovered from the burial site
in Southeast Austin. Appellant was booked into the Travis County Jail at approximately 8:30
that evening (of September 12th). She was taken to the jail nurse upon her arrival, and after a
medical intake evaluation indicated dehydration and high ketone levels, she was taken to
Brackenridge Hospital where she was treated for nausea and vomiting, dehydration, and high
ketone levels. She arrived at the hospital at around 10:00 p.m. She was given fluids to rehydrate
her and clear the ketones from her system (through urination) and was given medication for
nausea and vomiting. Appellant was discharged from the hospital several hours later, at around
2:00 a.m. (on September 13th), and was returned to the Travis County Jail.
Later that day (of September 13th), at around 3:00 p.m., appellant was transported
from the Travis County Jail to the Austin Police Department for another interview with Detective
Nelson who was joined by APD detective Ray Tynes. Once in the interview room, Detective
Nelson offered appellant a snack, which she accepted, and he provided her with pretzels and a
drink. He once again gave appellant Miranda warnings, advising her again of her constitutional
rights. She orally indicated that she understood her rights and that she wanted to talk with the
15
detectives. Appellant repeated the seizure story except this time she blamed Turner for C.T.’s
head injury, claiming that he had caused C.T.’s head to hit the air-conditioning unit inside the
motel room before the seizure. She explained that Turner had put C.T. in “time out,” which
involved making the two-year-old child stand on a chair and remain standing while looking up at
the ceiling. She said that C.T. had failed to keep his head up and stand straight, so Tuner had
“whupped” C.T. The child fell and hit his chin and then his head on the AC unit. According to
appellant, after that, C.T.’s chin was bruised and his head “swelled up so fast” and “kept growing
and growing.” Nevertheless, Turner made the child continue to stand in time out after he had
been injured. When they left the motel room an hour and a half later, they tried to walk C.T. out
to the truck, but the child could not walk and “would fall over.” Appellant carried C.T. to the
truck; he was crying, he was “really sleepy,” and his nose was bleeding. They drove to Turner’s
place of employment. Turner went inside while appellant stayed in the truck with her son.
Appellant told the detectives that, at that point, C.T. started seizing. She screamed for help, and
Turner came out of the business. He got in the truck, and they drove off.
Appellant admitted to the detectives that she thought that her son needed medical
attention at that time because “he was definitely not acting normal.” However, she and Turner
decided not to take C.T. to the hospital because C.T. was bruised,8 and Turner was afraid he
would go to prison, and she feared that CPS would take her son away from her. Instead, they
took C.T. back to their motel room where, over the next twelve hours, his condition worsened.
Appellant explained that her son was unresponsive—his eyes were open but “he wasn’t there . . .
his eyes were hollow”—and he was “completely limp.” He could not walk, could not talk (he
8
Appellant explained that C.T. was bruised across his lower back, buttocks, and thighs
from Turner “whupping” him.
16
only moaned), and could not drink (the water just dribbled out of his mouth). Appellant said that
she laid on the bed with C.T. and held him all night until she fell asleep for about thirty minutes.
When she woke up, C.T. was dead.
Appellant said that they stayed in the motel room that day, and then she helped
Turner bury C.T. that night. Appellant said, however, that she felt that C.T. was not buried deep
enough so she made Turner “unbury” her son, and they returned to the motel with the child’s
body that night. They stayed in the motel until the following evening. They left just as it
was getting dark and buried C.T. in Southeast Austin—at the location where police later
recovered the child’s body. At the end of the interview, which lasted about two and a half hours,
Detective Nelson offered appellant some water, which she declined, and a restroom break. She
returned from the restroom break at 5:30 p.m. with an additional snack (more pretzels) provided
by the detectives. She remained in the interrogation room by herself until she left at 5:52 p.m.
and was returned to the Travis County Jail. At no point during the interview did appellant
express discomfort, exhibit nausea, or vomit.
At 1:45 a.m. on September 14, 2014—approximately thirty-one hours after
appellant was arrested at the Williamson County Jail for tampering with physical evidence and
about twenty-nine hours after she was booked in to the Travis County Jail for that offense—an
arrest warrant was issued for appellant, charging her with tampering with physical evidence for
her role in concealing C.T.’s body by burying it. Approximately one and a half hours later, at
3:26 a.m., appellant was taken before a magistrate for the charge of tampering with physical
evidence—approximately thirty-three hours after appellant was arrested for that offense. After
further investigation by the Austin Police Department, additional arrest warrants charging
17
appellant with injury to a child and injury to a child by omission were issued on October 24, 2014.
She was arrested for those offenses that same day.
Procedural Background
Appellant was subsequently indicted for injury to a child causing serious bodily
injury (for inflicting C.T.’s head injury), injury to a child by omission causing serious bodily
injury (for failing to obtain medical treatment for C.T.), and two counts of tampering with
physical evidence (for her role in burying C.T.’s body twice). Appellant filed a pretrial motion
to suppress evidence in which she sought the suppression of, among other things, all of the
statements that she made to law-enforcement officers, contending that they were the result of an
unlawful seizure of her person.
The trial court conducted a four-day hearing on the motion and issued a written
order granting the motion in part and denying it in part. The trial court suppressed only the
statements that appellant made to law-enforcement officials from the time she was placed in the
“soft interview” room at the Cedar Park police station and told she was not free to leave until she
was released from the hospital and returned to the Travis County Jail because, the trial court
concluded, those statements were the result of an unlawful arrest.9 The State appealed the trial
court’s suppression order.
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s order, concluding that:
As noted previously, the trial court’s historical fact findings regarding the
interaction between law enforcement officers and [appellant] are supported by the
9
The trial court concluded that the taint of the unlawful arrest had been sufficiently
attenuated upon her release from the hospital and, thus, did not suppress any statements that
appellant made to law-enforcement officers after that.
18
record.[10] These facts support the trial court’s conclusion that [appellant] was
arrested when she was detained in the “soft interview” room at the police station
and told she was not free to leave. However, nothing in the record supports the
trial court’s conclusion that the arrest was unlawful. The conclusion about the
illegality of the warrantless arrest does not flow from the court’s fact findings.
The undisputed facts and circumstances—that [appellant] lied to the police
officers about C.T.’s location when they were investigating his status as a
missing, and possibly injured, child—gave the officers probable cause to believe
that [appellant] had committed the offense of false report regarding a missing
child. Furthermore, [appellant’s] commission of that offense in the presence of
the officers gave them the authority to arrest her without a warrant. Probable
cause to arrest and the statutory authority to make that arrest rendered
[appellant]’s arrest lawful. Therefore, the trial court’s conclusion that
[appellant]’s arrest was unlawful is not supported by the record.
State v. Work, Nos. 03-15-00730-CR, 03-15-00731-CR, & 03-15-00732-CR, 2016 WL 7335846,
at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 16, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Accordingly, we held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting, in part, appellant’s
motion to suppress her statements. Id. We reversed the trial court’s suppression order and
remanded the causes to the trial court for further proceedings. Id.After the case was remanded, appellant filed a second amended motion to
suppress seeking to suppress, among other things, the statements that she made to investigating
officers.11 Based on this Court’s conclusion that appellant had been arrested for false report
10
In the opinion, we set forth only the fact findings relevant and necessary to this
Court’s consideration of the custody issue and specifically held, “These historical fact findings
are supported by the record.” State v. Work, Nos. 03-15-00730-CR, 03-15-00731-CR, &
03-15-00732-CR, 2016 WL 7335846, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 16, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). This holding—that the record supported the trial court’s
historical facts findings—was limited to those fact findings set forth in the opinion as part of our
review of the custody issue. Id.11
Appellant filed three separate motions relating to the suppression of evidence,
including her statements to investigators. At the hearing, appellant pursued only her second
amended motion to suppress, which, she informed the trial court, incorporated all the issues
raised in the three motions.
19
regarding a missing child at the point that Detective Dailey told her that she was not free to leave
when they were in the soft-interview room, appellant argued that the failure to take her to a
magistrate in a timely manner following that arrest required the suppression of her statements. In
addition, she argued that her statements were involuntarily made because purported
misstatements of the law by investigators rendered the repeatedly given Miranda warnings
“void” and, thus, her statements should be suppressed.
