Mario Aguilar v. State ( 2020 )

Opinion issued April 2, 2020
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-19-00133-CR
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MARIO AGUILAR, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 230th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1564632
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant, Mario Aguilar, of the offense of aggravated
robbery.1 After finding true an enhancement allegation that appellant was previously
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 29.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2).
convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the jury assessed appellant’s
punishment at confinement for 35 years. The trial court entered an affirmative
finding that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, in the
commission of the robbery. In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court
erred in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense of unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle and on the law of parties, as it related to his defensive issue.
We affirm.
Background
At approximately 1:00 p.m. on September 12, 2017, the complainant, C.A.,
left his house to drive to his high school. While driving in his neighborhood, he saw
appellant walking in the middle of the street. When the complainant stopped to
avoid hitting him, appellant approached the driver’s door of the complainant’s truck
and pointed a firearm through the open window and at his face. The complainant
described the firearm as a black and silver Glock handgun. Appellant said,
“Disculpa, niño,” meaning, “excuse me, kid, or sorry, kid.” The complainant
testified that, fearing for his life, he parked and got out. Appellant got into the truck,
drove further up the street, stopped and picked up a woman, and drove away. The
complainant walked home and called the police.
The complainant further testified that he recognized appellant as a neighbor.
The complainant regularly drove past appellant’s house, saw appellant there, and
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saw appellant walking on the street. When police officers arrived, the complainant
gave them a description of appellant and identified his residence. He also used his
tablet to track a signal to his cell phone, which he had left in his truck. However,
only the phone was found. The next day, the complainant’s truck was found at a
nearby school. The complainant testified that the interior was damaged, and it
looked like someone had tried to remove the radio. The complainant identified
appellant, in a photographic lineup and during trial, as the robber.
Houston Police Department (“HPD”) Officer M. Hernandez testified that,
while on patrol on September 12, 2017, he was dispatched to investigate an
aggravated robbery. The complainant reported that, while driving, he saw appellant
running after a girl. Appellant then “jumped” in front of the complainant’s truck,
forcing him to stop, pulled a handgun from his waist, and pointed it at the
complainant. The complainant described appellant, identified his residence, and
described the handgun as having a “silver upper part and black handle.” Hernandez
noted that the complainant’s cell phone was found at a restaurant located
approximately one-half mile away from the scene.
HPD Investigator J. Rachel testified that the complainant positively identified
appellant in a photographic lineup. From his investigation, Rachel identified the
woman who had gotten into the truck as Michelle Rodriguez. He testified that he
interviewed Rodriguez and that her statement was consistent with that of the
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complainant. HPD Officer S. Villarreal testified that he was dispatched to
investigate a report of a suspicious vehicle at a school. There, he located the
complainant’s abandoned truck. J. Molina, of the Houston Forensic Science Center,
testified that fingerprints recovered from the outside surface of the driver’s side door
of the truck matched those of appellant.
Appellant testified that Michelle was a “call girl” and that he was her client
and close friend. He did not know the complainant. On the day at issue, appellant
was at his house when Michelle and the complainant arrived together in the
complainant’s truck. Michelle then drove appellant to a store to get beer, while the
complainant waited at appellant’s house. On the way, appellant and Michelle argued
because she wanted to go and buy “drugs.” Michelle dropped off appellant, and he
walked home. When he arrived, the complainant was gone. Appellant denied
having possessed a firearm or having robbed the complainant.
At the close of the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the trial court’s charge
authorized the jury to find appellant guilty of the offense of aggravated robbery with
a deadly weapon as a primary actor. Appellant did not object to this charge.
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Charge Error
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct
the jury on a lesser-included offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle2 and on
the law of parties,3 at it related to his defensive issue. He asserts that his complaints
must be addressed together because “the facts justify a party charge only in the
context of the lesser-included offense.” He further asserts that such error caused him
egregious harm, under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App.
App. 1984).
2
A jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is warranted if the lesser offense at
issue (1) qualifies as a lesser-included offense and (2) some evidence exists in the
record that would permit a jury to rationally find that if the defendant is guilty, he
is guilty only of the lesser offense. Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535–36 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.09.
A person commits the offense of robbery “if, in the course of committing
theft . . . and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property,
he . . . intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent
bodily injury or death.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.02(a)(2). Theft is the unlawful
appropriation of property with intent to deprive the owner of the property. Id.
§ 31.03(a). The offense of robbery is aggravated if, inter alia, the person “uses or
exhibits a deadly weapon” during its commission. Id. § 29.03(a)(2). A firearm is a
deadly weapon. Id. § 1.07(a)(17)(A). A person commits the offense of unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle if he intentionally or knowingly operates another’s motor-
propelled vehicle without the effective consent of the owner. Id. § 31.07.
3
“A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is
committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally
responsible, or by both.” Id. § 7.01(a). A person is criminally responsible for an
offense committed by the conduct of another if, “acting with intent to promote or
assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or
attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.” Id. § 7.02(a)(2). Appellant
asserts that a parties instruction is applicable to this case based on the role of
Michelle.
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The State argues that appellant failed to preserve error for review because he
failed to either request these instructions or object to their omission from the charge.
It argues, essentially, that Almanza does not apply. Appellant does not dispute that
he did not request such instructions or object to their omission.
A. Standard of Review
We review alleged charge error by first determining whether error exists in
the charge. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “If error
exists, we then analyze the harm resulting from the error” to determine whether
reversal is required. Id. In determining harm, we apply “separate standards of
review depending on whether the defendant timely objected to the jury instructions.”
Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. 2016) (applying Almanza, 686 S.W.2d
at 171). If the defendant timely objected to the charge error, then reversal is required
if we determine that the error caused the defendant “some harm.” Id. If the defendant
did not timely object, then reversal is required only if the error was “so egregious
and created such harm that the defendant did not have a fair and impartial trial.” Id.
