Donald W. Read v. TDCJ Policy and John Floyd ( 2020 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-19-00462-CV
    ___________________________
    DONALD W. READ, Appellant
    V.
    TDCJ POLICY AND JOHN FLOYD, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 17th District Court
    Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 017-306356-19
    Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Wallach, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Pro se inmate Donald W. Read has filed a challenge to the trial court’s order
    denying his motion to compel the trial-court clerk to issue citation, claiming that the
    order violates Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(f), (g)(1).
    Read sued “TDCJ Policy” and John Floyd. Along with his original petition,
    Read filed a “Motion to Proceed Pursuant to Texas Civil Procedural Rule 145” with a
    statement from his inmate-trust-fund account attached. 1 Read later moved to compel
    the trial-court clerk to issue citation. The trial-court clerk wrote to him acknowledging
    the receipt of his motion and stating,
    We did not receive any extra copies of the pleading[s] for the issuance of
    citation. Copy fees are not covered under the Paupers Affidavit of
    Inability to Pay Cost. You will need to provide filed [sic] stamped copies
    of the pleadings that you would like to be attached to the citation or you
    may pay for copies (.50 per page).
    See generally Tex. R. Civ. P. 99(a) (“The party requesting citation shall be responsible
    for obtaining service of the citation and a copy of the petition.”), (d) (“The party filing
    any pleading upon which citation is to be issued and served shall furnish the clerk
    with a sufficient number of copies thereof for use in serving the parties to be served,
    and when copies are so furnished the clerk shall make no charge for the copies.”).
    Read countered that because he was considered indigent under Texas Rule of
    Civil Procedure 145, he was not required to pay for copying costs. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
    1
    Read later filed a rule-compliant statement of inability to afford court costs. See
    Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(b).
    2
    145(a) (providing that declarant who files a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment
    of Court Costs cannot be required to pay costs and that after such a statement is filed,
    “the clerk must docket the case, issue citation, and provide any other service that is
    ordinarily provided to a party”), (c) (defining “costs” to mean “any fee charged by the
    court or an officer of the court that could be taxed in a bill of costs, including, but not
    limited to, filing fees, fees for issuance and service of process, fees for a court-
    appointed professional, and fees charged by the clerk or court reporter for
    preparation of the appellate record”).
    After a hearing, the trial court denied Read’s motion. Read appealed, claiming
    that the trial court’s order violated Rule 145. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(g)(1) (allowing
    declarant to challenge an order issued by the trial court under Rule 145 by motion
    filed in appellate court). We thus construed his notice of appeal as a motion
    challenging the trial court’s order under Rule 145 and ordered the trial-court clerk and
    the court reporter “to prepare and file the record of all trial[-]court proceedings on
    [Read’s] claim of indigence,” including the record of the hearing on Read’s motion to
    compel the trial-court clerk to issue citation. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(g)(1), (g)(3).
    After reviewing the reporter’s record from the hearing, along with the clerk’s
    record and the supplemental clerk’s record, we were concerned that the trial court’s
    order merely denied Read free copies of his petition and was not an order requiring
    him to pay costs under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f). See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(f)
    (limiting the trial court’s ability to order a declarant to pay costs). Under Rule 145,
    3
    Read is exempt from paying those costs charged by the court or an officer of the
    court that could be taxed in a bill of costs. Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(a), (c) (limiting “costs”
    to mean “any fee charged by the court or an officer of the court that could be taxed in
    a bill of costs”). Copy costs are not taxable unless a statute or rule requires copies to
    be made. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 140 (“No fee for a copy of a paper not required by law or
    these rules to be copied shall be taxed in the bill of costs.”); see, e.g., Ferry v. Sackett,
    
    204 S.W.3d 911
    , 913 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (concluding that because Rule
    203.4 requires the deposition officer to make copies of original documents marked for
    identification and attach them to the original deposition transcript, Rule 140 did not
    prohibit copying fees for documents attached to deposition upon written questions).
    No statute or rule requires the trial-court clerk to make copies of the petition for
    service; Read is required to furnish those copies to the clerk. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 99(d).
    The cost of copying the petition is thus not a “cost” as defined by Rule 145.
    Because the trial court’s order did not appear to be an order requiring Read to
    pay costs under Rule 145(f) and was not a final judgment or an appealable
    interlocutory order, we were then concerned that we lacked jurisdiction over the
    appeal. We wrote to Read informing him of our concern and warned him that we
    could dismiss his appeal for want of jurisdiction unless he filed a response showing
    grounds for continuing this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3.
    Read has filed a response, but it does not show grounds for continuing this
    appeal. Because the trial court’s “Order Denying Donald W. Read’s Motion to Order
    4
    Clerk to Issue Citation” is not a final judgment, appealable interlocutory order, or an
    order requiring Read to pay costs under Rule 145(f), we lack jurisdiction to consider
    this appeal. See In re Roxsane R., 
    249 S.W.3d 764
    , 774–75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    2008, orig. proceeding) (“Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final
    orders or judgments unless a statute permits an interlocutory appeal.”); see also 
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014
     (listing orders from which interlocutory
    appeals may be taken); Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(f), (g). We therefore dismiss this appeal for
    want of jurisdiction. 2 See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
    /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
    Elizabeth Kerr
    Justice
    Delivered: April 2, 2020
    2
    Read’s related appeal in cause number 02-20-00039-CV remains pending at
    this time.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-19-00462-CV

Filed Date: 4/2/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/4/2020