The trial court conducted a three-day hearing; no evidence was offered or
admitted, the parties simply presented argument based on the evidence adduced at the previous
suppression hearing, of which the trial court took judicial notice, and this Court’s opinion. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s second amended motion to
suppress evidence. The trial court later entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in an
order denying appellant’s motion,12 which concluded:
The State failed to comply with Article 15.17, TCCP. There was a causal
connection between that delay and statements made by Meagan Work. However,
Work was properly warned of her Miranda rights on five occasions. Despite
multiple factors to the contrary, after careful consideration of the totality of
the circumstances, the Court concludes Work’s statements were voluntary. In
accordance with Cantu v. State, the motion to suppress those statements is
hereby denied.
Subsequently, pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, appellant entered an open
plea of guilty to the first-degree injury to a child by omission causing serious bodily and the two
12
In these findings, the trial court noted that the parties stipulated that the evidence
adduced at the original suppression hearing be considered for appellant’s second amended
motion to suppress. The trial court also incorporated its prior findings of fact “as upheld by the
Third Court” into the fact findings on the subsequent motion. As we noted in footnote 10,
however, the fact findings that this Court upheld in its prior opinion were limited to those set
forth in the opinion as part of our review of the custody issue.
20
counts of second-degree tampering with physical evidence, a human corpse.13 After a three-day
punishment hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to confinement in the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice for thirty years for the injury to a child by omission and twenty years for each
tampering with physical evidence, ordering the sentences to be served concurrently. This appeal
challenging the trial court’s denial of appellant’s second amended motion to suppress her
statements followed.14
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of
discretion, State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Furr v. State,
499 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016), applying a bifurcated standard of review, State v.
Arellano, 600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We afford almost total deference to the trial court’s findings of
historical fact and determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and
demeanor if they are reasonably supported by the record. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 57; Sims
v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 39 S.CT. 2749 (2019). We
review de novo a trial court’s determination of legal questions and its application of the law to
13
The convictions for the two counts of tampering with physical evidence charged in
cause number D-1-DC-14-301864 are the subject the instant appeal. The Court of Criminal
Appeals granted appellant an out-of-time appeal in cause number D-1-DC-14-301864 when
notice of appeal was not timely filed in that cause. The conviction for injury to a child by
omission charged in cause number D-1-DC-14-302146 is the subject of the appeal in cause
number 03-18-00815-CR pending in this Court.
14
In cause number D-1-DC-14-302146, appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was
overruled by operation of law. See Tex. R. App. P. 28.1(c).
21
facts that do not turn upon a determination of witness credibility and demeanor. Arellano,
600 S.W.3d at 57; Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 640.
In our review, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. State v. Garcia, 569 S.W.3d 142, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Furr, 499 S.W.3d
at 877. “The prevailing party is afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.” Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 666–67 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013); State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When the
trial court makes express findings of fact, as it did here, we determine whether the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports the fact findings. Garcia,
569 S.W.3d at 153; Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We
overturn the trial court’s ruling only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or “outside the zone of
reasonable disagreement.” State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); State
v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Further, we will uphold the ruling if it
is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case that is reasonably supported by the record.
Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 57–58; State v. Ruiz, 581 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
DISCUSSION
In four points of error, appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her second
amended motion to suppress the statements that she made to investigating officers during her
custodial interrogation before she was taken to a magistrate. In her first point of error, appellant
contends that her statements should have been suppressed because they were involuntarily made.
In her second point of error, she argues that her statements should have been suppressed because
law-enforcement officers failed to take her to a magistrate without unnecessary delay in violation
22
of article 15.17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.15 In her third point of error, appellant
maintains that her statements should have been suppressed because she was denied the
opportunity to be released from custody on the misdemeanor on a personal bond pursuant to
article 17.033 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Finally, in her fourth point of error, she
asserts that her statements should have been suppressed because the alleged failure to take her
before a magistrate in a timely manner as statutorily required denied her “the protection afforded
her by the Fourth Amendment.”
Delay Before Being Taken to Magistrate
Appellant argues that the statements that she made to investigating officers during
her custodial interrogation should have been suppressed because law-enforcement officers
delayed taking her before a magistrate and thus violated the statutory provisions requiring that an
arrestee be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.
Article 14.06 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that upon making an
arrest, “the person making the arrest or the person having custody of the person arrested shall
take the person arrested or have him taken without unnecessary delay, but not later than 48 hours
after the person is arrested, before the magistrate[.]” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.06(a). On
being taken before a magistrate, the magistrate “shall immediately perform the duties described
15
We note that the parties and the trial court refer to article 15.17 when addressing the
failure to take appellant before a magistrate in a timely manner. However, because appellant was
arrested without a warrant, the applicable statutory provision regarding taking appellant before a
magistrate is article 14.06 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which governs arrests made
without a warrant and incorporates the duties of a magistrate set forth in article 15.17(a). See
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 14.06(a), 15.17(a). Given the similarity of the language used in
these statutes—both require an arrestee to be brought before a magistrate “without unnecessary
delay, but not later than 48 hours after the person is arrested”—this discrepancy does not impact
our analysis.
23
in Article 15.17 of [the Code of Criminal Procedure,]” which include informing the accused in
“clear language” of the accusation against him, of his rights to retain counsel, to remain silent, to
have an attorney present during questioning, to terminate the interview at any time, to request the
appointment of counsel, and to an examining trial. Id. art. 15.17(a). The magistrate shall also
inform the person arrested that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement
made by him may be used against him. Id.What constitutes “unnecessary delay” in taking an arrestee before a
magistrate depends on the facts of each case and varies with the circumstances. Moya v. State,
426 S.W.3d 259, 263 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.); Ontiveros v. State, 890 S.W.2d 919,
929 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no pet.); Niehouse v. State, 761 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1988, no pet.); see Gilbert v. State, 284 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955).
The length of detention must be considered along with other matters such as
accessibility of the magistrate, the facilities involved, the unavoidable
administrative duties of the officers making the arrest, the intervention of a
Sunday or holiday, the physical or mental condition of the person detained, a
delay occasioned by the voluntary act of the accused freeing himself of the burden
of guilt, and the time spent in further inquiry and investigation to corroborate the
statements made by an accused.
Niehouse, 761 S.W.2d at 494; accord Shea v. State, No. 05-04-00685-CR, 2005 WL 1744936, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see
Gilbert, 284 S.W.2d at 907.
Concerning the delay in this case, the trial court made the following fact findings:
Work was arrested at 12:02 AM on September 11, 2014 when she was placed in
the “soft interview room” and told she was not free to leave. As previously
found, CPPD officers began drafting applications for search warrants within two
hours of Work’s arrival at CPPD headquarters. Sometime before 5:00 AM on
September 11th, officers of the Cedar Park Police Department (CPPD) presented
24
an affidavit to a Williamson County magistrate seeking issuance of a search
warrant for Work’s truck and cell phone. The affidavit alleged there was probable
cause to believe Work had committed the offense of child endangerment. The
warrant was signed at 5:01 AM, September 11, 2014.
Work was eventually taken before a Travis County magistrate at 3:26 am on
September 14, 2014, roughly 75 hours after her arrest. . . .
The evidence demonstrates Work was not taken before a magistrate without
unnecessary delay. Specifically, as demonstrated by the first search warrant
application and warrant, there was a magistrate available. CPPD had the time and
opportunity to prepare a probable cause affidavit for a search warrant and
therefore could have easily prepared an application for an arrest warrant and taken
Work before a magistrate at the same time. Therefore, the delay was not
occasioned by reasonable investigative and processing procedures nor was it due
to the search for the missing child.
The evidence demonstrates Work was not taken before a magistrate within
48 hours.
As previously found by the Court, the evidence demonstrates Work was not
taken before a magistrate “of the county where the accused was arrested”
(Williamson County).
The State failed to comply with Art. 15.17. This arrest was for a Class “C”
misdemeanor, an offense which carries a maximum fine of $500 and no jail time.
The period of the delay was unreasonable. The delay is particularly egregious
after 48 hours have passed. . . .
Relying on these findings, appellant asserts that “unnecessary delay” occurred because she was
taken into custody at 11:00 p.m. on September 10th but not taken before a magistrate until
3:26 a.m. on September 14th.16 However, while the record supports some of the trial court’s fact
findings, it does not support the court’s ultimate fact finding and resulting legal conclusion—or
appellant’s contention—that the police failed to comply with the statute requiring appellant to be
taken before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay.”