“Almanza does not apply,” however, “unless the appellate court first finds
‘error’ in the jury charge.” Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998). Thus, here, before applying Almanza’s egregious-harm standard, as appellant
advances, we must first determine whether the trial court erred in not instructing the
jury on a lesser-included offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and on the
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law of parties, without appellant having requested such instructions or objected to
their omission. See Tolbert v. State, 306 S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(“Before applying Almanza’s egregious-harm standard for unobjected-to jury charge
error, the court of appeals should have first decided whether it was ‘error’ for the
trial court not to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense . . . .”).
B. Analysis
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.14 directs a trial court to “deliver
to the jury . . . a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case.”
Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 551–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14. The charge should include “all of the law applicable
to the criminal offense that is set out in the indictment or information,” as well as
general admonishments, i.e., presumption of innocence and so forth. Mendez, 545
S.W.3d at 552. “These matters are always ‘law applicable to the case.’” Id. And, a
trial court is required to instruct on these issues “sua sponte, even without prompting
from counsel, because the trial court is ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the
jury charge and accompanying instructions.” Id.; see also Tolbert, 306 S.W.3d at
779–80 (defendant need not preserve error to assert charge complaints involving law
applicable to case). Instead, whether the defendant objected to the error simply
determines which of Almanza’s dual standards of review, discussed above, applies
to determine whether the error is reversible. Mendez, 545 S.W.3d at 552.
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On the other hand, the law does not impose on a trial court a duty to sua
sponte instruct a jury on defensive issues. Tolbert, 306 S.W.3d at 779–80;
Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 179–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (defensive
issues include those “on which instructions are not mandated by any statute” or rule).
Defensive issues are treated differently because they involve strategic decisions
generally left to the defendant and his counsel. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244,
249–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 62–63 (“Article 36.14
imposes no duty on trial courts to sua sponte instruct the jury on unrequested
defensive issues,” even on defenses raised by evidence at trial). This rule is
“intended ‘to discourage parties from sandbagging or lying behind the log’ and to
discourage a defendant from retrying the case on appeal under a new defensive
theory, effectively giving the defendant ‘two bites at the apple.’” Tolbert, 306
S.W.3d at 780 n.6 (quoting Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 63). Accordingly, a defendant
“cannot complain on appeal about the trial judge’s failure to include a defensive
instruction that he did not preserve by request or objection: he has procedurally
defaulted any such complaint.” Vega v. State, 394 S.W.3d 514, 519 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013).
“[L]esser-included instructions are like defensive issues.” Tolbert, 306
S.W.3d at 780. Whether to request that a jury be instructed on a lesser-included
offense or, instead, to “go for broke” and seek an acquittal on the charged offense is
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a strategic choice that belongs to the defendant and his counsel. Id. at 780–82.
“Because of the strategic nature of the decision, it is appropriate for the trial court to
defer [and] . . . refrain[ ] from submitting lesser offense instructions without a
party’s request.” Id. at 781 (quoting 43 George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson,
CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 36.50 at 202 (Supp. 2006)). Thus, a trial
court does not have a duty to sua sponte instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense.
Id. at 781.
In Tolbert, the court of criminal appeals held that the trial court, presiding
over a capital-murder trial, “had no duty to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense of murder.” Id. Rather, a jury charge “on this lesser-included
offense was not ‘applicable to the case’ absent a request by the defense for its
inclusion in the jury charge.” Id. And, there being no such request by the defendant,
he waived his right to appeal that aspect of charge. Id. Further, “there was no jury-
charge ‘error’ to which Almanza’s egregious harm analysis would apply.” Id. at 782.
In Mendez, the court held that, “[i]f [a] defendant fails to object to the absence of
these kinds of instructions in the jury charge, the trial court will have committed no
error at all; a trial court does not err by failing to instruct the jury on an issue that
was, by virtue of the defendant’s silence, simply inapplicable to the case.” 545
S.W.3d at 552.
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Similarly, with respect to the law of parties, the court of criminal appeals has
held that, if a trial court “fails to apply the law of parties to the facts of the case, it
might be better trial strategy for the defense counsel not to ask for such a charge.”
Romo v. State, 568 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (op. on reh’g) (“A
charge on the law of parties enlarges a defendant’s criminal responsibility. The
charge benefits the State and not the defendant.”). Thus, a defendant’s failure to
either request that a charge be submitted to the jury applying the law of parties to the
facts or to object to the omission of such charge waives the issue. See Molina v.
State, 450 S.W.3d 540, 548 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.);
Phillips v. State, 770 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, no pet.) (holding
that trial court did not err in not submitting instruction on law of parties as defensive
issue).
We conclude that the trial court did not err in not sua sponte instructing the
jury on appellant’s unrequested defensive issues; rather, appellant was required to
preserve error. See Vega, 394 S.W.3d at 519; Tolbert, 306 S.W.3d at 779–81. To
preserve error, appellant was required to have provided to the trial court, either in
writing or through dictation on the record, the defensive instructions he desired, and
request that they be given to the jury, or object to their omission. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14, 36.15; Tolbert, 306 S.W.3d at 781. Appellant does not
dispute that he did not request an instruction on a lesser included offense of
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unauthorized use of a motor vehicle or request an instruction applying the law of
parties to his defensive issue. Further, he did not object to their omission in the
charge. Accordingly, we hold that appellant has not preserved his issue for appeal.
See Vega, 394 S.W.3d at 519 (“A defendant cannot complain on appeal about the
trial judge’s failure to include a defensive instruction that he did not preserve by
request or objection: he has procedurally defaulted any such complaint.”); Tolbert,
306 S.W.3d at 781.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Kelly and Goodman.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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