16
Appellant asserts that she was taken into custody when she left the Cyprus Lane
residence with officers at approximately 11:00 p.m., but that was not the trial court’s finding nor
was it this Court’s conclusion in our previous opinion.
25
It is true that, as this Court previously held, appellant was arrested on
September 11, 2014—at the point she was informed in the “soft interview” room that she was
not free to leave (which was, as the trial court found, at approximately 12:02 a.m.)—for a Class
C misdemeanor offense. See Tex. Penal Code § 37.081(b) (establishing that offense of false
report regarding missing child is Class C misdemeanor). It is also true that appellant was taken
before a magistrate “roughly 75 hours” after she was first arrested. However, the record
demonstrates that appellant was not in custody for the misdemeanor offense for which she was
arrested throughout that seventy-five-hour period.
The record demonstrates that appellant was arrested for the felony offense of
abandoning a child when Detective Dailey informed her at 8:48 the morning of September 11th
that she was going to be charged with child abandonment and she was already not free to leave.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 15.22 (explaining that person is arrested when he or she “has been
actually placed under restraint or taken into custody”); see also Tex. Penal Code § 22.041(d)(2)
(establishing that offense of abandoning child is third-degree felony “if the actor abandoned the
child without intent to return for the child”). The record further demonstrates that appellant was
formally arrested by Lieutenant Thomas at approximately 9:22 the night of September 11th for
the felony offense of abandoning a child.
Moreover, the record reflects that when appellant was booked into the Williamson
County Jail, she was charged only with the felony child-abandonment charge; she was not
charged with the Class C misdemeanor of false report regarding missing child. Thus, the record
reflects that, less than twenty-four hours after her initial Class C arrest, appellant was no longer
in custody for the Class C offense. Thus, this offense was no longer a charge, or an “accusation
against [her],” see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 15.17(a), that required an appearance before a
26
magistrate in Williamson County. Furthermore, the record shows that when appellant left
the Williamson County Jail at approximately 6:40 p.m. the following day, September 12th, the
Williamson County child-abandonment charge had also been dropped. Thus, less than
forty-eight hours after being arrested for the felony child-abandonment offense, this offense was
no longer a charge, or “accusation against [her],” see id., that required presentation before a
magistrate in Williamson County.
Even if appellant remained in custody for the Class C offense after being booked
into the jail on, and charged with, only the felony offense—which does not logically follow since
she was not booked into the jail on, or charged with, the Class C offense—the record reflects that
less than forty-eight hours after being taken into custody on Williamson County charges, all
Williamson County charges had been disposed of. The record does not demonstrate that the
investigating officers who arrested or had custody of appellant for either false report regarding a
missing child or for abandoning a child failed to take appellant before a magistrate “not later than
48 hours after [appellant was] arrested,” see id. art. 14.06(a), for either of those “accusation[s]
against [her],” see id. art. 15.17(a).
Furthermore, the record demonstrates that appellant was arrested at the
Williamson County Jail by Austin police officers for tampering with physical evidence at
approximately 6:40 the evening of September 12th, was transported to Austin, and booked into
the Travis County Jail at approximately 8:30 the night of September 12th. She appeared before
the magistrate for the charge of tampering with physical evidence at 3:26 the morning of
September 14th—approximately thirty-three hours after her arrest for that offense at the
Williamson County Jail and thirty-one hours after being booked into the Travis County Jail for
that offense. Thus, the record does not demonstrate that the investigating officers who arrested
27
or had custody of appellant for tampering with physical evidence failed to take appellant before a
magistrate “not later than 48 hours after [appellant was] arrested,” see id. arts. 14.06(a), 15.17(a),
for that “accusation against [her],” see id. art. 15.17(a).
The record does not establish that appellant was arrested for or in custody for any
offense more than forty-eight hours before being taken before a magistrate for that offense or
before being released from custody for that offense, which eliminated the need to be brought
before a magistrate since the “accusation against [her]” ceased to exist. Consequently, the trial
court’s fact finding that “[t]he evidence demonstrates Work was not taken before a magistrate
within 48 hours” is not supported by the record.
Concerning the trial court’s fact finding that the issuance of search warrants in the
early morning hours of September 11th demonstrated the availability of a magistrate, the record
supports the finding that, at the time the search warrant was signed, a magistrate was available.
However, the availability of a magistrate does not necessarily render a delay in taking an arrestee
before a magistrate “unnecessary.” See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 912 S.W.2d 793, 807 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993) (holding that sixteen-hour delay was not unnecessary delay in taking defendant
before magistrate even though magistrate was available during that sixteen-hour period).
Magistrate availability is but one factor to consider. See Gilbert, 284 S.W.2d at 907; Shea,
2005 WL 1744936, at *1; Niehouse, 761 S.W.2d at 494.
Regarding the trial court’s fact finding that the process of seeking and obtaining
the search warrants demonstrated that the delay in taking appellant before a magistrate was not
“occasioned by reasonable investigative . . . procedures nor was it due to the search for the
missing child,” the trial court appears to conflate the issue of magistrate availability with
conducting an investigation. The record reflects that the search warrants were obtained after
28
appellant had told police that she had left C.T. alone in her truck, that C.T. had been taken from
her truck, and that she did not report his kidnapping. Testimony from the officers at the
suppression hearing—and the trial court made no findings that such testimony was not
credible17—showed that police believed the truck to be a possible crime scene that might yield
information helpful to locating C.T. Further, the testimony reflected that the search warrants
were obtained in a coordinated police effort to find potential information about C.T.’s
whereabouts. The trial court seems to suggest that the ongoing investigative efforts to find C.T.
at the time the search warrants were issued were “unreasonable.” However, at the time that
CPPD obtained the search warrants, C.T. was still missing. “Investigation is not an unnecessary
delay.” Gonzalez v. State, — S.W.3d —, No. AP-77,066, 2020 WL 6482409, at *27 (Tex. Crim.
App. Nov. 4, 2020); see Moya, 426 S.W.3d at 263 (holding that continuing police investigation
does not constitute “unnecessary delay” under article 15.17).
The record demonstrates that at the time the search warrants were sought and
obtained, multiple police officers were exploring various sources of information, including
interviewing appellant, Turner, and the Cypress Lane residents; attempting to locate appellant’s
friends and family or anyone with possible information; and following up on the limited
information that appellant had provided. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 2020 WL 6482409, at *27
(concluding that delay in taking appellant to magistrate was not unnecessary “because
investigation was ongoing after appellant’s arrest” for capital murder; specifically, “in the
17
We acknowledge that the trial court is the sole trier of fact at a suppression hearing
and thus free to make credibility assessments of the witnesses. See Ramirez-Tamayo v. State,
537 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014); see also Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“The trial
judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given their testimony.”).
29
interim between appellant’s arrest and appearance before magistrate, ‘police were searching his
house and truck, and [the detective] was interviewing appellant’s wife and talking to other
investigators’”). The officers tasked with seeking information, even by search warrant, were not
the same officers who had arrested or who had custody of appellant. The fact that different
officers obtained search warrants, which may have been part of an investigation of a crime that
appellant had perpetrated, as the trial court found, does not negate the fact that there was an
ongoing investigation into C.T.’s location and condition. Given the situation facing police at that
time, we cannot conclude that the record supports a finding that investigative efforts to find a
missing and possibly injured two-year-old child were “unreasonable.”
Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that a delay that does not exceed the
statutory limit of forty-eight hours can violate articles 14.06(a) and 15.17(a), and further
assuming that the delay involved in appellant’s appearance before a magistrate in this case was
unnecessary and unreasonable, as the trial court found and concluded, the Court of Criminal
Appeals has consistently held that the failure to bring an arrestee before a magistrate in a timely
manner does not invalidate a confession absent proof of a causal connection between the delay
and the confession. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 649 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Cantu
v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Self v. State, 709 S.W.2d 662, 666–67
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Waller v. State, 648 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Hester
v. State, 544 S.W.2d 129, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Schultz v. State, 510 S.W.2d 940, 943
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Easley v. State, 448 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Hughes
v. State, 409 S.W.2d 416, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966); Creswell v. State, 387 S.W.2d 887, 890
(Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Collins v. State, 352 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961);
Golemon v. State, 247 S.W.2d 119, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952); Dimery v. State, 240 S.W.2d 293,
30
295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951); see Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 29–30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
(Holland, J., concurring) (recognizing that Court of Criminal Appeals “has consistently held that
violations of Art. 15.17 ‘[do] not automatically invalidate a confession’ because the statute
relates to the duties of the arresting officer and magistrate” (internal citation omitted)); Williams
v. State, 692 S.W.2d 671, 675–76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (observing that “[i]t is well
established” that article 15.17 “relates to the duties of the arresting officer and the magistrate,
and failure to comply with the statute does not automatically invalidate a confession”).
Regarding a causal connection between the delay in taking appellant before a
magistrate and the statements that she made to various investigating officers, the trial
court found:
As previously found by the Court, “[l]aw enforcement’s purpose in holding
Defendant in an incognito [the Court previously said “incognito” but intended to
say “incommunicado”] status was to isolate her and make her available for
repeated questioning to the benefit of their investigation.” In short, the delay was
to facilitate interrogation; CPPD and APD did interrogate Work and she
answered. Res ipsa loquitur (“the thing speaks for itself”). The evidence thus
demonstrates a causal connection between the delay and Work’s statements.
The record does not support the trial court’s fact findings that the purpose of law enforcement
was to “isolate” appellant and keep her “incommunicado.”
While the initial CPPD patrol officer explained that the reason for moving
appellant from the Cypress Lane residence to the police station was to take her to “a more
controlled area” to further the investigation, nothing suggests that the police decision to move
from a residence at 10:00 at night to an interview room at the police station was intended to
isolate appellant or render her unable to communicate with others. At that point, the record
reflects, appellant was the primary source of information in police attempts to find a missing and
31
possibly injured young child. Admittedly, the record indicates, through comments that
investigators made to appellant, that they kept her in the soft-interview room to facilitate the
investigation—that is, so they could follow up with her about information gleaned during the
course of their investigation. However, it would be expected that, as the principal source of
information, appellant would be kept available during such a crucial time in the investigation.
The testimony at the suppression hearing established that “when it comes to a missing child
investigation,” “time is of the essence” and it is important to have “resources available” to be
utilized in recovery efforts. The record does not reflect that police actions making appellant—a
critical source of information—available to assist with investigative efforts to recover C.T. were
done with improper intent, as the trial court’s findings suggest.
Further, the record does not reflect that appellant was held “incommunicado”—
that is, that she was not able or not allowed to communicate with others. See, e.g., Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incommunicado
(defining “incommunicado” as “in a situation or state not allowing communication”);
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/incommunicado (defining “incommunicado” as “deprived of
any communication with others”). In fact, the record demonstrates that appellant had her cell
phone with her in the soft-interview room.18 In addition, the record shows that not only did
appellant have access to her phone, she also spoke with CPS workers, medical personnel at both
jails, and hospital personnel. Further, the record does not reflect that appellant, at any point,
18
At the beginning of the interview with Detective Dailey, appellant explained to him
that the officer who escorted her to the soft-interview room plugged her cell phone in “just in
case it would work so that [she] could call anybody if [she] needed to.” The detective reviewed
the contact log in appellant’s phone and, at one point, discussed making a recorded call
to appellant’s friend in Sachse, who was giving information to police that appellant
disputed. Appellant’s cell phone remained with appellant during the time she was in the
soft-interview room.
32
asked to contact “outside” people but was denied the request. Nor does the record indicate that
friends or family tried, at any time, to see appellant or speak with her but were prevented from
doing so. While the evidence showed that appellant’s communication was limited—as expected
of a person in custody—it does not show that she was wholly deprived of communication
with others.
Ultimately, the trial court found a causal connection based on a series of facts—
that there was a delay in taking appellant before a magistrate, that “the delay was to facilitate
interrogation,” that interrogation occurred, and that appellant made statements during the
interrogation—and the torts negligence doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See Res Ipsa Loquitur,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “res ipsa loquitur” as “[t]he doctrine providing
that, in some circumstances, the mere fact of an accident’s occurrence raises an inference of
negligence that establishes a prima facie case”). This legal doctrine has no applicability here.
As we noted above, the Court of Criminal Appeals has specifically (and repeatedly) required
proof that the delay in the failure to take an arrestee before a magistrate caused the statements to
be made. Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 649 n.10; Cantu, 842 S.W.2d at 680; Self, 709 S.W.2d at 666–
67; Waller, 648 S.W.2d at 311; Hester, 544 S.W.2d at 135; Schultz, 510 S.W.2d at 943; Easley,
448 S.W.2d at 492; Hughes, 409 S.W.2d at 417; Creswell, 387 S.W.2d at 890; Collins,
352 S.W.2d at 844; Golemon, 247 S.W.2d at 124; Dimery, 240 S.W.2d at 295. Moreover,
the defendant bears the burden of establishing that causal connection. Serrano v. State,
No. 03-14-00516-CR, 2015 WL 6835463, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 6, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication); Moya, 426 S.W.3d at 262–64; Weaver v. State,
265 S.W.3d 523, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d); Fletcher v. State,
960 S.W.2d 694, 701 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1997, no pet.); State v. Vogel, 852 S.W.2d 567, 570
33
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref’d); see Cantu, 842 S.W.2d at 679; Wagner v. State,
687 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
The record here contains no evidence of a causal connection between the delay in
bringing appellant before a magistrate and any of her statements to the various investigating
officers. During the hearing on appellant’s second amended motion to suppress, appellant
acknowledged that her burden was “to show that [she] would have acted differently had she been
magistrated [sic].” She then contended that a single reference to seeing a magistrate, together
with two discussions about having an attorney, met that burden.19 However, to suggest that
asking about seeing a magistrate in that context—that is, seeking information about the potential
upcoming process—is pure speculation. Appellant’s question did not constitute evidence that
appellant would not have talked to law-enforcement investigators if she had been given the
opportunity to meet with a magistrate before (or during) the interviews. Appellant did not testify
at the suppression hearing, and nothing in the video recordings of the various interviews or
the testimony presented during the original suppression hearing established that appellant
would have “acted differently had she been magistrated [sic].” See, e.g., Shadrick v. State,
491 S.W.2d 681, 683–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (“The record is entirely silent of any evidence
that [the] failure to take him before a magistrate caused appellant to confess.”); Dimery,
240 S.W.2d at 295 (“In the instant case there is an absence of any testimony suggesting a causal
19
The record reflects one brief mention of seeing a magistrate when Agent Gutierrez
prepared appellant for the polygraph. Appellant asked him if, “after all of this,” she was under
arrest because “[the detective] said something earlier about child abandonment or something.”
At that point, the agent apologized to appellant for mistakenly telling her earlier in their
interview that she was not under arrest. In the ensuing discussion, appellant asked if she would
“just have to sit in jail until it’s all resolved” and if she could “see a magistrate some way.”
Agent Gutierrez explained his role in the investigation, that of a fact finder, and said that he
could not explain the process of the decision makers, which would depend on her cooperation
and “how it would play out.”
34
connection between the arrest and failure to take appellant before a magistrate and the making of
the confession.”). Thus, appellant failed to sustain her burden of presenting evidence to
demonstrate a causal link between the delay at issue and her statements to the investigators. See
Cantu, 842 S.W.2d at 680 (holding that defendant failed to show causal connection between
failure to take him before magistrate and statements he gave to police); Boyd v. State,
811 S.W.2d 105, 124–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (concluding that appellant failed to
demonstrate any causal connection between his statement and failure of authorities to take him
before magistrate); Shadrick, 491 S.W.2d at 683–84 (concluding that no causal connection was
shown in absence of evidence that failure to take appellant before magistrate caused him to
confess, even with delay of ten or eleven days). The trial court abused its discretion in
concluding otherwise.
Moreover, an unreasonable delay in presenting an arrestee before a magistrate
will not vitiate an otherwise voluntary statement if the arrestee was properly advised of his (or
her) Miranda rights.20 Cantu, 842 S.W.2d at 680; Boyd, 811 S.W.2d at 125; see Jones,
944 S.W.2d at 650 n.10; Von Byrd v. State, 569 S.W.2d 883, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In
this case, appellant was given Miranda warnings and advised of her rights on five separate
occasions and, each time, indicated that she understood her rights:
20
We note that some decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals indicate that the failure
to timely take an arrestee before a magistrate does not invalidate a confession if the arrestee has
been given proper warnings without stating the caveat that the confession is “otherwise
voluntary.” See Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Self v. State,
709 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Von Byrd v. State, 569 S.W.2d 883, 893 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978); Easley v. State, 454 S.W.2d 758, 760–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). We cite to
cases indicating that the delay in bringing an arrestee before a magistrate will not invalidate an
“otherwise voluntary” statement because appellant asserts in her first point of error that her
statements to the investigating officers were involuntary and challenges the trial court’s fact
findings and legal conclusions to the contrary.
35
• She was first read Miranda warnings and advised of her rights by Detective Dailey when he
initially met with her in the soft-interview room at the Cedar Park police station before he
began interviewing her. Appellant communicated that she understood her rights, by nodding
her head or orally indicating such, and agreed to talk with the detective.
• Appellant was next given Miranda warnings when she was again advised of her rights by
Detective Dailey when Lieutenant Thomas joined the interview approximately five hours
later. Appellant orally confirmed that she understood her rights and expressed that she
wanted to talk with the detectives.
• Appellant was given Miranda warnings the third time by Agent Gutierrez when she met with
him in the suspect-interrogation room. She conveyed her understanding of her rights by
signing the Miranda form. She then agreed to talk with the agent.
• She was given Miranda warnings the fourth time by Detective Nelson when he met with
appellant at the Williamson County Jail. She orally affirmed that she understood her rights
and agreed to talk with the detectives.
• Finally, appellant was given Miranda warnings again by Detective Nelson when he
interviewed her at the Austin police station. She again orally communicated that she
understood her rights and agreed to talk with the detectives.
Given that the record contains evidence that appellant was properly admonished of her Miranda
rights prior to giving her statements, the issue then is whether appellant’s statements were
“otherwise voluntary.”
Voluntariness of Statements
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the
government from compelling a criminal suspect to bear witness against himself. Pecina v. State,
361 S.W.3d 68, 74–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see U.S. Const. amend. V (stating that “[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”). “The Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination is satisfied only when a defendant’s statements are
given voluntarily.” Vasquez v. State, 411 S.W.3d 918, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.21 (providing that statements “freely and voluntarily made without
36
compulsion or persuasion” are admissible). A defendant may claim that her statement was
involuntary and thus inadmissible under three different theories: (1) that it was made in violation
of the Due Process Clause; (2) that it does not comply with the dictates of Miranda, as expanded
in Article 38.22, sections 2 and 3; and (3) that it was involuntary under Article 38.22, section 6
of the Code of Criminal Procedure—also known as “general involuntariness.” Oursbourn,
259 S.W.3d 159, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 282 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996).
A statement is obtained in violation of constitutional due process—and therefore
“involuntary”—only if the statement is causally related to objectively coercive government
misconduct of such a nature that any statement made was unlikely to have been the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice. Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986); Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 169–71; see also Lopez
v. State, — S.W.3d —, No. PD-0956-19, 2020 WL 6479197, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 4, 2020)
(explaining that to prevail on due-process “involuntary confession” claim, “a defendant must
show (1) that police engaged in activity that was objectively coercive, (2) that the statement is
causally related to the coercive government misconduct, and (3) that the coercion overbore the
defendant’s will”); Contreras, 312 S.W.3d at 574 (explaining that coercive government
misconduct renders statement involuntary if defendant’s “will has been overborne and
his capacity for self-determination critically impaired” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973))).
37
Regarding the dictates of Miranda and article 38.22, the Court of Criminal
Appeals has held that “[t]here are two facets to any inquiry” regarding the adequacy of a waiver
of an accused’s Miranda rights:
First, the waiver must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free
and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Second
the waiver must be made “with a full awareness both of the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”
Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Ripkowski v. State,
61 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). For a waiver of a Miranda right to be involuntary
“there must be some element of official intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. (citing
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169–70; Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 170). However, a claim that a waiver
of the article 38.22 statutory rights is involuntary “need not be predicated on police
overreaching.” Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 352 (quoting Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 172). Such a claim
of involuntariness can involve police overreaching but can also involve inquiries into the
accused’s state of mind that are not relevant to due process claims. Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at
172; see Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 352 (“Circumstances unattributable to the police that nevertheless
adversely impact an accused’s ability to resist reasonable police entreaties to waive his statutory
rights . . . are ‘factors’ in the voluntariness inquiry, though they ‘are usually not enough, by
themselves, to render a statement inadmissible under Article 38.22.’” (quoting Oursbourn,
259 S.W.3d at 173)).
Likewise, claims of “general involuntariness” “can be, but need not be, predicated
on police overreaching.” Lopez, 2020 WL 6479197, at *7 (quoting Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at
172). Such claims can involve “‘sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal
defendant who has confessed’ . . . that are not of themselves relevant to due process claims.” Id.
38
(quoting Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 172). “This is because Section 6 [of article 38.22] protects
suspects from themselves” rather than from law-enforcement officials. Id.; see Oursbourn,
259 S.W.3d at 172 (“But Section 6 of that article may also be construed as protecting people
from themselves because the focus is upon whether the defendant voluntarily made the
statement. Period.”).
The determination as to whether a statement was voluntarily made must be
analyzed by examining the totality of the circumstances. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
285–86 (1991); Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Lopez,
2020 WL 6479197, at *6 (observing that “involuntariness” of statement “is reviewed under the
Due Process Clause and articles 38.21 and 38.22 by examining the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the [statement]”); Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(explaining that evaluation of whether appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
Miranda rights before giving statement utilizes “[t]he ‘totality-of-the-circumstances approach’
[that] requires the consideration of ‘all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,’
including the defendant’s experience, background, and conduct” (quoting Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979))).
Relevant factors to consider when determining whether a statement is voluntary
include, but are not limited to: whether the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights
(given Miranda warnings or statutory warnings); the defendant’s age, intelligence level, and
education; the conditions under which the defendant was questioned—i.e., length of detention,
duration of questioning, environment, and access to restroom facilities and food; physical or
mental impairment of the defendant, such as intoxication, illness, the influence of medication or
drugs, and mental impairment or other disabilities; and whether physical punishment for
39
the failure to provide a statement, such as the deprivation of food or sleep, was used. Watts
v. State, No. 03-12-00480-CR, 2013 WL 4516187, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 20, 2013,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; Lopez,
2020 WL 6479197, at *7; Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 172–73.
Concerning the voluntariness of appellant’s statements, the trial court made the
following fact findings, which the court stated were “indicative of the lack of a free, knowing
and voluntary relinquishment of her Miranda rights”:
Work was young (20 years of age), homeless[,] and pregnant. She was about four
months into a high[-]risk pregnancy for which she was under a physician’s care.
She was intermittently ill during the questioning. The police became aware of her
pregnancy and complications but did not provide medical attention for the
pregnancy complications for several days. She was not afforded access to her
medication. . . .
Work was held incommunicado for a significant period of time.
The room in which she was confined for the first 26 hours had no provisions for
sleeping, no restroom and no ability to turn out the lights.
She was under constant armed surveillance.
She was awakened in the middle of the night for questioning.
During the first 26 hours of questioning, she was provided with no food other than
one taco (hardly appropriate for a person suffering from pregnancy
complications).
The offense for which she was under arrest and held was a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine only.
The police told her she was not under arrest.
The police falsely informed her they were authorized to take a buccal swab.
Work was questioned by multiple officers over the span of three days.
On several occasions, Work inquired about an attorney or about seeing a judge.
When she first asked about an attorney, the officer informed her that obtaining an
attorney was her responsibility, a false statement which ignored the fact that an
40
attorney would be appointed for her due to her obvious indigency. A subsequent
inquiry by Work was met with the response “Let’s put that aside for now.”
The trial court made additional fact findings, which the court stated “tend[ed] to
support a finding that the statements made by [appellant] were voluntary”:
During the initial consensual encounter at her temporary residence, Work
answered questions asked by the police without hesitation.
Work was advised of her Miranda rights five times during four days of
questioning by three different law enforcement agencies. After each warning she
again answered questions without hesitation.
Work’s inquiries regarding the assistance of counsel and being taken before a
magistrate were not unequivocal assertions of her right to counsel or her right to
remain silent.
There is no evidence of threats or inducements. There is no evidence that she was
under the influence of alcohol or drugs during questioning. There is no evidence
that she lacked mental capacity or suffered from any mental illness.
The evidence strongly suggests that Work voluntarily answered questions in
furtherance of her attempts to perpetrate her false narrative concerning her son’s
disappearance.
Relying on the trial court’s fact findings indicative of involuntariness but
challenging the court’s fact findings supporting voluntariness, appellant contends that law
enforcement “failed to adequately address [her] personal and medical needs” during the
interviews; “continually lied and misinformed [her]” during the interviews, which resulted in her
“confusion and lack of comprehension regarding her legal rights”; and delayed taking her to a
magistrate “for almost 75 hours” after arresting her without a warrant for a Class C misdemeanor
and, during that time, she was “unable to make outside contact and [was] continually kept under
guard.” These factors, she claims, rendered her statements involuntary.
41
A review of the record demonstrates that some, but not all, of the trial court’s fact
findings that the court characterized as indicative of involuntariness are supported by the record.
Moreover, in some instances those findings supported by the record do not accurately present the
record. The fact findings that the court characterized as indicative of voluntariness are, for the
most part, supported by the record, although, again, some of those findings with record support
do not accurately present the record.21
While the record reflects that appellant was twenty years old, the record does not
reflect that appellant was immature or inexperienced. The record reflects that she was educated
through the eleventh grade and then obtained her G.E.D. She participated throughout the
interviews, answering questions appropriately and occasionally asking questions of her own.
Her answers followed logically from the flow of the interviews. She was articulate and was able
21
Generally, reviewing courts “should apply a deferential review to a trial court’s
determination of historical facts, even when the evidence on which that determination is based
includes an electronic recording.” Baiza v. State, 502 S.W.3d 801, 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
However, although reviewing courts “must defer to the trial judge’s factual finding on whether a
witness actually saw what was depicted on a videotape or heard what was said during a recorded
conversation,” appellate courts “may review de novo ‘indisputable visual evidence’ contained in
a videotape.” State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (internal citation
omitted); see Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (observing that
“the nature of the evidence presented in the videotape does not pivot ‘on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor’”). As Judge Price once explained:
The main reason [reviewing courts] defer to a trial judge’s findings is that [the
judge] is in a better position to determine credibility . . . by seeing and hearing a
witness testify. We often say that because we have only a cold record, reviewing
courts do not have the best vantage point from which to make factual
determinations.
Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Price, J., concurring). Here, we are
not reviewing the trial court’s fact findings based on a review of simply a “cold record.” Rather,
we are watching the same video recordings of the various interviews that the trial judge watched.
The trial judge was not in an appreciably better position to review the evidence of the police
conduct or appellant’s behavior. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d 331–32 (recognizing that electronic
recording may speak for itself).
42
to easily and effectively communicate with the investigators. In fact, throughout the interviews,
appellant demonstrated a high level of sophistication. Nothing in the record indicates that
appellant’s age rendered, or contributed to rendering, her statements involuntary.
Although the record establishes that appellant was four months pregnant with a
high-risk pregnancy at the time of her interviews, the basis for that status is unclear, though the
record reflects that appellant was “borderline diabetic” and that she had been diagnosed with
GERD (heartburn) and hyperemesis gravidarum (“a lot” of nausea and vomiting during
pregnancy). However, while the record shows that she suffered with nausea “during
questioning,” she did not actually vomit in the presence of any of the investigators, or any other
officers, or while being questioned by any of them. The record does not reflect that her
pregnancy symptoms adversely impacted her ability to participate in the interviews. Moreover,
appellant was repeatedly asked how she was doing and how she was feeling, and, while she
described various pregnancy symptoms, she repeatedly told law enforcement that she was
“okay.” She did, at one point, indicate that she was cramping, but when Agent Gutierrez sought
to clarify her condition, she explained that she “cramped all the time.” Furthermore, when he
explicitly asked if she needed medical assistance, she declined, saying that she was “okay.”
Appellant did not at any time request medical attention or ask to discontinue questioning because
she was not feeling well.
Further, the record does not reflect, as the trial court’s findings suggest and
appellant seems to contend, that appellant was deprived of medical attention for “pregnancy
complications for several days.” After repeatedly asserting that she was “okay” throughout the
interviews and declining the offer of medical attention, appellant was taken to see medical
personnel shortly after being booked into the Williamson County Jail. At that time, she reported
43
that she was not “currently experiencing pain,” and the evaluation established that she was
demonstrating “no acute distress.” She remained in the infirmary throughout her stay in that jail.
Although she was not given medication for nausea while at the Williamson County Jail, the
record does not show that appellant “was not afforded access to her medication.” Rather, the
record shows that promethazine, the medication prescribed to appellant for nausea and vomiting,
is “an as-needed medication” that would have been given “only if she had asked.” Also, while
no blood-sugar checks were done because “she had no complaints as far as any blood sugar
related issues,” appellant was given insulin to take with her when she left the jail. In addition, on
being booked into the Travis County Jail, appellant was taken to the jail nurse who, after
consulting with the on-call physician, recommended that appellant be taken to the hospital.
Appellant was immediately transported to the hospital where she received treatment (fluids) to
address her dehydration and ketoacidosis (the high ketone levels that resulted from dehydration)
and was given medicine for nausea and vomiting.
Contrary to appellant’s contention and the trial court’s suggestion, nothing in the
record shows that appellant was, at any time, deprived of needed medical attention. She did not
request medical assistance during the interviews and, on one occasion, declined medical
assistance when it was offered. She was housed in the infirmary at the Williamson County Jail;
the record does not indicate that she made any medical complaints—related to her pregnancy or
diabetes or otherwise—that were not addressed. Further, appellant received medical attention at
the Travis County Jail, which included transportation to the hospital for treatment when her
condition warranted such care.
Moreover, appellant’s medical expert (a VA nurse who reviewed appellant’s
medical records) testified at the suppression hearing that, while mental acuity can be affected by
44
dehydration, those issues, such as “confusion,” occur if a person’s mean arterial blood pressure
(MAP) is below 60, and appellant did not exhibit those levels. The nurse opined that
hyperemesis gravidarum can be “a serious issue” and even life threatening “when you’re
vomiting all the time,” but the record does not demonstrate that appellant’s condition reached
that level of severity. The nurse’s testimony indicated that continuous vomiting would result in
someone being “not coherent” and “not carrying on an intelligent conversion.” While appellant
suffered nausea and several bouts of vomiting, the record demonstrates that she remained
coherent throughout her interactions with law enforcement. Furthermore, while her difficulty
eating and drinking resulted in dehydration and ketoacidosis, the nurse confirmed that someone
experiencing ketoacidosis “can still carry on a conversation” and “can make a conscious
decision,” and that that condition would not prevent someone from understanding the situation or
what was happening. The record does not support appellant’s contention that her medical issues,
even at the point that they required medical attention (which was then provided), rendered her
statements involuntary.
We have already determined that the trial court’s fact finding that appellant was
held “incommunicado” is not supported by the record, and we do not repeat that discussion here
except to note that while appellant was alone “for a significant period of time” when officers left
the interview rooms, they did so in order to follow up on information that she provided in their
efforts to find C.T. As for appellant’s contention that she was “unable” to “make a call of her
own,” we again note that the record reflects that appellant’s cell phone was in the soft-interview
room with her. Also, her contention that she was “unable to make outside contact” is refuted by
the evidence demonstrating that she had contact with CPS workers, medical personnel at both
jails, and hospital personnel as well as by the lack of evidence showing that she was, at any time,
45
denied a request to contact friends or family or that such individuals were prevented from seeing
or speaking with appellant.
While the trial court’s fact finding that the soft-interview room “had no provisions
for sleeping” is supported by the record to the extent that the room did not have a bed, the record
reflects that the room had a loveseat and that appellant slept on it on several occasions. Also,
while the room did not have a restroom, appellant was repeatedly asked if she needed to use the
restroom and was taken when she responded affirmatively as well as any time that she asked to
go to the restroom. Furthermore, while the lights remained on in the soft-interview room while
appellant was in it, no evidence in the record demonstrated that there was “no ability to turn out
the lights.”
The trial court’s fact finding that appellant “was awakened in the middle of the
night for questioning” is supported by the record, but we note that on the occasion that she was
awakened during the first night that she was in custody, officers sought to question appellant
further about information obtained during their follow-up efforts in attempting to locate C.T.
The record does not reflect that waking up appellant was based on any intent to deprive her of
sleep. Notwithstanding the perhaps less-than-ideal sleeping accommodations, and given the
situation and circumstances, nothing in the record demonstrates that appellant was deprived of
sleep. In fact, upon being asked, appellant reported several times to officers that she had slept.
Regarding the trial court’s fact finding that appellant “was under constant armed
surveillance” and appellant’s contention that she was “continually kept under guard,” we simply
note, as we concluded in our pretrial opinion, that appellant was in custody. She was being
monitored while in the soft-interview room but did not have an armed officer present in the room
with her at all times. She was in the presence of armed officers only when those officers were
46
investigators interviewing her or when officers were transporting her. Further, appellant was, on
repeated occasions, left alone in both interview rooms. Also, nothing in the record suggests that
appellant was under “armed surveillance” during the times that she was housed at either the
Williamson County Jail or the Travis County Jail. The record demonstrates that appellant was
under suicide watch at both jails, due to the nature of the charges and the publicity involved, but
such monitoring was done outside the cell. The trial court and appellant seem to equate, or at
least conflate, simply being in custody with being under armed guard.
The record does not support the trial court’s fact finding that during the first
twenty-six hours of questioning, appellant “was provided with no food other than one taco.”
Though the record reflects that appellant was provided a breakfast taco, which she did not eat,
the record shows that, also during that time frame, she was provided pizza, of which she only ate
a few bites, and an energy bar. More importantly, the record demonstrates that appellant was
asked numerous times throughout that period of questioning if she was hungry and if she wanted
something to eat, and she repeatedly declined the offers of food. The record does not reflect that
appellant was deprived of nourishment as the trial court’s fact finding (and comment) suggests.
Furthermore, the record refutes appellant’s similar contention that during the three
days that she was interrogated, she was “provided with very little food” consisting of only the
taco, pizza, and energy bar. In addition to the repeated offers of food and the food provided that
we described above, the record reflects that a “pregnancy diet” was ordered for appellant in the
Williamson County Jail, and nothing shows that she was not provided meals consistent with that
order during her stay in that jail.22 In fact, the record reflects that she was given lunch on
22
The medical sergeant from the Williamson County Jail testified about the times that
meals were provided in the jail and explained that if an inmate missed a meal because he was not
47
September 12th along with a prenatal vitamin. Nor does the record indicate that appellant was
denied meals while in the Travis County Jail on September 13th. Appellant’s medical expert
opined that appellant was “eating correctly” while at that jail. Additionally, the record shows
that at the beginning of her interview with APD detectives that afternoon, Detective Nelson
provided appellant a snack (pretzels and a drink). She was also provided an additional snack
(more pretzels) at the end of that interview before she was returned to the jail. Overall, nothing
in the record shows that appellant was deprived of nourishment.
The trial court’s fact finding that “[t]he offense for which she was under arrest
and held was a misdemeanor punishable by a fine only” is supported by the record but is only
accurate in part. As discussed previously, while appellant was arrested for the Class C
misdemeanor offense of false report regarding a missing child, the record reflects that she was
“held” for that offense (or for that offense alone) for less than twenty-four hours. She was then
“held” on the felony child-abandonment offense and then “held” on the felony tampering-with-
physical-evidence offense. As also discussed previously, the record refutes any statutory
violation based on appellant’s contention that she was “held in custody for almost 75 hours
without being taken to a magistrate after being arrested without a warrant for a class C
misdemeanor” as the record demonstrates that appellant was not held for more than forty-eight
hours after being arrested for any offense.
The trial court’s fact finding that the “police told [appellant] she was not under
arrest” is true with respect to Detective Dailey’s initial comment, which was immediately
followed by his statement informing her that she was not free to leave, and Agent Gutierrez’s
in his cell, the meal would be held or, in the alternative, the inmate would be provided a sack
lunch with a sandwich and a fruit.
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initial mistaken comment to appellant, which he later corrected with an apology explaining that
he was unaware of all the circumstances. However, the record demonstrates that Detective
Dailey informed appellant on the morning of September 11th that she was going to be charged
with child-abandonment. In addition, when Lieutenant Thomas formally arrested appellant for
abandoning or endangering a child that night, he told her that she was under arrest for that
offense. Likewise, when APD officers picked appellant up from the Williamson County Jail to
transport her to Austin, they arrested her for tampering with physical evidence and told her that
she was under arrest for that offense. Further, contrary to appellant’s assertion, the record does
not show that appellant asked “repeatedly” whether she was under arrest. Rather, the record
reflects that she asked that question one time of Agent Gutierrez. The FBI agent, who was not
present when Detective Dailey told appellant that she was not free to leave or when he told her
that she would be charged with child-abandonment, explained the various law-enforcement roles
and that the arrest decision would be made by others and, thus, told appellant that he did not
know. Given the evolving nature of the investigation, the involvement of multiple law-
enforcement agencies, and the various offenses and arrests, the record does not support
appellant’s contention that law enforcement “lied” to her, “misinformed” her, or “withheld”
information from her about her custody status.
The record demonstrates that CPPD obtained a DNA sample from appellant by
buccal swab when she was in the soft-interview room. The trial court found that “[t]he police
falsely informed her they were authorized to take a buccal swab.” However, the record
demonstrates that during his interview with appellant, Agent Gutierrez told appellant, “One of
the things that we need to do here is . . . they have to take a swab of your mouth for DNA,” and
appellant responded, “Okay.” A few minutes later, Lieutenant Thomas entered the room and
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asked the FBI agent if he had “asked her about the swab,” and Agent Gutierrez said, “Yeah.”
Lieutenant Thomas then thanked appellant and told her they “appreciate[d] it.” When appellant
asked “[w]hat’s it for exactly,” the detective explained that “[i]t’s evidence gathering, just
standard procedure, for the most part” and again expressed his appreciation to her. Appellant
then asked the uniformed officer taking the swab if “this is something that everybody does.” The
officer told appellant that “[i]t’s just part of the procedure that we do for evidence purposes.”
The record suggests that the officers perhaps miscommunicated about obtaining appellant’s
consent to take the DNA sample and reflects that law-enforcement officers conveyed to appellant
that obtaining her DNA sample was a standard part of evidence gathering. It does not, however,
show that anyone “falsely informed her they were authorized to take a buccal swab.”
The trial court’s fact finding that “Work was questioned by multiple officers over
the span of three days” is supported by the record. However, the record demonstrates that the
questioning was not continuous and included multiple breaks, some spanning hours, when she
was left alone in the soft-interview room and the suspect-interrogation room as well as the
periods during which she was at the jails. Furthermore, we note that the record reflects that the
search for missing C.T. was a massive law-enforcement effort involving numerous officers and
multiple law-enforcement agencies, including local police, local sheriff’s deputies, the FBI, and
the state police. As the information evolved, additional officers became involved in the
investigation and, consequently, the questioning.
Finally, the record supports only part of the trial court’s fact findings—and
appellant’s contentions—as to appellant asking about getting an attorney or seeing a judge. The
first mention of an attorney happened about forty-five minutes into the initial interview with
Detective Dailey. The detective explained to appellant that they were doing what they could to
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try to find C.T. and asked her if she had any questions for him. She said, “No,” but then asked
him, “If I ask for a lawyer . . . would he come here tonight and sit here with us . . . how does that
work?” Detective Dailey asked her if she wanted a lawyer, and she said that she did not know.
She complained that she did not know what was going on, and the detective explained that they
were trying to find C.T. He then told her, “[I]f you want to talk to an attorney, that’s something
that you’re going to have to initiate and find an attorney to call, but if that’s what you want to do,
you need to let me know.” Appellant then asked, “Well, didn’t you say something like I could
get a court appointed one?” The detective confirmed, saying, “Right.” Appellant then asked,
“And I can do that tonight or I would have to go to jail and wait?” At that point, the detective’s
phone rang, and he left the room. When he returned, Detective Dailey explicitly asked appellant
if she was asking for an attorney. She responded that she did not know. The trial court found
that the detective falsely informed appellant that obtaining an attorney was her responsibility.
However, the substance of appellant’s questioning was if she could have a lawyer with her at that
moment (that is, that night), and the information given to her was correct. Taken in context, the
detective’s comments, while perhaps poorly phrased, indicated that an appointed attorney would
not be available to be with her in the interview room at that time but that she could contact an
attorney (retained) to be present. We cannot concluded that this information was “false.” More
importantly, the detective asked appellant several times if she wanted a lawyer or was asking for
one and correctly conveyed that if she wanted one, she needed to let him know. She did not.
The second time appellant mentioned a lawyer was during the interview with
Agent Gutierrez when he asked her if she would agree to a polygraph. Appellant gave a hesitant
and equivocal response, and Agent Gutierrez sought to clarify her response and asked her what
questions he could answer for her. She then expressed that she did not know if she “need[ed] to
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try to talk to a lawyer or what.” In context, the comment indicated that appellant was unsure if
she needed to consult a lawyer before taking a polygraph. The agent responded, “Tell you what.
We can talk about this here in a little bit — this aspect” as he set aside the polygraph paperwork.
In his testimony at the suppression hearing, Agent Gutierrez explained that he understood
appellant’s comment to be “rhetorical” or an “equivocation,” and clarified that the matter he was
setting aside was the polygraph. The trial court did not make a finding that the agent was not
credible in this testimony. Furthermore, the video of that exchange does not support the trial
court’s finding that appellant made an “inquiry” about getting a lawyer or that the FBI agent
responded with a comment to set aside that inquiry.
The only reference to “seeing a judge” was when appellant sought information
from Agent Gutierrez about what would happen to her until the situation was “all resolved.” She
asked if she would “just have to sit in jail until it’s all resolved” and if she could “see a
magistrate some way.” She did not, as the trial court’s finding suggests, ask to see a judge and
have that request ignored or denied. Rather, appellant asked about the process—that is, what
would happen to her during the course of the investigation while law-enforcement officers
looked for her son—and Agent Gutierrez’s response conveyed that, given the evolving situation,
he did not know.
Further, the record does not support appellant’s contention that she was confused
or did not understand her legal rights. The portions of the record that appellant cites, including
those just discussed concerning getting an attorney and seeing a magistrate as well as a question
about possibly bonding out, do not demonstrate “confusion” or a “lack of comprehension.”
Rather, they reflect questions about the process and uncertainty about what would happen to her
given the situation. Appellant did not testify at the suppression hearing nor provide any other
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evidence showing that she was confused by what law-enforcement officers told her or that she
did not understand her rights. In fact, the evidence showed her repeated confirmation, in
response to the numerous Miranda warnings given, that she understood her rights.
Concerning appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s fact findings that supported
the voluntariness of her statements, we note that the entirety of the record demonstrates that
appellant answered questions—throughout the questioning at the Cypress Lane residence, at the
Cedar Park police station, at the Williamson County Jail, at the Austin police station, and during
the various transports between locations—“without hesitation” as the trial court found. Further,
as we previously noted, the record demonstrates that appellant was given Miranda warnings on
five separate occasions and that, each time, she indicated that she understood her rights. As just
discussed, the record does not support appellant’s assertions to the contrary—that she was
confused about or did not comprehend her rights. Also, as our earlier discussion about the trial
court’s fact findings concerning appellant’s “inquiries” about an attorney or magistrate shows,
appellant made no unequivocal assertion of her right to counsel. Moreover, the record reflects
that appellant did not, at any time, invoke her right to remain silent. Nor did she, at any time,
seek to terminate the interview. Also, the record supports the trial court’s findings that no
evidence in the record demonstrates any threat or inducement by law enforcement, shows that
appellant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs during any of the questioning, or indicates
that appellant lacked mental capacity or suffered from any mental illness.
Ultimately, the trial court concluded: “Work was properly warned of her
Miranda rights on five occasions. Despite multiple factors to the contrary, after careful
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes Work’s statements were
voluntary.” Reviewing the record and considering the relevant factors, we agree with the trial
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court’s conclusion that, based on the totality of the circumstances, appellant’s statements to the
various investigators were voluntarily made.
In sum, even if appellant—who was not arrested for and then held on any charge
for more than forty-eight hours before being released on the charge or being taken before a
magistrate—was not taken before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay” in violation of article
14.06, the record contains no evidence establishing a causal connection between the delay in
taking appellant before a magistrate and her statements to investigating officers. Moreover, the
record demonstrates that appellant was properly given her Miranda warnings on five separate
occasions prior to making statements to various investigators and reflects that appellant’s
statements were voluntarily made. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first and second points
of error.
Release on Bond
Appellant also contends that her statements should have been suppressed because
she was denied the opportunity to be released on a personal bond as required by article 17.033(a)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that
a person who is arrested without a warrant and who is detained in jail must be
released on bond, in an amount not to exceed $5,000, not later than the 24th hour
after the person’s arrest if the person was arrested for a misdemeanor and a
magistrate has not determined whether probable cause exists to believe that the
person committed the offense. If the person is unable to obtain a surety for the
bond or unable to deposit money in the amount of the bond, the person must be
released on personal bond.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.033(a).
Although the trial court commented during the hearing on appellant’s second
amended motion to suppress that the “ordinary course of procedure” in Travis County was for
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the magistrate setting the bond on a Class C misdemeanor to release the arrested defendant “on
their own recognizance” after setting the bond, appellant made no assertions that the failure to
comply with article 17.033(a) required suppression of her statements—in either her second
amended motion to suppress or at the hearing on that motion. Further, the trial court made no
fact findings related to article 17.033(a) or appellant’s inability to obtain release under that
statute; nor did the trial court render any conclusions about the purported violation of the statute
or resolve the suppression issue on that basis.
Assuming without deciding that this complaint has been preserved for appellate
review, see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a), the record reflects, as we have already observed, that
appellant was released from custody on the Class C misdemeanor offense less than twenty-fours
after her arrest for that offense when she was not booked into the jail on that offense. Moreover,
the record demonstrates that less than nine hours after her arrest for the Class C offense,
appellant was also arrested for the felony child-abandonment offense when, at 8:38 the morning
of September 11th, Detective Dailey informed her that she would be charged with child
abandonment, and she was already not free to leave. Thus, within the twenty-four-hour period
initiated by her Class C arrest, appellant was in custody on a felony offense. Thus, article
17.033(a) was inapplicable to appellant’s situation. We overrule appellant’s third point of error.
Fourth Amendment Claim
Finally, citing to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 (1975), appellant argues—
as she did in her second amended motion to suppress and at the hearing on that motion—that her
“prolonged detention” without being taken before a magistrate violated the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution because she was denied the right to receive the protection of a
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judicial probable-cause determination meant to be provided by a neutral magistrate. She
maintains that “[t]he point of Article 15.17 is the same as that of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. To provide the protection of neutral magistrate.” Concerning this
purported Fourth Amendment violation, the trial court concluded that “the Texas rule that ‘delay
in bringing an arrestee before a magistrate will not invalidate an otherwise voluntary confession
if the arrestee was properly advised of his Miranda rights prior to making the statement’
comports with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”
“Under Gerstein, warrantless arrests are permitted but persons arrested without a
warrant must promptly be brought before a neutral magistrate for a judicial determination of
probable cause.” County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53 (1991) (citing Gerstein,
420 U.S. at 114); see Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (recognizing
“Fourth Amendment requirement that a person arrested without warrant be given a ‘prompt’
judicial determination of probable cause to permit further detention”). However, the purpose of
article 15.17 “is to comply with constitutional and statutory requirements that an accused person
be promptly and fully informed of the accusation against him, as well as his legal rights,
including his Miranda rights and his right to reasonable bail.” Sorto, 173 S.W.3d at 486; see
McGee v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1206, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980). “Articles 14.06 and 15.17 concern only
the presentment of an accused before a magistrate in order to apprise the accused of his various
rights. . . . [N]owhere in these Code provisions is a requirement that a probable cause
[determination] be made promptly, or at all.” Cantu, 842 S.W.2d at 680 n.10.
Appellant’s argument conflates the duties of a magistrate under article 15.17 with
the judicial probable-cause determination by a magistrate required by the Fourth Amendment.
Given this distinction, we cannot conclude that the delay in taking appellant before a magistrate
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violated appellant’s Fourth Amendment right to a probable-cause determination by a magistrate.
Nor can we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that Texas law
regarding a delay in taking an arrestee before a magistrate—that such a delay will not vitiate an
otherwise voluntary statement if the arrestee was properly advised of his rights before making
the statement—“comports with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” We overrule
appellant’s fourth point of error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying appellant’s second amended motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s judgments of conviction.
__________________________________________
Melissa Goodwin, Justice
Before Justices Goodwin, Triana, and Smith
Affirmed
Filed: December 31, 2020
Do Not Publish
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